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Abstract 
The proactive inclusion of ex-combatants in politics is a common practice for post-conflict, 
transitory societies. Such inclusion is advisable given the necessity to create durable peace 
that accommodates the interests of ex-combatants and their constituencies, as well as to 
prevent spoiler effects that could arise should they feel aggrieved at the lack of political 
representation. Politics in Kosovo and FYR Macedonia is populated with parties emerging 
from armed groups, while their leaders are in decision-making positions in state institutions. 
But democratic consolidation in both countries has been a frustrating process undermined by 
the prevalence of state capture, clientelistic relations, and the encroachment of informal 
networks in politics.  
 
This thesis undertakes a comparative, qualitative study of the cases of Kosovo and FYR 
Macedonia, and explores the linkages between their institutional deficiencies and the 
systemic influence of ex-combatants. It offers a contribution to political science and 
democratisation studies by focusing on the scarcely-researched long-term political 
transformation of former combatants and their impact on democracy. It deconstructs their 
war legacy vis-à-vis democracy, the creation of new political classes emerging from conflict, 
predation and clientelist practices, and explores the novel concept of democracy spoilers. The 
findings concur that keeping ex-combatants out of post-war political arrangements runs 
counter to the spirit of inclusion. However, when the political establishment is pervaded by 
ex-combatants turned politicians, the clientelistic and predatory practices tend to spoil 
institution-building and democratic consolidation.  
 
This comparative study is led by first-hand data from semi-structured interviews with ex-
combatants turned politicians, civil society and academia, conducted in Kosovo and FYR 
Macedonia during 2015. The secondary literature on the topic of political transformation of 
combatants is buttressed by a decade of the author’s active participant observation in 
Kosovo, FYR Macedonia and the wider Western Balkan region.    
 
Keywords: democratisation, political transformation, Kosovo, FYR Macedonia. 
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I. Introduction 
1. Introduction 
The first chapter of the thesis begins by introducing the subject matter. Structurally it starts 
with a succinct account of the intra-state wars and the role of insurgency or rebel movements 
during and after conflict, leading to their political transformation. Further, the Introduction 
explains the relevance of the thesis and, having noted some of the literature on the subject, 
sets an argument about the contribution it claims to make to the field. Further, as a way of 
understanding the empirical context, the Introduction provides a glimpse into the political 
developments in the two case studies. Finally, the research question and the sub-questions 
are set out, the gaps in literature are identified and a theory is suggested, followed by a short 
description of the overall structure of the thesis.    
2. General overview 
2.1 From international to intra-state wars  
The predominant number of armed conflicts and wars in the post-Cold War era has occurred 
within the borders of an existing state. As a result, inter-state and conventional wars have 
seen a decrease, while intra-state armed conflicts have experienced an upward trend, 
particularly since the end of Communism (Olser and Aall 2001; Duffield 2014). This trend 
coincided with the dawn of the post-bipolar world and the reawakening of nationalist 
movements across the world (Ignatieff 1993). Usually, such movements were spurred on 
behalf of certain ethnic, religious or national communities, claiming to fight for equal rights 
that were supposedly being violated by the state. Sometimes these movements were 
transformed into rebel groups claiming to fight internal repression and aiming to reach 
greater autonomy for their community, to impose an inclusive power-sharing arrangement, 
or even to achieve complete secession from the existing state. Regardless of the motive of 
such movements, their common denominator is a marked departure from the more 
conventional methods of waging wars, i.e. inter-state or international wars. In parallel with 
the increase of intra-state wars and the end of Communism, the late 1980s and early 1990s 
heralded the beginning of the third wave of democracy (Huntington 1991) in many parts of 
the world, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe and, within it, in the Western Balkans. 
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Literature is rife with synonyms trying to capture the essence of these new wars. Because of 
their internal character, they have often been referred to as “intra-state conflicts” (Crocker, 
Hampson and Aall 2001; Dudouet 2012; Dudouet, Giessmann and Planta 2012), “civil wars” 
(Stedman 2001; Stedman, Rothchild and Cousens 2002; Kalyvas 2006; Kalyvas and Kocher 
2007; Kalyvas, Shapiro and Masoud 2008), or “new wars” (Kaldor 2001). Apart from being 
internal in character, another common denominator of such conflicts was the rise of 
nationalism that gave fuel to insurgencies across the world. For that reason, they have also 
been often termed “nationalist” or “inter-ethnic” conflicts (Ignatieff 1993), with insurgents 
claiming to represent a specific national, ethnic or religious group within an existing state 
(Glassmyer and Sambanis 2008; Koktsidis and Dam 2008; Dyrstad 2012; Koktsidis 2013a; 
Koktsidis 2013b).  
 
Examples of such conflicts could be drawn from various cases in Africa (South Africa, Namibia, 
Sudan, Burundi), Latin America (El Salvador, Colombia), Asia (Nepal, East Timor, Sri Lanka, 
Aceh/Indonesia), and Europe (Northern Ireland, former Yugoslavia). Although admittedly the 
wave of Arab revolutions from Tunisia to Syria and Yemen contain their own specificities, 
including a religious undertone, they do point to some similarities with the above conflicts in 
so far as seeing that the latter insurgents were also fighting to tackle an existing political 
situation occurring within the confines of existing state borders. Since the end of these 
revolutions we have witnessed the unfolding of tragic and grotesque events in these 
countries. Libya is still grappling with the essential challenges of building a viable state with 
meaningful institutions; Egypt is now controlled by a former General who is closely aligned 
with the army; Syria has for years been marred in an all-out-war between government forces 
and terrorist organizations – to name but a few of the factions – that has left tens of thousands 
dead, millions of refugees and internally displaced persons, and a ruined country. Yemen 
currently poses the greatest humanitarian catastrophe, with various armed factions fighting 
for control, and assisted by differing regional powers. To date, only Tunisia proves to be the 
exception, having managed to achieve a certain level of democratic progress since the 
revolution (Amnesty International 2018; Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue 2018; Michaelson 
2019).        
5 
 
2.2 From intra-state wars to political transformation 
Although a truism, it should be stated that each intra-state armed group has its specificities. 
Nevertheless, the empirical evidence still suggests that their trajectory seems to follow some 
common identifiable patterns. After a conflict has been waged, and following a mutually 
hurting stalemate, it will eventually come to an end. The way that it usually comes to an end 
is through the signing of peace accords. Notwithstanding the recidivist tendency of many of 
these accords, the leaders of insurgency movements or intra-state armed groups normally 
move on to become key actors in post-conflict peace processes. Far from being just passive 
recipients of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) and other 
transformation benefits, their leaders tend to become part and parcel of political processes, 
often perceived as offering a much-needed contribution towards stability and democratic 
transition in their societies (De Zeeuw 2008; Jarstad and Sisk 2010; Ishiyama 2016).  
 
Of course, whether theirs is a “much-needed contribution” to post-conflict democracy, peace 
and stability remains to be discussed below. However, as conflict intensifies and intra-state 
armed groups garner strength and support, their role tends to become indispensable in either 
continuing with the conflict, or in bringing it to an end. Subsequently, that role is bound to 
continue following peace accords, as their leaders quickly turn to politics. It is at this juncture 
that their contribution to peace, security and democracy becomes intriguing. Normally, they 
continue to enjoy widespread support from the electorate, either through their camaraderie 
links or because of their legacy as war heroes. They often even win free and fair elections, 
which puts them in powerful positions to steer their countries towards democratic 
consolidation.  
 
However, as this thesis’ case studies attest, the post-conflict times are usually fraught with 
many challenges that, amongst others, also relate to democratic reversal, corruption, state 
capture and predation. Those representatives of armed groups who entered politics have a 
direct responsibility for the state of democracy in their countries after the war. The greater 
their decision-making power as politicians, the greater their responsibility for the successes 
or the failures of democratic consolidation. When glitches to this democratic trajectory are 
identified, the culpability of the leaders and political parties that derive from conflict tends to 
manifest through the perpetuation of predatory practices and the maintenance of a clientelist 
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network that corrodes formal democratic institutions. This last point brings me to the aims of 
this thesis, which is to examine the constructive versus the obstructive role played by leaders 
and political parties that derive from armed conflict.   
 
3. Focus and relevance of the thesis 
This thesis tackles a topic which, with its relevance and comparability, echoes a universal 
appeal. It is universally relevant and comparable because, as explained above, most armed 
conflicts waged today are intra-state. From Sudan and South Sudan, Libya and Yemen, to 
Colombia and Nicaragua, to Sri Lanka and Nepal, to Indonesia and East Timor, the empirical 
data is rife with cases of armed groups waging wars within countries, which are followed by 
peace accords, and eventually followed by their integration in post-war politics.  
 
Marshall and Ishiyama (2016) claim that while we should recognize that ample attention was 
placed on the short-term inclusion of combatants in politics, this attention was mainly 
focused on the negotiating process that seeks an end to the armed conflict. However, by 
focusing on the immediate and short-term gains, the literature has fallen short of studying 
the long-term inclusion of combatants into politics. This is identified as a gap in literature, 
which is particularly serious considering that the longer-term transformation of combatants 
has direct ramifications for sustainable peace and democracy. “This involves the inclusion of 
former rebel parties in the process of governance after the peace process concludes, which 
involves winning electoral office and governing” (Marshall and Ishiyama 2016, p. 1010). They 
continue their argument by suggesting that “including relevant rebel groups (and perhaps 
more importantly not excluding significant groups) reduces the likelihood of civil war and 
conflict resumption”, and that “the key factor is the non-exclusion of major former rebel 
parties from representation in governing institutions” (Marshall and Ishiyama 2016, p. 1020). 
While I concur with the above statements that the inclusion of former combatants in 
governance and peace processes reduces the likelihood of conflict resumption, in this thesis 
I focus on the impact that their inclusion has on the long-term consolidation of democracy. 
On precisely this point – the long-term impact of former combatants turned politicians on 
democracy - literature is rather scarce, a point which I now discuss.  
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3.1 Addressing gaps in literature and contribution 
Literature has responded accordingly to the intensification of civil wars, new wars or intra-
state wars. There are ample sources that examine the relationship between the state and the 
intra-state armed group during the conflict as well as after it, utilising different areas and 
disciplines such as peacebuilding, conflict resolution and human rights, DDR and security 
sector reform (SSR), political science and democratisation.  
 
Authors such as Berdal and Malone (2000), Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Collier, Hoeffler and 
Söderbom (2008), or Keen (2012), have mainly focused on the greed versus grievance aspects 
of civil wars. The academic discussion amongst them has primarily revolved on ascertaining 
the true motives behind the emergence of armed groups. The issue of political economy is 
interwoven in such discussions, as well as the issues of the propensity for the monopolization 
of riches and resources by armed groups versus the state. On this latter point, Olser and Aall 
(2001), or Ballentine and Nitzsche (2003 and 2005) have also contributed with their respective 
work. Secondly, literature has come of age on the issue of the role of armed groups’ 
combatants in peace processes and the immediate aftermath of their demobilization. It has 
come of age because authors such as Barakat and Özerdem (2005), Humphreys and Weinstein 
(2007 and 2008), Curtis and de Zeeuw (2009), or Dudouet (2012) do not take a state-centrist 
perspective on such armed groups but build their arguments by viewing them as equal, 
constructive and indispensable actors in overcoming conflict and achieving peace. Along this 
vein, De Zeeuw (2008), Jarstad and Sisk (2010), Marshall and Ishiyama (2016) have elaborated 
on the DDR and SSR components following conflicts, examining the contribution of armed 
groups in these processes. McMullin (2013a) discusses the stigmatization of war veterans 
experienced through DDR, arguing for a more equitable and fairer treatment by the society. 
Then, within a peacebuilding framework authors have also examined the issues of including 
former combatants in political processes as a way of avoiding a potential relapse into conflict 
and neutralizing eventual peace spoilers (Hoddie and Hartzell 2003; Glassmyer and Sambanis 
2008). Lastly, in the last few years literature has been enriched with a few sources on the 
inclusion of war veterans in politics. For example, Joshi (2010), Kovacs Söderberg and Hatz 
(2016) focus on the creation of political parties by former rebel leaders and elaborate on the 
sustainability of their transformation from “bullet to ballot box” (Ishiyama 2016).  
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Notwithstanding this impressive body of literature, however, there are very scarce sources 
that analyze what the political transformation of war veterans has meant for the long-term 
impact on institution-building and democratization. Kuehn (2017) touches upon this issue but 
looks at the general democratic performance of countries in Latin America and Central and 
Eastern Europe. Some of the few authors who discuss the political transformation of 
combatants and the meaning this has for democracy are Manning (2004 and 2007), and 
Manning and Smith (2016).   
 
Upon this review, I have surmised there is a clear gap in literature that focuses on the long-
term nature of democracy as a result of the transformation of combatants in politics. There 
is very little data that looks beyond the immediate DDR and SSR processes, or the short-term 
inclusion of combatants in politics, with discussions mainly revolving on the pros and cons of 
this act of inclusion. My thesis, building on a field-based comparative analysis between 
Kosovo and FYR Macedonia, examines precisely the long-term political transformation and 
the subsequent effects on democracy. By “political transformation” I refer to the act of former 
combatants of intra-state armed groups entering politics either by joining an existing political 
party or forming a new one. This act entails a definitive and irreversible departure from the 
past life as a combatant and the opening of a new chapter as a politician. Further, the thesis 
differentiates between short-term and long-term impact on democratization. As per the 
interviews conducted, the key difference between the two is that, while short-term 
transformation and short-term impact normally entail one election cycle only, the long-term 
impact on democratization as a result of political transformation will require at least three 
election cycles (10 or more years). I submit that this timeframe is a sufficiently sound 
determining factor to ascertain whether the impact of political transformation is short-term 
or long-term. The likelihood is that if a former combatant has been active in politics for three 
election cycles or more, he or she will have left consequential trails upon the democratic 
trajectory in the politics of the country.      
 
The thesis examines issues of the war legacy vis-à-vis democracy, the creation of new political 
classes emerging from conflict, predatory behavior, and clientelist practices in fledgling 
democracies. It acknowledges that the risk of peace spoilers is potentially neutralized by 
including former combatants in post-conflict political space. However, the novelty aspect of 
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my research finds that the long-term ramifications for democracy resulting from the 
combatants’ inclusion in politics are not critically examined. My grounded theory claims that 
the new political elite rising from war is likely responsible for the maintenance of clientelistic 
networks which corrode democracy, and for the perpetuation of illicit activities which 
undermine formal democratic institutions. Therefore, while their inclusion may have avoided 
the risk of peace spoilers, former combatants turned politicians, when left unchecked, can 
become democracy spoilers in the long-term. In other words, the inclusion of former 
combatants in politics may have been decisive to closing the conflict chapter in a country’s 
history. The peacebuilding liberal practices may have helped along the way by emphasizing 
political inclusiveness and representation, but they would have also appealed as means for 
the appeasement of restive groups of former combatants, and as a way of buying peace. 
However, in the end, those groups who were included in every pore of political life, by 
wanting to maintain their clientelistic networks that profit a few but suppress the majority, 
became spoilers of democratic consolidation instead. The two case studies are prime 
examples upon which to base my empirical findings, since both share a war to peace 
trajectory, with their war veterans continuing to have a key role in politics. This is the 
contribution that I make to political science, and particularly to the area of democratization 
studies.     
 
4. Two case studies: comparative angle 
Following a series of wars during the 1990s, the political map of former Yugoslavia has 
undergone a complete change. The former internal administrative boundaries of Yugoslav 
entities have been elevated to international borders, thus creating independent states out of 
them. Slovenia and Croatia have both joined the European Union (EU) and they are both full-
fledged members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Alliance (Djokić and Ker-
Lindsay 2011). It is safe to conclude that they have both concluded their post-conflict 
transition period and have made a definitive departure from the tumultuous past. The third 
constituent Yugoslav republic – Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) – was marred in a tragic war 
that finally ended in 1995 following heavy-handed diplomatic intervention by the US 
(Holbrooke 1999). But since then, BiH continues to be a somewhat dysfunctional state with 
two parts of the confederate operating almost like private fiefdoms. The country still grapples 
with multi-layered levels of governments, with its Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina being 
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predominantly Bosniak (Muslim) and Croat, and the Republika Srpska dominated by Serbs. 
The forces of nationalism, division and break-up continue to hamper its democratic and civic 
progress forward. South of BiH, Montenegro became independent in 2006, having managed 
to secede peacefully from the post-Yugoslav Union of Serbia and Montenegro by a narrow 
win in a referendum (Bešić and Spasojević 2015; Ramet, Hassenstab and Listhaug 2017). 
 
Despite the tragic past, today all the countries in the region hold free and fair elections with 
minor incidents. It is fair to say that each of the former Yugoslav entities – including Kosovo 
and FYR Macedonia – are now democracies, albeit unconsolidated and quite fragile ones. This 
is confirmed by most organisations that conduct research on democratic performance such 
as International IDEA (2019a and 2019b), Freedom House (2019b) or the Economist 
Intelligence Unit (2019). The consensus of such sources is that, while the democratic quality 
of the above region remains considerably lower than that of consolidated democracies in 
North and Western Europe, the region has made substantial progress in its democratisation 
trajectory, particularly when one considers its bloody past. Having said that, much more work 
is still required, especially around the quality of democracy. 
4.1 FYR Macedonia 
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYR Macedonia1) also gained independence in 
1991, right at the beginning of the Yugoslav dissolution. However, unlike the tragedies 
 
1 Although its constitutional name when it declared independence was “Republic of Macedonia”, the UN 
formally recognised the country as ‘the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ (UN General Assembly 
Resolution A/RES/47/225 (1993)) pending settlement of disagreements over its name with Greece (see 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/47/a47r225.htm). Despite various efforts and initiatives to resolve this 
issue, the impasse lasted for almost thirty years. The impasse was, however, finally overcome in the first half of 
2019 when the governments in Skopje and Athens reached an agreement to change the country’s name to North 
Macedonia. (I will provide the latest updates on the name agreement in the Historical background of case 
studies). However, since this thesis began before the governments’ agreement on the name issue, and following 
consultations with my supervisors, we agreed that I would stick to the term agreed with them right from the 
start. I shall therefore continue to apply the term “FYR Macedonia” throughout this thesis to indicate both its 
constitutional name till recently and the title as was recognised by the UN. The country’s new name “North 
Macedonia”, or any other denominations (“Macedonia”, “FYRoM”) will be employed in this thesis only when 
citing directly other sources.  
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unfolding in Croatia and BiH at the time, FYR Macedonia escaped the embers of war quite 
remarkably. Having enjoyed the status of a republic within former Yugoslavia, coupled with 
the fact that there was a very small Serb minority in the country, resulted in Serbia being more 
resigned to letting it go (Petkovski 2015). That is why compared to the bloody wars in other 
parts of former Yugoslavia, the secession and the first steps at democratic reform in FYR 
Macedonia seemed nothing short of a miracle.   
 
However, a decade after independence the country experienced its own internal conflict. The 
new country that was being built rested on rather unjust foundations, seeing as it recognized 
the majority Slav Macedonians as the constitutive nation, while other communities – 
including ethnic Albanians which number around 25% of the overall population - were 
relegated to ethnic minority status. Because of such discriminatory practices, the ethnic 
Albanian part of the population felt increasingly marginalized and alienated from the new 
state, which caused grievances that triggered an armed conflict with Macedonian security 
forces. The ensuing fight with the ethnic Albanians’ National Liberation Army (NLA – in 
Albanian: Ushtria Çlirimtare Kombëtare - UÇK) in 2001 proved quite traumatic for the already-
frail inter-ethnic relations between Albanians and Slav Macedonians. However, this paved the 
way for an agreement which aimed to bridge the ethnic gap and create mechanisms for co-
governance at municipal and national level (Daskalovski 2004b; Gromes 2009; Demjaha 
2012).  
 
The main party from the Albanian side involved in power-sharing arrangements with Slav 
Macedonian parties was the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI – in Albanian: Bashkimi 
Demokratik për Integrim). DUI was created after the conflict by the same people who had led 
the armed resistance against the state. However, since the end of the conflict there has been 
significant progress in reconciling inter-ethnic relations and bringing Albanians closer to 
power-sharing arrangements. Every government since 2001 has contained an ethnic Albanian 
political party in its midst (to date that party always being DUI, apart from one mandate). 
However, numerous criticisms continue to be voiced over the unfinished implementation of 
the post-conflict agreement. Moreover, concerns over the client-patron nature of power-
sharing institutions – involving Slav Macedonians and Albanians alike – have given rise to 
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criticisms on the frustrated democratisation processes in the country (Reka 2011; Petkovski 
2015).  
4.2 Kosovo 
The former Yugoslav province of Kosovo, with its predominant Albanian population, was the 
last one to declare independence in 2008. Whilst being the last to secede, most authors would 
agree that the Yugoslav crisis began exactly there back in the early 1980s (Banac 1984; Little 
and Silber 1995; Kraja 2003a). After many years of state repression and civilian unrest, Kosovo 
exploded into an armed conflict in 1998/99, precipitating international diplomacy and armed 
intervention by NATO. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA – in Albanian: Ushtria Çlirimtare e 
Kosovës - UÇK) was the armed group that emerged attracting a huge following among Kosovo 
Albanians.  
 
The post-war transformation of its combatants, especially its leadership, into security and 
political structures, has given them space to be at the forefront of major political changes 
since 1999. Indeed, it is hard to conceive of any important milestone in post-war Kosovo 
without the impact given by former combatants in almost every pore of political life. The two 
political parties that emerged from the war are the Democratic Party of Kosovo (in Albanian 
– Partia Demokratike e Kosovës - PDK), and the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (in Albanian 
– Aleanca për Ardhmërinë e Kosovës - AAK). A third one, called Nisma Social-Demokrate, or 
just Nisma (The Social-Democratic Initiative), was created in 2014 by disgruntled members of 
the PDK, who had themselves been KLA combatants during the war. Known as the “war-wing” 
parties, each of them has taken part in coalition governments ever since Kosovo’s liberation 
in 1999.  
 
In addition to the domestic political players, any examination of post-war Kosovo is not 
complete without considering the role of the so-called international community. Beginning in 
1999, Kosovo became a de facto international protectorate up until it declared independence 
in 2008. Whilst a protectorate, Kosovo was administered by the United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) in collaboration with a wide array of other 
international organisations. The impact and influence of international institutions on Kosovo’s 
political landscape was omnipresent (Tansey 2009). Although an independent country, 
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Kosovo’s institutions and legal framework are built upon the foundations laid by the 
international community. Since independence, such organisations, including the UN, continue 
to have a presence in the country, but their role has largely shifted onto monitoring, reporting 
and technical assistance (Austin 2018; Distler 2018). Kosovo’s institutions (comprised to a 
comparatively great degree by former combatants turned politician and civil servants) are 
now in the driving seat of the country’s institutions.  
 
5. Research question 
This thesis aims to understand the depth of interaction between former combatants, which 
is often based on commander-soldier loyalty, war camaraderie, family relations, or financial 
incentives. Doing so will help build a picture of informal networks which continue to survive 
in times of peace. For example, a former commander who has made a successful transition 
into politics will most likely foster relations with his former soldiers. At first sight, these are 
legitimate relations which could reflect deep-seated emotional connections forged during the 
war. However, what begins making such relations corrosive for democracy is when they 
become a carte blanche for favouritism, nepotism and greed. Consequently, I will analyse the 
impact that such informal networks have had on consolidating formal democratic institutions.  
 
The thesis seeks to look at how newly emerging democracies are being set up in the aftermath 
of armed conflicts. By providing a comparative perspective between Kosovo and FYR 
Macedonia, it will examine the role of armed groups and their legacies in contributing to, or 
hindering, democratisation processes. Both case studies provide for an intriguing 
comparative study because: both armed groups represented the ethnic Albanian population, 
and they both claimed to fight for equal rights of their ethnic groups; both armed groups had 
links, similar objectives, ideologies, manpower and strategy; they both originated from the 
same clandestine movement of the 1980s and ‘90s; their leaders have turned to politics and 
have had direct impact on state-building and democratisation processes in Kosovo and FYR 
Macedonia respectively.   
 
What both cases have also in common is a very minor role played by women during the armed 
conflicts but also in their aftermath. Women constituted a very small minority in either of the 
armed groups; even when they were present, their role was to assist as medical staff, or 
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provide shelter for wounded rebels. It was also difficult to find women interviewees who were 
actively involved in combat. Out of a total of 26 interviews conducted I managed to interview 
8 women, out of which only one was a former combatant.  
 
Under conditions of democratic incrementalism, the thesis will explore issues of legitimacy, 
patronage or clientelism, informal entrenchment and capture of institutions. Given the 
democratic deficits that are easily recorded (and will certainly be invoked in this thesis) facing 
these two countries, I aim to analyse the role that the former combatants have had in this 
midst. I also aim to examine the predatory practices used as a way of personal or group 
enrichment and empowerment which have detrimental effects on democratisation 
processes.       
 
In order to help me answer the queries raised in the immediate paragraphs above, the 
overarching research question of the thesis will ask:  
- To what extent does the integration of former combatants in political structures contribute 
to, or inhibit, democratisation processes in Kosovo and FYR Macedonia?  
 
The research question is further supported by four sub-questions that each are meant to 
address certain aspects of the overall political integration of former combatants and their 
impact on democracy. They form pieces of the puzzle which, when placed together, help 
create a full picture of the research question. Those sub-questions are: 
1. How have former combatants been integrated into society? 
2. More specifically, how have former combatants been engaged in politics and decision-
making positions across institutions? 
3. What sets apart the former combatants' political engagement from that of other 
politicians? 
4. What is the relationship of former combatants turned politicians with each other and with 
their electoral base?  
 
The main research question has a two-pronged mission behind it:  
1. to look at the act of the integration and political transformation of former combatants; 
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2. to examine what their involvement in politics has meant for the quality of democracy 
and the state institutions. 
 
The sub-questions allow for a closer look at the world of former combatants by asking 
questions that shed light on the circumstances leading to their decisions to enter politics, the 
uniqueness of their political contribution, their relations with their kin as well as with others 
and, lastly, their impact on democratisation processes.  
 
When referring to the (re)integration of former combatants, the thesis will inevitably mention 
the DDR and SSR processes, but this is not the focus. The thesis will delve on the longer-term, 
political transformation of former combatants. The latter point is crucial for this thesis 
because its exploration aims to contribute to the academic debate by divulging the 
contribution of a group of people to fledgling democracies and, more to the point, discerning 
what makes their contribution so specific.     
 
My research on democracy and democratisation is based on academic and policy literature 
that assess and provide scores on the quality of democracies (Morlini 2011; Freedom House 
2019a, International IDEA 2019b). Such data is useful when assessing the kind of democracies 
encountered in Kosovo and FYR Macedonia. This in turn helps to identify the role that former 
combatants turned politicians have in their democratic systems.  
5.1 Structure and findings of the thesis 
The topic that I address in this thesis investigates the lives and actions of a very specific 
community of people in a very specific time period of a country. That community of people is 
represented by combatants who organise themselves around an illegally created armed 
group whose task it is to engage in combat against the state security apparatus. By an 
interesting twist of circumstance, those same combatants will eventually sit around a 
negotiating table with their former enemies and strike a peace deal. Not only that, but the 
long-term success of that very peace deal is mostly dependent on the political good will and 
cooperation between former warring sides. This thesis studies precisely this trajectory of 
former combatants and their subsequent long-term impact on their countries’ democracy and 
formal institutions. 
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In tackling this topic, the consulted literature offered me an in-depth overview of cases of 
armed groups around the world, their role during the conflicts as well as after them. Most 
such cases will have gone through a DDR process, and some combatants will have even been 
integrated in political structures after the war. This was certainly the trajectory of both cases 
studied here – that of Kosovo and FYR Macedonia. However, the data from my fieldwork, and 
especially the semi-structured interviews I conducted, provided me with a more complex and 
nuanced understanding of the interests, ambitions, goals and aspirations of these former 
combatants. It taught me that being a combatant of an armed group is in a way a blessing as 
well as a curse: on one hand, one is likely to be revered for their contribution during the war 
and perhaps even be treated as a hero. But, on the other hand, there is almost an unspoken 
rule in society that having belonged to an armed group will forever place you in that box. 
Once a soldier, always a soldier. When the war is over, ideally the soldier is expected to go 
home and somehow lead an insulated life from the society at large. Their integration in 
politics is somehow considered an aberration, an exception to the unspoken societal rule.  
 
And yet, this is exactly what happened in both case studies examined here (and in fact 
happens with most such similar cases around the world). Former combatants of intra-state 
armed groups, especially those in decision-making positions, decided to enter politics by 
forming their own parties and running in elections. The objective of this thesis is exactly to 
shed light on the multi-layered characteristics of former combatants, emphasising their mixed 
legacy comprised of war engagement and post-war political activity. The fieldwork made it 
clear for me that when these individuals set out to engage in combat and join armed groups, 
they did not and could not have planned to have a political career after the war. Their 
concerns back then were more immediate, primordial and existentialist: how to win a battle, 
how to survive, what tactics to use. However, when conflict came to an end, the option of 
entering politics presented itself as a natural progression for this next stage of their lives. They 
engaged in politics primarily for two reasons: firstly, there was a clear demand coming from 
the electorate who saw them as political leaders, and secondly, politics as a career choice was 
a natural decision for them as it would be for anybody else. “We were an anathema right from 
the beginning”, said to me a former combatant coded FMC 02, who after conflict went on to 
occupy various political positions including member of parliament and minister. Being an 
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“anathema” for others, former combatants judged that no one else but themselves would 
defend their interests and those of their constituencies. Besides, if they contributed to the 
freedom of their country by fighting in war, surely it was expected of them to do the same in 
times of peace. It is this aspect of their contribution, with an emphasis on long-term impact 
on democracy, that this thesis will explore below.     
 
Following the Introduction (which is also Chapter One), Chapter Two reviews the literature 
and examines the academic debate on DDR and political integration and transformation of 
former combatants, on democratisation and the international community’s peacebuilding 
paradigm, as well as the predation-associated phenomena of corruption, greed and 
clientelism. It will discuss the disciplines consulted for this thesis, ranging from international 
relations, security and securitization, human rights, peacebuilding and democratisation. In 
the end, the chapter will explain the literature direction undertaken herewith and the 
conceptual framework. The chapter will conduct a general map of DDR processes and, 
ultimately, of the theories of political transformation of armed groups. The description of DDR 
processes is meant to set the scene for the longer-term transformation of military leaders 
into political figures. For this reason, the transformation theories will be juxtaposed to the 
democratisation theories in post-conflict settings. By doing so, the literature review aims to 
examine the role of former combatants in times of democratic transition, with a focus on the 
predatory practices that hinder that transition.   
 
Chapter Three – Research methods - will set the theoretical framework and elaborate on the 
methods used for this research. It will provide an explanation as to why I have chosen the 
inductive-based, grounded theory as the basis on which to elaborate on the data from the 
fieldwork. The chapter will also contain information, including tables, of the theoretical 
models of categories which will help explain the arguments made in the field data chapter. 
Under methods, I will explain the comparative nature of this research, taking two case studies 
which are quite different, but simultaneously have many similar trajectories. This research is 
based on desk research, buttressed by a vital aspect of fieldwork, i.e. semi-structured 
interviews, and participant observation of almost ten years in the field.  
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Chapter Four – Historical background of case studies - will describe the cases of Kosovo and 
FYR Macedonia and their respective recent histories. This will enable us to bring the 
theoretical framework into a perspective. The objective of writing this chapter is not to play 
the historian, or to get side-tracked in the Balkan mist of differing historical narrations. 
However, it is important that a not-too-burdensome empirical account is offered as a way of 
setting the scene for the field chapter. In addition, an historical account helps the reader track 
the origins of the armed groups, their ideology, or family background. Therefore, without 
drowning in historical narratives, I judged it important to offer a concise descriptive 
background in order to enable the reader to understand today’s context better.  
 
Chapter Five – Presentation of evidence and findings from the field - will present the empirical 
data of my research and fieldwork. There will be a part on the findings from Kosovo, followed 
by another one on FYR Macedonia, summarised by a synthesised analysis of their common 
denominators in the end of the chapter. Based on the data from the field, this Chapter will 
discuss the gradual integration of combatants in post-war politics and what this has meant 
for the quality of nascent democracies. It will set arguments forward that speak in favour of 
their inclusion in politics as a prerequisite for a richer and more diverse democracy. This 
certainly proved to be the case in both case studies discussed here – Kosovo and FYR 
Macedonia. However, as also proven by the two case studies, the chapter will also underline 
the dangers of clientelism, corruption and greed that emanate from war-wing political parties 
and their leaders. The chapter argues that while the danger of peace spoilers is removed with 
the inclusion of former combatants in politics, their omnipresent dominance of the political 
system risks turning them into democracy spoilers instead.          
 
The Conclusion will summarise the thesis by revisiting key parts from each chapter. At the 
macro level it will remind us how in the last three decades international wars have witnessed 
a decline while intra-state conflicts have intensified. With the intensification of intra-state 
conflicts the emergence of intra-state armed groups has increasingly become a subject of 
study in literature. This thesis has a similar objective in so far as examining the political 
transformation of former combatants, necessitated by bottom-up requests for 
representation,  their war legacy, and a web of strong regional and family ties and alliances. 
In the end, the Conclusion reiterates what this political transformation has meant for the 
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quality of democracy in the long-run. By examining the long-term behavioural patterns of 
politicians coming from war, there is evidence of strong correlations between their role in 
politics and the embattled state of democratic institutions and democracy.  
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II. Literature Review 
1. Introduction 
As stated above, the overarching question of this thesis is to assess the extent to which the 
transformation and integration of former combatants in politics have contributed to 
democratisation processes. The thesis is a comparative and qualitative analysis of Kosovo and 
FYR Macedonia, both of whom share many commonalities but who also possess unique 
political trajectories in the aftermath of the Yugoslav breakup. Literature recognises 
similarities between the cases of the KLA and NLA in that they have both “managed to put 
Kosovo and FYR Macedonia under foreign probation and control. The KLA succeeded in 
releasing Kosovo from Serbian dominance and the NLA succeeded making FYR Macedonia the 
state of both Albanians and Slavic Macedonians” (Koktsidis and Dam 2008, p. 179). Moreover, 
both Kosovo and FYR Macedonia were part of former Yugoslavia; both armed groups were 
composed of ethnic Albanians and, moreover, both originated from the same illegal 
movement called the People’s Movement of Kosovo (in Albanian: Lëvizja Popullore e Kosovës 
(LPK)) that operated during the 1980s and 1990s in Kosovo, FYR Macedonia, and among the 
ethnic Albanian diaspora (Elshani 1998; Shala 2003; Bechev 2009; Babler 2015). At the same 
time, the two case studies are sufficiently different – particularly after their respective 
conflicts - so as to provoke an intriguing analysis that warrants consultation from a wide array 
of sources, as described below.   
 
Literature reviewed for the topic of this thesis draws from an eclectic number of multi-
disciplinary sources. Theories and practices on DDR and political transformation of 
combatants rely to a considerable degree on international relations, security and 
securitization studies (Buzan 1991; Ball 2001; Paris 2001; Zedner 2003; Kaldor 2007; Dudouet 
2009; Kilroy 2009; Waever 2011). The theories of post-war peacebuilding and 
democratisation borrow from political science, democratisation studies and the fields of 
conflict transformation/resolution and peacebuilding (Mansfield and Snyder 1995, 2001 and 
2002; Sisk 2001; Curtis and de Zeeuw 2009; Zürcher 2011). In addition, literature from human 
rights and development fields will also be consulted, particularly when shedding light on the 
nexus between peace, democracy and human rights, and the predation theories (including 
the debate on post-war grievance versus greed) that aim to explain some of the corrosive 
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phenomena inhibiting peacebuilding and democratic consolidation (Berdal and Malone 2000; 
Collier 2001; Keen 2012; Duffield 2014).  
 
This chapter will conduct a thorough mapping of the literature consulted for the thesis. The 
literature content will be set out and will explain how the referenced sources speak to the 
subject matter of the thesis. The immediate part below will explain some of the key notions 
encountered herein, as referred in literature. The chapter will continue by delving into the 
academic debate surrounding DDR and political transformation of combatants, followed by 
the debate on post-war peacebuilding and democratization, with a focus on the former 
combatants’ role in the process. Empirical evidence from both case studies will be evoked 
whenever necessary and will be applied to the academic debate. After setting out the 
literature direction, the chapter will explain the preferred conceptual framework within which 
I intend to build my theory, and which sits in the nexus between political science in general 
and democratization theories.  
   
2. Defining the concepts 
The review of literature for this thesis has looked at several case studies around the world 
that examine rebel or guerrilla movements, or liberation and resistance movements 
(depending on the source referred). For instance, the Berlin-based think tank Berghof Conflict 
Research (now known as Berghof Foundation) has produced a series of publications on such 
armed movements, like the case of Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) in the Basque country 
(Aiartza and Zabalo 2010), that of Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El 
Salvador (Álvarez 2010), the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Ireland (De Brún 2008), the 
Movimiento 19 de Abril (the 19th of April Movement - M-19) in Colombia (Durán, Leowenherz 
and Hormaza 2008), the African National Congress in South Africa (Maharaj 2008), the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka (Nadarajah and Vimalarajah 2008), the 
Maoists and the Communist party in Nepal (Ogury 2008), or the Garakan Acheh Merdaka 
(Free Aceh Movement – GAM) in Aceh, Indonesia (Wandi and Zunzer 2008). Other cases, 
examined by other sources, include the South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) in 
Namibia, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in Rwanda (Curtis and de Zeeuw 2009), or various 
rebel groupings in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Manning 2007). More recently, Colombia’s former 
rebel force, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) has been transformed into a 
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political party called the Common Alternative Revolutionary Force, thereby ending more than 
fifty years of bloody conflict with government forces and submitting themselves to the force 
of the ballot box (Isacson 2018). Some recent examples of the challenges related to the 
demobilisation and reintegration of armed groups may be witnessed in Afghanistan, Iraq, and 
even Syria and Yemen (Rotmann 2019). 
 
There is a wide array of terms used in literature when describing armed groups that fight 
within a state. As cases mentioned above indicated, terminology such as “non-state armed 
groups”, “rebel movements”, “insurgents”, “resistance/liberation movements”, or “freedom 
fighters”, may indicate a superficial semantic difference, but may also carry a deeper, more 
substantial, or even politically biased meaning, depending on one’s point of view (see among 
others: Manning (2004); De Zeeuw (2008); Dudouet (2009); Curtis and De Zeeuw (2009) 
Hansell and Gerdes (2017)). For example, De Zeeuw (2008) offers the following definition on 
a “rebel movement” as being, 
(…) non-state organization with clear political objectives that contests a government’s authority and 
legitimate monopoly of violence and uses armed force in order to reform, overthrow, or secede from 
an existing state regime or control a specific geographical area (De Zeeuw 2008, p. 4).  
 
Depending on the political bias that sides may bring onto the table, such armed groups may 
be referred to as terrorist organisations or criminal groupings. The states against whom such 
armed groups may be fighting would usually take such a stance. However, I make a clear 
differentiation between intra-state armed groups as being politico-military organisations 
versus extremist, terrorist, or criminal enterprises. Literature tends to make a similar 
differentiation in so far as making deliberate emphasis on the “politically instrumental use of 
violence” as a means of excluding other non-state groups from the definition such as criminal 
gangs or terrorist networks. The armed groups, which are the object of this study, are also 
portrayed in literature as “guerrillas”, “armed opposition or resistance groups”, “non-state 
armed actors”, or “insurgents” (De Zeeuw 2008, p. 4). They might be “liberation movements”, 
“separatist / secessionist groups”, “reform movements”, “warlord insurgencies” (De Zeeuw 
2008, p. 7). 
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For the purposes of this thesis, I will use the terms “non-state armed groups”, “guerrillas, 
rebels or rebel movements”, and/or “insurgencies” interchangeably. These terms denote that 
the conflicts these groups were involved in were waged within states. For all intents and 
purposes, both the KLA and the NLA were armed groups created within the confines of 
borders of internationally-recognized states. As the case is with all these armed groups when 
they are initially created, both the KLA and the NLA were illegal organizations whose aim was 
to fight the state apparatus. However, while they emerged with the aim of fighting the state, 
their end objective differed: the KLA fought for complete secession from Serbia and eventual 
independence for Kosovo, whereas the NLA’s purported objective was equal rights for ethnic 
Albanians within the existing FYR Macedonia. The members of both armed groups were 
indeed guerrillas, or rebels, in that they often employed guerrilla tactics of hit and run against 
state-orchestrated armies. In the end, the term “insurgency” also describes them well, as they 
did indeed lead popular revolts or uprisings against their respective states.      
 
One of the main aspects of the thesis is to examine the act of transformation of former 
combatants into politics. The vehicle through which this is done is the political party. Creating 
a party or becoming a member of an existing party continues to be the main avenue for the 
former combatant’s integration into politics. That is why at this stage it is important that I 
offer a clear definition of what is meant by a political party. For the purposes of this thesis, I 
borrow Sartori’s (1976) well-known definition of a political party, meaning “any political group 
that presents at elections, and is capable of placing through elections, candidates for public 
office” through nonviolent political means (Sartori 1976, p. 57). In other words, once 
combatants give up arms, they must be prepared to completely relinquish violence as means 
to fighting for their objectives. Instead, they must be willing to run as candidates of political 
parties and, in a level-playing field shared with their political rivals, submit themselves to the 
will of the people in a ballot box. Political parties are therefore the necessary vehicle which 
are supposed to replace armed groups and through which former combatants turned 
politicians will fight peacefully to get into power. But while the parties are a vehicle, the 
destination for these new politicians will be the state institutions from where they will be able 
to wield that political power. These explanations fit perfectly well with the trajectory of the 
KLA and the NLA stories. After their respective conflicts, the leadership of both armed groups 
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were expedient in creating their own political parties, known as the war-wing parties, with 
which they agreed to yield themselves to the will of the people in elections.  
 
3. Theories and practices on DDR and political transformation 
3.1 DDR as a technical and immediate post-conflict change 
While the background theme of this thesis explores some of the causes for the eruption of 
armed conflicts in Kosovo and FYR Macedonia, the focus of its analysis is on the aftermath of 
those conflicts. As is usually the case, the conflicts in both case studies came to an end 
following peace accords. The armed groups which had fought their respective state 
institutions – the KLA in Kosovo and the NLA in FYR Macedonia – were partially to be 
accredited with the achievement of peace accords. However, ironically, with the end of 
conflicts their raison d’être ceases to be of relevance, and they must disband. Consequently, 
both the KLA and the NLA underwent a DDR process which entailed employing a percentage 
of them into security structures (the police, the state army, protection corps, or private 
security companies), or facilitating a return to civilian life. Still for others, DDR was not the 
solution to their ambitions, which is why they began exploring ways of engaging politically as 
soon as conflicts came to an end. This was the case with a large percentage of leaders and 
commanders from both the KLA and the NLA ranks. This trajectory of intra-state armed groups 
seen with the KLA and the NLA is well documented in literature, as will be described below.  
 
In the last couple of decades, a growing volume of literature has expanded its scope of 
analysis on armed conflicts by also paying attention to actors other than states. For example, 
literature on international relations, security and securitization studies have progressively 
acknowledged that states are no longer exclusive players in the international scene. Wars are 
increasingly fought within states, while they are waged less and less between states (Buzan 
1991; Crocker, Hampson and Aall 2001; Kaldor 2007). In addition, the nature of conflicts and 
wars has become more complex, involving actors that until recently were undefined entities 
in international relations. National boundaries are increasingly porous when governments are 
faced with modern threats such as cyber groups that utilise information and communications 
technology, and social media to pose threat to social order as we know it (Diamond 2019; 
Deibert 2019). The so-called “war on terror” (Boyle 2008) has further contributed to the 
25 
 
changing patterns of conflicts in the present day. In short, nowadays wars are rarely a clear-
cut affair that develop between two (or more) states.  
 
There is a plethora of non-state actors that act as real adversaries with whom states are 
forced to enter in conflict. Armed groups, rebel groups, or insurgencies that operate within 
those states are such actors. Usually, it is with those very armed groups that states, once 
conflict nears the end, engage in peace accords with the view of reaching a peace deal. From 
adversaries in war, intra-state armed groups become potential partners with whom the state 
must make peace and endeavour to build joint democratic institutions thereafter. One of the 
first steps to building peace is DDR of the armed groups’ combatants, followed by their 
political engagement. Along the journey of the political transformation of former combatants 
is, unavoidably, the immediate challenge of relinquishing arms and embracing post-conflict 
peace processes such as democracy, justice and the rule of law. Literature is rich with cases 
of combatants undergoing DDR processes, followed by another spell of joining the reformed 
army or police forces of their country, only for some to shed the uniform for a life in politics 
(Spear 2002; Glassmyer and Sambanis 2008; Humphreys and Weinstein 2008; Dudouet 2012; 
Dudouet, Giessmann and Planta 2012; Blease and Qehaja 2013). This process is normally 
examined within the fields of international relations, security and securitization studies. More 
specifically, this part of the chapter will delve into the academic debate on DDR, coupled with 
the combatants’ integration in politics. 
 
In a way, once conflict comes to an end, DDR is the first point of call in the long and final 
transformation from combatant to politician. For this reason, the examination of DDR 
literature represents an element of this research. Literature recognises former combatants as 
“peacebuilding partners, rather than as mere recipients of reintegration assistance or as 
spoilers to be disarmed and demobilised as quickly as possible” (Dudouet, Giessmann and 
Planta 2012, p. 3). 
 
To deconstruct the technical jargon, disarmament refers to the process of collection, control 
and disposal of weapons; demobilization is another stage in the process with a focus on the 
complete disbandment of armed forces; finally, reintegration refers to the process whereby 
former combatants are integrated back into social, political and economic life. The impetus 
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to reintegration can be humanitarian, in the sense that there are genuine efforts to lessen the 
suffering of former combatants after conflict. But the principal motivation for reintegration 
assistance is strategic: “(…) reintegration programs, along with sibling programs for soldiers’ 
demobilization and disarmament, are crucial to maintaining peace and security during the 
unstable transition from war” (McMullin 2013a, p. 2).  
 
However, the reintegration of former combatants takes a more holistic meaning in the social 
context. It refers to the transformation of former combatants in a post-conflict environment; 
in other words, reintegration is a “social contract” between them and the society at large 
(Knight and Özerdem 2004). Reintegration is “civilianisation of demobilized soldiers” 
(McMullin 2013b, p. 17). Additionally, in order for DDR to work, the society as a whole needs 
to stand ready to overcome past animosities and to offer space for reintegration to former 
combatants. The latter, too, need to be fully prepared to integrate back into society, without 
recourse to past rivalries. And for it to work, the “social contract” needs to be maintained and 
promoted by a political agreement that is supported by the widest possible political spectrum. 
The whole process, too, needs to be underpinned by justice, truth and reconciliation efforts 
that are meant to provide a healing ground for peace and democracy to take root.  
 
The term “reintegration” is itself a debatable concept. Reintegration into what? Surely not 
into a societal oppressive pattern that existed before the conflict, but rather into a new 
political reality that accounts for the representation of former combatants and their electoral 
base. So, with reintegration also comes the gradual inclusion of those combatants into 
political life. Therefore, reintegration also means a gradual transformation of former 
combatants, particularly of the leaders of the rebel group, into political actors. Some of them 
will want to continue to play a role in public life by joining political parties, or even creating 
them from scratch. The likelihood is that they will enjoy a constituency base which may likely 
consist of the ethnic or religious community that they fought for. These former combatants 
turned politicians will have to yield to the power of the ballot box and thus play a role in post-
conflict democratization processes. By doing so, they will have made that transition from 
“bullet to ballot box” (Ishiyama 2016), which is an all-important prerequisite for post-war 
democratization to commence in earnest.  
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Once post-war political democratisation (or self-governance) and security sector integration options 
have been clarified, the demobilisation of non-statutory security forces should be accompanied by the 
consolidation of civilian entities – be it in the form of political parties or former combatant associations 
and other support structures (Dudouet 2012, p. 3). 
 
Literature increasingly views DDR processes as partnership endeavours involving former 
combatants and the state in a relatively equal footing. These processes are increasingly less 
state-run or top-down impositions. Instead, for peace to have a chance to triumph, there 
needs to be a level-playing field in which both the state and the representatives of the armed 
group (in other words, yesterday’s enemies) recognize each other’s contribution to post-
conflict peace and democracy. They each possess unique pieces of the puzzle which, when 
brought together, come to form a wholesome picture of what we might call representative 
democracy. This recognition then serves as a premise upon which to build the DDR processes. 
In other words, members of intra-state armed groups are not treated (or at least should not 
be treated) as rogue elements of society that are coerced into correction and that should be 
dictated how to reintegrate. By the same token, the government should not be treated as the 
possessor of all that is moral, because the likelihood is that they, too, were culpable for the 
violent conflict which the society is trying to put behind. In fact, the government will likely 
bear a significant part of the responsibility for the conflict’s eruption, being that it was likely 
sprung out of horizontal disparities, or socio-economic injustices - real and perceived - 
perpetrated by it against a part of the country’s population. On the other hand, while they 
might have been culpable of past abuses, the intra-state armed group might have legitimately 
fought to protect the rights of a specific ethnic, religious or national group. Therefore, the 
government does not have outright moral or even de facto authority to conduct a unilateral 
oversight of DDR but should instead do this in partnership and in collaboration with former 
intra-state armed group representatives.  
 
Consequently, in a post-conflict society DDR and transformation processes are more inclusive 
and empowering for former combatants, viewing them not just as “mere recipients” of 
assistance, but as active players in public life. Otherwise, there is always a possibility for post-
settlement tensions to arise, which might threaten an already fragile democratic transition. 
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Below is a convincing case of why the state should not be the only actor to provide security 
when in fact it has proven to be a source of insecurity:  
From the point of view of resistance and liberation movements, the recognition of ‘state security’ of a 
regime that they consider to be illegitimate is a contradiction in terms. In fact, if their main motivations 
for engaging in armed activities are rooted in structures that are conducive to an endemic climate of 
insecurity, then their continued willingness to participate in constructing a peaceful and legitimate 
post-war political order is inherently conditional upon the transformation of the (security, political 
and/or socio-economic) structures of oppression and inequality that caused the conflict in the first 
place. For its part, the concept of DDR is considered deeply flawed because it implies that non-state 
actors represent the only threat to security. From the perspective of these actors, however, the 
renunciation of force is interdependent with, and hence cannot precede, […] the transition of power 
towards more accountable and legitimate state institutions that can provide a more secure 
environment for all. (Dudouet, Giessmann and Planta 2012, p. 7). 
 
The Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (SIDDR) 
strengthens these arguments by stressing that, 
(…) taking up arms is an indication that governance has failed. The politics of exclusion in one way or 
another has already manifested itself at an extreme level and many in society see war as the only 
recourse for dialogue and change (SIDDR 2006, p. 19).  
 
It is therefore not right or conducive to peace to view intra-state armed groups as rogue or 
terrorist elements that should be quashed by the state by any means. Their rebellion might 
be a manifestation of a “failed governance” or deep-seated injustices in society. It might be 
that the state is the one to bear the brunt of responsibility for the escalation of a societal crisis 
that in the end erupted into an open armed conflict. Therefore, once war is over and a peace 
process is under way, one of the main priorities of a post-conflict society is for “DDR to provide 
a space for the parties to realise that the military option is no longer legitimate or necessary” 
(SIDDR 2006, p. 19). The peace accords and the follow-up steps to their implementation can 
provide such a space. However, for the peace process to work, it ought to be inclusive, 
transparent and representative, with some sort of power-sharing arrangements that bring 
together the threads of all society around a decision-making process. Former combatants will 
play, and should play, their share of the role in security and political structures, too.  
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The aspect of inclusion of combatants is key for a successful DDR process. Inclusion needs to 
come from two sources, however: from the state, as discussed above, but just as importantly, 
it needs to derive from the society at large, too. The society must accept former combatants 
into its midst for the DDR to work in the long run. That is why DDR in the framework of 
peacebuilding is meant to be conducted in a way that does not stigmatise former combatants 
for having partaken in conflict. It aims not to put them in a box that differentiates them as a 
special social category which requires a different degree of attention from everybody else. 
McMullin (2013a) explains the social stigmatization of former combatants in a peacebuilding 
framework by breaking it down into two narratives: 
 
a. The threat narrative: according to which former combatants are portrayed as inherently 
threatening to post-conflict peace; and 
b. The resentment narrative, according to which the community will likely resent the 
assistance provided for former combatants, thereby portraying communities as more 
deserving of aid than, and fundamentally distinct from, former combatants (McMullin 2013a, 
p. 386).  
 
Both narratives emphasise an “essential excombatant otherness” that distinguishes them 
from the society at large and implies a “unique ex-combatant culpability” for the violence 
perpetrated during the conflict. As such, this is not just a matter of language, but the 
stigmatisation of former combatants has a direct influence on the DDR programme, and the 
future relations between former combatants and the society (McMullin 2013a, pp. 412-413).  
Paradoxically, even though reintegration programs aim to make ex-combatants as unemployed and 
marginalized as ‘everyone else’, reintegration discourse simultaneously implies that ex-combatants can 
never, and will never, be ‘like everyone else’: they are destined to remain menacing, separate from 
their communities, unintegrated after their return from war (McMullin 2013b, p. 233). 
 
That is why for the DDR process to be successful authors emphasise the importance of an 
overall “security transition” (Dudouet, Giessmann and Planta 2012) and a rebalancing of 
forces between the state’s mechanisms representing the status quo, and the new forces that 
have sprung up from intra-state armed groups. In its narrow sense of the word, this is an 
essentially technical and logistical undertaking, but with long-term political and security 
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ramifications. It is technical and logistical because it refers to the actual handing over of the 
weapons and to the act of abandoning uniforms. If there is good will and political agreement 
between parties involved, there should be no reason why the process, as a logistical and 
technical undertaking that it is, cannot be accomplished according to a set timetable. In the 
long-run, though, the DDR process has security and political ramifications because, if 
executed correctly, it will likely ensure a greater security balance representing the interests 
of all communities concerned. This will subsequently contribute to post-conflict sustainable 
peace and democratic reforms. 
 
The end of conflict and the disbandment of armed groups goes hand in hand with an offer for 
economic prospects for the future. DDR represents a commitment to, and faith in, the short- 
and long-term creation of an environment where the economic and security value of a 
weapon is gradually eliminated (Willibald 2006). In other words, for weapons to be means 
that have outgrown their usefulness, former combatants need to be shown a clear path to 
economic recovery. However, the economic and security devaluation of weapons can only 
happen if there are real and sustainable reintegration opportunities for combatants, including 
those in politics. And this is a longer-term goal which surpasses the challenges of technical 
and logistical aspects of DDR. This in fact refers to the authentic and sustainable 
transformation of former combatants, including the political transformation of their 
leadership, into future stakeholders of the country’s peace and democratisation processes.   
3.2 Political transformation and longer-term post-conflict change 
In a study on an armed group’s political mobilization in Colombia, Söderström (2016) notes 
that the political integration of former combatants involves not just a mutation into political 
parties but a profound transformation of the organizational culture. She goes on to describe 
three paths to political mobilization:  
- The Resilient: defined by a sustained or increasing political mobilization post-disarmament; 
- The Remobilized: defined by decreased political participation at some point after 
disarmament followed by a re-mobilization in politics up until today; 
- The Removed: defined by a decrease in political mobilization sometime after disarmament 
lasting until today (Söderström 2016). Therefore, former combatants may not only undergo 
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a profound political and organizational transformation after the war, but their paths to 
political mobilization may vary greatly, too.  
 
De Zeeuw (2008) breaks down the transformation of soldiers to politicians into structural and 
attitudinal. The structural transformation consists of: 
1. The demilitarization of the army’s organizational structure, which translates into the 
technical aspects of disbandment or the DDR process; 
2. The creation of a party organization, which is conditioned upon the former combatants’ 
ability to represent popular interests convincingly, to organize election campaigns and, 
ultimately, to take governance responsibilities. This points to the longer-term political 
transformation of former combatants and to their ability to govern while respecting, adhering 
to, and advancing democratic norms of accountability and transparency. 
 
Apart from the structural transformation of armed groups (i.e. its short-term, technical 
transformation, followed by the longer-term, political transformation), there also has be an 
attitudinal transformation. Namely, 
 
1. Democratization of decision-making: how does an armed group, which by definition is a 
non-democratic, dictatorial entity, become a representative, inclusive and consensus-
oriented party? The main challenge here is to be able to democratize decision-making from 
an authoritarian, top-down hierarchy as required and practiced by armed groups, into a more 
horizontal, consensus and dialogue-based structure. 
2. Adaptation of strategies and goals: here the challenge is simple but fundamental at the 
same time. It has to do with reorienting strategies and goals from war to peace, doing away 
with the former as means to achieving goals, and embracing the latter as the only option 
available. 
When the conflict ends through negotiations, the warring parties, including former rebel movements, 
are usually able to reach some form of power-sharing deal or peace agreement in which the political 
legitimacy of each party is formally acknowledged. This then creates opportunities for establishing a 
relatively open political arena in which elections can become the primary tool for selecting and 
legitimizing the new government and party representatives who, alone or in coalition with other 
parties, will implement the peace agenda (De Zeeuw 2008, p. 19). 
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This takes us beyond the DDR act as a technical and logistical undertaking and into the longer-
term transformation of combatants into political players which will give them a real stake into 
the realm of governance in times of peace. The political integration or transformation, 
therefore, is a political process just as much as it is a technical one. “The power dynamics of 
finding a social and political role for former combatants in post-conflict environments is if not 
more, at least as important as the opportunities of employment and education” (Özerdem 
and Podder 2011, p. 75). Such long-term transformation processes are considered key to 
helping a country make a decisive leap from war to peace. With reintegration and political 
transformation comes democratisation, which involves a series of military, social and 
economic interventions (Humphreys and Weinstein 2007). Former combatants – those who 
had in the past waged war against the state – find that in times of peace and as politicians 
often become key players of democratisation processes. One of the first tests to the political 
integration relates to the legitimacy of elections in which former combatants participate. The 
electoral legitimacy is assessed based on the former combatants’ interaction with the 
institutional landscape, and their perception of the integrity of the electoral process 
(Söderström 2013, p. 429). 
 
The successful completion of a civil war and the subsequent leap to a sustainable and 
enduring peace is contingent upon the successful transformation of rebel movements into 
“normal” political organizations. This transformation, however, is perhaps the most 
challenging part of this transition. It requires that former combatants should not only lay 
down their weapons and their military fatigues, but more importantly it demands of them to 
“change their military struggles into political ones and to reorganize their war-focused 
military organizations into dialogue-based political entities (De Zeeuw 2008, p. 1). For this to 
happen, and for peace and political transformation to be seen as luring prospects, armed 
groups must be convinced that peace offers a comparative advantage, which outweighs war 
as an option. Armed groups and their successor political parties must believe the 
opportunities offered to them as democratically-elected representatives. Otherwise, they will 
likely not give up weapons unless forced to do so. Or, even if they do decide to disband, they 
might consider rearming again in case they do not gain satisfactory representation in post-
conflict political arrangements. Such a scenario of “recidivism” (Kaplan and Nussio 2018) will 
remain a realistic prospect for quite some time after conflict, particularly when a critical mass 
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of former combatants is left disgruntled after peace accords. As the case of Colombia has 
shown, recidivism of former combatants might be induced by three context-related factors:  
- economic conditions: when a former combatant’s relative economic prospects worsen, 
participation in illegal activities is likely to increase; 
- security context: in conditions of insecurity former combatants are pushed toward joining 
violent organizations and participating in illegal activities; 
- criminal opportunities: ex-combatants may be pulled towards illegal opportunities where 
there is demand for their specific skills and networks of former comrades (Kaplan and Nussio 
2018). 
 
De Zeeuw’s focus is on analysing what happens with rebel movements in the period after the 
war. Indeed, the term “transformation” might assume “a certain direction and inevitability or 
organizational change – from an armed rebel group towards an unarmed political party” (De 
Zeeuw 2008, p. 3). But transformations can be successful (FMLN, SWAPO), or they can be 
partial (Hamas, SPML/A, CNDD-FDD), or they can fail completely, with resumption of armed 
hostilities. In this respect my thesis is in line with De Zeeuw’s focus. However, his and other 
scholars’ attention is to examine the degree of success of the rebels’ transformation from 
armed formations into political parties (De Zeeuw 2008; Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom 2008; 
Gurses and Rost 2013). The success of this transformation is the act of transformation itself. 
However, little focus is given to the long-term impact of these political parties and their 
leaders onto the political scene. My thesis looks exactly into the impact of these combatants, 
turned into decision-makers of their political parties, in the state’s political institutions.  
 
Suazo (2013) has written on the effects that the long-term inclusion of former combatants 
may have for sustainable peace. Long-term inclusion “acknowledges the need to account for 
warring parties’ roles in post-conflict societies by considering their political participation after 
the peace process” (Suazo 2013, p. 8). His hypothesis in based on the premise that when the 
rebel groups are offered the opportunity to influence the political system through legitimate 
and legal means, that will decrease their incentives to take up arms again (Suazo 2013, p. 8). 
In other words, if the route to political participation, joint decision-making or even power-
sharing, is open, the need for rebel forces to fight will inevitably recede. The prospect of 
having a seat at the table increases chances for peace. Suazo further explains his hypothesis 
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by recalling a few relatively successful examples of such long-term inclusion. El Salvador is 
one of those examples where, after a decade-long conflict, FMLN was reintegrated into civil 
and political life in the early 1990s. Consequently, FMLN as a political party, has been a 
participant in each legislative election that has taken place in El Salvador since 1992 (Suazo 
2013, p. 12). 
 
Political transformation of former combatants is seen as key to a successful implementation 
of peace accords. Instead of being viewed as a drawback and a threat to security, the political 
involvement of former combatants ought to be considered as an opportunity to transform 
the relationship of former enemies (the state versus the armed group) into one of 
partnership. It follows that the success of post-conflict peace accords depends on the 
commitment of former warring parties to tackle “issues of representation, equality, 
association, and reconciliation”, which by default require the former combatants’ sense of 
inclusion and post-conflict polity (McMullin 2013b, p. 34). In practical terms, political 
transformation means that former members of armed groups either join existing parties or, 
what is more likely to happen, form new ones. Indeed, the “successful transformation of rebel 
organization into parties is critical to post-conflict peace and democratization”, and “the 
creation of durable peace settlements requires the active involvement and cooperative 
engagement of these political groups” (Ishiyama 2016, p. 969).  
 
The peace duration and the quality of democracy that takes shape depends to a large degree 
on whether former rebel groups decide to adapt to, evade, or exit the post-war political arena 
(Ishiyama 2016). Therefore, one of the imperatives of post-war politics is to accommodate 
and give voice to those political parties that represent the interests of former guerrilla groups. 
However, giving former combatants a voice also means potentially entering a battle of 
competing historical narratives. Together with their inclusion in politics, former combatants 
will be eager to ensure that their war legacy – the way that they see it – is imprinted on the 
country and its future generations. This is how Metsola (2010) describes this race for a 
dominant narrative on post-independence Namibia: 
Such historical interpretations are not merely a matter of abstract national imagery. They are highly 
significant to current socio-political relations, defining terms for inclusion or exclusion from the 
Namibian nation and for granting entitlements. References to the liberation struggle keep recurring in 
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debates over land, jobs and education. Similarly, the actors involved in Namibian ex-combatant 
‘reintegration’ have appropriated and contested Namibia’s violent past in negotiating the status and 
entitlements of excombatants (Metsola 2010, p. 590). 
 
However, the transformation of such groups into parties does not guarantee peace and 
democracy. But their leap from being an armed group into registering as a political party, 
willing to compete in elections and place forward eligible candidates, is the first step towards 
accepting political competition and supplementing violence with political means (Manning 
and Smith 2016, p. 973). As political party representatives, former combatants will submit to 
the system of checks and balances, of conducting campaigns and offering pledges that 
promise to improve the livelihoods of their constituents. Instead of bombs and military 
tactics, their fight will shift to winning the vote of the people they seek to represent. Instead 
of seeking to win military battles, they will look for ways to increase the number of jobs in 
health and education, to improve welfare services for the elderly, or to pass anti-corruption 
legislation. This is an entirely new game which former combatants need to muster in order to 
succeed, and one which replaces bullets for ballots. And the vehicles through which this is 
done are political parties.    
 
It is therefore no coincidence that in many countries coming out of armed conflict, the 
political institutions are populated by former combatants. This is very much the case with the 
two case studies chosen for this thesis: both in Kosovo and in FYR Macedonia political parties 
have helped former combatants get elected to positions of mayors and assembly members 
at the municipal level, or members of parliament, ministers and deputy ministers, prime 
ministers and presidents. They can be found throughout the state civil service, too, as well as 
in most independent institutions and public enterprise boards.       
 
Political transformation does not necessarily lead to peace and democracy. Indeed, caution 
should be placed against a linear understanding of post-conflict transition and political 
transformation. That is because the journey from war to peace and democratic consolidation 
is not bound to be a one-way street. Often, in order to reach their objectives these groups 
may combine violent and non-violent strategies, formal and informal mechanisms that may 
have detrimental effects on democracy (Dudouet 2009). This means that, although the 
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transformation of armed groups has been completed, and their leaders have been turned into 
political actors, the democracy that is built is vulnerable and erosive. 
 
4. Democracy and peacebuilding    
4.1 Democratisation 
The consequences for democracy should figure more prominently in our analysis of armed groups. 
       (Sindre and Söderström 2016, p. 115) 
 
One of the areas of focus for democratisation studies relates to the emergence of multi-party 
democracy which aims to be inclusive and representative of various constituencies of the 
country in a post-war setting. Provided that intra-state armed groups agree to a ceasefire, the 
multi-party democracy will likely make room for the “organisational transformation of 
insurgencies, from underground guerrilla movements to conventional political parties” 
(Dudouet 2009, p. 8). The path from war to peace, or from communism to a capitalist, multi-
party system with open markets, is examined in democratisation studies. More poignantly for 
the purposes of this research, such studies aim to intercept the role played by former 
combatants turned politicians in their country’s path to becoming a consolidated democracy. 
 
In a scenario in which former combatants and the government try to overcome past 
animosities by building democracy, democratisation is defined as a “process of recovery and 
maintenance of human security during the period running from the negotiation of a peace 
agreement between a state and its challengers up to establishment of democratic 
governance” (Dudouet, Giessmann and Planta 2012, p. 7). The desired outcome of a 
successful process of armed groups’ transformation, and the society’s democratisation, is a 
transformed security and justice system controlled by democratically-elected and 
accountable political institutions. The challenges facing armed groups regarding this long-
term task relate to the “institutionalisation of cohesive and effective political structures” 
(Dudouet, Giessmann and Planta 2012, p. 39). In other words, the successful leap from war 
to peace, from weapon to ballot paper, and from combatant to politician, is a prerequisite for 
a democratic transition to take place. Indeed, years and sometimes decades of exile or 
underground operations ought to be unlearned and translated into full-fledged participation 
in post-war state-building and democratic transition. This certainly rings true of both the KLA 
and the NLA. The origins of both armed groups can be traced back to the clandestine 
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movement of the early 1980s which operated mainly in the diaspora. The end of conflicts 
represented for them the first time in their existence when they could safely emerge from 
the shadows and onto mainstream public and political life.   
 
Literature on democracy explains that power-sharing arrangements are often a mechanism 
used to offer former combatants some incentives to be part of governance structures, 
thereby making return to armed conflict less and less likely. When discussing the “institutions 
of government” Gromes (2009) underlines state-building as an integral part and a subtask of 
democratization. It should be recalled that the aim of democratisation after conflict is to 
create inclusive institutions that would break the cycle of discrimination. Consequently, 
democratization requires that such structures be made available where all parties to the 
conflict would operate. To this end, power-sharing institutions must be re-established or at 
least altered (state-building).  
Democratization in ethnically divided post-civil war societies faces the challenge of creating a modicum 
of mutual recognition so that common institutions can function. It requires that enemies start to regard 
each other as political opponents and a sense of belonging emerges to overarch or reduce the weight 
of the forcibly cemented particularist identities (Gromes 2009, p. 2). 
 
In theory, the concept of power-sharing denotes inclusivity, transparency, and the 
rectification of past wrongdoings by bringing previously-marginalized communities into 
decision-making processes. But what literature seems to focus less on is the devious or 
aberrant aspects of power-sharing arrangements. As an idea, power-sharing is a noble notion 
that signifies equality, justice and representation for all regardless of ethnic, religious or other 
backgrounds (Hoddie and Hartzell 2003). But in practice power-sharing may degenerate into 
a scheme whereby power and the government institutions that wield that power are 
perceived as a pie that needs to be shared into mutually-agreed pieces among stakeholders 
as a means of preserving an artificially-patched peace. In FYR Macedonia, there are certainly 
concerns that power-sharing arrangements between Slavic Macedonians and ethnic 
Albanians are artificial set-ups whose main function are to maintain power for the incumbent 
parties and their elites, and not to serve equitably to all citizens regardless of background. In 
the name of representative democracy, the pie of power-sharing is cynically shared, and each 
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stakeholder can have complete autonomy over their share of power, and in so doing will use 
the means of power for personal gains.  
 
Such an artificially-induced power-sharing scheme has direct repercussions on democracy. 
This leads to a mutant kind of democracy which, for reasons stated above, shows clear signs 
of fragility and has recidivist tendencies. It is a sort of democracy that may be subjected to 
compromising and ad hoc solutions by new elites that primarily attend to the interests of their 
own clientelistic base. Various scholars have recently detected such worrisome tendencies in 
democratizing societies. For example, Diamond (2015) has warned that in the last decade or 
so the number of democratic regimes seems to have come to a standstill, oscillating between 
114 and 119 respectively. In addition, there has been a trend of declining freedoms in several 
countries during the same period. This “democratic breakdown” or a “decisive reverse wave” 
is attributed to many factors, some of which have to do with the executive abuse of power, 
or “power aggrandizement” (International IDEA 2017, p. 75).  
 
Power-sharing arrangements in less consolidated democracies are often subject to abuse of 
power, because each political entity that represents a constituency tends to have relative 
autonomy over their portfolio in power-sharing constellations. In other words, in fragile 
democracies a government comprised of two or more parties may not function in 
coordination and with a single clearly delineated programme. Instead, each party may tend 
to perceive the ministries and portfolios that they oversee as their own feuds. If they are not 
given autonomy over their portfolios they may likely threaten to withdraw from power-
sharing arrangements. Being in power, on the other hand, may result in a propensity to 
indulge on their predatory instincts. The Catch-22 situation in this scenario is that if such 
political parties are in power they are likely to indulge in corruption and other illicit activities, 
but if they are left out of power the fragile peace may quickly unravel. In other words, there 
is a discernible correlation between bad governance and democratic vulnerability (Diamond 
2011). The greater the propensity of governments to abuse with power, the bigger the 
chances of still-fragile democracies to roll back into authoritarian, semi-democratic regimes, 
or even armed conflict.  
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This brings us to a paradox: instead of being proponents of democratic consolidation, such 
political elites – whose mission is supposedly their country’s democratic consolidation – end 
up establishing regimes that become breeding ground for executive aggrandizement and 
authoritarian rule (Lyons 2016). From heroes they become gravediggers of democracy (Kuehn 
2017). 
Leaders who think that they can get away with it are eroding democratic checks and balances, hollowing 
out institutions of accountability […], and accumulating power and wealth for themselves and their 
families, cronies, clients, and parties (Diamond 2015, p. 149).  
 
In a post-conflict environment, the space of the political elite is crowded with former 
combatants who become the new masters of post-war transition. They are also identified as 
the main culprits of this executive abuse of power which by consequence has debilitating 
effects on democracy. On both case studies - Kosovo and FYR Macedonia - a considerable 
number of authors suggest that efforts at institution-building and democratisation are 
thwarted by the political elite which is dominated by the war-wing parties. Correlations are 
made between the longevity of the war-wing parties in power and the beleaguered state of 
democracy in the country, which produces regimes with authoritarian tendencies or state 
capture (Daskalovski 2004a; Günay and Dzihic 2016; BIEPAG 2017; Bieber 2018; Foa 2018; 
Bassuener 2019). 
 
There have been many terms used to describe this shady, indeterminate area between a 
consolidated democracy and a rollback to authoritarianism. Labels such as “semi-
democracies”, “electoral democracies”, “illiberal democracies” or “partial democracies”, or 
“competitive authoritarianisms” (Morlino 2004, 2011; Freedom House 2019b) have often 
been used to describe political regimes which have made a clear leap from an authoritarian 
past towards democracy, but which clearly shows default tendencies. To note this shady area 
when a country is not fully democratic but at the same time cannot be downgraded to an 
outright autocracy, Morlino (2011) came up with the notion of “hybrid regimes” described as, 
(…) a set of institutions [that] have been preceded by authoritarianism, a traditional regime (possibly 
with colonial characteristics), or even a minimal democracy, and are characterized by the break-up of 
limited pluralism and forms of independent, autonomous participation, but the absence of at least one 
of the four aspects of a minimal democracy (Morlino 2011, p. 5).  
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In this thesis, one way of ascertaining the level of democratisation is to adopt Morlino’s (2004) 
three different notions of democratic quality, “grounded on procedure, content and result”. 
In order to measure such notions of democratic quality, one can examine indicators deriving 
from rule of law, accountability, responsiveness, freedom and equality. The result is a 
colourful spectrum of democratic quality, ranging from low to upper. Its application on a 
chosen country will show us how “good” that country’s democracy is (Morlino 2004).   
 
This notion of “hybrid regimes” is meant to indicate that middle ground of a political system 
which lies between liberal democracy and outright autocracy. Formally speaking, the 
institutions – as the legal and legitimate representatives of the people - must be sole players 
in the political domain. However, what often happens in these hybrid regimes is that those 
very institutions, fragile as they are, are bypassed for the sake of strengthening informal ties 
between political, business and other actors. These ties represent that sinister bond between 
political actors on one hand, and the underground world on the other. This collusion between 
formal and informal worlds leads to state capture and the rise of authoritarianism, which are 
phenomena observed in both Kosovo and FYR Macedonia (Keil 2018). 
 
There are ample discussions on the hybridity of regimes, and various organisations and think 
tanks even score countries according to their democratic performance (International IDEA 
2019a and 2019b; Freedom House 2019b; EIU 2019). However, there is not much analysis on 
the correlation between the fragility of democracies, the hybridity of political systems, and 
the role of former combatants as a political elite in this midst. To what degree can the fragile 
or hybrid state of democracies be attributed to a rising political elite that is all but dominated 
by war veterans turned politicians? Both case contexts feature veterans as rising political 
elites and can be understood as fragile democracies with hybrid political systems.  
 
In the two case studies, former combatants have traditionally operated in networks that 
relied on family or clan associations, on ideology, or simply on a pragmatic camaraderie 
forged by the embers of war. Some of those former combatants go on to enter the formal 
realm of politics, becoming leaders of political parties and stakeholders in power-sharing 
arrangements in government. Others may go on to undertake illicit activities related to rent-
seeking, patronage and organised crime. They can do this because they have a network of 
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like-minded comrades, and they have the muscle to achieve their aims. Moreover, because 
of those networks of camaraderie which grant them access, they can collude with their 
brethren who sit in the formal sphere of politics. Because they are not necessarily elected by 
the people, such actors do not have a responsibility towards them; rather, their operations 
are conducted at the level of “invisible politics” (Morlino 2011). Furthermore, “elections or 
the other forms of electoral participation that may exist […] have no democratic significance 
and, above all, are not the expression of rights, freedom and genuine competition to be found 
in democratic regimes” (Morlino 2011, p. 4). Elections thus become hollowed-out procedures 
without meaningful substance; they mainly have a symbolic significance, and are an 
expression of pre-arranged, clientelistic formulas and behind-the-scenes dealings of who 
should be elected and by whom. 
 
In a society undergoing transition, such an interplay between formal and informal politics 
tend to morph into a way of (quasi-institutional) life. They become embedded in public 
discourse and co-exist side by side with peace and stability. But in actual reality, does stability 
– and by default, a stable transformation of former combatants into politics - automatically 
translate into democracy? And if yes, what kind of democracy? What are the obstacles 
encountered along the way? In the post-war power-sharing constellations, what is the 
contribution that former combatants turned politicians offer to their societies’ stability and 
democracy? What do they get in return? Morlino’s (2004) qualifications on democracy 
(procedure, content and result) provide a sound basis on the nature of new democracies 
created and enable us to discern possible glitches and downfalls. In new democracies, such 
downfalls are rather common. It is the task of this thesis to identify correlations between 
hiccups in democratisation processes in Kosovo and FYR Macedonia and the role of former 
combatants turned politicians. 
 
In a series of papers, Mansfield and Snyder (1995 and 2002) have made distinctions between 
a so-called “democratic” regime versus a “democratizing” one. They warn of the “war-prone” 
nature of post-conflict societies which are on a transition road to full-fledged liberal 
democracy. According to them, countries do not become mature democracies overnight. 
More typically, they go through a rocky transitional period, where democratic control over 
foreign policy is partial, where mass politics mixes in a volatile way with authoritarian elite 
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politics, and where democratization may easily suffer reversals. In this transitional phase of 
democratization, countries become more aggressive and war-prone, not less, and they do 
fight wars with democratic states (Mansfield and Snyder 1995, p. 5).  
 
It seems, therefore, that there are certain dangers in the first several years of a post-conflict 
society. And the question, pertinent for this thesis, is to what degree are former combatants 
responsible for the volatile nature of democratization processes. Authors have warned of the 
“dangers of rapid democratization” (Keen 2012, p. 765) which, when translated into the 
context of this thesis, the empirical data from the field and the literature, means that former 
combatants-cum-politicians are prone to resisting deep democratic reform which might 
undercut their influence. In transitional societies, with fledgling democratic institutions and 
porous oversight and accountability, the space for corrupt activities underpinned by greed is 
greater. In such societies where the rule of law is weak, those with guns, power and greed, 
tend to become champions of corrupt phenomena. They might welcome cessation of 
hostilities but, if it becomes clear that political power is slipping out of their hands, they might 
not be entirely happy to yield to democratic norms and practices which may weaken their 
position.    
 
Yet, democratization is critical to building sustainable peace in post-civil war societies (Joshi 
2010). Participation by all political actors, including former combatants, is key. However, all 
signs show that post-war societies are fragile settings upon which democratization cannot 
thrive uninhibited. The challenges are manifold, not least the often contentious (political, 
economic) interests of former rivals. Joshi (2010) therefore argues that for democratization 
to have a chance to succeed, former rivals ought to agree on terms of a transition toward 
democracy while having in mind that there is a stable balance of power between the 
government and rebel groups. Such a balance should stretch to their respective access to 
political power as well as economic resources. This is another way of saying that power-
sharing arrangements between rebels-turned-politicians and non-rebels, are the way forward 
for transition to peace and democracy (Joshi 2010). However, this argument does not 
diminish the afore-mentioned challenges to democracy when it comes to power-sharing 
arrangements, which might come to be viewed as taking one’s share of the pie regardless of 
the ramifications that such an egotistical approach may have for democracy.    
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Mansfield and Snyder (2002) explain that establishing viable and effective democratic 
institutions takes time. There are many reasons for this (also depending on the context and 
country), but some of the main ones point to the threat that interest groups feel to 
democratisation.  
Where powerful groups feel threatened by democracy, they seek to keep its institutions weak and 
malleable. Thus the practices of many newly democratizing states are only loose approximations of 
those that characterize mature democracies. Limited suffrage, unfair constraints on electoral 
competition, disorganized political parties, corrupt bureaucracies, or partial media monopolies may 
skew political outcomes in newly democratizing states away from the patterns that coherent 
democracies generally produce (Mansfield and Snyder 2002, p. 301).  
 
The powerful groups in a post-conflict setting, or in a society in transition, are usually 
associated with armed groups. The war veterans and their networks, coupled with the war-
wing parties, represent such groups in Kosovo and FYR Macedonia. To keep a tight control on 
power, political elites will restrain democratic consolidation because this is seen as a direct 
threat to their control.    
 
As regards Kosovo and FYR Macedonia, most of the reports published in recent years from 
international organisations such as Freedom House (2019), the Economist Intelligence Unit 
(2019), or International IDEA (2017), highlight the dangers of rollback to authoritarianism or 
democratic backsliding. This is a clear warning sign that democratisation is far from 
consolidated, and the possibilities for reversal are real and looming. This phenomenon of a 
democracy seen to be in retreat, and the tendency of the political elite to tighten grip on 
power is also known as “democratic backsliding” (Bermeo 2016). Many reasons are given for 
this backsliding, starting from a weakening of the liberal notion of democracy, to crises of 
migration and globalisation, to the disenchantment of the electorate with mainstream 
politics, which is turn makes them turn to populism, nativism and radicalism (Bieber 2018; 
Krastev 2018; Krastev and Holmes 2019).  
 
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) 
(2017), in its effort to provide a global state of democracy today, explores issues of “modern 
backsliding” in countries that are undergoing democratisation processes. One of the dangers 
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to democracy today, it is claimed, comes from the political elite that becomes adept at playing 
pretence with democracy, while in fact strengthening hold on power and silently widening 
their tentacles of authoritarian rule. The trick, however, is that they do this not by breaking 
laws and using brute force, but by manipulating and bending the constitution and the laws to 
their interests and those of their cronies. In the last few years we have seen examples of such 
“backsliding” in countries such as Poland, Romania, Turkey, the US, Thailand, the Philippines 
etc. The signs are quite common in all of them: authoritarian tendencies, intrusion into the 
judiciary and the media, executive aggrandizement, populist rhetoric attacking migrants, 
people of another religion or ethnicity, etc (International IDEA 2017; International IDEA 
2019b).     
 
The danger of such democratic backsliding is potentially even greater in countries undergoing 
transition, or democratisation processes. Such countries may indeed have accrued a relatively 
praiseworthy record in conducting free and fair elections. Election observers may apply 
scrutiny to the election process, only to conclude that the elections were free and fair, and in 
accordance with international standards, and may subsequently praise the country’s 
leadership for making great strides toward democratic reform. However, most of the 
backsliding occurs after elections, and they are manifested through behind-the-scene 
manipulations, political buy-outs and sell-outs, or clientelistic networks of operation (Bermeo 
2016).  
 
In general, these countries in transition share three elements which represent a post-election 
trap whereby the instruments of democracy are used to undermine it from within: a party or 
leader is elevated to power through elections broadly considered to be free and fair; the 
institutions and procedures designed to provide checks on executive power are manipulated 
or captured; the rule of law is used to reduce civic space and political freedoms, crush dissent, 
disable political opposition and diminish the role of civil society (International IDEA 2017). It 
follows then that culpable leaders do not abolish democratic mechanisms and institutions per 
se. They manipulate them. If need be, they change electoral laws, or hold off electoral 
reforms, to hold on to power. So long as modern backsliders are democratically elected and 
act within the law, they can claim legitimacy for the numbers they have in parliament and are 
able to form governments because of those numbers (Bekaj 2017).  
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As seen, the debate around democratic backsliding discusses some of the root causes of its 
manifestation, and of course highlights the dangers it poses for democracy as we know it. 
However, the debate lacks focus on another underlying cause for this democratic rollback, 
which is due to the informal ties and illicit activities associated with members of the political 
elite, some of which have a war-related past. Drawing cause and effect trajectories between 
war parties that originate from wars and the current democratic backsliding may offer a fuller 
explanation on the state of fledgling democracies witnessed in countries in transition such as 
Kosovo and FYR Macedonia. In other words, in countries with a relatively new democratic 
tradition, there is a great danger that politicians, once in power, may feel it to be more 
practical to do away with real democratic reforms and instead keep a democratic façade in 
place, while simultaneously tightening their grip on power. In some ways, the risk of 
backsliding may be accentuated with former combatants who have turned to politics, for the 
simple reason that their informal networks, client-patron relations, and the sheer possession 
and manifestation of power, will enable this to happen with fewer hindrances in place.      
Democracy can be challenged from within. Modern democratic backsliding can take place through the 
manipulation of democratic rules and institutions. Constitutions and electoral rules can be used to 
favour a ruling party and limit the independence and power of the judiciary and the media. For a 
democracy to resist backsliding, the checks-and-balances system must be prepared to counteract the 
manipulation, abolition, or weakening of existing rules and institutions. A democratic system can 
recover if one element of the system can react to these dysfunctions, which requires citizens to have 
the capacity to adapt and respond to changing political scenarios, as well as opposition from the 
judiciary, the legislature, the media and political parties (International IDEA 2017, p. 71). 
 
Lastly, the correlation between the transformation of combatants in politics and their 
domination of the political scene, in a democratic system that shows clear signs of weakness 
or capture, is not complete without examining the peacebuilding paradigm promoted by the 
UN and its agencies, and other international bodies, to which we now turn.  
4.2 International community and the peacebuilding paradigm 
Literature on conflict resolution/transformation recognizes the important role played by 
intra-state armed groups in peace processes, but they also place emphasis on external or 
third-party engagement. Both the cases of the KLA in Kosovo and the NLA in FYR Macedonia 
have witnessed third-party involvement throughout the cycle of conflict transformation: from 
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a latent or structural conflict to nonviolent confrontation, followed by violent confrontation, 
conflict mitigation, conflict settlement, peace implementation, and finally peace 
consolidation (Lederach 2002; Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 2003).   
 
Additionally, peacebuilding literature gives us insight into the evolution of armed movements 
in post-peace accords. It also offers analysis on the involvement of international interlocutors 
in peace accords, post-conflict peacebuilding, reconciliation and democratisation (Doyle and 
Sambanis 2000; Reychler and Paffenholz 2001; Morphet 2002; Annan and Mousavizadeh 
2013). Finally, such literature also looks at power-sharing agreements as well as issues of 
potential “spoilers” in peace processes (Stedman 1997; Curtis and de Zeeuw 2009; Jarstad 
and Sisk 2010).   
 
Literature on peacebuilding, conflict resolution and democratisation in a post-conflict setting 
is interweaved with the fields of security and development (Duffield 2014). This is because for 
a country emerging from conflict the array of emergencies is multi-layered, which itself 
requires multi-disciplinary approaches. In addition, it requires an understanding that the 
subject of study is often not the state but actors within the state (such as intra-state armed 
groups). The field of human rights provides a balance in this regard, as it highlights the internal 
paradox between two major principles of international relations and international law: on 
one hand, it is the principle of state sovereignty and non-interference in internal matters of 
that state by foreign states or other actors, and on the other hand, the respect and promotion 
of human rights as a universal and inalienable entitlement of any citizen regardless of their 
country. The literature deriving from such fields such as human rights takes a critical view on 
the state’s undisputed paramountcy over the fate of its citizens, arguing that when there are 
grave human rights abuses committed by that very state against its populace, this ceases to 
be just an internal matter and rather becomes a humanitarian and human rights concern of 
other states, too. Regional and international organizations find themselves obliged to appeal 
for adherence of human rights, to mediate, assist economically, and even intervene 
diplomatically or militarily. The balance in favour of human rights and against non-
interference has been tipped, it seems, after the end of the Cold War and following the civil 
wars in former Yugoslavia, amongst others. This literature, therefore, brings to the fore the 
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increasing importance of offering space to non-state actors, particularly when the state is 
seen as culpable of trampling upon human rights of segments of its population.  
 
The DDR process and the political transformation of former combatants does not necessarily 
just involve local actors of a state. In fact, in most such cases, external actors ranging from the 
UN and its agencies, various embassies, international and regional organisations, will have a 
role to play. They will either help in brokering the peace agreement, mediate in talks between 
warring factions, help oversee the DDR process, or indeed assist in post-war reconstruction 
and reconciliation, state-building and democratisation efforts after the war.  
 
That is why when examining post-conflict transition societies, one should also address the 
role of the so-called international community and its paradigm of “liberal peacekeeping” 
(Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom 2008). By espousing ideas of liberal democracy and human 
rights, the application of this paradigm has been exercised in most post-conflict countries in 
the last two decades or so. For instance, in countries such as Kosovo and FYR Macedonia, the 
international community has been very active in mediating between warring parties and 
facilitating an end to armed conflicts (in the former case by even intervening militarily via 
NATO’s aerial bombing campaign) (Annan and Mousavizadeh 2013). Their engagement 
continued to varying degrees after the conflict, either by providing technical support to the 
implementation of peace agreement (such as in FYR Macedonia), or in helping set up 
institutions from scratch (like they did in Kosovo). International actors such as the UN, EU, 
NATO, US and other individual (Western) countries have played a key role in post-conflict 
reconstruction, institution-building and democratic consolidation in both countries. 
Admittedly, their level of engagement has differed in these two countries, but the challenges 
encountered have been similar. Therefore, to have a fuller picture of the transformation of 
combatants into politics and their impact on democratisation processes, one should also take 
a close look at the role played by international organisations. With their engagement, the 
liberal peacekeeping paradigm promoted and enacted by such organisations has often had a 
determining effect on home politics.       
 
This is the kind of international intervention that we have witnessed in Kosovo and FYR 
Macedonia: one which claims to act on behalf of a liberal peacebuilding and peacekeeping 
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paradigm, and which supports post-conflict democratisation processes as a central 
precondition to making a definitive departure from the past. It is an exercise in “pump-
priming democracy”, while the post-conflict elections (often managed or overseen by 
international actors) is viewed as an effort in “pump-priming peace” (Collier, Hoeffler and 
Söderbom 2008, p. 463).     
 
By way of critically examining peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions, some authors have 
argued that the international community has faltered in striking a right balance between 
peacebuilding, democracy and development. 
While today’s peace operations complement traditional security priorities with efforts to hold 
democratic elections and establish good governance and rule of law programmes, strategies to 
adequately address the specific challenge posed by the political economy of peacebuilding and post-
conflict reconstruction have often lagged behind (Nitzschke and Studdard 2005, p. 226).  
 
Chandler (2006) echoes such sentiments as he reviews the wave of peacebuilding operations 
that took place in the first few years of the twenty-first century. He critically assessed the 
concerted efforts by the UN and other organisations in establishing peacebuilding missions in 
places such as Kosovo, Somalia, Afghanistan, and East Timor. Based on that assessment, 
Chandler highlighted the precarious balance between the promotion of human rights and the 
new policy of interventionism in the name of such rights on one hand, and the principle of 
non-interference in sovereign states on the other. While the UN, NATO and other bodies have 
a responsibility to act when human rights violations occur, this should be done cautiously for 
fear that this principle might be abused, and sovereign states might be attacked under the 
pretext of defending universal human rights (Chandler 2006).   
 
The paradigm of liberal peacekeeping and “liberal peacebuilding” (Le Billon 2008) has guided 
international efforts to move these societies towards a “democratizing, marketizing break 
with the past” (Horowitz 2006, p. 96). Essentially this paradigm has dictated that peace is 
consolidated through democracy and free markets economy, coupled with the creation of a 
non-ethno-centric civic polity and an overarching civic identity and value system. In the case 
of Kosovo and FYR Macedonia, this has meant not just a transition from war to peace, but 
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also a leap from a communist economy into a free market system of capitalism where the 
privatisation of national assets would lead the way towards economic regeneration.  
 
However, one of the challenges encountered with the implementation of this paradigm is that 
the international community can become an overpowering and omnipresent actor on the 
ground, to the point that local partners are side-lined to becoming passive recipients of 
foreign diktats. In both Kosovo and FYR Macedonia, the transition from war to peace has 
come as a result of negotiated accords between warring parties, but where the international 
actors played a crucial role as mediators and even arbitrators to the conflict. But their role did 
not end on the day of the finalization of peace accords but extended well beyond that point. 
Especially in the case of Kosovo, the international community went on to play an omniscient 
role in setting up governance institutions from scratch, with local counterparts tagging along 
the way (O’Neill 2002). Its peacebuilding mission was in fact an international protectorate, 
turning Kosovo into an international tutelage.    
 
Another problem identified in this process has been the issue of reconciling the “dual 
objectives of institution-building and empowerment of local actors” (Lemay-Hébert 2012, p. 
465). In other words, what the above paradigm seems to have produced is a strategy of 
“institutionalization before liberalization”, understood as emphasizing externally-controlled 
institution-building to the detriment of local empowerment. Such was the case, for instance, 
with Kosovo (Di Lellio 2006), where the UN established itself as the protectorate authority in 
the territory and where, to paraphrase its first Chief Sergio Vieira de Mello it exercised powers 
akin to a “benevolent despot” (Lemay-Hébert 2012, p. 469). It seems that the first objective 
(that of building externally-controlled democratic institutions) might have taken an upper 
hand in promoting a procedural kind of democracy (Morlino 2004) without letting the process 
be taken forward by endogenous factors. Such a top-down approach raised legitimacy issues 
and demonstrated that “institution-building has significant limits when it is disconnected 
from the needs and perceptions of the local society targeted by the intervention, 
encompassed here under the concept of local empowerment” (Lemay-Hébert 2012, p. 476).  
 
It should also be remembered that the “international community” is not one single actor with 
a unified decision-making structure and a single objective. In her ethnographic work 
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Autesserre (2014) provides quite a nuanced picture of the multi-nature of the international 
community and its peacebuilding work. The principle of “do no harm” is constantly challenged 
in the field, not because of malicious intent but due to the complex environment where 
peacebuilding missions occur, which involve competing narratives and interests, 
compounded further by conflicting parties (Autesserre 2014).  
 
Therefore, “far from being a monolithic or united bloc, [the international community] consists 
of a broad range of bilateral, multilateral, and nongovernmental actors, which all have 
different mandates, capacities, and interests (De Zeeuw 2008, p. 22). Their involvement is 
multi-layered and multi-dimensional too, depending on the context and country. In Kosovo, 
for instance, their involvement was very thorough and all-pervasive, from facilitating a peace 
agreement, to providing security through its NATO Force, to installing a UN administration. 
They led the way in organising elections, setting up institutions, drafting the constitutional 
framework, providing emergency and economic recovery measures, and installing the rule of 
law. In FYR Macedonia, the international community had a less engaging role because, unlike 
Kosovo between 1999 and 2008, this was already a state. Nevertheless, they helped broker 
the Ohrid Framework Agreement in 2001, and have provided technical advice in matters of 
its implementation over the years. They have also helped political parties reach consensus on 
early elections in 2017, following a series of scandals of the previous government. In both 
cases, the face of this “international community” is the West, mainly represented by the US, 
Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and their allies, through their embassies, aid 
organisations, think tanks and institutes. Russia and its satellites provide another layer of this 
“international community” in the region (Bassuener 2019). However, their many attempts to 
disrupt the installation of a liberal peacebuilding paradigm in the region have not proven 
successful so far. 
 
Within the context of a liberal peacebuilding paradigm as promoted by the international 
community (read: the West), there is a particular set of objectives listed in the rebel-to-party 
transformation: 
 
a) Conflict management and conflict prevention: demobilisation of combatants is key to 
immediate cessation of hostilities; 
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b) Motivated by virtues of a liberal multiparty system, the international community will 
promote a more inclusive political system that entails representation of armed groups 
or their representatives in politics; 
c) The international community will want to make sure that the former combatants will 
not retake arms or engage in criminal activities. This would spoil the peace and with it 
everything that might have been achieved since the end of hostilities (De Zeeuw 
2008). 
The notion of peace spoilers – i.e. former combatants who might disrupt post-conflict peace 
through return to violence - has been discussed at considerable length in academic literature 
(Stedman 1997; Hoddie and Hartzell 2003; Ballentine and Nitzsche 2005; Glassmyer and 
Sambanis 2008; Dudouet, Giessmann and Planta 2012; Lyons 2016; Hansell and Gerdes 2017). 
The gist of the argument is that for peace to work, former combatants must not only return 
to civilian life but that they must be discouraged, disallowed or demotivated to take up arms 
again. In order to achieve this, former combatants are offered economic incentives, amnesty, 
or political space. However, while the argument for pre-empting peace spoilers is a valid one, 
literature has not quite been self-critical and reflective of this argument. That is because what 
they have failed to examine is the long-term impact of former combatants turned politicians 
in the democratic consolidation of their countries. By successfully removing the risk of peace 
spoilers in the immediate aftermath of the conflict, the liberal peacebuilding paradigm has 
had the inadvertent effect of helping to create democracy spoilers in the long-run. Kosovo 
and FYR Macedonia are telling examples of this scenario.     
   
The rationale for the international community and the peacebuilding paradigm to avoid peace 
spoilers is certainly understandable and valid: they wish to achieve long-lasting peace and 
stability. However, post-conflict peace arrives as a result of a negotiated settlement, which in 
effect translates into a negotiated democracy between warring parties. War veterans, 
opposition movements and peace spoilers will inevitably be factored in the new settlement 
and any negotiations henceforth. It follows that for “war veterans and exiles freshly brought 
to power, reconstruction can become a pay-back scheme, with wartime ‘sacrifices’ justifying 
the misuse of newly controlled public offices and positions” (Le Billon 2008, p. 346). In a 
country with weak political institutions, the political actors with the right predatory instinct 
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for power and resources will become key players in reconstruction. The international 
community, on the other hand, tends to tread carefully when counteracting these players, for 
fear of jeopardizing the peace. The result is a “mix of electoral politics and power-sharing 
arrangements [that] can undermine institution building and reduce accountability as each 
faction asserts ‘sovereignty’ over its territorial and institutional turf” (Le Billon 2008, p. 350). 
Those actors who have the right network of friends and acquaintances, which often go back 
to alliances forged during the war, are in an advantageous position to compete for resources 
and power.    
 
For the international community and the local incumbent political elite, the engagement with 
former combatants is fraught with dilemmas. On one hand, it is the option of cooperating 
with former combatants who might have been or are still involved in illicit activities, but in 
return ensuring peace and stability. The other option is to be principled and refuse any 
cooperation with persons who are suspected of illicit involvement. But the danger here is that 
the former combatants who do enjoy widespread popular support through their networks, 
will become dangerous peace spoilers. If left out in the cold they could easily use their 
networks to cause havoc on a hard-won fragile peace. When put in balance, therefore, it is 
perhaps better to bring such actors inside the process and work internally to change 
behaviours and attitudes and maintain peace. That is the reason why the international 
community actors usually end up cooperating with people that they would not normally 
cooperate with, as a price to pay for stability and peace. Mozambique, for example, provides 
a case in point to this inherent dilemma of including or not former combatants in senior 
positions after the war. In many instances, decisions on reintegration of senior officers there 
contributed to organised criminality (McMullin 2013b, p. 232).   
 
However, the side-effect of such a practice is that while stability and peace may indeed be 
maintained, this will be done to the detriment of democracy and the consolidation of 
institutions that are supposed to be bulwarks of democracy. However, this approach to 
ensuring stability and peace at all costs, even it if means collaborating with actors involved in 
illicit activities, has led some to coin the term “stabilitocracy” that is very much applicable for 
the Western Balkan countries undergoing transition. Where “stabilitocracy” is becoming the 
norm, countries are shrouded in “weak democracies with autocratically minded leaders, who 
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govern through informal, patronage networks and claim to provide pro-Western stability in 
the region” (BIEPAG 2017, p. 7). Under such a system, peace is preserved but at a cost of 
eroding democratic principles and norms and undermining civil society and the independent 
media.  
 
Hoddie and Hartzwell (2003) offer an insightful analysis on civil war settlement 
implementation and stability. In their study they have adopted a comparative angle, which 
enables them “to identify common patterns in the peace process that might not prove readily 
apparent when concentrating on the specifics associated with a single state’s efforts to 
transition from civil war to stable polity” (Hoddie and Hartzwell 2003, p. 311). In a post-
conflict setting, stability is key to ensuring implementation of peace accords because stability 
is a by-product or an integral part of democratisation. Without stability, democracy, the rule 
of law, and the creation of inclusive political and security structures, are threatened. Kosovo 
and FRY Macedonia are cases in point about the stability’s importance as a precondition to 
consolidating democracy and the rule of law. However, in actual practice politicians (and the 
international community) are often placing indiscriminate emphasis on the importance of 
preserving stability that democracy and the rule of law take a secondary seat. This is a 
situation in which one can see how stabilitocracy has taken root.  
 
Further, to achieve stability post-conflict accords usually stipulate power-sharing 
arrangements that try to ensure that no ethnic, national or religious community is 
discriminated against. Authors stress the importance of having all sides of warring factions be 
included in democratic governance as a necessary precondition for peace to hold. In the 
context of inter-ethnic animosities, the establishment of power-sharing institutions may 
create incentives for cooperation between different ethnic factors.  
These institutions encourage the previously excluded group to work within the existing political system. 
In this way, the aggrieved ethnic group is brought back into the fold and accommodation may lead to 
peaceful co-existence (Gurses and Rost 2013, p. 473).  
 
In fact, this has been the mantra propagated repeatedly by all international community 
actors, which is stability and power-sharing arrangements that will pave the way for peace 
and democracy. Together with stability, power-sharing institutions that aim to be inclusive of 
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all ethnic, national and/or religious communities, are then prerequisites for the creation and 
consolidation of democratic institutions.  
 
In the context of the case studies of Kosovo and FYR Macedonia, this was translated into the 
inclusion of former guerrilla decision-makers into political players partaking equally with 
others in power-sharing institutions. In theory, the idea behind such agreements is to offer a 
democratic formula of fair and direct representation for all constituent (ethnic, religious, 
national) elements of a country. However, in practice, sometimes power-sharing agreements 
tend to be another name for a de facto segregated system of representation entrenched 
along ethnic lines, in which each one takes care of their own kind. Since 1999, Kosovo has had 
a coalition government comprised of the majority ethnic Albanian representatives, but also 
of minorities representing Serb, Turkish, Roma and other communities. While they belong to 
the same government, they tend to rather lead separate lives and serve to their own 
constituencies. Likewise, since its conflict FYR Macedonia has had power-sharing 
governments comprised of Slav Macedonians and ethnic Albanians. The agreement between 
the parties’ representatives was that each one would represent their own communities and, 
by that logic, carve out zones of interest and resources along the same lines. To describe such 
a deformed version of power-sharing governments, Mansfield and Snyder (2002) have coined 
the term “log-rolling”, meaning “mutual back-scratching among narrowly self-serving 
interests. In forging a logrolled bargain, each group in the coalition agrees to support the 
others on the issue that each cares about most” (Mansfield and Snyder 2002, p. 302). 
Therefore, in practice, power-sharing arrangements and a blind emphasis on stability may be 
used to reinforce hold over electorates as if they were political feuds, and to maintain 
clientelistic practices and corruption, which have direct knock-on effects on democracy and a 
fair and inclusive system of governance.  
5. Corruption, clientelism and post-conflict predation 
(…) informal practices are not mere ‘local’ phenomena but inherent in international practices of 
statebuilding and peacebuilding and therefore co-constitute the socio-economic development of post-
conflict societies and their economies of peace (Distler 2018, p. 287). 
 
While the emphasis on peace and stability may ensure that the country does not return to 
conflict, it does not guarantee a definitive transition to democracy. Also, societies in 
55 
 
transition, or post-conflict societies, almost by definition provide fertile grounds for the 
enrichment of a handful of people through means of patronage, corruption and crime. Even 
after conflict former combatants continue to cultivate a tightly knit network of comrades who 
might have similar objectives in mind. If those objectives relate to extorting and expropriating 
arbitrarily the state’s assets, then a truly democratic peace that ensures the application of 
norms and rules of good governance may restrict their ability to do that. That is why authors 
raise the signal that elites that grow strong amid civil war are likely to oppose reforms that 
could endanger their means of rent-seeking and predation, such as racketeering, smuggling, 
illegal private taxation, drug cultivation, and, above all, corruption (Zürcher 2011, p. 84). The 
two case studies of this study provide clear empirical data that support exactly such a claim. 
 
Belloni and Strazzari (2014) go a step further when they claim that in the post-conflict political 
system, natives and internationals alike cohabit and collude with corruption and crime, as an 
acceptable modus operandi that preserves peace and stability. The lack of formal structures 
in the war period, they argue, leads to the emergence of political leaders who did not have 
democratic credentials but whose legitimacy derived from sources like violence and 
patronage. “In this politico-economic system corruption is not an aberration caused by the 
presence of a few dishonest public officials: it is structural, and becomes standard operating 
procedure” (Belloni and Strazzari 2014, p. 857).  
 
In such settings, formal state structures continue to grapple with weakness and inefficiency. 
A part of the reason for this fragile situation derives from the “strategic behaviour [of] elites 
who are involved in a predatory project of extracting resources from the state” (Krastev 2002, 
p. 50). According to this claim that looks sceptically at the international community’s good 
intent on leading peacebuilding missions, the international actors are themselves involved, 
together with the local counterparts, in the underground world of corruption and 
conspiracies. The real objective, according to this scenario, is to maintain stability while 
extending the predatory reach for plunder and preaching the language of peace and 
democracy for the masses. The line between formal practices and informality become quite 
blurred (Distler 2018). The local politicians (in this case, former combatants) are more than 
willing to collude, being as they already are involved into illicit activities such as corruption, 
money-laundering and organised crime.  
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Corruption works as a ‘compensation chamber’ that enables power relations to be reproduced, despite 
formal constraints and rules; indeed, it can be a way to speed the achievement of formalised deals, 
endowing them with an informal substantial dimension (Belloni and Strazzari 2014, p. 868).  
 
In both case studies, particularly in Kosovo, there is evidence to suggest that the international 
community is partly responsible for allowing corruption and crime to thrive. This was done 
either because certain individuals of the international community benefited themselves from 
illicit transactions, or because the preservation of peace and stability, as they saw it, required 
a certain degree of laxness in the face of underground activities taking place. 
 
Despite empirical evidence pointing to the expansion of democracy in conflict-ridden 
countries - former Yugoslav countries are cases in point, having all made a relatively successful 
transition to democracy today - there are authors who highlight the negative aspects of this 
transition. Authors such as Proksik (2013) take an uncompromising view, stating that there is 
a potential for crime elements to penetrate every pore of institutional life. According to this 
view, the process of democratic consolidation is constantly frustrated by crime elements in 
politics and society. In the case of Kosovo, he lists the international community whose mission 
it has been to install democracy and build institutions from scratch. On the other side, it is the 
“organized structures” deriving mainly from the KLA who have managed to impose 
themselves on those emerging democratic institutions. Since immediate stability is the focus 
of the international community, so the argument goes, criminal elements have been allowed 
to consolidate their structures further.  
The NATO-brokered demilitarization granted the former power structures of the KLA with a dominant 
role in Kosovo’s future security architecture and thereby endowed Kosovo Albanian (para)military 
elements frequently linked to violence and organized crime with disproportionate political influence 
(Proksik 2013, p. 288).  
    
However, I submit that the picture is more complex, and not quite as portrayed by Proksik 
(2013). The author does not seem to differentiate between crime elements in war-wing 
parties and those representatives who have made a relatively successful career as politicians. 
In other words, not all combatants-turned-politicians are crooks, and it is our job as 
researchers to break down generalisations and identify the nuances in the quest for truth.  
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Therefore, drawing a clear line between the international community operating in a post-
conflict zone, and the national institutions, where one has altruistic objectives and the other 
one is corrupt, is simplistic. In an area where such actors are involved, the spheres of 
responsibility are more complex than that. The so-called “global peacebuilding industry” 
(Lindberg and Orjuela 2014, p. 726) coupled with the “global reconciliation industry” (Wilson 
2003, cited in Eastmond 2010, p. 4) in post-war countries has become amenable to living with 
corruption and crime for the sake of overall stability. In fact, “turning a blind eye to various 
types of corruption is sometimes seen as necessary to sustain a fragile peace, while the influx 
of foreign funds in support of reconstruction may further extend the opportunities for 
corruption” (Lindberg and Orjuela 2014, p. 724). It follows that predatory behaviour cannot 
exist in a vacuum: while local leaders (who often derive from intra-state armed groups) may 
indeed be culpable of corruption, organized crime or patronage, international actors often 
turn a blind eye to these phenomena. Worse still, they may be complicit in covering up 
predatory behaviour, underlining the need for social stability as of paramount importance. 
Such literature offering a critique on the liberal peacebuilding paradigm has enabled me to 
critically assess the long-term role of former combatants-turned-politicians in 
democratisation processes. This has led me to coin the term “democracy spoilers” to illustrate 
their corroding impact on democracy as a result of crime and corruption.       
 
Other authors have drawn attention to the criminalised aspects of intra-state groups, to those 
individuals who will use war efforts, as noble as they may be, for personal enrichment during 
and after war has ended. They are the war profiteers, human and arms traffickers, and 
smugglers who seem to be able to infiltrate and/or hijack the causes of war. Taking Bosnia 
and Herzegovina as an example, Andreas (2004) notes how these actors do not just profit 
from the war but are seldom in key and decisive positions following the armed conflict. By 
being integral elements to the very conduct of conflict, “these actors emerge from the 
devastation of war as part of a new elite with close ties to political leaders and the security 
apparatus, often impeding reforms and complicating post-war reconstruction efforts” 
(Andreas 2004, p. 31). The chapter of the field findings echoes such findings when discussing 
the rise of an economic and political nouveau riche that is responsible for throwing the old 
order and imposing a new one dictated by them. 
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When we realise the depth of interaction between criminal elements and politics, there is no 
longer a clear-cut case of predation as an activity on one hand, and politics on the other.  
Indeed, in post-war times the level of illicit collaboration with crime elements is so pervasive 
that it is difficult to distinguish politics from crime, and vice versa. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
for example, many aspects of the “criminalized conflict are state-sponsored and directly serve 
political interests, such as when political leaders subcontract out key tasks to criminals and 
smugglers, because they either cannot or prefer not to perform these tasks themselves” 
(Andreas 2004, p. 32). It follows that politics in a post-conflict country may often take the 
form of clandestine interaction between formal institutions and the informal, underground 
world. Corruption and predation have to do with “the emergence of different power 
constellations and of a distinctive form of the state, characterised by hybrid systems of 
accountability, discontinuous forms of regulation and control, and pervasive extra-legal 
governance structures” (Belloni and Strazzari 2014, p. 868). 
 
How to cut the formal versus informal ties of power relations without affecting the fragile 
stability of a country coming out of conflict? Informality equals corruption, and corruption 
corrodes stability and democracy. So how does one appease former combatants in return for 
them handing out weapons and going home? More importantly, their leaders’ buy-in in 
democratic processes is essential for democracy, peace and stability, but at what price? 
 
In countries in transition corruption has often been viewed as a necessary evil which helps 
preserve stability. How can corruption “buy peace”? It can in situations when peace is 
“purchased through the integration of a restive competitive elite or large-scale redistribution 
to the restive masses” (Le Billon 2003, p. 421). This claim applies quite well to the two case 
studies discussed here. In Kosovo this “restive political elite” came in the form of PDK and the 
smaller AAK as direct descendants of the KLA. In FYR Macedonia it came in the form of DUI 
which was a direct descendant of the NLA. What became obvious very early on is that their 
political inclusion in post-conflict accords was necessary to maintaining peace and stability. 
This process of buying peace by accommodating the restless elements of an armed group can 
be interpreted as a corruptive one. But, as paradoxical as this might sound, as much as it is 
corruptive, it is also conducive to a stable political environment. And therein lays the paradox: 
attempting to do away with corruption in one instant may be detrimental to the fragile 
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stability of the country, which can potentially deal a blow to democratic institutions and rule 
of law. Corruption, in other words, “is part of the fabric of social and political relationships”. 
It is endogenous in character, which means that “conflicts may arise more from changes in 
the pattern of corruption, than from corruption itself. Domestic or external shocks affecting 
the pattern of corruption may therefore contribute to conflict, particularly when corruption 
is pervasive” (Le Billon 2003, p. 414). 
 
What is usually evidenced in countries affected by war is the class and social impact it has on 
the society. “War not only involves military confrontation, but also a radical social 
transformation. As part of this transformation, many who lived on the margins of society 
experience rapid upward mobility that would have been inconceivable in peacetime” 
(Andreas 2004, p. 49). As both cases of Kosovo and FYR Macedonia show, combatants who 
joined intra-state armed groups are more likely to come from impoverished and rural 
communities rather than urban and affluent ones. They are more likely to have been cast at 
the margins of society, facing discrimination at school, at work or in everyday life. Joining the 
armed movement is therefore transformed in a quick way to turn some life corners and reach 
for the economic and societal affluency that would have otherwise been impossible for them 
to achieve.   
Smuggling and criminal actors can contribute to the outbreak and persistence of war, but also to its 
conclusion. Smuggling and criminal actors can contribute to the looting of the country, but also to its 
survival. [..] Smuggling and criminal actors can stymie and complicate international conflict resolution 
initiatives, but international interventions can also fuel smuggling and enrich criminals. Postwar 
reconstruction is hindered and distorted by a criminalized smuggling economy, but such clandestine 
commerce is also an essential survival strategy for many people in the face of dire economic conditions. 
(Andreas 2004, p. 49).  
Following the same logic, the post-war era brings with it a great many opportunities for 
combatants to climb the social ladder rapidly. A new social class is thus born, which overthrow 
the old and imposes itself upon society, as elaborated in the chapter on the field findings.   
 
International organisations themselves are not immune from corrupt practices. In fact, 
empirical evidence suggests that they are just as culpable in condoning corrupt practices as 
their local counterparts. Experience tells us that international community representatives 
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have knowingly involved themselves in corruption as a way of buying political stability or 
buying off political opponents or restive groups. “This strategy has even been used, with some 
measure of success, in conflict resolution and peacekeeping initiatives” (Le Billon 2001, p. 7). 
 
Corruption becomes a means to satisfy post-war predation and address grievances of restive 
groups. It corrodes transparent democratic principles and practices and undermines the 
formality of elected institutions and structures. It is maintained through the extension of 
clientelistic circles, accommodating into its bosom any new dissenting voices that are 
prepared to provide credible opposition to the establishment. They may come from 
opposition political parties, or they may be journalists, civil society activists, students’ 
associations. But regardless of their background, the recipe is the same: when dissention 
becomes visibly threatening to the established political order, they are offered a prize – a 
position in government, a tender or a stake is a business – which usually silences them. And 
often, they accept the offer. This culture of political corruption “can be conducive to social 
and political peace as the pattern of co-optation is used throughout the structure of society 
– from upper to lower classes – therefore be broadly legitimated, given acceptation of social 
order and the existence of coercive forces” (Le Billon 2001, p. 7). This quote is completely 
applicable to my case studies because in a situation of poor economic development and high 
unemployment such as in Kosovo and FYR Macedonia, the chances of silencing dissent 
through corruption seem to be greater. In other words, it is harder to stick to some pure ideals 
when one’s very existence is doubtful due to lack of jobs and prospects for a better future.  
 
In post-war divided societies where the “centrifugal tendencies of ethnic politics” (Hislope 
2005) are still at play, corruption can offer rival parties a proportionate stake in the system. 
Corruption may even serve as an antidote to nationalism, and “corrupt exchange among 
ethnic party elites fosters durable multiethnic coalition government and, thereby, reduces 
the possibility of interethnic violence” (Hislope 2005, p. 12). Every government in Kosovo from 
1999 onwards has had representatives of ethnic minorities in its ranks, and not just Serbs but 
also Turks, Roma etc. Their inclusion in government is to this day taken for granted, and 
indeed they are ensured a quota of representation in parliament. Likewise, every government 
in FYR Macedonia from its independence in 1991 to this day (including the time of the armed 
conflict in 2001) has had an ethnic Albanian party in its coalition. An inclusive government 
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which ensures that minority members are adequately represented should be applauded, one 
could say. That is correct, and it is true that in this respect both countries’ legislation after 
their respective conflicts has been favourable to equal representation, and even to positive 
discrimination. The issue is, though, that governance, be it at central level or at municipal 
level, still seems like an artificially enforced business. It resembles a marriage of convenience 
whereby parties coalesce with the aim of forming a coalition, motivated primarily by their 
interest at gaining access to the riches of government. “When political dissensus defines 
interethnic group relations, corrupt exchange among rival ethnic elites can purchase peace 
by giving each side a stake and personal interest in the system” (Hislope 2005, p. 17). 
 
Regardless of who is behind them, illicit activities play a detrimental effect on post-war 
democratisation processes. A country conducting relatively free and fair elections may be 
considered to have made a departure from its conflict past and to have become a democracy, 
but a more basic or electoral kind of democracy as opposed to a liberal democracy where 
there is a wide application of civil liberties (EIU 2019; Freedom House 2019). But how 
inclusive, participatory and transparent is the regime which still fulfils only the basic 
requirements of a democracy? In countries facing transition today, we see the rise of the new 
elite that has the power, the network and the money to influence politics, to shape 
institutions, and to control the media and civil society. By doing so, they exert an undeniable 
influence in the process of transition, leading to warnings of a case of “state capture”, defined 
here as the “capacity to influence the formation of the basic rules of the game (i.e. laws, rules, 
decrees and regulation) through private payments to public officials” (Hellman, Jones and 
Kaufmann 2000, p. 4). This definition perfectly fits the profile of the political systems in both 
Kosovo and FYR Macedonia. This hampers democratic consolidation, prompting several 
authors to highlight the “war-prone” or fragile nature of “democratizing societies” (Wolf et al 
1996; Mansfield and Snyder 2002). 
 
When faced with state capture, high levels of corruption and predation, democratic 
institutions grapple to exert formal influence. As nascent as they may be, they are left 
underdeveloped and vulnerable to political intrusion, which has a damaging impact on their 
independence, neutrality and overall performance. Meanwhile, the political elite 
concentrates their power in the hands of a few, while intimidating opposing voices. 
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Space for opposition parties, civil society, and the media is shrinking, and international support for them 
is drying up. Ethnic, religious, and other identity cleavages polarize many societies that lack well-
designed democratic institutions to manage those cleavages. State structures are too often weak and 
porous – unable to secure order, protect rights, meet the most basic social needs, or rise above corrupt, 
clientelistic, and predatory impulses (Diamond 2015, p. 149).      
 
What the above author neglects to mention explicitly is that at times state capture does not 
necessarily entail a visible curtailment of civic space and the media. The sinister ploy of 
politicians responsible for state capture is to allow space for opposition to take place; 
however, the dissent is carefully controlled and allowed to take place only so as to give people 
the illusion of genuine political pluralism. 
  
Larry Diamond (2008; 2015) offers insightful analyses on how democracies, particularly young 
ones, can be subjected to serious challenges today. He explains that poor governance is a 
constant plague that threatens democracies everywhere. Those most at risk appear to be 
“trapped in patterns of corrupt and abusive rule that it is hard to see how they can survive as 
democracies without significant reform” (Diamond 2008, pp. 42-43). In the absence of serious 
and meaningful reforms, this may easily lead to a “predatory state”. In such states, democracy 
and democratization are façades that embellish a cynical and opportunistic behaviour by the 
political elite. Yes, elections may well be held, and yes, they may appear to be competitive, 
fair and democratic. Further, elections may even pass the test of legitimacy in the eyes of 
election observers who will report that they have met certain international standards. But, in 
fact elections become “a bloody zero-sum struggle in which everything is at stake and no one 
can afford to lose” (Diamond 2008, p. 43). The state is thus turned into a predatory, 
clientelistic enterprise in which people are not citizens and real sovereigns of the country but 
are instead turned into clients of powerful local bosses (read: patrons).  
Stark inequalities in power and status create vertical chains of dependency, secured by patronage, 
coercion, and demagogic electoral appeals to ethnic pride and prejudice (…) The most egregious 
predatory states produce predatory societies. People do not get rich through productive activity and 
honest risk-taking; they get rich by manipulating power and privilege, by stealing from the state, 
extracting from the weak, and shirking the law (Diamond 2008, p. 43).   
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This corresponds with the data from the field of my case studies: the political regimes there 
are not outright authoritarian. In fact, they are democratic, however fragile. But the long-
term danger to the system is the almost undetectable perpetuation of clientelist networks 
that are hard to break. 
   
In his seminal book on patronal politics, Hale (2015) provides a detailed account on the formal 
realms of politics versus the informal mechanisms that can dominate public discourse. In fact, 
he argues that corruption, predation and patron-client relations cultivate such strong bonds 
that the very system may be maintained by them. When corruption and informality are so 
pervasive and endemic, they are not simply a “tumor on the body politic”, they are rather 
“the body’s lifeblood” (…) “Not only do they course throughout the whole of society (…) but 
they deliver vital nourishment that keeps society functioning and growing” (Hale 2015, p. 19). 
This argument points to the vicious cycle, maintained by informal relations, that may be 
created between politicians who adopt a patron’s role versus the voters who are placed in a 
client’s role. The phenomenon of clientelism is thus installed which feeds off informal 
exchanges of favours and bribes, and which is deeply corrosive of formal state institutions 
and democratic consolidation.    
Patronal politics refers to politics in societies where individuals organize their political and economic 
pursuits primarily around the personalized exchange of concrete rewards and punishments through 
chains of actual acquaintance, and not primarily around abstract, impersonal principles such as 
ideological belief or categorizations like economic class that include many people one has not actually 
met in person. In this politics of individual reward and punishment, power goes to those who can mete 
these out, those who can position themselves as patrons with a large and dependent base of clients 
(Hale 2015, pp. 9-10). 
 
Ironically, clientelism is difficult to uproot because considerable swathes of society may be 
dependent on it. Clientelism maintains a system, leaving fledgling democracies in a grey zone 
between their conflict pasts and an unfulfilled consolidated democracy in the future. 
According to Hicken (2011) clientelism is defined as a system that feeds off a “dyadic 
relationship” between politicians and voters, in which the former provide favours in the form 
of jobs and resources, while the latter provide support in the form of votes (Hicken 2011, p. 
291). A part of the reason for the clientelistic nature of democracies in transition are the 
formal-informal networks nourished by the political leadership which is comprised to a great 
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degree by former combatants turned politicians. The underlying causes for the creation of 
such a nefarious system that undermines fledgling democracies is predation and is the pursuit 
for personal riches and power. 
 
One of the moments of depression after the war is exactly this clientelistic network that 
enriches a few but keeps the majority poor. In a post-independence, underdeveloped context, 
clientelistic relations help to concentrate the wealth in the hands of a small group of people 
(those who are close to the powerholders), while keeping the ordinary citizens under a silent 
suppression of poverty. This is true, for example, for many countries in Africa, where the 
“disappointment of independence” has led to calls by ordinary people for a “second 
independence”, triggered by an increased awareness that the economic plight is primarily 
caused by “the monopoly of power enjoyed by a failed leadership” (Ake 1993, p. 240).  In such 
a context, the task of state-building and institution-building may generate “façade institutions 
where much governance and power continues to be concentrated in and implemented 
through informal structures; ranging from systems of patronage, regional or ethnic bonds, to 
old political and military ties” (Themnér and Utas 2016, p. 256). The authors here refer to the 
existence of informal governance functions that take charge of maintaining security or 
distributing economic resources and, in so doing, de facto outsourcing some state functions. 
In this sense, this sort of “governance through brokerage” is a tool – albeit an informal one – 
“for governing elites to integrate what is often perceived as problematic groups into the 
statebuilding process, and a mechanism that empowers war-affected groups” (Themnér and 
Utas 2016, p. 257). In Liberia, for example, the governing elites helped distribute patronage 
to different former combatant communities as a way of alleviating their economic grievances.  
 
In many respects this is a phenomenon of Bigmanity (Utas 2012) identified especially in 
different contexts in Africa. Bigmanity holds a few key characteristics: 
- It is based on social relations. Big Men transform social relations into strategic power and 
control. 
- Big Men do not generally control followers. In fact; it is in the interest of followers to 
maintain ties with a Big Man because he is best positioned to provide economic possibilities, 
protection and social security. 
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- Bigmanity is a response to a lack of formal structures. Big Men wield a great deal of social 
power in situations where there is a structural void. Big Man power is seen as an alternative 
form of governance, where the national state does not reach (Utas 2012, p. 8). Cases of the 
prevalence of the Bigmanity principle are discerned in countries such as Uganda, Sierra Leone, 
Congo, Liberia, Ethiopia, etc. (Clapham 2018; Utas 2012).  
 
Mkandawire (2002) echoes these descriptions when he talks about neopatrimonial regimes 
in Africa, where the chief executive “maintains authority through personal patronage, rather 
than through ideology or law” (Mkandawire 2002, p. 184). In this patron-client relationship 
the primary goal for all concerned in the race for political office, power and self-enrichment. 
However, he also cautions against the simplistic interpretation of neo-patrimonialism and 
clientelism as a “kind of Panglosian gloss (that) is given to the many malfunctionings that 
afflict Africa” (Mkandawire 2011, p. 21). Clientelism and the neo-patrimonial practices, he 
argues, may explain greed-related conflicts, but grievance should not be discounted as a 
genuine cause for a lot of social ailments in Africa.   
5.1 Grievance leading to conflict, followed by predation 
Predatory elites sit at natural odds with a democratised system. They are each other’s obvious 
adversaries. The more democratised a society is, the greater the threat to the predatory 
instincts of the political elites. The more transparent and accountable the latter is forced to 
be, the narrower the space for their predatory practices to occur. In transitional societies, 
those who hold power often see democratisation as a problem rather than a solution and 
may well prefer a form of government which is removed from liberal democracy, but which 
would ensure their political survival (Zürcher 2011, p. 85). There are plenty of cases when the 
post-conflict elites tend to push off democratisation and instead put an emphasis on 
stabilisation of the country (Keen 2012). Zürcher further raises the point that in countries such 
as Kosovo and Bosnia (and, I would add, FYR Macedonia) “liberal democracy poses a threat 
to the monoethnic fiefdoms on which elites have built their power” (Zürcher 2011, p. 91). 
Post-war stability, therefore, ought not always be synonymous with, or even a precondition 
to, democracy. Stability in such a scenario is preserving power-sharing arrangements for the 
enrichment or empowerment of new elites.      
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This connects to the post-conflict predatory behaviour of combatants. Although this thesis 
focuses on democratisation processes after the conflict, it is important to focus on the initial 
motivations of people joining armed groups. In so doing, I aim to obtain a picture over the 
corrosive effects that greed and predatory behaviour have over democratisation processes. 
However, there is a seemingly minor but essential element in the debate about predatory 
behaviour (or greed versus grievance dichotomy) which has not been discussed in literature 
with the attention it deserves. And that is the time factor. I argue that if we apply a time shift 
forward to when the war is over, the above dichotomy will be applied to completely new 
circumstances. In times of peace, when war is over and the agreement is reached, the 
predatory behaviour is strengthened, reinvigorated and takes a whole new meaning and 
relevance, which impacts directly on democratisation processes. 
 
In the post-war setting, the factions of organised crime and underworld activities are a spill-
over effect of demobilisation and deviant reintegration. Such phenomena can have a serious 
impact on democratic processes and might pose a threat to peace with continuing regional 
ramifications (Berdal and Malone 2000; Clewlow 2010b). I identify this as a security paradox 
within international relations of transitional societies, because sometimes the results of 
reintegration or transformation can have unintended consequences. There are bound to be 
former combatants who will undergo the DDR process but who will carry those camaraderie 
networks nourished during the war into times of peace with illicit objectives in mind. In so 
doing, they may establish crime and corruption networks that may bring immediate riches for 
them and their closed circle of friends and allies. What is more, former combatants turned 
politicians may well be involved in such illicit activities. In societies undergoing transition to 
democracy, these are formidable challenges of informal networks undercutting the hard work 
of formal political networks that are involved in furthering democratisation processes. These 
are examples of such deviant reintegration and transformation practices in post-war settings. 
Therefore, tackling issues of corruption and organized crime are intrinsic and corrosive side-
effects of a society in transition (Thachuk 2005; Tanner 2007).     
 
Scholars have waged a lively debate about the root causes of conflict, more specifically civil 
wars. Authors such as Collier (2001), Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Murshed and Tadjoeddin 
(2009), or Berdal and Malone (2000) have been vocal about highlighting economic factors 
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influencing insurgency movements. The common denominator of their theory notes that 
genuine plights have been abused with, and wars have been waged, for personal enrichment 
of certain individuals who have seen opportunities in the grievance of other people. They 
have argued that, although there obviously are genuine causes for grievance stemming from 
social deprivation or oppression, the causes of grievance are often hijacked by certain 
individuals who are driven by greed and drive for economic control. “Conflicts are far more 
likely to be caused by economic opportunities than by grievance (…) Civil wars create 
economic opportunities for a minority of actors even as they destroy them for the majority” 
(Berdal and Malone 2000, p. 91). 
 
However, such an interpretation of the emergence of intra-state armed conflicts or civil wars 
has been criticised for being too insensitive and simplistic a theory as to why wars occur. This 
is because the theory almost by default excludes the possibility that people might take up 
arms against state repression. Indeed, it weighs too heavily on the assumption that the state 
will not show too abhorrent a behaviour towards a certain group of the population, which 
proves to be the real trigger factor for rebellion. In his manifesto on the subject, Keen (2012) 
acknowledges that “‘greed’ (in the sense of economic motivation) is an important factor 
propelling violence in a great many civil wars” (Keen 2012, p. 759). However, he is against a 
one-dimensional interpretation over the causes of conflict, stressing the legitimacy of many 
insurgency movements against ruthless regimes. Indeed, blaming just greed for insurgency 
movements is “politically convenient”. Moreover,  
The work represents a pretty far-reaching deligitimization of political violence that might threaten 
existing power structures; it provides an important alibi for a range of abusive states; and it chimes 
nicely with a neo-imperial zeitgeist that attributes various kinds of beneficial and healing powers to 
western military intervention and occupation (Keen 2012, p. 758). 
 
Ballentine and Nitzschke (2005) have argued that inferring individual motivations of “wanting 
to do well out of the war” to the whole rebel movement is hardly a precise conclusion for its 
reason for being. Also, let us not forget the role that the state plays in committing crimes and 
indeed of prolonging the war, which is an aspect that seems to go amiss with Collier et al. 
Furthermore, “casting rebellion as a merely criminal rather than political activity may 
foreclose opportunities for diplomatic solutions” (Ballentine and Nitzschke 2005, p. 5). As 
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noted above, whenever armed hostilities come to an end, former combatants will most likely 
be part of peace accords or, even more, be part of government structures.  
 
The question of why people join armed movements is one which continues to attract 
discussions among academic and policy circles alike. Conjoined with the “greed versus 
grievance” dichotomy is the perennial question on why people become combatants. What 
security ramifications or risks are there for men who become combatants versus those who 
refuse to join ranks? Common sense tells us that joining war efforts will increase the likelihood 
of harm, which in normal circumstances should act as a discouragement to wear the uniform. 
Such a “collective action problem” paradigm has purported to explain social group’s 
predicament to joining demonstrations, protests or social movements. By the same token, 
joining an army in war will increase the risks posed to individuals which, according to this 
argument, decreases the number of people who want to join.  
 
However, authors such as Kalyvas and Kocher (2007) have also highlighted that there are 
certain benefits and incentives which one derives from joining the war, too. In fact, in many 
instances “the costs of nonparticipation and free riding often equal or even exceed those of 
participation: while it is undoubtedly true that rebels run serious personal risks in war zones, 
war is very dangerous for nonrebels as well” (Kalyvas and Kocher 2007, p. 183). Therefore, in 
times of war, staying home and not joining does not necessarily equate with greater safety. 
On the contrary, often being without a weapon might increase the likelihood of danger for 
oneself and one’s family. This follows that joining the rebel army and the war efforts might 
provide you with a degree of safety, symbolized by the Kalashnikov you might be holding and 
the comrades around you. In the aftermath of conflict, it is those same comrades who will be 
likely strengthen clientelistic networks and adopt a predatory behaviour that will damage the 
country’s democratic transition. Both Kosovo and FYR Macedonia prove that there were 
certain benefits which some of those who fought (mainly those in leadership positions) would 
come to enjoy precisely because they were part of such war efforts.   
 
6. Conclusion 
In a world where most conflict are waged within the borders of existing states, the role of 
intra-state armed groups ⁠—otherwise known as rebel, guerrilla, liberation movements, or 
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insurgencies ⁠—often determines not just the outcome of the conflict but also the viability of 
post-war peace processes. From Colombia to Northern Ireland, from Aceh to Nepal, from 
Burundi to South Sudan, there are numerous cases that testify to the role played by 
combatants not just during conflict but in its aftermath, too. 
 
Usually, such groups follow a similar trajectory of development. The breeding ground that 
fosters their creation is the marginalization or repression of an ethnic or religious group by 
state authorities, coupled by demands for equal human rights, autonomy or independence 
by that group. If those demands are ignored, stifled or suppressed by the state, an armed 
resistance or insurgency may come to life. The intra-state armed conflict that ensues usually 
comes to an end after a defeat, a mutually hurting stalemate, if there is intervention from 
abroad, or if there is mutual interest to reach a peace agreement. In the process, rebel groups 
tend to become legitimate stakeholders of the agreement and the ensuing implementation 
of peace accords. In a rather paradoxical change of circumstance, former enemies become 
indispensable partners for peace and reconciliation, and while substituting bullets for ballots, 
some combatants create political parties and submit themselves to the will of the vote as 
politicians. The inclusion of former combatants in politics is a common practice for post-
conflict, transitory societies. Such inclusion is advisable given the necessity to create durable 
peace that accommodates the interests of former soldiers and their constituencies. It is also 
encouraged as a way of preventing spoiler effects that could arise should they feel aggrieved 
at the lack of political representation (Manning 2007; Curtis and de Zeeuw 2009; Dudouet 
2009; Metsola 2010; McMullin 2013b; Söderström 2016; Hansell and Gerdes 2017; Isacson 
2018). 
 
The literature review for this thesis has borrowed from an eclectic mix of sources such as 
international relations, security, peacebuilding and conflict resolution, democratisation and 
post-conflict predation. The chapter conducted a mapping of the academic discussion on the 
role of intra-state armed groups’ representatives in the post-conflict period, including their 
involvement in politics.  
 
Firstly, the chapter reviewed the literature discussion on DDR and political transformation 
from fields such as international relations, security and securitization studies. Current 
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literature offers a variety of cases of combatants undergoing DDR processes, which may mean 
a return to prior civilian life, reengagement in other security forces, or involvement in politics 
(Glassmyer and Sambanis 2008; Humphreys and Weinstein 2008; Dudouet 2012; Dudouet, 
Giessmann and Planta 2012; Blease and Qehaja 2013). Literature now also recognises armed 
groups as equal and necessary partners in striking peace accords, considered as a vital link for 
the enactment and survival of a post-conflict peace and a cohesive social contract (Knight and 
Özerdem 2004; Dudouet, Giessmann and Planta 2012).  
 
Similarly, the discussion on the political transformation of former combatants looks mainly at 
the “structural” and “attitudinal” challenges of this transformation (De Zeeuw 2008). It 
underlines the importance that a successful political transformation can have for peace 
accords, as well as for the reengagement of former combatants through the means of ballot 
papers as opposed to weapons (Ishiyama 2016; Manning and Smith 2016). A successful 
transformation of former combatants in politics means a definitive break from the violent 
past and the installation of a potentially peaceful and democratic regime in the country.     
 
While the literature on DDR deals largely with the immediate technical aspects of the 
combatants’ reintegration in society, the discussion on political transformation focuses on the 
politics and the political dynamics after the conflict. They both underline that the importance 
of DDR and of political transformation is inherently linked with long-lasting peace. However, 
these discussions focus mainly on the early stages of the combatants’ engagement after 
conflict. They offer little in terms of the long-term effects of reintegration, particularly of 
political transformation. They give primacy to peace and do not necessarily delve into the 
democratic quality that is built over three-four political mandates and further. I concur with 
Söderström (2016) when she argues that the research on the “transformation of armed 
groups into political parties has focused on explaining the transformation itself (…) rather 
than its effects on individual ex-combatants (or indeed the long-term workings of such 
parties” (Söderström 2016, p. 215). The impact of long-term transformation of combatants in 
politics remains a moot question.    
 
Secondly, an integral part of DDR and political transformation is the process of 
democratisation or post-conflict democratic transition. Democratisation studies deal with the 
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emergence of multi-party democracy, and examine notions of inclusivity, transparency and 
representation. Within this framework, democratisation studies also examine the 
“organisational transformation” (Dudouet 2009, p. 8) of intra-sate armed groups from illegal 
guerrilla formations to mainstream political parties. A multi-dimensional transition (from war 
to peace, from weapon to ballot paper, from soldier to politician) is assessed by the literature. 
Post-conflict institutional set-ups such as power-sharing arrangements, state-building and 
institution-building (Gromes 2009), are examined as an integral part of democratisation 
literature.  
 
Given the ailing state of democracy in the world today (Munck 2016; EIU 2019; International 
IDEA 2019b; Krastev and Holmes 2019), academic and policy-making literature offers a wide 
range of studies on the challenges facing democratisation. Such challenges range from 
authoritarian tendencies betrayed by democratically-elected leaders, to democratic 
backsliding and executive aggrandizement (Diamond 2015; Bermeo 2016), to the dangers of 
rapid democratization (Keen 2012) when complex social grievances of different strata of 
society are not accommodated. Contemporary literature also underlines the beleaguered 
state of liberal democracy, affected by crises of migration and globalisation, the financial crisis 
and the austerity measures of a decade ago. Their influence is felt to this day in the form of a 
disenchanted electorate with mainstream politics and the rise of populism, nativism and 
radicalism (Bieber 2018; Krastev 2018; Krastev and Holmes 2019). 
 
The moot points in the literature on democratisation relate to identifying correlations 
between setbacks in democratisation processes and the role of former combatants turned 
politicians. For instance, in general power-sharing arrangements are viewed as good 
balancing acts between different warring factions which are meant to ensure sustainable 
peace and representation. However, literature falls short of critically examining some devious 
aspects of power-sharing arrangements which often relate to the feudalisation of 
ethnic/religious/national electorates for the narrow benefits of political parties.   
 
The literature on conflict resolution and conflict transformation (Lederach 2002; Miall, 
Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 2003), as well as that on post-war security and development 
(Duffield 2014) complements further our understanding of the complex challenges related to 
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peace and democratisation. Winning post-war peace and reconciliation, surpassing 
entrenched animosities in divided societies, undertaking security sector and economic 
reforms, are all issues that help to consolidate a nascent democracy. True to the liberal values 
of the peacebuilding paradigm, they are part and parcel of the so-called international 
community’s drive to help a country turn a page from war to peace, from autocracy to 
democracy. In addition, the post-conflict peacebuilding paradigm and its advocacy for liberal 
values and human rights (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Reychler and Paffenholz 2001; Morphet 
2002; Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom 2008) offers a crucial insight on the role played by the 
so-called international community in peace accords and democratic transition. Within the 
peacebuilding framework, literature discusses the notion of peace spoilers, defined as a 
community of former combatants who might disrupt post-conflict peace through return to 
violence (Stedman 1997; Hoddie and Hartzell 2003; Ballentine and Nitzsche 2005; Glassmyer 
and Sambanis 2008; Dudouet, Giessmann and Planta 2012; Lyons 2016; Hansell and Gerdes 
2017). For this reason, the paradigm stresses a vital importance on the maintenance of 
stability as a precondition for long-lasting peace and democracy. However, in order to have 
stability, potential peace spoilers need to be managed and their expectations need to be met. 
This gives rise to criticisms that the international community is buying peace and political 
stability (Le Billon 2001) and is instead imposing stabilitocracy (BIEPAG 2017).  
 
A blind spot that does not seem to be tackled by the above literature is what happens to 
democracy’s quality in the long-run when combatants are deeply integrated in politics. The 
peacebuilding paradigm advocates for giving a voice to former armed groups in the post-
conflict era, and in neutralising potential peace spoilers as a matter of priority. However, this 
new political elite that comes from conflict, how is it shaping democracy in the long-run? The 
discussion as to whether the inclusion of former combatants in politics has turned them into 
democracy spoilers is not addressed.   
 
Moreover, the peacebuilding literature comes under scrutiny in the framework of discussions 
on corruption and other illicit phenomena after conflict. Several authors stress that societies 
in transition often provide a fertile ground for the enrichment of the elite through means of 
corruption and crime (Zürcher 2011; Belloni and Strazzari 2014). What’s more, the 
international community is not devoid of culpability in perpetuating corruption and in 
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tolerating informal practices (Krastev 2002; Distler 2018). This gives rise to claims of a “global 
peacebuilding industry” (Lindberg and Orjuela 2014, p. 726) that by putting an emphasis on 
stability, grows to cohabit and even collude with corruption and crime.   
 
In a post-conflict society, patterns of corruption and crime are often underpinned by an 
unholy alliance between politicians who adopt the role of patrons and voters who are 
imposed with a clients’ role (Hicken 2011; Hale 2015). Clientelism is inherently corrosive for 
democracy and can easily lead to a predatory state (Diamond 2008). However, literature does 
not offer much insight on the linkages between corruption, crime and clientelism, and the 
responsibility of former combatants who are turned politicians for such phenomena.  
 
However, literature does discuss the dichotomy between greed and grievance (Berdal and 
Malone 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Murshed and Tadjoeddin 2009; Keen 2012). The 
academic discussion elaborates at some length on the economic incentives underpinning 
conflict, which are explained as greed but embellished as social grievance. But while the 
motivations for engaging in conflict are discussed, the reasons for engaging in greed after 
conflict are not aired out. What is not discussed are the post-conflict motives for greed and 
predation, and the illicit phenomena such as corruption, crime and clientelism that enable 
predation. The new political elite that comes from conflict, what is its responsibility for the 
installation of a predatory state? What does this mean for democracy? Literature is still to 
elaborate on these cause and effect links.   
 
Having consulted the above fields of study, it became clear to me that the literature direction 
that is guided by my research question sits within political science and democratisation 
studies. My conceptual framework agrees with the academic argument that the inclusion of 
former combatants in post-war political arrangements is in the spirit of peace and democracy, 
and as such should be supported. However, the political elite that may be dominated by a 
network led by former combatants is likely maintained by a clientelistic web and predatory 
practices which in turn corrupt and frustrate institution-building and democratic 
consolidation. 
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III. Research Methods 
1. Introduction 
This chapter sets out the research methods and the tools utilised to gather data for the topic 
of this thesis. It starts by providing a general overview of the epistemological query that 
predated the research, and the steps taken to come up with the initial concept idea. It 
describes the research strategy and explains the reasons behind deciding on a comparative 
and qualitative analysis between two case studies. The part on data collection methods 
elaborates on the tools used to obtain data, particularly focusing on the pros and cons of field 
research, which ties with the part on ethical considerations. In the end, the chapter refers to 
the grounded theory to explain the inductive approach undertaken to generate the theory for 
this thesis, which is explained with the diagram illustrations.  
 
Of note, while explaining the above steps taken for my research methods, I have at times used 
the first tense because I judge that a personalised account of my experience is relevant and 
insightful for the reader to be able to fully comprehend the context in which the research was 
born and developed.    
 
I have referred to literature whenever was needed, but I intentionally interweaved an 
academic style of writing with a rather descriptive and journalistic style of narration to convey 
a more personalised approach to research methods. In other words, this chapter sets out to 
build an academic case for research methods but also brings in a personalised style of 
narration to tell the background story of the researcher, too. 
    
2. Epistemological queries leading to conceptualisation of research question  
One of the overarching challenges at the end of conflicts is how to reintegrate former 
combatants into society. Equally important is the question of the ability or willingness of 
society to accept former combatants in its midst. Just as poignantly, one of the burning issues 
in an immediate post-conflict environment is what kind of integration should take place. Is it 
right that the former combatants are integrated with a degree of preferential treatment that 
might come at the detriment of other critical needs facing a post-conflict society? A part of 
the society might object as such a preferential treatment may be viewed as applying unjust 
practices when justice should be delivered in tandem with the new-found peace. Still others 
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might argue that the integration of former combatants is detrimental to the survival of that 
very peace; that their inclusion in political processes ensures longevity of peace; and that 
otherwise they might become spoilers that can influence a rollback into conflict (Barakat and 
Özerdem 2005; Greenhill and Major 2006/07; Dudouet, Giessmann and Planta 2012; 
McMullin 2013a).     
  
The longer-term inclusion of combatants in political structures is another burning matter. This 
is an issue that although touched upon by some authors, has not enjoyed nearly the attention 
and level of dissection as that of the immediate transformation of combatants (Manning 2004 
and 2007; De Zeeuw 2008; Jarstad and Sisk 2010; Joshi 2010; Ishiyama 2016; Kovacs, 
Söderberg and Hatz 2016; Manning and Smith 2016; Marshall and Ishiyama 2016; Kuehn 
2017). Literature agrees on a set of challenges, particularly immediate ones, relating to the 
reintegration of combatants, including in politics (Kalyvas, Shapiro and Masoud 2008; Jarstad 
and Sisk 2010; Joshi 2010; Ishiyama 2016). There is a basic moral and political dilemma at 
play, which is to ascertain whether the integration of former combatants into post-conflict 
societies is a genuine step towards democratic transition. After all, for that transition to 
succeed, former enemies - the regime and the armed group representatives - are obliged to 
work together as partners. Therefore, this automatically becomes a question of trust, of 
justice, peace and reconciliation, democracy and grievances. In the end, it is a question of 
finding the right balance between all these notions.  
 
It follows, therefore, that peace accords and post-conflict democratisation are built on 
compromises and on finding a common ground between different stakeholders of the peace 
process. An integral part of those compromises is the integration of former combatants, 
including their transformation in politics. These are legitimate questions since for many 
segments of society the integration and transformation in politics are often considered a 
appeasement tactic to ensure the combatants’ buy-off for peace. Otherwise, so the argument 
goes, if left out in the cold they can easily become dangerous spoilers to implementation of 
post-conflict peace accords. It is a choice, as many see it, between appeasing the destructive 
instincts of former combatants who in peacetimes may turn into spoilers or confronting such 
instincts as a matter of principle but jeopardising a hard-won fledgling peace (Stedman, 
Rothchild and Cousens 2002). For others still, as long as combatants are prepared to lay down 
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weapons and compete in democratic elections, this in itself should attest for a successful 
transition from war to peace. If there has been a successful and verifiable transition “from 
bullets to ballots” (Ishiyama 2016) then the transformation of former combatants to political 
figures should be accepted within the norms of normal democratic behaviour. Judging from 
many other case studies, the post-conflict transformation process is viewed as means to 
reintegrating former combatants in return for promoting democratisation and democratic 
institution-building (Kilroy 2009). 
 
When I set out to delve into this subject, my main query aimed at exploring the longer-term 
transformation of former combatants (especially political one) as it seemed to hold the key 
to the success or failure of a post-war country’s democratic system and its institutions. What 
are the causes, processes and results of this transformation, as well as the subsequent impact 
on institutions and democratic consolidation? These were some of the questions I explored 
in the literature related to DDR and the post-conflict transformation in politics.  
 
My interest in armed groups and/or resistance movements spans two decades, going back to 
the emergence of the KLA and their fight against the Serbian regime in Kosovo. I took an 
interest in them because I am from Kosovo and, by default, had a personal stake in what was 
happening there. At the time of the Kosovo war I was a student (BA and MA) at Leeds and 
Bradford universities in the UK, which enabled me to start researching the theoretical 
explanations of the rise of armed groups. Later, during 2007-09 I was a Political Advisor to the 
Committee of Internal Affairs and Security of the Assembly of Kosovo, which made it possible 
for me to work and know personally many politicians who had been part of the armed 
struggle. This was the time of great changes in Kosovo’s political scene (Kosovo declared 
independence on 17 February 2008) and by working at the Kosovo Assembly at the time I was 
able to witness and assist in the rapidly evolving security-related legal framework. In 2009-10 
I became part of a global network of researchers examining resistance and liberation 
movements in transition, a fascinating project led and coordinated by the Berlin-based think 
tank, Berghof Conflict Research.2 In addition to working closely with former combatants from 
Kosovo and FYR Macedonia, I got to meet and listen to the stories of many such personalities 
 
2 Now simply known as Berghof Foundation. See: https://www.berghof-foundation.org/en/.  
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from around the world where there have been or continue to be conflicts: Colombia, El 
Salvador, Northern Ireland, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Aceh. The end-result of my involvement with 
Berghof culminated with a report on Kosovo’s journey from the 1990s till after independence, 
with a focus on the KLA’s role in this midst (Bekaj 2010).            
 
3. Research strategy 
I undertook this research with the aim of allowing primary data to provide the backbone for 
the research. Since my main approach to fieldwork focused around semi-structured 
interviews, it was important that enough insight was gained about the history, the political 
dynamics, relations and processes between various political actors in the region. This 
insightful understanding was obtained as a result of spending a decade working in the region, 
immersing myself in participant observation, and cultivating trust-based relations with my 
respondents, informants and others who assisted along the data gathering process. 
Throughout this journey I was very conscious of the importance that the first-hand data had 
for my research. I also felt privileged to be able to have access to respondents such as former 
combatants, politicians, academics and civil society actors. I was also acutely aware of the 
sensitive nature of my research. All these factors made be deeply conscious of my 
responsibility as a researcher to build, nourish and respect trust-based relations with my 
respondents from the very start.     
 
That is why one I managed to gain access to my respondents, it was essential that I maintained 
those trust-based relations while preserving the credibility of my research. From the start I 
was mindful that certain respondents would try to sell me a certain narrative of the history 
so that it would align with their party’s political objectives. For instance, the issue of which 
group contributed to the war efforts continues to be a serious bone of contention in Kosovo, 
with wild and unsubstantiated claims made in all directions. Every time this issue comes back 
for debate (and this is usually during the election period) the public is left even more 
befuddled than before. This might in fact be the whole purpose of such “debates”, as the aim 
seems to be to reap short-term electoral benefits by stoking the electorate’s emotions rather 
than having a frank discussion and agreeing on a joint narrative on what happened in the past.  
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Another issue that came up several times with my interviewees was the matter of who funded 
the Kosovo war. One of them, a former commander of the KLA and an earlier activist of the 
clandestine resistance movement in the diaspora, was emphatic that they had raised all the 
money themselves and not a penny had been contributed by Kosovo’s government in exile 
which was then led by the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) (FMC 02). (To recall, during the 
Kosovo crisis in the 1990s the LDK-led government had an acrimonious rapport with the KLA 
resistance movement, although they both represented ethnic Albanians). This to me seemed 
rather an exaggeration as, despite many disagreements between the KLA and the LDK, there 
was evidence that the latter had attempted to reach out to the former on several occasions 
during the conflict. I therefore broached the same subject with the representative of that 
government in exile who at the time of my meeting with him was a private citizen living in 
Kosovo. He categorically denied the KLA representative’s claims, underlining that the LDK-led 
government had not only supported the war efforts but had given a considerable sum of 
money to this end (in millions of German Marks) (OPP 04). Having consulted credible 
literature on the subject and having read various interviews that shed light on this issue, it 
felt safe to conclude that the truth erred considerably on the side of the LDK-led government 
representative. However, it was not for me to put numbers and figures to those claims 
because of the insufficiency of the public documentation that is available.               
  
While in the field, therefore, the strategy that I employed fitted perfectly with the notion of 
a “structured, focused comparison” as coined by George and Bennett (2004). Namely, 
The method and logic of structured, focused comparison is simple and straightforward. The method is 
“structured” in that the researcher writes general questions that reflect the research objective and that 
these questions are asked of each case under study to guide and standardize data collection, thereby 
making systematic comparison and cumulation of the findings of the cases possible. The method is /I 
focused" in that it deals only with certain aspects of the historical cases examined. The requirements 
for structure and focus apply equally to individual cases since they may later be joined by additional 
cases (George and Bennett 2004, p. 67). 
 
Likewise, my field experience relied heavily on a qualitative and comparative analysis 
between interview data provided by respondents in Kosovo and FYR Macedonia respectively. 
The interviews were structured in the sense that they provided general direction for the 
theme of the conversation (role of combatants in war, their personal circumstances that 
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pushed them to join politics, their rapport with the electorate, etc.). They were also focused 
in the sense that particular and individualised focus was given to each interviewee as a way 
of ensuring that their story, their nuanced narrative, was duly expressed.  
4. Conceptualisation and case study choices 
I approached the fieldwork with specific target groups of respondents in mind. My plan was 
to conduct a comparative analysis between two case studies and their respective armed 
groups: Kosovo and the KLA, and FYR Macedonia and the NLA. There are several reasons 
pointing to this decision, one of which derived from my long-term interest on the subject 
matter and the region. Secondly, and just as importantly, there are a series of common 
denominators between both armed groups which made for a compelling comparative 
examination:  
 
i. Both the KLA and the NLA represented the ethnic Albanian population, albeit in two 
different countries and settings. 
ii. Both armed groups claimed to fight for equal rights of their ethnic groups, rights which 
were being violated in different degrees and by different means. An important caveat 
is that while the NLA fought for equal and non-discriminatory treatment for the ethnic 
Albanian community within the Macedonian state, the KLA fought for complete 
secession of Kosovo from Serbia and for independence.  
iii. Although the conflicts were waged in two different countries and time periods 
(Kosovo in 1998-99, FYR Macedonia in 2001) both armed groups had clear links and 
synergies, coupled with similar objectives, ideologies, manpower and strategy. Some 
of the main organisers at the conceptualisation stages of the KLA came from FYR 
Macedonia. They often operated clandestinely from the diaspora in tandem with their 
co-activists from Kosovo, strategizing, raising awareness and money for the “cause”. 
By the same token, the NLA was assisted considerably by an influx of former KLA 
soldiers who joined their ranks. Certainly, a lot of weapons that spilled over from the 
demobilisation process of the KLA also found their way onto the NLA’s possession. 
iv. The origins of both armed groups lie in the clandestine resistance movement that 
emerged in the former Yugoslavia in the 1980s, the People’s Movement of Kosovo (in 
Albanian: Lëvizja Popullore e Kosovës, LPK). Ideologically, the LPK representatives 
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were Marxist-Leninist-inclined, but more than that they were nationalists who were 
prepared to use politics as well as arms in defence of the ethnic Albanian polity 
(regardless if they lived in Kosovo or FYR Macedonia).        
v. Since the armed groups’ disbandment, a considerable number of former combatants 
were integrated in security structures, such as the army, police forces, intelligence 
services, and private security companies. In Kosovo, the KLA when disbanded provided 
the predominant number of personnel for the newly-constituted security apparatus. 
In FYR Macedonia, the NLA combatants were subjected to an amnesty law. More 
ethnic Albanians began to be integrated in security structures, which was in 
accordance with the peace accords and the Macedonian state’s pledge to 
accommodate a greater percentage of this community into state institutions.     
vi. Since the armed groups’ disbandment, their leadership representatives have occupied 
space in the political arena at the national and municipal level. Following the conflicts, 
both the KLA and the NLA decision-makers created political parties, subjecting 
themselves to the vote of the electorate. Today, three parties that originate from the 
KLA exist in Kosovo, and one party that derives from the NLA operates in FYR 
Macedonia. In both cases, their leaders’ role on the political scene has been quite 
central to the future of their countries. Furthermore, they have been part of most 
coalition governments ever since the end of their respective conflicts. By virtue of 
being part of such coalitions, they carry a distinct responsibility over the successes or 
failures in democratisation processes.    
vii. Lastly, both Kosovo and FYR Macedonia share a common past (having been 
constituent elements of the former Yugoslavia), and both are in a relatively 
comparative proximity in their democratic transition trajectories, as claimed 
repeatedly by various organisations that work on democratic performance scoring, 
such as the Freedom House (2019a, 2019b), International IDEA (2019b), or the 
Economist Intelligence Unit (2019).  
 
As the above points suggest, both case studies share a few common denominators, denoting 
a logical explanation for why I chose them for a comparative analysis. In other words, this was 
not an arbitrary selection process that tried to impose a comparable perspective on two 
countries with very little common ground. Both Kosovo and FYR Macedonia occupy the same 
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geographical area and share some identifiable traces that should make the research and its 
findings interesting and appealing for the reader. At the same time, they have both moved on 
with their own political trajectory, especially since their conflicts, which should make the 
nuances of the comparative study more gripping. Lijphart’s (1971) observations on 
comparative analysis were quite informative in this respect:        
 Comparability is indeed not inherent in any given area, but it is more likely within an area than in a 
 randomly selected set of countries. It seems unwise, therefore, to give up the area approach in 
 comparative politics… The area approach should not be used indiscriminately, but only where it offers 
 the possibility to establishing crucial controls (Lijphart 1971, p. 689).  
 
At the start of this research, I toyed with the idea of a tripartite comparative analysis, bringing 
Serbia into the equation as well. Serbia had also grappled with an armed group in 2000/01 in 
its southern part bordering Kosovo. However, I opted against this option, as a third case study 
would have added too cumbersome an element at the stage of dissecting, comparing and 
analysing a triple set of data.   
Comparative analysis must avoid the danger of being overwhelmed by large numbers of variables and, 
as a result, losing the possibility of discovering controlled relationships, and it must therefore judiciously 
restrict itself to the really key variables, omitting those of only marginal importance (Lijphart 1971, p. 
690). 
 
Adding the case of Serbia into the mix would have been accompanied with the inclusion of 
yet another layer of variables which would have further hindered my ability to “control 
relationships” (Lijphart 1971, p. 690). In any case, the conflicts in Kosovo and FYR Macedonia 
were relatively major compared to the one in Serbia, and as such can serve as paradigmatic 
cases in peace and conflict studies.   
 
The two countries chosen as case studies are comparable for many reasons. For the purposes 
of this thesis, the word “comparable” means that the case studies are “(…) similar in a large 
number of important characteristics (variables) which one wants to treat as constants, but 
dissimilar as far as those variables are concerned which one wants to relate to each other” 
(Lijphart 1971: 687). Kosovo and FYR Macedonia are certainly “comparable” and “similar” in 
several ways. There is: 
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i. a geographical proximity and they both derive from the same federal state of former 
Yugoslavia;  
ii. they have both made a transition from one-party, communist rule to fledgling multi-
party democratic systems of governance;  
iii. they have both experienced intra-state conflicts; 
iv. they are both in similar stages of institutional development and democratic 
consolidation.     
 
Simultaneously, conform Lijphart’s (1971) definition, there are enough dissimilarities 
between the two countries to warrant a comparative examination. Although both countries 
have emerged from the same federation and have experienced internal strife, they have both 
experienced their own trajectories of democratic consolidation. Moreover, there are clear 
variations on the scope and depth of the international community’s involvement. In FYR 
Macedonia there have been frequent instances of mediation and advocacy initiatives from 
international actors, especially the Western powers. For instance, the peace accords in 2001 
were mediated by international actors, while in 2016-17 they monitored, guided and advised 
the Macedonian political parties out of a government crisis and onto early elections. In Kosovo 
the post-war administration of the territory was completely taken over by the UN and related 
organisations, becoming a de facto international protectorate. Since independence this has 
changed, with the government being placed at the steering wheel. However, the international 
involvement remains noticeable to this day, either in a monitoring and advising capacity or 
when certain political decisions that are consequential for the country’s and the region’s 
future are reached. Further, both countries have passed legislation to ensure representation 
of their non-majority communities in government structures. In Kosovo, the Serbian 
community is represented in certain ministries and in parliament by a guaranteed quota. In 
FYR Macedonia, the Albanian community through its political party(ies) is represented in each 
government through power-sharing arrangements. Both cases provide for the inclusion of 
their communities in governance structures, but the practicalities of those arrangements are 
quite different.          
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5. Data collection methods and research 
The thesis builds on the review of secondary literature such as books and reports on the 
region, legal and normative acts, peer review journals, etc. It is supported by the author’s 
participant observation in the ground for a period of ten years between 2006 and 2017. Most 
crucially, it relies quite heavily on semi-structured interviews conducted with former 
combatants of armed groups (KLA in Kosovo and NLA in FYR Macedonia), from the opposition 
parties, academia, and civil society. A detailed disaggregation of the interviewees’ sample is 
elaborated immediately below under the sub-heading “Semi-structured (elite and non-elite) 
interviews”. 
 
I have not conducted first-hand quantitative research (surveys or questionnaires) but have 
instead decided to borrow data and information from the secondary literature. The reason 
for that when it comes to assessing and measuring democratic trends, ranking and scoring, is 
that there is ample and credible literature that I have been able to consult for this research. 
Sources from organisations such as the Freedom House, International IDEA, the Economist 
Intelligence Unit, or Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem), have proven greatly beneficial for this 
purpose. Each of these organisations has developed their individualistic conceptual 
frameworks and methodologies based on sets of indicators and questions that help them 
come up with measurements on the state of democracy across the world. Their indicators 
might shed light on different sets of freedoms at the country level (Freedom House 2019a), 
they might zoom into questions of civil liberties or checks on government (International IDEA 
2019b), or they might provide identifiable variables for electoral versus liberal democracies, 
or autocracies or authoritarian regimes (Economist Intelligence Unit 2019; Varieties of 
Democracy 2019). Additionally, there are many renowned scholars who are at the cutting 
edge of the debates on the quality of democracy in the world today, such as Bermeo (2016), 
Dawson and Hanley (2016), De Zeeuw (2008), Diamond (2008; 2011; 2015), Dudouet (2009; 
2012), Foa (2018), Morlino (2004; 2011), Munck (2016). However, rigorous cross-checking of 
this secondary data was applied throughout, which also coincides to a large degree with my 
own findings on the case studies of the research.  
 
For these reasons, I deemed it more important and a value-added element to the field if I 
focused on semi-structured interviews. What was unique about the interviews and, by 
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extension, my participant observation, were the first-hand, authentic narratives obtained 
from actors who continue to be active players in the political scenes in Kosovo and FYR 
Macedonia. Their stories provide in-depth and personalised accounts of both countries’ 
histories, which were collected as data, cross-referenced and cross-checked, only to finally 
provide the backbone of the analysis in my thesis.     
        
This is therefore a comparative analysis between two case studies, relying considerably on 
qualitative data gathered through fieldwork. As Bernard and Ryan (2010) note, in social 
sciences researchers are normally interested in people’s behaviour, their thoughts and 
emotions, but also their artifacts, translated as the physical residue of people’s behaviour, 
thoughts and emotions. In addition, and to obtain a fuller picture of fieldwork, researchers 
are curious about the “environmental conditions” in which people behave, feel, think etc. 
(Bernard and Ryan 2010, p. 46). This point represents the diverging paths between 
quantitative and qualitative data (and I opted for the latter).  
When we reduce our experience of those things to numbers, the result is quantitative data. And when 
we reduce people’s thoughts, behaviors, emotions, artifacts, and environments to sounds, words, or 
pictures, the result is qualitative data (Bernard and Ryan 2010, p. 5).   
 
Throughout my research my intention was to focus on analyzing “thoughts, behaviors, 
emotions, artifacts…” (Bernard and Ryan 2010, p. 5) as a way of helping me test hypotheses 
and buttress the theories. Hence, the focus on qualitative analysis and on exploring the 
“environmental conditions” of my respondents. The only way I could immerse myself with 
the data was by spending considerable amounts of time understanding their behavior and the 
circumstances that explained their decisions.  
 
To summarise, during this research I have utilised the following data collection methods:  
 
Desk research and literature review – Throughout this journey I continuously conducted 
research and kept up to date with first-hand information from native authors in Kosovo and 
FYR Macedonia. My mother tongue is Albanian. I speak fluent Serbian and am conversant in 
Macedonian. This enabled me to make use of a wide array of valuable texts in local languages, 
which are not necessarily available in English. By being able to follow the local press and 
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portals, reading various conference reports and briefings, I was able to keep a close eye on 
the pulse of daily political dynamics between actors. I believe that having access to the “local” 
perspective in political developments was a real insight and an asset for my research. Having 
said that, I was also vigilant of the bias that some of the publications by local authors can 
inherently contain, which is why I cross-checked a lot of such data with other sources, as and 
when needed.     
 
Additionally, of course, English books and journals on the topic have provided a backbone to 
the desk research. Fortunately, there has been a surge of publications both on Kosovo and 
FYR Macedonia, particularly from the late 1990s onwards. However, it is my belief that often 
some of these publications are written with a degree of mysticism and exotics. The political 
developments are sometimes portrayed with bombastic tones (for instance, Kaplan (2005) 
and his reference of the ancient hatreds as a simplistic justification for all Balkan woes, or 
Judah’s (2000) rather flamboyant portrayal of the KLA as this exotic rebel group emerging 
from mystic beginnings). However, while such readings may be attractive to read, sometimes 
they lack depth of analysis. Often, the blame for inter-ethnic tensions that culminated in 
violent conflicts was put on ancient hatreds, thus implicitly suggesting that perhaps such is 
bound to be the fate of the people of the Balkans. This is an overly simplistic description that 
tends to explain complex cultural, political, economic or social relations of a region’s peoples 
with very broad strokes. It boxes a whole region in one category – that of a restless and 
troublesome backyard of Europe – and, by default, it contains them inside its borders. By 
putting the region in one box and labelling it, such a view admits that these are their specific 
problems, their specific social interactions, thereby suggesting that they have nothing to do 
with the rest of us. It is an exclusionary approach and, besides, it is wrong methodically.     
  
For example, as the political situation in the Balkans was escalating in the 1990s, it is said that 
to get informed about the peninsula’s history, the US President Bill Clinton had read Kaplan 
(2005), which in fact offers a somewhat derogatory picture of the Balkans as peoples who 
have always fought one another and who are still grappling with “ancient hatreds” (Kaufman 
1999). In his memoirs/autobiography the British Prime Minister Tony Blair (2010) offers his 
own take on why he had advocated for NATO bombardment over Kosovo in 1999. However, 
his view on the conflict seems to have been quite miscued, astonishingly, since he viewed the 
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conflict as essentially being a religious one, which obviously it was not. While on the topic of 
so-called “ancient hatreds”, the Serbian/Croatian Nobel prize winner and writer Ivo Adrić 
(1977) has written quite impressively and much more insightfully (and poetically, of course) 
on the reason for ethnic, religious or national animosities between various communities (in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example).  
 
Nevertheless, the list of English publications on the region is still dominated by scientifically-
robust books, reports, journals and articles written by academics, journalists, and 
practitioners who have themselves worked in the Balkans. In addition, and in line with my 
inter-disciplinary approach, I expanded my research to include texts from democratisation 
and security studies, politics, history, as well as normative and legal acts. The latter 
documents were particularly useful in dissecting “procedures, content and results” (Morlino 
2004) of democracies while they are being built.     
 
Field research in Kosovo and FYR Macedonia – This first-hand experience enabled me to 
conduct a relatively thorough mapping of security-related and political actors in the region. 
Following the successful defence of my PhD proposal in July 2014, I began my fieldwork in 
earnest in the beginning of 2015, which lasted for about a year.  
 
Participant observation – Balsinger and Lambelet (2014) describe participant or participatory 
observation as an attempt to “gain insight in to mobilization processes as they take place, and 
understand activism from within” (p. 144). They note three core aspects that make for 
credible participant observation: 
 
1. Collecting first-hand data: it is the element of “first-hand activity” that has moved 
social sciences as an activity done in libraries to “the scientific and modern form of 
anthropology based on field research” (Balsinger and Lambelet 2014, p. 145).  
2. Moving the observation scale: doing participant observation aims at acquiring a deep 
knowledge of the social community.  
It entails adapting to a local area and culture, and it requires evolving within the community of people 
one is studying over an extended period of time in order to gain a close and intimate familiarity with 
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them and their practices. It wants to get an indigenous view of the alliances, conflicts, and the different 
goals and strategies of actors… (Balsinger and Lambelet 2014, p. 146). 
3. Experiencing: this is what is gained through participant observation. Through 
experience, “the best way to understand what people do, mean, think, or believe in is 
to be as close as possible to them” (Balsinger and Lambelet 2014, p. 146).  
 
While spending time in the field, I have had almost daily interactions with decision-makers 
and other actors who are currently involved in security mechanisms and politics in their 
respective countries. Living in Kosovo and in such proximity to FYR Macedonia enabled me to 
stay on top of the news on politics in both countries. Through my work I have also been able 
to attend numerous meetings, conferences or presentations by political actors. Whilst in this 
position, I managed to observe from up close the security and political landscape, and to 
assess the impact of changes in the ground. While doing so, I was able to conduct active and 
passive participant observation for a period of ten years in the region (from 2006 to 2017). 
The key difference between active versus passive participant observation consisted on the 
depth and scope of my personal involvement as a researcher in the field.  
 
My active participant observation was mainly conducted as a direct result of my professional 
assignments in Kosovo and FYR Macedonia over the years: between 2007 and 2009 I was a 
Political Advisor to the Committee on Internal Affairs and Security in the Assembly of Kosovo, 
whereas between 2010 and 2017 I conducted various civil society and research assignments 
in the areas of security sector reform and democratisation in the region. The Committee on 
Internal Affairs and Security conducted biweekly parliamentary proceedings between early 
2007 to mid-2009 (when I left my job as Political Advisor). These meetings were held at the 
premises of the Assembly of Kosovo and were chaired by the Head of the Committee, Rrustem 
Mustafa MP. Mustafa had been a KLA commander for the Llap region in east Kosovo during 
the war and now belonged to the ruling PDK party. As Advisor I was privy to these Committee 
meetings and the preparations leading up to them. My tasks included researching and 
working on the legal security framework, advising the Chair and the Committee members on 
policy orientation and draft law amendments, and helping prepare questions directed to the 
Minister of Internal Affairs or other members of the executive. Following that, between 2009 
and 2012 I worked as a freelance researcher for a global research project titled 
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“Resistance/Liberation Movements and Transition to Politics” headed by the Berlin-based 
think tank Berghof Conflict Research. While part of this project my duties entailed to conduct 
research on the KLA and LPK historical trajectory and collect first-hand data from former 
combatants through interviews and focus group discussions. At the invite of Berghof Conflict 
Research, I also attended three conferences that were held in Bangkok (May 2010), Bogota 
(May 2011) and Ottawa (May 2012), which brought together researchers and former 
combatants from a wide range of case studies: El Salvador, Colombia, Sri Lanka, South Africa, 
Burundi, Northern Ireland, Aceh/Indonesia, Nepal, and of course, Kosovo. I travelled to these 
conferences together with a former commander of the KLA for each of the events. The 
objective of these conferences was to share experiences on the reasons why intra-state 
armed groups wage war, and on the role of former combatants to achieving and keeping the 
peace after conflict. In addition, between 2012 and 2015 I conducted various research 
democracy-related projects for civil society organisations of the region, entailing interviews 
and discussion groups with former combatants, security sector representatives, academics 
and politicians. Throughout these tasks and assignments, my interlocutors were informed 
that I was also pursuing my PhD studies and that the information obtained might be 
informative for this project in the future.    
 
My passive participant observation evolved naturally as a result of my living and working in 
the Western Balkan region during the above time period. During this time, I worked for a 
number of international organisations such as the OSCE, USAID, then the Assembly of Kosovo, 
civil society, and taught at the Rochester Institute of Technology in Kosovo. These experiences 
enabled me to stay abreast of political developments through access, contacts and networks. 
I followed closely what was happening in the region, be it through regular contacts with 
interlocutors, or attending various conferences, workshops, or simply through ongoing 
research. 
 
One of the techniques that I employed in gathering data during my active and passive 
participant observation was to take notes. During an event or after it I found it useful to add 
a thought, an observation, or just a key word. For instance, when observing the meetings with 
the Committee of Internal Affairs and Security, it was very clear to me that the political 
dynamics between the Committee members were conditioned to a considerable degree not 
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just by the party they represented but also by their past. In other words, it mattered greatly 
whether they came from the war provenance or if they belonged to the LDK pacifist 
resistance. Since the Committee was headed by a former KLA commander, I saw clearly how 
his efforts to ensuring benefits for war veterans, for instance, were translated into law. 
Moreover, I also observed how the last coalition government in Kosovo (September 2017 – 
February 2020), which was comprised of three war-wing parties, was particularly amenable 
to addressing the war veterans’ concerns. It was during this government that the welfare 
package for war veterans and their families was adopted. Another observation was following 
the evolution of the former combatants’ political stance, their rhetoric and their principles. 
For example, as I was listening to Ali Ahmeti of FYR Macedonia deliver a lecture and answer 
questions in an event in Skopje in the summer of 2016, I was struck by his seemingly 
passionate defence of the Macedonian state. This was the same Ahmeti who was now leader 
of the ethnic Albanian DUI party, but who in 2001 had led the NLA rebel army in armed conflict 
against the Macedonian state. This was a person who has made a remarkable transformation 
from having been an enemy of the state to having become one of the state’s staunchest 
guardians.   
 
Semi-structured (elite and non-elite) interviews – The semi-structured interview is defined as 
an approach whereby the researcher uses an interview guide to facilitate a more focused 
exploration of a specific topic. In such situations there is a list of questions that the interviewer 
will want to ask, which add focus to the conversation. However, they also serve as reference 
points to enable a relaxed and conversational approach to the interview (Fossey et al. 2002). 
Semi-structured, qualitative interviews are conducted not only with the purpose of gaining 
answers but also to “gain access to the experiences, feelings, and social worlds of 
participants” (Hewitt 2007, p. 1150).  
 
For the purposes of this thesis I found semi-structured interviews to be the most effective 
elicitation method of data collection. My experience tells me that structured interviews can 
be too rigid, dry and uncompromising. Because of the formality associated with structured 
interviews, they might scare people off, and might make the researcher seem prying, 
suspicious and unfriendly. In addition, the answers obtained from structured interviews may 
be unfulfilling and lacking in detail. Particularly when one is interviewing subjects that may be 
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of a sensitive nature (war and peace, combatant to politician transformation etc.), the 
answers given may just be a ready-prepared mantra to be serviced for daily consumption. On 
the other hand, with unstructured interviews the researcher risks losing control of the 
direction of the interview. They may set out to discuss a politician’s route from being a 
combatant to becoming a minister but might instead end up listening to his slogans from last 
night’s party rally. If left to his own devises, the interviewee might completely disregard your 
question and instead provide you with an account of what he wants you to hear. Elite 
interviews in particular benefit from a semi-structured approach precisely because the 
researcher is not bound by a rigid set of questions and uses probes to generate additional 
answers. In addition, elite interviews will likely offer the researcher empirical evidence that 
carries a certain contextual depth based on first-hand experience of the interviewees (Lilleker 
2003).    
Elite interview protocols often rely on a limited number of open-ended questions (…) Unlike the more 
passive role played by an interviewer using structured questions, this type of questioning allows the 
researcher to make decisions about what additional questions to ask as the session progresses (Berry 
2002, p. 681).  
 
For these reasons, I found semi-structured interviews as the best fit. Because if the sensitive 
nature of the themes discussed (negative impact on democracy, corruption and nepotism, 
state-building stagnation), and because the interlocutors normally came from “elite” groups 
(suspicious by default, authoritative, even narcissistic), semi-structured interviews were the 
best recipe for credible data collection. This setup provided us with the time to strip away 
rigid formalities and to create a sense of bond and mutual trust (Aberbach and Rockman 
2002). Being semi-structured, the interview also enabled me to improvise around my themes, 
depending on who I was interviewing and in what circumstances. By so doing, I allowed my 
respondents enough space to elaborate on answers as they deemed fit but giving me 
sufficient control to guide the interview as per my own requirements.  
Semistructured interviews occupy an interesting position along the structured-unstructured 
continuum. Semistructured interviews are flexible in that the interviewer can modify the order and 
details of how topics are covered. This cedes some control to the respondent over how the interview 
goes, but, because the respondents are asked more or less the same questions, this makes possible 
comparisons across interviews (Bernard and Ryan 2010, p. 29). 
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I found the point of comparison across interviews very useful for my research. Using the same 
set of questions for two sets of research environments (Kosovo and FYR Macedonia) brought 
with it a plethora of very useful data. In the process, I benefited from the advantage of 
comparing data between interviewees within the same country (Kosovo or FYR Macedonia), 
and of comparing data between the two countries involved. I began detecting the point of 
saturation when the respondents, regardless of whether they came from Kosovo or from FYR 
Macedonia, began giving me similar answers to my set of questions.     
 
Approaching the interview, I had a list of general questions which had been previously 
prepared by me and cleared by my supervisors, preceded by the following statement which 
would be presented to the interviewee:  
This thesis will look at how, in the aftermath of armed conflicts in Kosovo and FYR Macedonia, security 
mechanisms in newly-emerged democracies have been rearranged. It will examine the role of the 
armed groups and their legacies in contributing to, or hindering, democratisation processes. Their role 
in building security structures will also be examined within the context of emerging democracies. The 
research is addressing the influence of armed groups, the transformation of combatants into politicians 
of today, the implications of such transformation in politics and public life, and their role in 
consolidating, or hampering, democracy in their countries. The interview themes will focus on, but will 
not be limited to, 1) the role of the armed group’s leadership in (Disarmament, Demobilisation and 
Reintegration) DDR and transformation processes; 2) their influence in creating and maintaining 
democratic procedures and institutions, such as elections, coalition governments, parliaments etc., 3) 
the influence of informal relations between former combatants in post-conflict democratisation 
processes (Appendix II). 
 
The questions of the open (semi-structured) interview3 served to guide the general direction 
of the conversation but allowed space for the interviewee to expand on various topics 
depending on their background and expertise. For instance, when interviewing a former 
activist of the Illegality movement s/he would be probed more on their role during this period. 
A current opposition party representative would be asked to elaborate on their stance 
regarding the clientelist networks maintained by the governing parties, etc.  
 
 
3 Note that a copy of the Open (semi-structured) interview is attached in Appendix II of the thesis. 
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As a considerable degree of the data stems from qualitative research, the interviews with key 
stakeholders were a vital part of this research. In line with this view, my plan was to engage 
with some of the main actors involved in armed groups and politics, and with those 
considered experts in the field of security and democratization in Kosovo and FYR Macedonia. 
The first part of 2014 was spent consulting and identifying the right people to interview. The 
last part of 2014 and most of 2015 I spent in the field arranging interviews. In so doing, I tried 
to maintain an ethnic, gender, geographic and professional balance with the aim of obtaining 
a representative field sample.  
 
In total, 26 semi-structured interviews were conducted. Out of those, 14 interviews were on 
Kosovo, 5 interviews were on FYR Macedonia, and 7 were joint interviews on both Kosovo 
and FYR Macedonia. Out of the total of 26 interviewees, 18 were men and 8 were women. 18 
interviewees were of Albanian ethnicity, 6 were Macedonian, 1 Serb, and 1 other.  Based on 
a further disaggregation of the interviewee sample, the following interviews were conducted:  
- nine interviews conducted with former military commanders and activists – coded FMC; 
- four interviews conducted with opposition political representatives – coded OPP; 
- six interviews conducted with civil society organisation representatives – coded CSO; 
- seven interviews conducted with members of academia – coded ACA.  
 
The unequal number of interviews on Kosovo and FYR Macedonia is a token of the difficulties 
encountered in arranging to meet some of the interlocutors. As a rule, it seemed that the 
higher the seniority of anticipated interviewees, the more challenging it was to arrange formal 
interview sessions with them. Nonetheless, the actual experience of interviewing was 
worthwhile, and a lot of useful data was gathered. When meeting the interviewees, I normally 
stressed the aspect of narrative interviewing, and encouraged them to tell their stories during 
conflict, and their subsequent integration in politics and public life. By way of comparison, I 
used the same set of questions in both cases, to enable me to compare data in the end. The 
interview themes were generally focused on, but not be limited to, the issues of 1) the role 
of the armed group’s leadership in DDR and transformation processes; 2) their influence in 
creating and maintaining democratic procedures and institutions, such as elections, coalition 
governments, representative parliaments etc.; 3) the influence of personal relations between 
former combatants in post-conflict democratisation processes. Since I have received training 
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on NVivo software4, I used this programme to plug in the data, as well as to triangulate and 
compare the end results.    
 
In approaching the interviews, I am fully aware of how sensitive a subject this can be for 
people of any ethnicity living in Kosovo and FYR Macedonia. From the experience I know that 
whoever you talk to, there is a sense that their side of the story is true and therefore should 
be put across. I approached field research with this context in mind, knowing that as a 
researcher I hold a moral responsibility to be loyal and fair to the collected data. In that sense, 
I was guided by Cutcliffe and Ramcharan’s (2002, p. 1000) coined term “ethics-as-process” to 
mean that as researchers our trust-based loyalty to the field data is a continuum that 
kickstarts at the interview stage, and continues during the writing phase and even well 
beyond it. Because indeed, the researcher’s ethical conduct does not end at the completion 
of the interview but rather continues and even becomes crucial during the transcription phase 
of field interviews.     
 
Participant Information Sheet5 and Consent Form6 – Such forms were signed between the 
interviewee and the interviewer to attest respect for confidentiality. These are standard 
forms which were cleared and issued by the University of Sheffield, and which offer a synopsis 
of the research project, purpose, and anticipated results. They explain to the interviewees the 
reasons why they were selected for an interview and state confidentiality and anonymity for 
the information given. The Participant Information Sheet informs:  
You are kindly being invited to take part in the above research project. Before you decide we think it is 
important that you understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take 
time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Ask us if there is 
anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. Take time to decide whether or not 
you wish to take part. Thank you for reading this (Annex II). 
 
4 NVivo is computer software that supports qualitative and mixed methods research. It is designed to help 
researchers organize, analyse and find insights in unstructured or qualitative data such as interviews, open-
ended survey responses, articles, social media and web content. NVivo offers a place to organize and manage 
gathered material, and provides tools that allow researchers to ask questions of data in a more efficient manner. 
See http://www.qsrinternational.com/what-is-nvivo. 
5 Note that a copy of the Participant Information Sheet is attached in Appendix II of the thesis. 
6 Note that a copy of the Participant Consent Form, is attached in Appendix II of the thesis. 
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Anonymity and consent to participate – In line with the above forms, I agreed on the rules of 
interviewing, disclosure and anonymity with all interviewees prior to engaging with them. The 
interviewees were assured that anonymity and confidentiality would always be respected. 
This is reflected in this thesis whereby I have made sure that any reference to interview data 
is coded and thereby protects the sources’ identities. The following codes have been used: 
- Former military commanders and activists – coded FMC; 
- Opposition political representatives – coded OPP; 
- Civil society organisation representatives – coded CSO; 
- Members of academia – coded ACA. 
  
On the issue of anonymity the Participant Information Sheet informs:  
Confidentiality: All the information that we collect about you during the course of the research will be 
kept strictly confidential. You will not be able to be identified in any reports or publications (Annex II). 
 
Knowledge of criminal and other illegal activities – Living and working in the Balkans has 
equipped me with a general understanding of illicit activities potentially involving members 
of the political class. My research, too, aims at exploring, among others, issues of greed-
inspired phenomena which have fuelled corrupt activities, and subsequently have hampered 
democratisation efforts. With this background in mind, I was cautious in interviewing and 
obtaining data only from credible and reliable sources. Consequently, ahead of each meeting 
I always undertook a degree of preparatory work on the background of interviewees during 
the conflict and after it (Lee-Treweek and Linkogle 2000). Each interviewee was handed over 
a copy of the Participant Information Sheet and the Participant Consent Form. Additionally, I 
went to great lengths to explain to them the object of my study, and to reassure them of 
anonymity throughout my research. But at the same time, I did not have to embark on 
daredevil initiatives to interview people who have a proven track record of criminal activities. 
That is why my efforts at researching the potential interviewees’ background beforehand was 
so important. Moreover, even when interviewing former combatants, I made sure that I spoke 
to those who are generally considered respected members of the community, ie. politicians, 
doctors, academics.  
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When broaching sensitive topics such as corruption or state capture, my stance was that of 
an objective researcher exploring the truth on a given problem. In reality, no one in the 
Western Balkans can or will argue against the prevalence of such corroding phenomena. 
Everyone agrees there is corruption and that the institutions are partially captured. 
Therefore, I would begin my discussions with interviewees from that premise and explore, 
without judgement or blame, the causes of these social ailments. Seeking the truth, 
respecting the interviewee and cultivating a mutually trustworthy relationship were my 
guiding principles.    
 
Security and personal safety – Although both Kosovo and FYR Macedonia are generally 
considered safe, in any case I made a conscious effort not to place myself in unpleasant 
situations when interacting with people in the ground. Most meetings took place in open 
spaces, such as cafes or restaurants, and were duly recorded with the prior permission of the 
interviewees. 
 
Objective assessment – Depending on whose “side” one is perceived to be, I am mindful that 
my thesis might generate divisive and heated debates. In accordance with my academic 
principles of serving to the truth, however, I employed a rigid method of deconstructing 
narratives and assembling my arguments based on objectivity, empirical evidence and cross-
referencing of data.  
 
6. Ethical considerations during fieldwork 
Charmaz (2006) is a proponent of seeing the world of our research participants from within. 
This means that the researcher needs to go beyond just a formal Q & A session with their 
respondent. The researcher needs to understand the internal dynamics that explain the 
respondent’s behaviour and choices. S/he needs to inhabit the respondent’s space while 
ensuring that they remain objective and unbiased throughout this process. In accordance with 
Charmaz’s advice, I also tried to gain as much inside information on the circumstances 
impacting the life and career of my interviewees as I could. Through active participant 
observation I made a conscious effort to enter their settings and situations to the greatest 
extent possible.  
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Seeing research participants’ lives from the inside often gives a researcher otherwise unobtainable 
views. You might learn that what outsiders assume about the world you study may be limited, 
imprecise, mistaken, or egregiously wrong (Charmaz 2006, p. 14).  
 
However, as much as I placed validity onto the importance of viewing the participants’ world 
from within, I also sensed an ethical predicament associated with this approach. I was faced 
with a classical “insider versus outsider” dilemma (McEvoy 2006, p. 187) in conducting field 
research. The fact that I am from Kosovo, living and working in the Western Balkans, made 
me doubly aware of the necessity to cross-reference all the gathered data. This is because, as 
McEvoy (2006) warns, the researcher should consider whether their identity and potential 
bias of both them and the researched may have bearing on the data. As a researcher I 
consciously tried to preempt any prejudices I might have carried with me to the field. 
However, it was more difficult, impossible even, to control and preempt any prejudices that 
my respondents might have had about me. This was the tricky part of the equation. This is 
where cross-referencing field data with secondary literature was vital for the credibility of the 
research. What is important to remember from the fieldwork is to understand “how and 
where the stories are produced, which sort of stories they are, and how we can put them to 
honest and intelligent use in theorizing about social life” (Miller and Glassner 2011, p. 145). 
Also, when discussing sensitive and emotional themes such as war and loss, I was conscious 
that my job as a researcher was to walk carefully between expressing a necessary degree of 
empathy versus keeping a professional distance vis-à-vis the interviewee. Whilst engaging “on 
an emotional level” may be common in such situations, the researcher should be mindful not 
to “enter the ground of the therapist” (De Laine 2000, p. 2).     
 
The thesis I explored touched a sensitive subject area, which has to do with the contribution 
that former combatants have given to democratization processes after the conflict. Conjoined 
with this question is the inevitable issue of their role in illicit activities that may have hindered 
such processes. A considerable number of interviewees I spoke to are former commanders of 
intra-state armed groups who continue to be active in public life as politicians, academics or 
army/police officers. Others I spoke to are also public figures working in academia, civil society 
or politics. Considering they are still active in political life (i.e. they have a direct impact on 
political and democratic processes today), and considering this research examines their very 
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role in such processes, it was clear that their input could also be tinged with the politics of the 
day. In such situations, the researcher can even detect a tendency to use one’s research as 
means to move forward certain political agendas of the interviewees’ liking (Bekaj 2014). 
After all, they have a personal stake in the story told to the researcher (Robben 1998).  
Often informants, and especially victims, have a stake in making researchers adopt their truths, 
especially since they perceive them to be curators of history who will retell their stories and provide 
them with the halo of objectivity brought by academic status (Kalyvas 2006, p. 51).  
 
This was therefore my first ethical challenge upon meeting my interviewees: the challenge of 
knowing how to strip their narrative from the daily politicking and party agendas, and to shed 
light on the genuine message put across. Such a task was realised through prior research on 
the interviewees’ personal and professional lives, their background and political interests. 
Also, it derived from in-depth understanding of the political dynamics reigning in Kosovo and 
FYR Macedonia which stemmed from years of active participant observation in the region. As 
regards their viewing of me, my being an ethnic Albanian opened a few doors with Albanian-
speaking respondents. This was helpful, as one might imagine. However, at no time did I 
mislead them into believing that the research would abide by their potential political 
preferences. Each participant was shown the Participant Information Sheet of the University 
of Sheffield, which explains the background of the research. My approach to interviewing 
non-Albanians (i.e. Serbs and Slavic Macedonians) was to abide by my professional etiquette 
and to share with them the same formal documents of my research, including the Participant 
Consent Form.      
 
Striking a relationship based on trust and honesty was another challenge. In preparation for 
interviews, Goodall (2000) lists a seemingly straightforward number of questions which might 
“problematize” and “complicate” an otherwise ordinary field experience. Namely, how does 
a researcher gain appropriate entry to a site, or gain legitimate trust and confidence of her/his 
informants? How does one deal with common questions of the researcher’s position in 
relation to the informants’ opinions? What sort of relationships and levels of interpersonal 
contact are appropriate? What should the researcher do, or not do, with obtained 
information about illegal, unethical or immoral activities? (Goodall 2000, pp. 153-154). 
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Such a list of questions that could potentially “problematize” the field experience, were kept 
in mind during my research. Being familiar with the interviewees’ biographies was one of the 
first homework tasks. As stated above, most of my interviewees hold important positions in 
politics and security structures, be it as representatives in parliament, political party 
members, municipal assembly members, high-ranking officers in police and army, academics 
and civil society. Knowing their biographies presupposes that the researcher is generally 
familiar with their political points of view and allegiances, their role during the war and after 
it, and their current positions. With this background knowledge I could deduct that their 
answers might be influenced by their positions and political allegiances. From my experience 
in the region thus far, I found this to be a general trend with elite interviewees (Bekaj 2014). 
In fact, the higher their present positions, the more likely were they to stick to the official 
story. As a result, I identified a blind spot that comes with conducting elite interviews. I called 
it the danger of mediocrity and repetitiveness. In other words, the risk that the interviewees 
might just repeat the political mantra that is the party line, or the official stance of the 
institution they currently represent. My mission in this regard was to dissect propaganda from 
truth, and daily political talk from long-term political impact. This was because when 
conducting interviewees, it is the researcher’s moral responsibility to be on the lookout for 
answers. One must dig proactively for the true answers and not be passively content with 
superficial response. In the end, it is the researcher who influences what and how much we 
can see.  
Just as the methods we choose influence what we see, what we bring to the study also influences what 
we can see. Qualitative research of all sorts relies on those who conduct it. We are not passive 
receptacles into which data are poured. We are not scientific observers who can dismiss scrutiny of our 
values by claiming scientific neutrality and authority. Neither observer nor observed come to a scene 
untouched by the world (Charmaz 2006, p. 15). 
 
This raises issues of objectivity versus bias, or truth versus data manipulations in field 
research. However, we pre-empt such an undesirable dilemma by being clear in our research 
question and research methods. Nevertheless, first-hand data constituted a vital part of my 
research and, in the end, it is their “truth” – the truth of the respondents - that we are 
interested in. Going into the interview, my aim was to be comfortably knowledgeable of the 
subject matter and the respondent who I was to interview. But, simultaneously, my approach 
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was to stand far enough from the object of analysis so as not to make a judgement but rather 
to describe the events and the phenomena witnessed. Because, after all,  
Every text, every story, privileges someone’s point of view. The questions ‘who owns the truth about a 
culture?’ is not easily resolved by simply increasing the number and diversity of voices within a text. 
Indeed, what you might gain in ethical display, you may lose in narrative coherence (Goodall 2000, p. 
160).  
 
The approach to the interviews needed to be “ethically sensitive” but at the same time 
“methodologically persuasive” (Shaw 2003, p. 9). It is in this nexus between ethical 
considerations and a truthful narrative (Clark 2012) that my fieldwork took place. The answers 
of my interviewees shed light into the uniqueness of their position as former combatants 
turned politicians, and their impact on their respective democratic systems. It was their story 
that I wished to explore, after all.       
By pursuing this seemingly simple solution [looking at everyone’s side of the story], we arrive at a 
problem of infinite regress. For everyone has someone standing above him who prevents him from 
doing things just as he likes (…) There is no end to it and we can never have a “balanced picture" until 
we have studied all of society simultaneously. I do not propose to hold my breath until that happy day. 
We can, I think, satisfy the demands of our science by always making clear the limits of what we have 
studied, marking the boundaries beyond which our findings cannot be safely applied (Becker 1967, p. 
247). 
 
It is equally true that ethical considerations do not cease to apply when the interview is over. 
Once the data is obtained, it is the responsibility of the researcher what s/he does with the 
data. As the interpretative explanation, or the unriddling, of the phenomenon studied takes 
place (Alasuutari 1995), the burden of responsibility to be truthful, honest and fair to the 
interviewees lies with the researcher. Therefore, the responsibility for a righteous ethical 
conduct should be even heavier in the post-interview stage. In the end the researcher needs 
to be comfortable that the data presented in the text does justice to what was said during the 
interview, and that it does justice to the interviewee and preserves the bond of trust 
developed during the interview, despite the researcher’s opinions on the subject matter. 
Thus, the act of writing becomes a public act. The information bestowed from the interviewee 
to the researcher should be “handled as a valuable gift” (Zinsser 2006, p. 115). I was guided 
by this principle in my research and did my best to do justice to my interviewees until the end. 
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The “ethics-as-process” term, coined by Cutcliffe and Ramcharan (2002, p. 1000), was my 
guiding principle throughout my field research. I see truth narratives as stemming naturally 
out of such an ethical conduct. Because, in the end,    
Truth is ungenred. It is a quality of what you have experienced, and what conclusions you come to, that 
allows it, as a concept, to transcend any representational boundaries. That “truth” may be – and usually 
is – limited to the truth of my experience, but it is as close as I am likely to “what is” and “what was” via 
language. I believe the business of the new ethnography is the interpretive evocation and 
representation of such truths (Goodall 2000, p. 168).         
 
7. Grounded theory in qualitative research 
The research for this thesis was conducted within the inter-disciplinary triangle of politics, 
democratisation and security studies. Although possibly unorthodox, this inter-disciplinary 
approach helped me examine my subject matter from a wider perspective while considering 
various variables that fed into the research question. It provided me with the freedom and 
elasticity to borrow from more than one discipline as a way of reaching for the truth, whilst 
keeping me grounded within the parameters of the research objectives.  
 
Between 2006 and 2017 I lived and worked in the Western Balkans. I continue to be closely 
in touch with political developments in Kosovo and FYR Macedonia. Years of non-participant 
and participant observation have been utilised to produce valuable data for this research. My 
participation, presentation and facilitation of various workshops and conferences in 
Thessaloniki, Sheffield, Prishtina, Belgrade, Skopje, Tirana, Zagreb, Wroclaw etc. with 
politicians, civil society and academia have also proven to be a fertile ground for data 
collection and data testing. Therefore, it only seemed natural that I applied grounded theory 
to my research, allowing the data collected from the field inform my findings and my theory. 
 
According to Suddaby (2006), grounded theory is an interpretive process that results from the 
researcher’s immersion in the field. It is partly conditional upon the researcher’s sensitivity to 
nuanced meanings and connotations of the data that may not be apparent from a mere 
superficial observation. “Many grounded theory researchers describe this interpretation as 
occurring subconsciously, as a result of their constant "immersion" in the data” (Suddaby 
2006, p. 639). Also, a key element of grounded theory researchers is their ability not only to 
observe data, but to also create certain identifiable patterns and variables out of them. By 
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doing so, the examined data is subsequently elevated onto a higher level of abstraction 
(Martin and Turner 1986). For the purposes of this study, for instance, the recurring social 
practices of illicit interactions (such as corrupt exchanges and favouritism in politics, 
distribution of government jobs and services based on party loyalty), is identified as a clear 
case of clientelism that impacts right at the core of formal institutions and the democratic 
system itself. Also, the conceptualisation of long-term political transformation was gradually 
formed out of the semi-structured interviews. During these interviews, it became clear that 
my respondents were making a difference between the engagement in politics as a single act 
in time, versus the longer-term role in politics. Both Kosovo and FYR Macedonia have had 
more than three election cycles involving war-wing political parties as partners in 
government. In addition, the respondents referred to long-term political transformation as 
deriving from the creation of new political parties by former combatants, as opposed to 
joining existing ones. As these cases have shown, some of the longer-term consequences of 
their involvement in politics can only be seen after around three election cycles 
(decentralisation of government, results of economic reforms, EU visa liberalisation, etc.). 
Therefore, my definition of the long-term transformation of former combatants in politics 
uses three election cycles, or around ten years, as a reference point.   
 
As I set out to do fieldwork, my intention was to record a life of a particular group of people 
by bringing to the forefront their relations and interactions, their processes and results. This 
group of people were the former combatants of intra-state armed groups, and the desired 
subject of study was their integration and political transformation after conflict. This was a 
qualitative study adding a comparative angle between two similar cases. Grounded theory 
and the inductive approach were adopted as guiding principles that helped generate the 
theory for this study. As Charmaz (2006) notes, grounded theory involves,      
 […] sustained participation and observation in their milieu, community, or social world. It means more 
than participant observation alone because an ethnographic study covers the round of life occurring 
within the given milieu and often includes supplementary data from documents, diagrams, maps, 
photographs, and, occasionally, formal interviews and questionnaires (Charmaz 2006, p. 21).  
 
This reference to the “sustained participation” of a given milieu echoes closely with the 
writings of Geertz (1996) on the subject. Referring to the ethnographic research conducted in 
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the Indonesian towns of Pare and Sefrou, Geertz underlines the importance of long-term, 
inter-connected and multi-faceted aspects of ethnographic research. The inter-
connectedness of one’s research subject, stretched over a period of time, will help create 
variables that would otherwise be impossible to discern just from a single interview or desk 
research.     
For an ethnographer everything is a matter of one thing leading to another, that to a third, and that to 
one hardly knows what. Beyond Pare and Sefrou, around them, behind them, standing before them, 
hovering over them, is an enormous array of-what shall I call them? practices? epistemes? social 
formations? realities? that connect to them, and that must find a place in any project which seeks to 
gain from messing around in them something more than odd information. However difficult it may be 
to begin this sort of discourse, it is even harder to stop it (Geertz 1996, p. 20). 
 
Charmaz (2014) states that grounded theorists try to learn what occurs in the research setting 
and generally to learn more about the participants’ lives. Whatever the sources of our data – 
interviews, documents, scenes – grounded theorists examine with an open mind, “[…] so that 
we can learn about the worlds and people we study” (Charmaz 2014, p. 3). As grounded 
theorists we do not impose an already-prepared hypothesis upon the subject matter. We 
approach the field with an open mind, and let the data generated from the field inform our 
analysis. “As grounded theorists, we start with data. We construct these data through our 
observations, interactions, and materials that we gather about the topic or setting” (Charmaz 
2014, p. 3).  
 
I concur that as grounded theorists we start with data. However, a common misunderstanding 
is that we should enter the field without much knowledge of the subject matter or prior 
research. “An extreme variant is the notion that not only must the researcher enter the field 
with a blank mind (…), but that she or he must also enter the field with a blank agenda (i.e., 
without a defined research question)” (Suddaby 2006, p. 634). This idea of embarking on the 
fieldwork with a tabula rasa state of mind is a misplaced one, for it tends to ignore the 
importance of literature knowledge as a preparatory step to the fieldwork. The idea of a pure 
induction coupled with the delay of literature review may lead to some seriously skewed data 
in the end. Rather, one should opt in favour of a grounded theory that is informed by the 
literature review but is still comprised of the fieldwork data as a vital part of the research.      
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What I call informed grounded theory refers to a product of a research process as well as to the research 
process itself, in which both the process and the product have been thoroughly grounded in data by GT 
methods while being informed by existing research literature and theoretical frameworks (…) an 
informed grounded theorist sees the advantage of using pre-existing theories and research findings in 
the substantive field in a sensitive, creative and flexible way instead of seeing them as obstacles and 
threats (Thornberg 2012, p. 249). 
 
Prior to commencing my work in Kosovo and FYR Macedonia I already had a relatively solid 
grasp of the academic literature in the region and of the theoretical frameworks pertaining 
to my chosen study. My choice for an inductive approach towards grounded theory was, 
therefore, taken not as a way of substituting for my lack of knowledge of the region, but rather 
as a means of obtaining a more inherent understanding of relations and processes. Through 
this approach I was able to discover “who they think they are, what they think they are doing, 
and to what end they think they are doing it, something a good deal less straightforward than 
the ordinary canons of Notes and Queries ethnography, or for that matter the glossy 
impressionism of pop art “cultural studies,” would suggest” (Geertz 2001, p. 9). In order to 
get to this level of in-depth analysis, it is important to insightful familiarity with their modus 
operandi of everyday lives. “This does not involve feeling anyone else’s feelings, or thinking 
anyone else’s thoughts, simple impossibilities. Nor does it involve going native, an impractical 
idea, inevitably bogus. It involves learning how, as a being from elsewhere with a world of 
one’s own, to live with them (Geertz 2001, p. 9).  
 
Throughout my fieldwork, I employed a systematic and focused observation which helped me 
collect, compare, make sense, and filter through data. Particularly through my interviews I 
was informed not just about the questions I posed but also about the respondents’ lives. That 
is because my fieldwork was more than just my interviews and it lasted longer and delved 
deeper into the interviewees’ lives, their careers and the wider political context. Throughout 
my fieldwork I soaked up knowledge about the people who were a focus of my study, and I 
let their world inform my theory. That is how my theory was constructed. I adopted an 
inductive approach which allowed for their relations, claims and actions to be analysed 
(Charmaz 2005), which led to a systematic and cohesive theory that applies to both case 
studies.           
104 
 
Grounded theory methods consist of systematic, yet flexible guidelines for collecting and analyzing 
qualitative data to construct theories from the data themselves… Grounded theory begins with 
inductive data, invoked iterative strategies of going back and forth between data and analysis, uses 
comparative methods, and keeps you interacting and involved with your data and emerging analysis 
(Charmaz 2014, p. 1).  
 
8. Analytic procedure 
Once an interview came to an end, I commenced the transcription of data. Coding was the 
next stage of making sense of the bundle of data gathered. As the pivotal link between 
collecting data and developing an emergent theory to explain these data, coding helped me 
define what is happening with the data and what it everything meant (Charmaz 2014, p. 113). 
In this regard, I used memos to describe my observations throughout my research. Through 
memos I summarized ideas, made links between themes, and identified what causes themes 
to exist in the first place. 
For example, if you are analyzing a set of texts about the experience of giving birth, you may notice that 
some women mention the pain; others don’t, or even play it down. Noticing and memoing how the 
theme of pain is linked to other themes is an act of theory making, as is noticing and memoing the 
circumstances in a woman’s life that make the mention of pain predictable” (Bernard and Ryan 2010, 
p. 78). 
 
For instance, quite a few interviews noted the links between voters and politicians as 
conditioned by an unhealthy and dependent relationship based on promises of jobs and 
services in return for votes. This dyadic relationship, which is deeply corrosive for democracy, 
was built around the theme of clientelism. As seen in chapter 5, clientelism transpired to be 
one of the main strands that assisted me during the act of theory making.  
 
Memos and analyses served to identify patterns of relations, causes and effects, and to 
generate new meanings out of them. Those meanings were then compared with each other, 
leading to the conceptualization and the generation of the theory. Each of these steps was 
replicated through the comparative lens of the two case studies. Take for example the raw 
data taken from one of my interviews: 
Demilitarization happened too quickly, without a proper plan, without a proper project as to where and 
how they (combatants) would be systematized. There were a lot of improvisations, empty politics, 
deceiving politics of the international community, and the pacifist wing of resistance (LDK)… We came 
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to realise that the state we were trying to create did not have an overall strategy (including how to 
accommodate former combatants) (FMC 02). 
 
The raw data was deconstructed into the following: 
- Demilitarization (DDR) happened too quickly;  
- There was no systematized plan for the reintegration of combatants; 
- Improvisation and empty politics from the international community and the LDK; 
- State did not have an overall strategy (for the integration of combatants); 
- We were anathema from the start. 
 
Followed by: 
We did not want to become politicians after the war. Our main objective was the liberation of Kosovo 
and its becoming a state, and why not, leading to eventual national unification, which is a will and a 
desire that exists today too (…) Politics remained as the only asset where persons could develop (FMC 
02).        
 
Which was deconstructed as follows: 
- No initial desire to enter politics. 
- Main objective: liberation of Kosovo and perhaps national unification. 
- Politics as the only available asset for professional development. 
 
These themes were then placed in the following conceptual categories: 
- Unfair and unjust reintegration process of former combatants. 
- Rivalry and hostility from other political factions as well as the international community. 
- Entrance in politics as the only way for professional development and representation of own 
electorate base. 
  
The diagrams below set out in more specifics the batches of codes per category diagram, and 
the conceptual categories that emerged from the analysis of interview data. They are meant 
to illustrate how I have identified the main concepts deriving from the semi-structured 
interviews, and how they contribute to the overall research question. The first two diagrams 
provide granularity of data by breaking down the research question into two parts: 
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- Category diagram - Assessing impact of former combatants on democracy outcomes 
in Kosovo and FYR Macedonia: this diagram aims to explore the first part of the thesis 
which concerns the act of integration or political transformation of former 
combatants. In order to answer this part of the question, the interview data has led 
me to identify two main indicators: the persistence of war experiences and 
relationships, and the push-pull factors influencing entry into politics and impacts of 
entry into politics on post-war opportunities. The persistence of war experiences and 
relationships indicator draws on what I identified as the incomparable weight of the 
war legacy that the former combatants have over their political rivals. In other words, 
in their quest for votes former combatants-turned politicians are likely to have an 
advantage that derives from their war legacy, which other politicians don’t have. The 
other indicator (push-pull factors influencing entry into politics) measures the bottom-
up requests for political representation versus the former combatants’ personal 
interest in viewing political engagement as means to a career. Each of these two 
indicators is then buttressed by three sub-indicators respectively. I have found that 
the indicators and sub-indicators stemming from the interview data are equally 
applicable to both case studies.  
- Category diagram – Assessing political transformation and reintegration outcomes in 
Kosovo and FYR Macedonia: this diagram zooms into the nature and duration of state 
capture by former combatants as a result of their political transformation in the long 
term. The interview data identifies two indicators which are equally applicable to 
Kosovo as well as FYR Macedonia: the rise of the new masters, and the client-patron 
relationships. What is specific about Kosovo is the role of the international 
community, whereas for FYR Macedonia it is the issue of power-sharing 
arrangements. Both issues are explored in separate indicators for either of the two 
case studies, which themselves are further supported by a set of sub-indicators.  
- The third and last diagram represents a synthesis of the above diagrams, displaying 
the richness and complexity of data with less granularity and more generality. The 
concept diagram – evaluating democracy quality in Kosovo and FYR Macedonia, offers 
a more generic summary of the research question by identifying key concepts that 
build upon the categories and indicators of the two previous diagrams. It is an 
evaluation of democratisation processes in post-conflict environments, claiming that 
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the quality of democracy is dependent upon the reigning power dynamics. Those 
reigning power dynamics in turn are dependent and feed off: 1. clientelism and 
corruption, 2. war legacy transformed in state capture, and 3. the peacebuilding 
paradigm and the international community as an enabler. 
 
Both the category diagrams as well as the concept diagram show a structured build-up of the 
data findings deriving from the field. Akin to a pyramidal form, the diagrams begin by 
identifying the main indicators and then, building on those indicators, highlighting the main 
categories and concepts that feed into the overall research question of the thesis. For reasons 
of consistency, the same structure is then replicated under Chapter V - Presentation of 
evidence and findings from the field, where I discuss at length these concepts under a 
separate subheading each.  
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8.1 Category diagram - Assessing impact of former combatants on democracy outcomes in Kosovo and FYR Macedonia 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Integration / political transformation of former combatants 
Persistence of war experiences and relationships 
 
Family and regional affiliations 
Sense of sacrifice, duty and guardianship 
for the state 
 
Push-pull factors influencing entry into politics and impacts of 
entry into politics on post-war opportunities 
War credentials 
 
Camaraderie and loyalty 
Politics as a career path 
Lack of other career choices – economic 
underdevelopment  
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8.2 Category diagram – Assessing political transformation and reintegration outcomes in Kosovo and FYR Macedonia 
 
 
 
  
Nature and duration of state capture by former combatants 
Client-patron relationships 
 
Rise of new masters  
Distribution of government 
jobs and services 
 
Efforts to influence collective memory 
and war legacy 
 
 
International community 
(Kosovo only) 
Intra-Albanian schism 
 
Social class struggle 
 
Stability / stabilitocracy 
 
Power-sharing arrangements 
(FYR Macedonia only) 
Elite agreement vs people 
 
Dualism of ethnically based 
governments 
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8.3 Concept diagram – Evaluating democracy quality in Kosovo and FYR Macedonia  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Quality of 
fledgling 
democracies 
War legacy 
transformed in 
state capture 
Political 
power 
dynamics 
Clientelism and 
corruption 
Peacebuilding paradigm 
and international 
community as enabler 
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9. Conclusion 
This chapter began by sharing some epistemological ponderings about the subject matter, 
followed by a description of the research methods and the rationale behind the 
conceptualisation of the thesis. It offered a personalised account on the informed decisions 
taken on the collection methods employed to gather data, particularly focusing on the added 
advantage of fieldwork and the aspects of participant observation and semi-structured 
interviews. It also explained the rationale behind option for a qualitative and comparative 
research analysis, borrowing from a wide range of secondary literature areas, strengthened 
with data from the field.  
The explanation on the grounded theory as well as the diagrams above help to 
compartmentalise the main concepts deduced from the fieldwork data. While the categories 
on diagrams 1 and 2 are more granular as they pertain to the country-level findings, diagram 
3 produces generic concepts which serve to build the inductive-approach theory. This concept 
and diagram structure will represent a logical explanation for the full understanding of the 
field Chapter 5 below.    
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IV. Historical Account of Case Studies 
1. Introduction 
This thesis does not intend to delve into deep historical records. Judging from the wide array 
of books, journals and articles that have been published on the Balkans over the recent years, 
there is an abundance of such writings. In fact, while offering historical accounts many 
authors have also been known to fall prey to adopting narratives of different and subjective 
local perspectives of the people of the peninsula. As if to react to the many differing 
interpretations of history, they tend to give an extensive account of the history of the Balkans, 
sometimes going as far back as the 14th century when the Ottomans began conquering the 
region. To make sense of the present, they decide to dig into the past. For example, while 
Glenny (1999) or Kaplan (2005) emphasise ancient hatreds as a cause for recent wars in the 
Balkans, others such as Judah (2000), Ramet (2002), and Economides (2009) offer more 
realistic analyses focusing more on the socio-economic and political inequalities for former 
Yugoslavia as reasons for its demise.  
 
While an historical perspective may help make sense of the present, it does not fully explain 
the current political setup. Also, telling historical tales of war and hatred, invasions and 
liberations, religion and cohabitation, may make for attractive reading, but may also subject 
historiography to bias of politics, conflict and religion. This can damage a publication’s 
credibility and, in most cases, does not offer anything new to the historical account at hand. 
And yet, this is exactly what some of the writings on the Balkan countries sound like: they 
read as if delving into the quagmire of the medieval ages will help explain the complex social, 
political and economic realities of the present. But in fact, they often do the opposite: the 
distant past does not necessarily explain the present, and so the writing ends up lacking 
credibility or being tarnished as biased. Of course, this thesis aims to escape this trap.   
 
Having said that, it is still important to offer a succinct picture of the recent past and events, 
but only as they relate directly to the rise of the armed groups. Cognizant of the fact that this 
thesis is rooted in political science, the historical account offered here is only meant to serve 
as a short background to the case studies of Kosovo and FRY Macedonia. The background 
does not merely aim to serve as an historiographical record but rather as a narration of the 
political dynamics in former Yugoslavia that led to the emergence of the armed groups, and 
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the subsequent events including the armed conflicts, the peace accords and the creation of 
new states. Its purpose is therefore to offer a fuller tableau for the reader as s/he delves into 
the topic of the thesis. Thus, the start date of the chapter will be around the creation of former 
Yugoslavia, which was accompanied with the popular grievances of ethnic Albanians that did 
not wish to be included within its borders. Such grievances were then manifested over the 
coming decades in sporadic armed rebellions that were swiftly and violently squashed by the 
Yugoslav/Serbian regime. Such events are explained in some detail below which, when taken 
together, serve as a good historical background to explain the events of the 1990s and their 
aftermath.  
 
Structurally, this chapter will begin by offering a meta-picture of the creation of Yugoslavia, 
followed by a focus on the two case studies and their experience with the rise of the illegal 
political and military organisations, completed by a synopsis of their respective post-conflict 
institutional set-up.  
 
2. The Yugoslav experiment    
In the beginning of the twentieth century the Ottoman Empire – the “sick man of Europe” (de 
Bellaigue 2001) – was making a final withdrawal from the Balkans. Under the banner of a 
newly-awakened ethnic nationalism, what ensued was a frantic scramble for territories freed 
from Ottoman rule. Immediately after their withdrawal, the two Balkans wars of 1912 and 
1913 were waged primarily with the objective of grabbing territories and obtaining an upper 
hand in the new and emerging power dynamics in the peninsula (Bilandžić 1978; Bej Vlora 
2002; Mulaj 2016). In addition, the Balkans proved to be a bloody terrain between peoples 
during the two worlds wars. In what became known as Yugoslavia, the communist partisans 
led by Josip Broz Tito (who became in effect the father of the new country after WWII), fought 
against Fascist and Nazi occupation. But, at the same time, there was also a de facto civil war 
being waged between the communists on one hand and other factions on the other. There 
were factions fighting under the banner of a myriad of ideologies and nationalisms. For 
instance, the ethnic groupings of Croatian Ustashe, Kosovar Albanian Ballists (both allied with 
the Germans) or Serbian nationalist Chetniks, all fighting for their own independent countries 
with preferably expanded frontiers. But in the end, Tito’s communists emerged triumphant 
and, supported by the Allied forces (the capitalist West as well as the communist Soviet 
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Union), began the built-up of the Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia (check: Banac 1984; 
Malcolm 1996; Malcolm 1998; Glenny 1999; Allcock 2000; Ramet 2002; Lampe 2008). 
 
One of the great beneficiaries of these turbulent times was Serbia. Following the Ottoman 
withdrawal, it was quick to move with its expansionist ambitions in the region. From having 
been an administrative region of the vast Ottoman Empire (or vilayet in Turkish), Kosovo was 
annexed by Serbia on the pretext of its self-proclaimed divine right over it. To support its claim 
over the territory, Serbia evoked memories and myths of its medieval kingdom predating the 
Ottoman occupation (Judah 2000). This was part of the nationalist discourse that set out to 
reawaken and reimagine the past so that it could serve the country’s ambitions and interests 
in the future. It was necessary to delve into the past (a supposedly glorious one at that), and 
recall it, modify it, glorify it, so that it justified the present and the claim for new territories. 
Nations and nation-states, imagined or otherwise, were thus created in the redrawn Balkan 
map (Anderson 2006; Gellner 2008). From that time onwards, Kosovo remained as part of 
Serbia in what was initially called the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. After the Second 
World War, Kosovo became one of the two autonomous provinces of Serbia under the overall 
umbrella of the Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia (the other province, also within 
Serbia, being Vojvodina in the north) (Malcolm 1998; Glenny 1999).  
  
In addition to the Republic of Serbia and its two autonomous provinces, the communist7 
Yugoslavia consisted of five other republics: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Montenegro, and Macedonia. The latter became one of the constituent republics of 
Yugoslavia after the Second World War. According to the Yugoslav constitution, Macedonia 
enjoyed the same legal and political rights as the rest of the republics, including the right to 
secession. The territory that came to be known as the Socialist Republic of Macedonia within 
Yugoslavia was comprised of Slavic Macedonians, Albanians, Bulgarians, Roma, Turks, Serbs 
etc. It must be noted that there was an intersection between the identities of a Macedonian 
and that of a Bulgarian which often overlapped. A part of the population would have 
 
7 Note that I use the terms “communist” and “socialist” in this text interchangeably. In doing so I am replicating 
how they were used in former Yugoslavia, in everyday parlance or in official political discussions. 
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considered themselves ethnic Macedonian as a distinct people with its own identity and 
history.  However, a percentage of them would call themselves Bulgarian living in Yugoslavia 
(Rossos 2008).8 In any case, upon the creation of Yugoslavia post-Second World War, in a 
stroke of genius (or abrasive disregard for ethnic aspirations of peoples, depending on one’s 
point of view), its leader Tito saw it prudent to create the Republic of Macedonia as a federal 
unit of Yugoslavia. Its people were referred to as Macedonian (although a considerable 
percentage of them were Albanian, plus other nationalities), and their language as 
Macedonian (Bechev 2009).   
 
Like the republics, the two autonomous provinces – Kosovo being one of them - enjoyed de 
facto equal rights, especially after the amendments of the Yugoslav constitution in 1974 
(Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 1974). However, from a legal 
standpoint they were still provinces and as such came within the domain of the Serbian 
republic. But there was equality, for instance, in so far as political representation was 
concerned (following Tito’s death the Yugoslav rotating presidency took turns to also include 
representatives from the provinces) (Szayna and Zanini 2000). Provinces, just like the 
republics, had their own autonomous bank, their parliament and government. However, in 
that distinctive parlance reminiscent of communist times, the peoples of the republics were 
considered “nations” and their respective republics were their homelands. The peoples of 
provinces, on the other hand, were deemed to be “nationalities”. This differentiation points 
to more than just a semantic nuance. While the former refers to nations who comprise a 
federation, nationalities refer to a community of people who live in Yugoslavia but whose 
“mother nation” was located outside the Yugoslav borders. In other words, nations were 
those whose only home country was Yugoslavia, while nationalities were those peoples 
whose majority ethnic kin were resident in another, neighbouring country (Allcock 2000). For 
instance, while Hungarians living in the northern province of Vojvodina were indeed Yugoslav 
citizens, it was clear that by virtue of them being ethnic Hungarians they classified as a 
 
8 The purpose of this overview is not to offer an historiographical or linguistic account on the origins of FYR 
Macedonia and its people. That should be left to the experts. I merely wish to refer to the country’s recent 
history as it helps contextualise its present, the political dynamics within FYR Macedonia, as well as its relations 
with immediate neighbours, i.e. Greece, but also for different reasons, Kosovo, Albania, Serbia and Bulgaria.   
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nationality whose “mother nation” was Hungary. The same applied to Turks, for instance. 
Although they had lived in this region for centuries, and although they too were now Yugoslav 
citizens, they were still considered a nationality because their “mother nation” was Turkey. 
In the case of ethnic Albanians, even though they were a predominant majority in Kosovo, 
they were considered a nationality because, such was the reasoning, there was already an 
Albanian nation in the neighbouring Albania. Having two nations on both sides of the border 
fanned the flames of secessionist and nationalist desires, which undermined the Yugoslav 
federation.   
 
In any case, the Yugoslav experiment was about striking the right balance between a 
hodgepodge of ethnic groupings in a region known for war and tragedy (Andrić 1977). The 
concept of Yugoslavism was meant to provide an umbrella sense of identity within which all 
nations and nationalities – Croats, Serbs, Albanians, Macedonians etc. – would live together 
as equals. Supported by the ideals of communism, this was meant to create a new kind of 
citizen, a Yugoslav citizen. In theory, it was about containing nationalist instincts for 
hegemony (Serbia’s instincts especially) by diluting them in a larger federation and offering 
balanced rights to marginalised communities. Between 1945 and the early 1990s, Yugoslavia 
built a federation under the slogan of “Brotherhood and Unity”, where different nationalities 
and religions would cohabit peacefully together (Allcock 2000; Ramet 2002).  
 
This was the vision at least, a vision which was primarily undermined by two internal forces. 
The first one was Serbia’s ambition for hegemony, which never really dissipated despite the 
improving economic wellbeing in Yugoslavia. The second one was represented by the 
nationalist and secessionist movements, underlined by ethnic identity politics, that were 
successfully stifled but were never eradicated completely. These two internal forces would 
eventually come to a head-on collision, causing the bloody Yugoslav implosion of the 1990s 
(Little and Silber 1995; Ramet 2002; Terrett 2018). How did it come to this implosion, then, 
and why in the early 1990s? 
 
Firstly, it is no coincidence that the dissolution occurred as the Cold War was nearing the end 
and as communism was collapsing throughout Central and Eastern Europe. With the removal 
of the communist veil, the peoples of this part of Europe (and further to the East) were able 
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to reemphasize freely their belongings and identities. In the name of those identities, they 
began exerting claims for human rights, autonomy and even independence. The Soviet 
republics are obvious examples; the peaceful break-up of Czechoslovakia is another one. The 
communist mindset of totalitarianism, as heavy-handed and undefeated as it might have 
seemed to be, proved to be in the long run a clay giant when faced with the determined will 
of the peoples. The “power of the powerless” had triumphed and won the day (Havel 2018).  
 
It is the same wave of exerting one’s own identity that eventually swept across Yugoslavia. 
Besides, the early 1990s saw the re-emergence of the forces of “new nationalism” (Ignatieff 
1993) all over the world, not just in the former communist bloc. Quebec held a referendum 
for independence, Northern Ireland was still an arena of sectarian infighting, and Spain faced 
an independence movement in the Basque country (Ignatieff 1993). The different ethnic 
communities in Yugoslavia, too, wanted a greater degree of control over their republics and 
provinces. The people quickly embraced the reawakened brand of nationalism and their 
ethnic identities, while rejecting the fuzzy identity of Yugoslavism. This withdrawal into 
oneself seemed the right step to take particularly in the face of a rising hegemonic threat 
coming from Serbia. 
 
This brings us to the second cause for the break-up of Yugoslavia. As seen from Table 1 below, 
according to the last census held in Yugoslavia in 1981, there was a considerable percentage 
of Serbs who lived in BiH (32%), Croatia (11.5%), and Kosovo (13.2%). The rise of Slobodan 
Milošević to power in 1989 was the real gamechanger. Aware of the winds of change 
engulfing the region, he unleashed the forces of extreme Serbian nationalism which had 
simmered under the surface throughout the Yugoslav existence. This was a primordial form 
of nationalism that was very simple in its outlook: wherever there is a Serb there is a Serbian 
land (Drakulić 1993; Gow 2017). This in effect meant that Serbia claimed large swathes of land 
in Croatia, BiH and the whole of Kosovo. The end-result of these competing nationalisms (i.e. 
one based on ethnic identity and independence, and another based on hegemony and 
control) resulted in the bloody decade of the 1990s.   
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Map 1: Map of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Source: Geographic Guide (No date). 
 
 
Ethnic Group Population (in thousands) 
Serbs 8,141 
Croats 4,428 
Muslims 2,000 
Albanians 1,731 
Slovenes 1,754 
Macedonians 1,342 
Montenegrins 579 
“Yugoslavs” 1,209 
Hungarians 427 
Others 818 
TOTAL 22,428 
 
Table 1: Population of Yugoslavia by ethnicity according to 1981 census. Source: Szayna (2000).  
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Republic 
or Province 
Percent of Population by Ethnicity 
Montenegrin Croat Macedonian Muslim Slovene Serb Albanian Yugoslav Other 
Yugoslavia 2.58 19.75 5.97 8.92 7.82 36.30 7.72 5.44 5.51 
BiH 0.34 18.38 0.05 39.52 0.07 32.02 0.11 7.91 1.60 
Montenegro 68.54 1.18 0.15 13.36 0.10 3.32 6.46 5.35 1.54 
Croatia 0.21 75.08 0.12 0.52 0.55 11.55 0.13 8.24 3.61 
Macedonia 0.21 0.17 67.01 2.07 0.03 2.33 19.76 0.75 7.67 
Slovenia 0.17 2.94 0.17 0.71 90.52 2.23 0.10 1.39 1.77 
Serbia 1.35 0.55 0.51 2.66 0.14 85.44 1.27 4.78 3.29 
Kosovo 1.71 0.55 0.07 3.70 0.02 13.22 77.42 0.17 3.14 
Vojvodina 2.13 5.37 0.93 0.24 0.17 54.42 0.19 8.22 28.33 
 
Table 2: Ethnic groups by Republic and Province according to 1981 census. Source: Szayna (2000). 
 
3. The rise of armed groups and the militarisation of societies 
This sub-chapter provides a snapshot on the creation of armed groups or armies all over 
Yugoslavia against the background of an exponential disintegration of the Federation in the 
1990s. I believe such a snapshot for the whole Yugoslavia is befitting here considering that 
the topic of the thesis relates to the transformation of armed group combatants into politics. 
This is because, in hindsight, the pattern of how these armies emerged is to a great extent 
replicable from case to case.  
 
As explained above, there were many reasons that led to the Yugoslav implosion but two 
mains ones were: 1. the secessionist movements of people for independence underpinned 
and encouraged by a post-Cold War reemergent nationalism, and 2. the traditionally self-
contained but increasingly abrasive hegemonic instincts demonstrated by Serbia which 
desired control of larger swathes of territories, particularly those populated by a percentage 
of Serb communities in Croatia, BiH and Kosovo. Mindful of this political background, but also 
knowing that there was one single official army – that of Yugoslavia – what were the other 
armies that fought in the 1990s and what was their role in the unfolding tragedy?     
     
The Yugoslav wars of the 1990s were accompanied by the emergence of various armed 
factions that claimed to fight in the name of their respective ethnic group (Ignatieff 1993). On 
one hand there was the Yugoslav Army which, with the unravelling of the federation, was de 
facto usurped by Serbia. While the army kept being referred to as Yugoslav, for all intents and 
purposes it had become a Serbian army overnight. Together with the military arsenal and the 
knowhow, the army was simply co-opted by Belgrade which considered itself as the direct 
descendant of Yugoslavia and fighting in defence of it. In addition to having an army, the 
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Serbian regime was quick to deploy paramilitary and other irregular security forces, 
comprised of hard-line nationalists. Such irregular units were often comprised of criminals, 
football hooligans and the like (Power 2002).  
  
To obtain complete control of the Yugoslav army, Slovenian, Croatian and Bosnian soldiers 
and officers were either quickly purged or they changed sides to fight for their own aspiring 
countries. The emerging security vacuum, coupled with the intensification of hostilities 
between the former Yugoslav entities in which Serbia possessed a clear military advantage, 
forced Slovenia, Croatia and BiH to create their own national armies (Ignatieff 1993; 
Holbrooke 1999). Slovenia was less affected by the wars, having been the battleground of 
skirmishes that lasted about a week. To form an army, Croatia mobilised its internal resources 
but also relied heavily on foreign support of its wealthy diaspora in countries such as 
Germany, Austria etc. BiH followed suit in the same manner but struggled to get enough 
arsenal and to gain an upper hand in the war, which translated in the large number of victims 
and defeats on their side (Little and Silber 1995).       
 
Since the end of hostilities, the armies of all these new countries have been undergoing 
reforms of democratic civilian control with various degrees of success. Certainly, Slovenia and 
Croatia have made the most impressive progress, now enjoying the status of full-fledged 
NATO and EU members (NATO No Date). Croatia and BiH have both seen their share of former 
combatants who made a leap to become politicians. Some of them have even been indicted 
by the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to be sentenced or 
acquitted (for individual cases see: http://www.icty.org/en/action/cases/4). Particularly in 
BiH the issue of former combatants who play a role in politics continues to be a divisive one. 
This is mainly since BiH continues to remain a fragile confederation, dependent on the whims 
of a few nationalist leaders that do not mind threatening secession or using veto powers in 
government, which subsequently leads to political blockades (Hunt, Durakovic and 
Radeljkovic 2013). Therefore, being a politician with a combatant’s past in BiH is likely to lead 
to accusations, or at the very least to a degree of suspicion, as to one’s role during the war. 
 
Towards the mid-1990s, a similar pattern of insurgency formation followed suit in Kosovo. 
The emergence of the KLA was a reaction to the increasingly oppressive Serbian regime 
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exerted on the Kosovo Albanian population. As soon as Milošević came to power in 1989 he 
annulled Kosovo’s autonomy, which led to the further segregation of society along the lines 
of majority Albanians and minority Serbs. In response, Albanians were quick to organise 
around their self-proclaimed government that created a parallel system of peaceful 
resistance, led by the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK, as per its Albanian name: Lidhja 
Demokratike e Kosovës), headed by Dr Ibrahim Rugova. This was an internationally 
unrecognized government, voted in internationally unrecognized elections with a mandate to 
represent the needs and interests of Kosovar Albanian people (Clark 2000). However, by mid-
1990s and particularly after the Dayton Accords in 1995 which brought an end to the war in 
Bosnia (Holbrooke 1999), it was becoming increasingly clear that the LDK’s peaceful policies 
were too feeble and ineffective a resistance for the ultra-nationalist Serbian regime of 
Milošević.  
 
As a result, we witnessed the emergence of the KLA, whose first cells date back to 1994/95. 
The KLA founding members generally came from a traditionally marginalized strata of 
Albanian society, and they were normally young and rebellious. Despite sporadic attempts at 
mobilization, the KLA did not quite take off until around mid-1998, which is the time when 
Kosovo was submerged in full-scale war (Bekaj 2010). The subsequent intensification of the 
armed conflict between the KLA and Serbian forces led to an increased interest in 
international diplomacy. However, despite diplomatic interventions by the West and Russia, 
the Serbian regime was determined to treat the “Kosovo issue” as an internal matter. Such a 
stance seemed completely at odds with the reality on the ground, particularly in view of the 
impending humanitarian catastrophe in danger of spilling over from Kosovo into the wider 
region. The failure of diplomacy was followed by NATO’s armed intervention in Serbia in the 
first half of 1999. By the end of the 1998/99 war, almost 15,000 were killed (mostly Albanian 
civilians), around 3,500 were unaccounted for, 120,000 houses were pillaged and destroyed, 
and rape was widely used as an instrument of war. Almost 900,000 ethnic Albanians fled 
Kosovo during the war for the neighbouring Albania, FYR Macedonia and Montenegro. 
Hundreds of thousands of others were internally displaced (Human Rights Watch 2001). The 
end of the Kosovo war ended the violent cycle of the break-up of Yugoslavia, resulting in new 
and reconfigured frontiers in the Western Balkans (for reference see: Glenny 1999; Holbrooke 
1999; Clark 2000, Webber 2009). (Further details of the Kosovo crisis will be described below 
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under the Kosovo sub-chapter when I delve deeper into the trajectory of combatant 
activities).   
 
Although the Kosovo war ended the bloody dissolution of former Yugoslavia, there were two 
more intra-state armed groups that appeared at the dawn of the twenty-first century. One 
emerged in FYR Macedonia (NLA), and another one in the southern part of Serbia (National 
Liberation of Medvegja, Presheva and Bujanoc, or in Albanian: Ushtria Çlirimtare e Preshevës, 
Medvegjës dhe Bujanocit - UÇPMB), both representing ethnic Albanian communities in those 
countries. What ensued were short-lived conflicts between them and the national armies of 
the two respective countries, with the former claiming to fight for rights of their communities 
which were being suppressed, and the latter claiming to exert control and stability over their 
territories. The UÇPMB armed group emerged in the latter part of 1999/early 2000 in the 
southern tip of Serbia bordering eastern Kosovo, claiming to fight for the liberation of three 
Albanian-dominated municipalities there (Presheva, Bujanoc and Medvegja). Most of the 
manpower and arsenal came from the newly-disbanded KLA in Kosovo. Having won the 
conflict with Serbs in Kosovo (admittedly, thanks to the NATO bombing), the idea was to seize 
the day and try to annex three more municipalities to Kosovo. Serbian forces were quick to 
quash such armed dissent, however, while the international community had drawn a line to 
their intervention within Kosovo (Sejdiu-Rugova 2015).  
 
The NLA was formed in 2001, limiting their activities around the region bordering Kosovo and 
in the west of FYR Macedonia, which is also predominantly ethnic Albanian. As a direct spill-
over of the KLA’s disbandment, a lot of combatants, weapon and ammunitions came from 
Kosovo. In the six-month armed conflict that ensued with the Macedonian army, the NLA 
claimed to fight for equal rights and representation of ethnic Albanians within FYR 
Macedonia. In its peak the NLA did not number more than 3,000 soldiers in its ranks. As a 
result of the fighting with the Macedonian army, over 200 persons died and more than 
100,000 persons exiled or internally displaced (Koktsidis and Dam 2008; Ceka 2018). In the 
end, similarly to the KLA, the NLA was involved in peace accords, with some of their leaders 
eventually becoming political figures. Their role in the power-sharing arrangements of FYR 
Macedonia has been crucial ever since (Risteska and Daskalovski 2011; Taleski 2011; Aziri and 
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Emurllai 2014). (Further details of the Macedonia crisis will be described below under the FYR 
Macedonia sub-chapter when I delve deeper into the trajectory of combatant activities).  
 
The above text was meant to paint a general picture of the set-up of Yugoslavia, as well as to 
highlight a couple of its main internal tensions which eventually contributed to its demise. It 
made a quick detour over the rise of armed groups in each of the Yugoslav entities and noted 
their transformation in politics after conflict. This trajectory is a common denominator of all 
of them. I also touched upon the history of Kosovo and FYR Macedonia, however briefly and 
superficially. Below I will now delve into deeper examination on each of the two case studies. 
I will look at the political and social circumstances that set the scene for their internal strife 
in the late 1990s and early 2000s respectively and will then describe the processes of political 
transformation from combatant to politician as they have happened in both countries to date. 
Such a detailed account will help the reader contextualise the empirical data gathered from 
interviews and the fieldwork observations in chapter five. 
 
4. Kosovo – overview 
Traditionally, Kosovo was a region populated by a majority Albanian population, but with a 
minority percentage (smaller or bigger, depending on the period) of Serbs, Montenegrins, 
Turks, Roma minorities and others. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire provided an 
opportunity for the regional powers of the Balkans – first and foremost that of Serbia, 
traditionally supported by Russia – to carve out the territories abandoned by the Ottomans. 
Kosovo had been home to the Serbian Orthodox Church way back in earlier Ottoman and pre-
Ottoman times. In the newly-awakened Serbian nationalism of the late 1800s Kosovo was 
portrayed as the holy Jerusalem of the Serbian nation and the home of their spiritual identity. 
This religious-historical claim by Serbia came in direct conflict with the aspirations of the 
majority ethnic Albanians to be part of Albania, which declared independence from the 
Ottomans in 1912. However, this aspiration came at complete odds with the Serbian 
nationalist agenda. Serbia was more powerful and had the support of the Great Powers of the 
day. As a result, Kosovo found itself swallowed by the Serbian state as the Ottomans were 
withdrawing (Allock 2000; Babler 2015).   
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Years Total Ethnic Albanian Ethnic Serb Others (Turkish, RAE, 
Bosniac, Gorani etc.)  
1948 733.034 498.463 or 68% 176.661 or 24.1% 57.910 or 7.9% 
1953 815.908 524.628 or 64.3% 196.633 or 24.1% 94.645 or 11.6% 
1961 963.988 646.835 or 67.1% 226.537 or 23.5% 90.614 or 9.4% 
1971 1.243.693 916.601 or 73.7% 228.839 or 18.4% 99.495 or 8% 
1981 1.584.440 1.226.356 or 77.4% 209.146 or 13.2% 148.937 or 9.4% 
2011 1.780.021 1.619.819 or 91% 60.520 or 3.4% 99.681 or 5.6% 
 
Table 3: Kosovo population census between 1948 and 2011 by numbers and percentiles. Source: Kosovo Agency 
of Statistics (2019).9 
 
 
Map 2: Map of Kosovo. Source: KfW Development Bank (No date). 
 
Since the will of the majority of the people was at odds with the emerging political 
environment, Kosovo entered the 20th century in a state of turmoil and uncertainty. In fact, it 
is safe to say that Kosovo spent the whole of the 20th century torn between two extremes: on 
one hand, the Serbian state’s heavy-handed approach to yield the province to its diktat, and 
on the other hand, the long-lived wishes of the majority Albanian population for 
 
9 Note that there was no census held in Kosovo for 1991 and 2001. By 1991, Milošević was already in power, 
Kosovo’s autonomy was already suspended, and the situation had generally deteriorated to such a degree that 
organizing a census would have proven completely senseless. In 2001, too, there was no census organized 
considering that Kosovo had just emerged from war two years prior. The international community headed by 
the UN mission had too many priorities to tackle and the census certainly could not be one of them. The first 
census to be organized after a hiatus of thirty years was in 2011.   
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independence and unification with Albania. Therefore, it should be noted that the Albanians’ 
dissent against the Serbian/Yugoslav regime in Kosovo goes back almost a century ago. The 
reasons for dissent relate to their refusal to submit to Serbian rule, coupled with their 
aspiration for liberation and national unification with Albania. It is important to highlight this 
historical background as becoming aware of it helps to explain a lot of the current political 
dynamics in Kosovo and the region.  
 
Soon after its annexation and right to the Second World War there were already several 
rebellions against the Serbian regime. Although usually such rebellions were sporadic and 
small, appearing in rural areas, they pointed to the Albanians’ increasing discontent with the 
new regime. Such were, for example, armed struggles between the two world wars led by the 
so-called “kaçaks”, meaning outlaws or rebels. These were, however, scattered and 
disorganized rebel groups that proved no match for the Serbian troops to quash (Bekaj 2010).  
 
During the Second World War, many warring factions appeared in Kosovo (just like in the rest 
of the Balkans), some of which sided with nationalist forces, others with German or Italian 
occupying troops, and others that fought alongside the communist partisan forces. What was 
clear, though, is that the underlying nationalist resistance was very much alive even at the 
height of this war. Regardless of ideology, the common denominator of most of them was the 
ideal for unification with Albania after the war. To that effect, on 31 December 1943 and 1 
January 1944, the leaders of Kosovo gathered in Bujan, northern Albania, and signed the “First 
Conference of the National Liberation Council for Kosovo and Dukagjin Plateau”, which 
envisaged that, according to the will of the people, Kosovo would unify with Albania following 
the end of the Second World War. The so-called Bujan Declaration was signed by “the 
representatives of all parts of Kosova and the Dukagjin Plateau, Albanian, Serbian and 
Montenegrin: nationalist, communist, anti-fascist youth, communist youth, anti-fascist 
women, (…) for the development and union of the peoples of Kosova” (Weller 1999, pp. 50-
51). What was novel about the Declaration is that for the first time the leaders of Kosovo 
managed to organize politically and agree on a joint platform that would pave the way for the 
future of the territory. Secondly, the delegates who signed the Declaration came from all 
ethnic and religious backgrounds of Kosovo, which testified to the agreement’s tolerant and 
inclusive political approach and vision for the territory’s future.   
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However, after the Second World War dissenting voices were stifled, side-lined or 
marginalized, while a new era of communist rule commenced. Under the slogan 
“Brotherhood and Unity”, the new Yugoslav leaders were eager to show that the ideology of 
communism was omniscient and prevalent over all national or ethnic identities. A new 
identity, one based on a Yugoslav and communist persona, was to replace and rise above all 
the other, narrower, forms of it. There was hope, real or feigned, that a new world order had 
been born, one in which the communist Yugoslavia would offer space for cohabitation to all 
the peoples living in it (Kraja 2003a). Based on this ideology, Tito’s Yugoslavia sought to forge 
ties between “nations” and “nationalities” based on communist principles. At the same time, 
it sought to strategically address nationalist and hegemonic streams in certain republics, 
either by bringing their leaders closer to the government, or by quashing them when the 
timing allowed for such action to take place. Tito seemed to be cognizant that these streams 
were very much alive, such as the nationalist Chetniks in Serbia, or the secessionist Ustashe 
in Croatia. Such was the case, for example, with the Serbian nationalist, Aleksandar Ranković, 
who served as Tito’s interior minister during the 1950s and part of the 1960s. Under the 
pretext of searching for weapons, he became infamous for using terror tactics upon the 
Albanian population in Kosovo. He also represented a constant threat to Tito’s grip on power 
and symbolised Serbia’s resurgent tendencies for hegemony within the Federation. Ranković 
was eventually removed in the mid-1960s, which represented a blow (however short-lived) 
to Serbian nationalism and a win for the reconstitution of a Yugoslav balance of powers, 
however fledging and fragile this proved to be in retrospect (Ramet 2002; Babler 2015).     
 
On the other hand, the socio-economic situation was improving fast, making Yugoslavia an 
acceptable and credible partner internationally, both with the capitalist West and the socialist 
East. In addition, Tito as one of the founders of the Non-Aligned Movement managed to strike 
close relations with most of the Third World countries, thereby positioning Yugoslavia on a 
solid footing on the international stage (Mišković 2009). For a while at least, it seemed as if 
the economic betterment might neutralise the unhappy voices within the federation.   
 
However, throughout this time Kosovo remained the poorest and most deprived entity of the 
federation. Starting from the 1970s onwards one could witness the gradual creation of an 
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urban, middle-class community, some of whom were even true proponents of the idea of 
Yugoslavism and the slogan of “Brotherhood and Unity”. They were well-integrated at school 
and at work, and they managed to get good jobs at nationally-owned social enterprises, or 
the state institutions. However, this new elite represented a very small minority in a territory 
whose population continued to be predominantly poor, rural and traditional.  
 
The mid-1970s brought an era of political liberalisation in the Yugoslav federation. The 
nationalist and hegemonic undercurrents were successfully stifled (at least for a while, as 
witnessed later), and further powers were decentralised across the republics and provinces. 
The constitutional amendments of 1974 brought a greater degree of autonomy for Kosovo 
Albanians (Constitution of SFRY 1974). What ensued were around fifteen years of relative 
economic prosperity for the province. In addition, Kosovo gained autonomy over its banking 
system, had its own parliament, while the newly-established University of Prishtina became 
the epicentre of Albanian culture and literature (Clark 2000). Kosovo, with its emerging 
communist, urban, middle class was making strides towards becoming genuinely an organic 
part of the Federation, not just an artificial add-on for Serbia. Or so it seemed for some.   
 
However, despite the economic boom and the political cohesion seemingly taking root across 
Yugoslavia, Kosovo continued to be the centre of a resistance which manifested itself in 
various forms and intensities. This undercurrent of resistance, of rebellion, armed or 
otherwise, was always there, from the beginning of Yugoslavia to its very end. It never 
dissipated, but rather continued to simmer among the more marginalized and rural parts of 
the territory. In general, there were two reasons for this lingering discontent. One was 
economic in nature – despite the economic progress in the federation, Kosovo remained the 
most deprived territory. The second reason was essentially political - Kosovo Albanians 
continued to be a marginalised community, relegated to de facto second-class citizens, and 
destined to fall in the lower category of a “nationality”, not that of the “nation”. These factors, 
coupled with the fact they considered Kosovo to have been occupied by Serbia, only served 
to enflame their nationalist ideals for liberty and unification with Albania. 
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4.1 From random spots of resistance to a unified clandestine movement  
Normally, students and young people were at the forefront of clandestine activities against 
the Yugoslav establishment. These activities began to pick up around the end of the 1960s. 
There were a wide range of clandestine cells that started appearing, mainly organized by 
young students, but also intellectuals with a nationalist streak in their demeanour, or by 
defiant peasants in rural areas. Such cells were not necessarily organized around a whole and 
coherent structure. Rather, they seemed like scattered and disorganised rebellious mini-units 
that pointed to a larger symptom of popular discontent. Eventually, as the work of resistance 
cells intensified, they all came to be identified with a generic name for the movement known 
as “Illegality” (“Ilegalja” in Albanian). Henceforth, all clandestine activities were referred to as 
part of this movement (Elshani 1998).  
 
In 1968 the first major demonstration was held in the streets of Prishtina, where the slogans 
“Kosovo - Republic” and “Long live Albania” were chanted (Clark 2000). The Albanian flag was 
also seen flying among demonstrators, which was a rare and punishable offence for that time. 
One of the inspiring figures of the time was a young writer named Adem Demaçi. In his articles 
and books, he was very vocal about demanding that Kosovo be granted the right to secede 
from Serbia and Yugoslavia, and to unify with Albania. Because of his remarks and actions, 
Demaçi was subsequently arrested and spent most of the next thirty years in prison (with two 
short interim releases) (Gashi 2010). Following his final release, in 1991 the Council of Europe 
awarded Demaçi the Sakharov prize for Freedom of Thought. On its note about Demaçi, The 
European Parliament stated the following, among others:  
Adem Demaçi is a symbol of the struggle for Kosovo's independence. Involved as a senior leader in the 
country's politics for many years, he was also a long-time political prisoner who spent a total of 28 years 
in jail for speaking out against the treatment of ethnic Albanians and criticising communism under 
Yugoslav dictator Josip Broz Tito (EP 1991). 
 
Demaçi’s case offers an illustrative example of the journey of an intellectual (writer, 
journalist) who turned into a fiery proponent for liberation. He came to be known as the 
Mandela of the Balkans and a beacon of resistance for the younger generation within the KLA 
and outside of it. Even while in prison he continued to inspire young men and women with 
his nationalist ideals for struggle and freedom. But his political journey continued after prison, 
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too, and well into the 1990s and 2000s. When the KLA came into the scene and grew big 
enough to require a clear political structure, Adem Demaçi was appointed their Political 
Representative. While in this role, he came to represent a rather radical standpoint within the 
KLA ranks. Since armed groups are extreme by definition – as they employ violence to reach 
their goals – this says a lot about Demaçi’s figure. He did not agree with what he considered 
to be Kosovo’s concessions in the peace talks in Rambouillet, France (as well as the KLA 
leadership’s role in ceding to those concessions), and he was quite vocal about these views. 
However, the younger soldiers of the KLA leadership politely disagreed with him, always 
extending their respect and courtesy to the man who had grown to represent the ideals of 
their armed resistance (Gashi 2010). Demaçi continued to be active in politics until his death 
in 2018, promoting peace and reconciliation between Serb, Roma, Albanian and other 
communities. By so doing, he completed quite a remarkable circle in his political life, from 
having been a radical nationalist to becoming a credible figure calling for genuine peace and 
reconciliation between communities in post-war Kosovo.  
 
The figure of Demaçi was central to the whole resistance movement in Kosovo after the 
Second World War, and even to the establishment of the KLA. His struggle and leadership 
came to embody the Illegality movement. In the 1960s and 1970s there were many scattered 
and decentralised cells of this movement that looked up to him for leadership. Although 
Demaçi was already in prison, in February 1982 these resistance cells managed to unify under 
a single hierarchy of command and formed a single political organisation that operated 
clandestinely called Lëvizja Popullore e Kosovës (LPK) (Elshani 1998; Gashi 2010; Surroi 2014). 
As will be elaborated in the beginning of Chapter V, the LPK was a Marxist-Leninist 
organisation that did not exclude armed confrontation from its strategy to liberate Kosovo 
from Serbia. A considerable majority of ethnic Albanian dissidents from the 1980s onwards 
were members of this organisation, including the founding members of the KLA. As will be 
seen in the immediate sub-chapter below, the LPK led the resistance until the creation of the 
LDK in the beginning of the 1990s. With its pacifist philosophy of resistance and its Western-
oriented approach, the LDK changed the course of Kosovo’s recent history and in so doing 
weakened the LPK’s role, until the latter came back onto the scene with the emergence of the 
KLA in the late 1990s.        
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4.2 An accelerating crisis leading to full-fledged war 
Meanwhile, towards the late 1980s the political situation in Yugoslavia was worsening, and 
Kosovo was at the epicentre of it. After Milošević rose to power in 1989 in Serbia, inter-ethnic 
relations between Serbs and Albanians took a turn for the worse. In 1989, Kosovo’s autonomy 
was annulled, more than 100,000 ethnic Albanian workers were forced out of their jobs, and 
the premises of the University of Prishtina and most secondary schools were closed for ethnic 
Albanian students (Clark 2000).  
The quite open and undisguised nature of the programme of ethnic politics and repression, enshrined 
in Serb law, was a reflection of the belief that the armour of state sovereignty would protect Belgrade 
from significant international interest in relation to these practices. After all, all the relevant decisions 
had been adopted by what Serbia claimed were the appropriate constitutional procedures, and only 
Serbia would be in a position to judge the validity of her own actions. While the abolition of Kosovo’s 
independent powers had, in fact, occurred under rather controversial circumstances, the protestations 
of the Albanian leadership were now being portrayed as manifestations of separatism which, in turn, 
could justify even fiercer opposition (Weller 1999, p. 26). 
 
As the above quote suggests, the Serbian regime’s justification for increasing repression in 
Kosovo was the “armour of state sovereignty”. In the name of that sovereignty and the 
principle of non-interference in states they seemed committed to prosecute anyone who was 
considered disruptive for the state. However, as will be seen below, the gross violations of 
human rights throughout the 1990s could not be hidden from the international audience, and 
nor could the sovereignty principle be a panacea for all such actions.    
  
In response, Kosovo Albanians entered the 1990s by creating a parallel system of governance 
and welfare, coupled with economic and political boycott against Serbia. They organised 
themselves around the newly constituted party LDK, led by the writer-turned-politician Dr 
Ibrahim Rugova. The peaceful resistance, as it came to be known, relied largely on appealing 
to Western powers on the plight of Kosovo Albanians, while avoiding a direct armed clash 
with Serbian forces, considered to be catastrophic for the unarmed and unprepared Albanian 
population (Hamiti and Hamiti 2017). 
 
At this point, it is interesting to note a change of gears and of leadership within the Albanian 
political spectrum in Kosovo. As I noted above, right up to the beginning of the 1990s the main 
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opposition movement in Kosovo was that of “Illegality” or, more precisely, of LPK. Its 
ideological outlook veered towards Marxism-Leninism, if only because of the communist 
regime in Albania which was viewed as the mother nation and a role model to follow. 
However, suddenly, the late 1980s and early 1990s ushered a new era in politics not just in 
Yugoslavia but internationally, too. The Cold War was coming to an end, communism was 
collapsing throughout Central and Eastern Europe, and scholars were talking about the end 
of history in which the capitalist West and the liberal order were the conclusive winners of 
the day (Fukuyama 2006). In the emerging era of pluralism (the buzzword of the day which 
exemplified the creation of more than one political party and the tolerance of the shaky 
communist regimes for them), new political parties also began appearing in Yugoslavia. It was 
right at the beginning of this changing political climate that the LDK was created in December 
1989 (Hyseni 2019).  
 
The popular support for the party in Kosovo was vast and unprecedented, and remained like 
that until the escalation of hostilities a decade later. Apart from being a new party, another 
novel aspect of it was its ideological outlook: the LDK leadership led by Dr Rugova made a 
conscious decision from the start to orient Kosovo towards the capitalist West and to position 
themselves in the centre right of the political spectrum (as much as one could talk about such 
a spectrum in Yugoslavia of that time). Additionally, the LDK was not comprised of clandestine 
escapees who had operated in the shadows. Although admittedly there were a few former 
political prisoners and LPK activists in their midst, the LDK was mainly composed of academics, 
writers, journalists and doctors. These acts alone – the creation of the party and its ideological 
positioning – were enough to completely throw the LPK movement out of the game and into 
the margins of political life (Marsavelski, Sheremeti and Braithwaite 2018). It took almost a 
decade (i.e. until the eruption of the war) for the LPK members to return to the forefront of 
politics and decision-making either through political activism in LDK or other parties or, more 
pointedly, through the KLA.          
 
Meanwhile, Yugoslavia was quickly unravelling, falling prey to the ultra-nationalist and 
hegemonic forces orchestrated by Milošević, which were coming into clash with nationalist 
secessionist tides of constituent republics. The first one to get away was Slovenia, following a 
“seven-day war” with Serbian/Yugoslav army. In 1992 Croatia entered a war with Serbia too, 
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followed shortly by an even bloodier war in BiH. The international community’s involvement 
in these conflicts peaked with the Dayton Accords in 1995, which brought an end to these 
wars, thus concluding this first harrowing chapter in former Yugoslavia’s dissolution 
(Holbrooke 1999). Just like Slovenia, Croatia became a state with its Yugoslav borders 
elevated to international ones. BiH became a state, too, but a confederate model with half of 
it under the control of Bosniacs and Croats, and the other half under the administration of 
Serbs.    
 
At the same time, Rugova’s peaceful resistance was looking increasingly like a defeatist 
resignation in the face of increasing brutality by the Serbian regime. This became clear 
particularly after the Dayton Accords. The main premise upon which the LDK leadership had 
built its peaceful resistance was to appeal to the West for intervention in the Kosovo crisis. 
There was hope that when an international conference such as Dayton eventually took place, 
the Kosovo issue would be discussed parallel with that of Bosnia’s. Meanwhile, people of 
Kosovo had to show restraint and patience. However, Kosovo was not discussed at Dayton at 
all (Holbrooke 1999), which was quite a shock for the LDK in Kosovo. This was certainly a cold 
shower upon anyone who harboured illusions that the international community was about to 
intervene in the Kosovo crisis. From that moment on, although the LDK continued to enjoy 
widespread popular support, it began losing terrain to alternative voices who criticized it for 
being too passive as a resistance (Hamiti and Hamiti 2017; Marsavelski, Sheremeti and 
Braithwaite 2018).  
  
Clandestine organisations such as the LPK had long been arduous opponents of Dr Rugova. 
Even when cast aside by the overwhelming popularity of the LDK, they had never ceased to 
plot for ways to mobilise people in an armed resistance against Serbia. Their efforts 
intensified in the second half of the 1990s, with diaspora representatives beginning to actively 
raise funds to this end. During this time there were a few initiatives at armed organizations, 
but the one that emerged as the dominant force on the ground was the KLA. Rather than an 
army, initially this organisation resembled a random assortment of several haphazardly 
scattered cells across various villages in Kosovo (Elshani 1998; Bekaj 2010). It was only later, 
with the acceleration of hostilities in late 1997 and early 1998, that a newly formed leadership 
was put in place that helped create a coherent command structure of the KLA at the country-
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wide level. It is around this time that people like Hashim Thaçi, Azem Syla, Agim Çeku, Kadri 
Veseli, Xhavit Haliti, Rexhep Selimi, Sylejman Selimi, Jakup Krasniqi and others were identified 
as the leaders of this guerrilla group. All of them, without exception, entered politics after the 
war and have been playing very important roles in Kosovo’s political process ever since.     
 
The KLA’s emergence signalled two things: a preparedness for an armed confrontation with 
the Serbian regime, and an undermining of the LDK as the main resistance force. Its rise 
should indeed be understood in the context of the “persistent oppression of the Kosovo 
Albanians by the Serbian/Yugoslav governments (…) and subsequent Albanian efforts to 
obtain their independence” (Mulaj 2008, p. 1114). Until early 1998, the KLA was mainly 
involved in hit-and-run tactics, with its fighters organising isolated attacks against police 
forces or collaborationists of Albanian or other ethnicities. In response, Serbian forces 
conducted a series of assaults against KLA cells, also killing civilians and families in the process. 
Massacres of civilians were met with outrage, which triggered massive voluntary 
mobilisations in the KLA ranks from early 1998 onwards. By then it was becoming clear that 
the armed conflict was inevitable and that the LDK’s peaceful resistance had to make way for 
the drums of war.              
For a long time, they [the people of Kosovo] would not be searching for other political alternatives, but 
would instead end up comprising a subordinate mass of people, led by an almost unconscious inertia. 
Therefore, however harsh and inhumane this might sound, Kosovo was needed a war also for internal 
reasons. Kosovo had to get rid not only of Serbia, but also dispose of the idea of subordination […] 
Kosovo needed a war to help her understand that there were other political alternatives, apart from 
that capital deception that dictated one could live in occupation, whilst dreaming of their freedom 
(Kraja 2003b, p. 36). 
 
The above quote, written by a Kosovo-based writer and, coincidentally, one of the founding 
members of the LDK, is meant to portray the sense of pessimism that had engulfed Kosovo 
during that time. The LDK’s passive resistance was increasingly viewed as just an excuse to 
justify the indignity and humiliation endured daily under the Serbian regime. That is why the 
KLA, when it appeared, managed to attract such huge popular following in such a short space 
of time (Judah 2000; Judah 2008).  
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The attention of international diplomacy was now fully fixed upon the unfolding humanitarian 
catastrophe in Kosovo. Any attempt at avoiding full-scale war was met with another round of 
armed clashes between the KLA and Serbian forces. The LDK was still a major political force 
in Kosovo but, as the hostilities intensified, it became clear that the KLA and its political 
leadership was gaining the upper hand (Marsavelski, Sheremeti and Braithwaite 2018).  
 
As was note above, the KLA was not a birthchild of the LDK but rather of its historic nemesis, 
the LPK. Kosovo’s LDK and KLA were not like Northern Ireland’s Sinn Fein and the Irish 
Republican Army (IRA) in the sense that the former was the political wing and the latter was 
the armed wing of the same resistance. Rather, in Kosovo, while both the LDK and the KLA 
had similar objectives – fighting off the Serbian occupation of the country – the LDK employed 
pacifist means of resistance, whereas the KLA was expressly formed to be a guerrilla army. 
However, and this is key, the LDK was not the political wing of the KLA and the KLA was not 
the armed wing of the LDK. Their representatives came from two walks of life – while the 
LDK’s leadership mainly comprised of urban intellectuals such as literary critics, journalists 
and professors, the KLA’s founding members came largely from rural and marginalised areas 
and they had normally operated clandestinely with the LPK in the past. Therefore, as the 
resistance against Serbia intensified, so did the power play between these two strands of 
ethnic Albanian groupings. While the LDK was the point of contact for all political matters 
throughout the 1990s, by early 1998 the balance of power began to tip in favour of the KLA. 
Even for the international mediators who visited the region, the KLA political leaders were 
gradually becoming the main points of contact. This provided a degree of legitimacy for the 
KLA’s struggle and suggested that any future political deal on Kosovo could not go ahead 
without the buy-in of the army’s political leadership (BBC Albanian 2010; Jagger and Boyes 
2018).   
 
As it transpired during 1999, this indeed proved to be the case. On this year the main 
international actors – the Western powers as well as Russia – reached a consensus that the 
Kosovo conflict needed to be resolved swiftly. All diplomatic means would be used to try and 
pre-empt a humanitarian catastrophe with wider ramifications for the region. To this end, in 
March 1999 the representatives of the Serbian government and the leadership of Kosovo 
(comprised of the LDK, KLA and others) met in Rambouillet, France, to discuss a peace treaty, 
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under the auspices of French, British, American and Russian foreign envoys. The fact that the 
Serbian delegation was headed by Milan Milutinović – the then-President of Serbia – while 
the Yugoslav President Milošević had decided not to grace the conference with his presence 
was indicative from the start that they did not take these talks seriously. Everyone knew that 
the real decision-making power was concentrated with Milošević and that no deal could be 
signed without his approval. (After all, it was Milošević who had agreed on a deal on behalf 
of Serbia and the Serbs of BiH at Dayton four years previously). On the other hand, the Kosovo 
delegation was represented by Dr Rugova (LDK), Prof Rexhep Qosja (leader of a new party – 
LBD), Veton Surroi (independent), and Hashim Thaçi (KLA). The head of this delegation, 
without whose approval no decision would be taken, became the 30-year old Thaçi (Tahiri 
2001; Shala 2003; Surroi 2014; Jagger and Boyes 2018). This was the first time that the KLA 
political leaders officially reached the front-line of political decision-making for Kosovo.       
 
In hindsight, the outcome of Rambouillet peace talks was to be expected. The accords called 
for immediate and verifiable cessation of all hostilities, withdrawal of all Serbian forces from 
Kosovo, and simultaneous establishment of a NATO-led force in the territory. It further called 
for self-government for Kosovo and left an avenue open for its future status to be resolved 
after three years through the will of the people (UN 1999c). Serbia did not agree to sign the 
treaty, while Kosovo’s representatives signed it. This meant that by all accounts, the efforts 
at resolving the conflict through diplomacy had reached a dead-end, thus opening the 
possibility for military intervention against Serbia. Serbia’s refusal to agree to the treaty’s 
terms opened the way for NATO to begin a 78-day bombing campaign against it, making this 
the Alliance’s first ever war against a sovereign state. In this “virtual war” (Ignatieff 2000), 
NATO conducted the whole operation from the air against an army operating on the ground. 
At no point during the bombing campaign did a single NATO soldier venture into ground 
combat.  
 
NATO planes dropped their first bombs on 24 March 1999. The Alliance’s aim was to target 
specific military installations of the Serbian army and weaken its capabilities to wage war 
against civilians on the ground in Kosovo. Initially, it was thought that the campaign would 
not last more than a couple of weeks, as Milošević would be coerced to succumb when faced 
with the Alliance’s might. However, this did not prove to be the case and the Alliance quickly 
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had to expand the number of targets across the country to also include non-military 
installations such as bridges (strategic targets) or the national television of Serbia which by 
then had been transformed into a propaganda machinery for the regime (Blair 2010).  
 
Finally, on 9 June 1999, Serbia agreed to sign a capitulation agreement with NATO. The 
Kumanovo agreement (as it came to be known, taking the name of the town in FYR Macedonia 
where the agreement was signed) was officially named the Military Technical Agreement 
between the International Security Force ("KFOR") and the Governments of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia. It stipulated for the “deployment in Kosovo 
under UN auspices of effective international civil and security presences” (NATO 1999). It 
further set detailed steps of the withdrawal of all Serbian forces from Kosovo and the 
subsequent setup of an international security presence headed by NATO (NATO 1999).10 
4.3 International tutelage and independence 
On 12 June 1999, NATO forces – henceforth to be known as the Kosovo Force (KFOR) - entered 
Kosovo from the south, while the Serbian forces left towards the north and into Serbia. The 
United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was installed, mandated 
under the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), among others, to perform basic 
administrative functions over the territory; to organise and oversee the development of 
provisional institutions; and to facilitate a political process to determine Kosovo’s future 
status (UN 1999b).11 The resolution called upon the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia  to “put an 
immediate and verifiable end to violence and repression in Kosovo, and begin and complete 
verifiable phased withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces 
according to a rapid timetable, with which the deployment of the international security 
presence in Kosovo will be synchronized” (UN 1999b, p. 2). This resolution was also to provide 
the main and overarching legal framework within which all institutions, international and 
domestic, would operate thenceforth. Within the framework of stipulating for the 
establishment of an international security presence in Kosovo to be led by NATO, the 
resolution also called upon the KLA to immediately end “all offensive actions and comply with 
the requirements for demilitarization as laid down by the head of the international security 
 
10 Note that a copy of the Military Technical Agreement is attached in Appendix III of the thesis.  
11 Note that a copy of the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) is attached in Appendix IV of the thesis.  
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presence in consultation with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General” (UN 
1999b, p. 5).   
 
The above resolution laid the groundwork for UNMIK to push for the speedy demobilization 
of the KLA. In fact, one of the immediate tasks of the UN Administration was to oversee the 
DDR process of KLA troops. On 20 June 1999 (just over a week after the conflict), a document 
called “Undertaking of Demilitarisation and Transformation by the UCK (KLA in Albanian 
acronyms)” was signed by the then-KFOR Commander General Mike Jackson, the then-Chief 
of Staff of the KLA Agim Çeku, and the then-Political Director of the Political Directorate of 
the KLA Hashim Thaçi. The agreement set out the terms, the timeframe and the process for 
demobilizing KLA combatants, and stated that the authority with regards to monitoring its 
implementation rested with the Commander of KFOR (UN 1999a). With NATO already fully 
operational across Kosovo, there was not going to be another force in the ground. “With 
immediate effect on signature the UCK agrees to comply with this Undertaking and with the 
directions of COMKFOR (Commander of KFOR). Any forces which fall to comply with this 
Undertaking or with the directions of COMKFOR will be liable to military action as deemed 
appropriate by COMKFOR” (UN 1999a, p. 2). All KLA combatants were to complete the process 
of demobilization within 90 days of the agreement entering into force.12  
 
Exactly 90 days later, on 20 September 1999, UNMIK promulgated Regulation No. 1999/8 on 
the Establishment of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) (UNMIK 1999). It stated that the KPC 
would be established as a civilian emergency service agency, tasked with (a) providing disaster 
response services; (b) performing search and rescue; (c) providing a capacity for humanitarian 
assistance in isolated areas; (d) assisting in demining; and (e) contributing to rebuilding 
infrastructure and communities (UNMIK Regulation No. 1999/8)13. By this time the process of 
demobilization and disarmament was successfully completed. In addition, UNMIK appointed 
the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) with the task of offering Information 
Counselling and Referral Services during the demobilization process. The above regulation 
 
12 Note that a copy of the Undertaking of Demilitarisation and Transformation by the UCK is attached in 
Appendix V of the thesis.  
13 Note that a copy of UNMIK Regulation No. 1999/8 is attached in Appendix VI of the thesis. 
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allowed for the integration of KLA combatants into the newly-formed KPC (Clewlow 2010a). 
By November 1999, when the DDR process was rounded up, there were around 25,000 
soldiers registered (Barakat and Özerdem 2005, p. 31). Around 5,000 of KLA combatants were 
transferred to KPC (Özerdem 2004, p. 442). Additionally, around 5,000 ex-combatants joined 
the Kosovo Police Service (KPS), which was also created following the conflict.      
 
The immediate post-war period saw Kosovo undergo a rapid transition process that changed 
the make-up of its politics and the actors involved to a considerable degree. The KLA’s 
transformation saw several of its key figures join post-war security mechanisms. However, 
most of its senior figures went on to either co-found political parties or were co-opted by 
those parties soon afterwards. One of them - PDK – was formed and is still led by former KLA 
leaders: between 1999 and 2017 by Kosovo’s current President Hashim Thaçi, and from 2017 
to this day by the current Speaker of the Assembly of Kosovo, Kadri Veseli. Due to political 
infighting, in early-2014 a splinter group led by one of the former commanders of the KLA, 
Fatmir Limaj, left the PDK and created its own political party called The Social-Democratic 
Initiative (Nisma Social-Demokratike in Albanian). Limaj has also been very active in politics 
after the war, occupying various positions in government or in the Assembly as a deputy. 
Currently he serves as Kosovo’s Deputy Prime Minister. Finally, another commander of the 
KLA, Ramush Haradinaj, went on to form his own political party after the war, called the 
Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK). Haradinaj is currently serving as Prime Minister of 
Kosovo.  
 
Almost twenty years after the conflict the membership base in these three parties has 
changed considerably, with members from the academia, civil society, or younger men and 
women, joining their ranks (CSO 03). Although in everyday political discourse they continue 
to be referred to as the “war parties” or “parties that have emerged from war”, over the years 
they have become much more diverse and representative of a greater stratum of the people 
of Kosovo. However, what remains unchanged is the figure of the leader and the weight 
behind that figure. In all the cases mentioned here, each party has been founded and 
continues to be led by an important ex-KLA commander or decision-maker. Few would 
disagree that without them in charge their respective party would diminish greatly in scope 
and popularity.          
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Through their political parties, the former KLA combatants managed to insert themselves into 
the mainstream political scene. In many ways they have dominated that scene ever since, 
even when they were not in power. Kosovo’s current political spectrum is comprised, on one 
hand, of these three parties that emerged from war. On the other hand, there is the LDK party 
with its pacifist legacy of Ibrahim Rugova. Lastly, a new party founded in 2004, called Self-
determination (Vetëvendosje – VV) has become one of the main players of the scene (OPP 
02). Although its leadership and members generally come from a younger, post-war 
generation, the party has attracted a few former KLA combatants who over the years might 
have become disgruntled with their old comrades in arms.  
 
To this date politics in Kosovo continues to be affected to a large degree by parties or 
politicians whose origins are traced back to the KLA. During the UNMIK era of executive 
administration (1999-2008), Ramush Haradinaj’s party entered in a coalition government with 
the LDK. Later, beginning in 2007 the PDK was part of each coalition government, either 
occupying the Prime Minister’s post or other important positions. It was during Thaçi’s first 
mandate as Prime Minister that Kosovo declared independence from Serbia on 17 February 
2008. The declaration of independence was the culmination of several years of negotiations 
between Belgrade and Prishtina on the future status of Kosovo. The negotiations were 
mediated by the UN Special Envoy, the former Finnish President Marti Ahtisaari. His Report 
on Kosovo’s future status, dated 26 March 2007, recommended that Kosovo be granted 
independence, supervised by the international community for a limited time (UN 2007).14 
Following an appeal by Serbia, the International Court of Justice issued an advisory opinion 
on 22 July 2010 stating that Kosovo’s “declaration of independence of 17 February 2008 did 
not violate general international law.” (ICJ 2010, p. 7).15 
 
 
14 Note that a copy of the Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo’s future status is 
attached in Appendix VII of the thesis. 
15 Note that a copy of the International Court of Justice’s Advisory Opinion on Accordance with international 
law of the unilateral declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo (2010) is attached in Appendix VIII of the 
thesis. 
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However, the issue of final disentanglement from Serbia has in many ways proven to be the 
most challenging one. The whole political spectrum in Kosovo continues to be preoccupied 
with the issue of Kosovo-Serbia relations. Former combatants turned politicians are at the 
forefront of making decisions about the state of these relations in the future. Currently, the 
decision-making triumvirate in Kosovo is composed of: Hashim Thaçi (President), Ramush 
Haradinaj (Prime Minister), and Kadri Veseli (Speaker of the Assembly). All three of them are 
former KLA combatants.   
 
Since the declaration of its independence, Kosovo’s claim to statehood is still an on-going 
political process. Serbia’s adamant stance not to recognize the “break-away province” and its 
tireless lobbying against independence, has brought the wave of recognitions to a standstill, 
and has blocked Kosovo’s membership accession to certain international bodies, such as the 
UN, EU, the Council of Europe (CoE) or the Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (OSCE) (Weller 2009). However, there are ongoing talks between Belgrade and 
Prishtina, mediated by the EU, which are meant to lead to the “normalisation of relations” 
between the two countries. There are many roadblocks along the way to reaching an 
agreement, but there is a push for the parties to agree on a deal as soon as possible, probably 
during 2020 (Kuzmanovic 2019).  
 
5. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia - overview 
The violent break-up of Yugoslavia produced unspeakable tragedies from Slovenia in the 
north, to Kosovo in the south. But there were two Yugoslav republics that managed to secede 
without a shot being fired. One of them was Montenegro, Serbia’s long-lasting ally. Following 
a referendum in 2006, Montenegro declared independence without violent consequences to 
such a decision. They took this step, however, only after seeing through the bloody decade of 
the 1990s and having been subjected to an uneasy and condescending cohabitation with 
Serbia during the same period, and with the prior consent of the latter. However, the Serbian 
minority in the country continues to pose political obstacles to Montenegro’s closer ties with 
the West. It has tried to hinder Montenegro’s aspirations to full membership with NATO but 
to no avail, as the country became a member of the Alliance in 2017. Serbia and/or Serbian 
politicians from Montenegro have also been accused of helping Russia become a destabilizing 
force in the region. For instance, Russia was accused of being behind a foiled coup attempt in 
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October 2017 which the Montenegrin political leadership claimed was intended to topple the 
pro-Western government and derail the country from its NATO accession (see:  Balkan Insight 
2018; Bešić and Spasojević 2018).  
 
Years Total Slavic Macedonian Ethnic Albanian Others (Vlach, Turkish, 
Roma, Bosniac, 
Bulgarian etc)  
1953 1.304.514 860.699 or 64.97%  162.524 or 12.45% 281.291 or 21.56% 
1961 1.406.003 1.000.854 or 71.18% 183.108 or 13.02% 222.041 or 15.79% 
1971 1.647.308 1.142.375 or 69.34% 279.871 or 16.98% 225.062 or 13.66% 
1981 1.909.136 1.279.323 or 67.01% 377.208 or 19.75% 252.605 or 13.23% 
1991 2.033.964 1.328.187 or 65.30% 441.987 or 21.73% 263.790 or 12.96% 
1994 1.945.932 1.295.964 or 66.59% 441.104 or 22.66% 208.864 or 10.73% 
2002 2.022.547 1.297.981 or 64.17% 509.083 or 25.17% 215.484 or 10.65% 
 
Table 4: FYR Macedonia population census between 1948 and 2011 by numbers and percentiles. Source: 
Republic of North Macedonia State Statistical Office (2018).16 
 
Map 3: Map of FYR Macedonia. Source: KfW Development Bank (No date). 
 
 
16 Note that the irregular timing of censuses in FYR Macedonia post 1991 points to the essentially political and 
potentially divisive nature of this issue. The 1994 census was organized soon after independence as a way for 
the government to reaffirm clear population data now that the country was independent. The 2002 was another 
attempt to reconfirm the data and set the census on a normal procedure from then on. Another census was 
attempted in 2011 but it was botched due to accusations and counteraccusations of inflating or lowering 
percentages of Macedonian and ethnic Albanian communities respectively. The matter was therefore 
abandoned until further notice when political conditions are ripe for the reintroduction of the census procedure.   
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The other Yugoslav republic that managed not only to secede peacefully but to achieve this 
right at the start of the break-up of the federation, was FYR Macedonia. Several reasons point 
to this lucky escape, but two are perhaps the most important ones. The first is the fact that, 
like in Slovenia, there is a very small Serb minority living in FYR Macedonia. This meant that 
Serbia had no legitimate reasons to try and force FYR Macedonia against independence as it 
did not clash with Milošević’s expansionist policies of uniting all Serbs into a single country. 
Secondly, Serbia was less interested to intervene in any case as it was already becoming 
fatigued by fighting wars in Croatia and BiH, as well as exerting control over Kosovo with a 
heavy police and army machinery.  
 
FYR Macedonia declared independence in 1991. Two years later it became a member of the 
UN. Immediately after independence its government began undertaking serious efforts at 
institution-building and democratic reforms (ICG 1997). For a while the country seemed to be 
head over shoulders everyone else in the region in their EU integration path. While other 
former Yugoslav entities were submerged in war, FYR Macedonia was quick at consolidating 
state structures (Petkovski 2015). The political trajectory since the Yugoslav break-up seemed 
so unusually positive for FYR Macedonia that its first post-Communist President, Kiro 
Gligorov, kept praising his country for being an “oasis of peace” in a region that was being 
torn apart by barbarities. 
Today, the world perceives the Republic of Macedonia as an atypical Balkan country. Located in one of 
the most neuralgic European regions, the Balkans, the Republic of Macedonia has gained the attention 
of the international community as a model of successful mastery over the causes and risks of Balkan 
instability and conflicts (Gligorov, cited in Balalovska 2004, p. 199). 
 
However, the successful creation of a peaceful democratic state rested on the premise of 
promoting and consolidating the Slavic, ethnic Macedonian national identity at its core. The 
downside to this was that very little attention was paid to the presence and rights of non-
Macedonian national communities and minorities in the country. From the outset it became 
clear that Slavic Macedonians would be the constituent nation, whereas the rest would be 
boxed into the category of national minorities. This was problematic especially for the ethnic 
Albanian community which makes up around thirty per cent of the population (Gromes 2009; 
Demjaha 2012). Seeing themselves in a new country with little sense of co-ownership, this 
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community grappled with finding a role in the new state. This was an almost existentialist 
dilemma, namely how to find a role for themselves without being left in the margins of 
decision-making, and how to feel co-owners and not second-class citizens.  
 
However, the constitution of the new state was very clear that this was a Macedonian country 
with a Macedonian language, and all other communities were given minority rights. This was 
a euphemism for imposing a second-tier citizenship on non-Macedonian communities. The 
1991 Constitution of the country stated:  
The citizens of the Republic of Macedonia, the Macedonian people, as well as citizens living within its 
borders who are part of the Albanian people, the Turkish people, the Vlach people, the Serbian people, 
the Romany people (…) have decided to establish the Republic of Macedonia as an independent, 
sovereign state (Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia 1991, p. 23).  
 
In other words, the country was comprised of its Slavic Macedonian people, as well as other 
citizens who happened to live inside its borders but who were part of other peoples. Little 
was done to reach out to the ethnic Albanian community to reassure them that they, too, 
would enjoy equal rights as citizens living in FYR Macedonia.      
 
For Slavic Macedonians, the creation of the new state meant, by order of priority, the 
consolidation and internationalization of a Macedonian nation and a Macedonian language 
with its own history, customs and tradition. The project for the consolidation of such an 
identity was exclusionary by design and left little room for other ethnicities to feel as rightful 
co-owners of the new country. Through it the aim was to entrench Slavic Macedonian identity 
and language and Slavic Macedonian people as masters of the new country. The project of 
what was essentially a revival of national identity in the new country was ethnic-centred, not 
civic-oriented, relegating other ethnic communities to the rank of secondary citizens. 
 
Because of the nature of it, at the core of the project was general discrimination against the 
Albanian community, be it in state public administration, the use of the Albanian language, or 
the right to higher education in their native language. This created two worlds, leading an 
uneasy cohabitation in FYR Macedonia: that of Slavic Macedonians who were in charge of 
politics, administration, security, and generally busying themselves with the creation of a 
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national identity, and that of ethnic Albanians who were left almost completely out of such 
processes and consequently did not feel like stakeholders in the new state (Brunnbauer 2002; 
Ellis 2003; Ringdal, Simkus and Listhaug 2007). Their economic situation was also much more 
deprived than that of Slavic Macedonians, often living off remittances from the diaspora in 
the West, as well as off of small family businesses. 
The 1991 constitution of the newly independent state of FYR Macedonia established a national state 
for the ethnic Macedonian people; but one in which the sizeable Albanian minority was perceived as a 
nationality with equal rights, rather than a constituent nation and co-owner of the state. The 
constitution declared Macedonian as the sole official language, granted special recognition to the 
Macedonian Orthodox Church, and made no reference to the provision of higher education in the 
Albanian language… For the Albanians, their designated constitutional status implied that ethnic 
Macedonians have a higher constitutional status, paving the way for more discrimination in education, 
language and equitability (Koktsidis 2012, p. 7). 
 
In other words, the new FYR Macedonia was home to only one constituent nation – the Slavic 
Macedonians. All others were minorities which turned them into passive recipients of the 
laws and decisions that were taken on their behalf by the constituent Macedonian nation. For 
ethnic Albanians particularly (since they comprised almost 30% of the population) this was an 
unjust and discriminatory concept from the start, as the project did not give them co-
ownership over the build-up of the country (Xhaferi 2017a).  
5.1 The inter-ethnic conflict 
In the absence of assurances from Skopje, there were a few unilateral initiatives by ethnic 
Albanians aimed at asserting their rights. In the mid-1990s they opened a university in 
Albanian language in the predominantly Albanian town of Tetovo, which was not recognized 
by the regime. This proved to be a serious cause for disagreement between the two 
communities, with Albanian representatives stressing the right to education in their mother 
tongue, and the government insisting that this was an illegal act since Macedonian was the 
only official language of the country (Xhaferi 2017b).  
 
Additionally, the town of Tetovo and the surrounding area proved to be a potential area for 
popular discontent due to another reason: some of the leaders of the LPK movement which 
had taken root in Kosovo and in the diaspora, came from this very area. As described above, 
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those leaders were very active in leading the resistance in Kosovo but, at the same time, they 
had an instrumental role to play in galvanising the Albanian public opinion to demand equal 
rights in FYR Macedonia. One of them, Fazli Veliu, came from that region. Veliu had become 
Head of LPK in the latter part of the 1980s, which was a time of rising turmoil in former 
Yugoslavia (Elshani 1998). 
 
To surmise, there were genuine grievances stemming from social deprivation that eventually 
triggered an Albanian revolt. The uprising happened a decade after FYR Macedonia had 
declared independence, i.e. in the first part of 2001. The circumstances for such an uprising 
were quite opportune seeing as the armed conflict in Kosovo had drawn to a close in 1999. 
This gave the rebellious forces in both sides of the border a chance to start a new front. 
Ironically, one of the unintended side-effects of the KLA’s DDR process was that it gave ethnic 
Albanians in FYR Macedonia a chance to arm. A lot of weapons which had been used by the 
KLA found their way into Albanian villages in north-west of FYR Macedonia. Several KLA 
soldiers, mainly those who felt disgruntled for having to disarm and to submit to the 
international community’s command, stood ready to join forces with their brethren down 
south in the fight against the Macedonian army (Ceka 2018). It is impossible to say how many 
former KLA soldiers joined ranks with the NLA. Because of the secretive nature of such 
transactions, this data cannot be found easily. As a researcher one must rely on anecdotal 
evidence of those who took part in these conflicts, or on claims of other researchers who 
studied the subject. However, based on the above evidence accrued during the course of this 
research, it is safe to state that between 300 and 500 former KLA soldiers found their way to 
join the NLA at one point or another of the conflict in FYR Macedonia.  
 
The NLA was thus created, engaging in armed conflict with Macedonian forces in the early 
2001. Like the KLA story of its early days, the organisational set-up of the NLA was rather an 
ad hoc venture. In the run-up to its creation, this was an initiative undertaken by various 
rebellious cells in FYR Macedonia and Kosovo (CSO 06). Their aim was to engage in armed 
combat against the Macedonian regime. Manpower was drawn from FYR Macedonia but also 
from Kosovo, while the weapons were smuggled largely from the latter’s conflict and the 
subsequent demobilisation process. When it finally took shape, the NLA was a small armed 
force that managed to assemble hierarchically under one unified command structure.     
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It is highly unlikely that the NLA exceeded 3,000 active combatants at its peak. A more moderate 
estimate speaks of 1,000 to 1,200. The rebel group probably consisted of at least six brigades. It is 
doubtful whether these so-called brigades fully submitted to a higher authority. However, given the 
post-crisis influx of NLA veterans into Ahmeti’s political party DUI (Bashkimi Demokratik për Integrim – 
Democratic Union of Integration), most regional commanders probably paid allegiance to Ahmeti 
(Koktsidis and Dam 2008, p. 176). 
  
The NLA’s commander, Ali Ahmeti, had been an active member of the LPK’s leadership as 
early as the 1980s. Like a lot of other LPK representatives who came from Kosovo, he operated 
from abroad for several years. Ahmeti came back to FYR Macedonia in the beginning of 2000s 
to help form and take charge of the newly-formed NLA in their armed struggle against the 
Macedonian army. As claimed in the above-quote, the NLA as an armed group did not quite 
manage to function like a fully-formed army. Besides, their struggle only lasted for about six 
months. But in the end, there was a hierarchy in place and Ahmeti came to be viewed as the 
driving force of the armed group (FMC 06). More importantly perhaps, his role as a leader 
amongst the ethnic Albanian community was consolidated after the conflict, overshadowing 
all the other leader figures of this community.  
 
The armed conflict between the NLA and Macedonian forces lasted about six months, 
precipitating an international diplomatic intervention. The fighting resulted in over 200 
casualties and more than 100,000 persons exiled or internally displaced (Ceka 2018). The 
reasons for the conflict, as said above, were to be found in the grievances over the social 
deprivation of the ethnic Albanian community. This was a result of their marginalization as 
second-class citizens by the Slavic Macedonian-run state. Going into conflict, the NLA 
leadership might have even toyed with the idea of fighting to carve out ethnic Albanian 
territories that could then be annexed to Kosovo. For some, this seemed like a promising idea 
considering that Kosovo was no longer under Serbian control. In fact, among the clandestine 
movements in Kosovo, FYR Macedonia and the diaspora, there had been plans for some time 
aimed at carving up FYR Macedonia and annexing it to Kosovo, which would then eventually 
end up joining Albania (Elshani 1998; Daskalovski 2004a). For a new country such as FYR 
Macedonia struggling with consolidating its international position, such ideas seemed quite 
realistic, particularly in the climate of the creation of new states out of former Yugoslavia 
(Krastev 2002; Dyrstad 2012). For ethnic Albanians whose rights in FYR Macedonia were being 
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ignored, at a time when the territories of former Yugoslavia seemed to be in constant flux, it 
seemed that this was the right moment to cede parts of the country along ethnic lines.  
 
Such ideas, however, never came to fruition, even after the coming into scene of the NLA. The 
momentum of border changes, if ever was one, had passed with the bloody decade of the 
1990s. By the early 2000s, certain red lined had been drawn on the geopolitical picture of the 
Western Balkans, one of which was that there would be no changes of borders and no 
realignment of territories along ethnic lines. Such red lines were fiercely guarded by the 
international community, especially the Western powers which had invested heavily into the 
peninsula. They were determined to make a success story out of the existing new states based 
on a civic form of identity, not ethnic. This meant that if it wanted to be realistic, the NLA had 
to come up with a formal objective that purported to demand equal human and political rights 
on behalf of ethnic Albanians within the existing state of FYR Macedonia. As the armed 
hostilities intensified, the NLA leadership clarified its official position that they were fighting 
for equal and non-discriminatory treatment of their community within the Macedonian state 
borders (ICG 2001).  
 
The international community led by the West were quick to mediate a solution to the armed 
conflict. After six months of fighting, the compromise came in the form of a peace accord 
signed on 8 August 2001 in the Macedonian town of Ohrid (OSCE 2001). Under the auspices 
of international mediators, the leaders of the country’s main political parties agreed on a set 
of wide-ranging constitutional amendments that aimed to meet the ethnic Albanians’ 
demands. The actors involved were the Prime Minister at the time Ljubcho Georgievski from 
the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation – Democratic Party of National Unity 
(known with its Macedonian acronym VMRO-DPMNE), Branko Cervenkovski from the Social-
Democratic Union of Macedonia (known with its Macedonian acronym SDSM), Arbën Xhaferi 
from the Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA), and Ymer Ymeri from the Party for Democratic 
Prosperity (PDP) (Daskalovski 2004b). Xhaferi and Ymeri were representatives of the ethnic 
Albanian community. Noteworthy, no representatives of the NLA played a role during the 
accords. However, as will be seen below, their role as politicians post-Ohrid accords managed 
to overshadow Xhaferi and Ymeri and their parties for a long time to come.  
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The Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA)17, as it came to be known, provided provisions for 
the cessation of hostilities, the development of a more equitable and decentralised 
government, for education and the use of languages, special parliamentary procedures etc. 
(OSCE 2001; Brunnbauer 2002). The issue of a more equitable decentralized state was an 
important one to tackle. The idea behind this initiative was to bring the government closer to 
the citizens by having careful considerations about their ethnic affiliation and representation 
in a given municipality. In tandem with that, the Agreement introduced the principle of non-
discrimination and equitable representation, to be applied “in particular with respect to 
employment in public administration and public enterprises, and access to public financing 
for business development” (OSCE 2001, p. 2). Seeing as one of the root causes of the conflict 
was the lack of representation of ethnic Albanians in public administration and state 
institutions, this principle was meant to revise such erroneous practices by ensuring inclusion 
and fairer representation. The same principle applied to the use of languages, whereby the 
state would ensure that students of primary and secondary schools would be able to receive 
education in their native languages, including Albanian. Further, state funding would be 
available for university level education in languages spoken by at least 20 percent of the 
population, which directly applies to ethnic Albanians (OSCE 2001). But perhaps the most 
fundamental change pertained to the agreement on the constitutional amendment of the 
preamble. Whilst the existing Constitution had defined the country as the “[N]ational state of 
the Macedonian people, which guarantees the full civic equality and permanent co-existence 
of the Macedonian people with the Albanians, Turks, Vlachs, Roma and the other nationalities 
(…) (Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia 1991, p. 23)”, the amendment was formulated 
as follows: 
The citizens of the Republic of Macedonia [italics added], taking over responsibility for the present and 
future of their fatherland, aware and grateful to their predecessors for their sacrifice and dedication in 
their endeavors and struggle to create an independent and sovereign state of Macedonia, and 
responsible to future generations to preserve and develop everything that is valuable from the rich 
cultural inheritance and coexistence within Macedonia, equal in rights and obligations towards the 
common good (…) (OSCE 2001).   
 
 
17 Note that a copy of the Ohrid Framework Agreement is attached in Appendix IX of the thesis. 
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The concession here was to do away with terms such as “Macedonian people” and instead 
focus on the civic concept of citizenship. The new Constitution did not talk about nationalities, 
peoples or minorities, but rather referred to “majority population”, “communities”, and 
“communities not in the majority” (Brunnbauer 2002). Although these concepts may seem 
semantic at first sight, the desired change is much more fundamental and related to making 
the state of FYR Macedonia more inclusive, equitable and representative regardless of ethnic 
belonging.    
5.2 Intra-Albanian political rivalries, the armed conflict and the peace agreement 
The OFA had a two-fold effect. Firstly, it paved the way for constitutional amendments that 
aspired to bring the ethnic Albanian community in par with Slavic Macedonians. The 
underlying tenet of the agreement was that ethnic Albanians, too, were a constituent 
community of the Macedonian state, not just a minority. And of course, the Agreement was 
not an end in itself but the start of a long series of reforms aimed at creating a truly civic state 
where all communities, regardless of ethnic background, would be treated equally. For some, 
there is still more work to be done in order to fulfil the spirit of the agreement (Phillips 2011; 
Aziri and Emurllai 2014; ACA 07).  
 
Secondly, the armed conflict and the peace agreement that followed it, produced a side-effect 
within the ethnic Albanian political space in that they managed to shake and transform the 
balance of power between ethnic Albanians for good. The armed conflict was the catalyst that 
enabled this transformation to happen almost instantly. 
 
Between independence and the 2001 conflict, ethnic Albanians were mainly organized 
around two main political parties. The PDP had been part of the government from the 
country’s independence right up to the 1998 elections. The DPA, on the other hand, had 
broken from PDP and had been a member of the government from the early 1999. At the time 
of the Ohrid Agreement, Ymer Ymeri was leader of the PDP, while Arbën Xhaferi was leader 
of the DPA. Both had an academic world and neither of them had anything to do with the rise 
of the NLA. The group of people who took charge of the latter’s creation came from other 
walks of life, such as clandestine activities with the LPK (Taleski 2011). 
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When the NLA appeared on the scene many politicians from ethnic Albanian parties were 
taken by surprise. The emergence of its cells was accompanied with mixed responses from 
the existing Albanian parties. Some of those responses were quite negative, aiming to 
distance themselves from armed incidents instigated, as they saw it, from combatants of a 
dubious armed organisation. The spokesperson of PDP even branded them as “terrorists”, 
referring to the NLA’s attack in a police station in the village of Tearce (Aziri and Lutfiu 2014, 
p. 390). As the armed conflict with the Macedonian army intensified so did the rivalry 
between the NLA and Albanian parties become fiercer. The leadership of DPA, Arbën Xhaferi 
and Menduh Thaçi, even gave statements in support of the preservation of stability of FYR 
Macedonia. Xhaferi called the rebels as “psychologically damaged Rambos”, while Thaçi 
denounced them as “criminals” and “traitors” who were exercising a “cosmetically modified 
plagiarism” of their party’s programme. The latter even suggested that the government 
should use any force necessary to fight the rebels, as “any government should exert its power 
in the entire region it governs”. In response, the NLA spokesman accused the DPA of being 
corrupt and for betraying the interests of the ethnic Albanian constituency (Hislope 2005, p. 
31). As far as the representatives of the armed group were concerned, the above two parties 
that had been part of the Macedonian government from independence right to the eruption 
of armed conflict in 2001, were not and could not be devoid of responsibility for the second-
tier status of their community in the country. Therefore, their revolt was also, as they saw it, 
a scathing condemnation of the subjugation of those Albanian parties to Slavic Macedonian 
diktats. In his analysis of the political competition between Albanian parties in FYR 
Macedonia, this is how Taleski (2011) describes the schism between DPA as the main Albanian 
party leading to the conflict, and the NLA and its successor party:     
  
The main argument of DUI is that they as NLA won in 2001, and thus strongly improved the rights of 
Albanians in Macedonia. Hence their main legitimacy derives from their proclaimed success in the 2001 
conflict. DUI display this act as grandiose, pinning it to ideals of countless generations. To support their 
glorification they depict themselves as mountains and high tops. They are protectors and providers of 
Albanian rights and do not want to divide the people. On the other hand they are overtly claiming that 
DPA is trying to deligitimize the conflict in 2001. This in the view of DUI is detrimental for all Albanians, 
and makes their political competitors comparable to mice and other pests. An interesting point to note 
is the differentiation that DUI makes with their competitors during the conflict and ten years later. In 
their understanding, they fought and won the battle with DPA during the conflict and afterwards. 
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On the other hand DPA sees the conflict in 2001 as a scenario of Belgrade. For them there was no reason 
to start the conflict in 2001. It was a scenario of the Serbian secret service to harm the independence 
of Kosovo, and DPA aims to investigate the causes of the ethnic conflict. They made a strong point that 
the history of Albanians does not start from 2001. This translates into their construction of the in group 
Albanians. They point to other historical events predating the conflict in 2001 as more important for 
the Albanians in Macedonia. DPA claims that Albanians should seek the truth and remove the ‘Serbian 
spies’ from the political scene. DPA presents themselves as a party that does not want political tricks 
and manipulation, just regular democratic elections. However on the other hand, DPA claimed that 
NLA/DUI were controlled by the Serbian secret service and Slobodan Milosevic. DPA also accused DUI 
of wanting to harm the Albanian national interests (Taleski 2011, p. 180). 
 
As it became clear soon after the conflict, the underdogs (NLA) were eager to engage in 
politics after the peace accords. In order to ensure they had political space to gain votes they 
needed to do the utmost to eliminate the established parties from the scene. Even while the 
conflict was raging, this was already a race to gain votes among ethnic Albanians, with plenty 
of accusations and counteraccusations thrown between the rival groups. As the conflict 
progressed, the incumbent DPA was quickly losing the upper hand while the NLA gained in 
popularity. In the eyes of the ethnic Albanian community the latter stood on a moral high 
ground because they had challenged the regime via an armed resistance for equal rights. They 
had done so while the established Albanian parties had essentially colluded with that same 
regime for years while trampling over their constituency’s rights. 
 
Shortly after the conflict was over, the NLA leadership created its own political party called 
the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI, or in Albanian: Bashkimi Demokratik për Integrim) 
with the former leader of the NLA, Ali Ahmeti, at its helm. Ever since its formation, DUI has 
been the most popular political party among ethnic Albanians, leaving the rest of them in 
shadows. Since the OFA to this day they have played an active role in Macedonian politics by 
being part of each government coalition, except for a short hiatus in 2007-08 (Aziri and 
Emurllai 2014).   
5.3 Power-sharing arrangements in today’s FYR Macedonia 
Some authors continue to claim that the OFA ended the conflict, but it did not put an end to 
the sources of this conflict (Reka 2011; Aziri and Emurllai 2014).  
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The Ohrid Agreement excluded from consideration territorial solutions to ethnic problems, but 
preserving the unitary character of the country was not accompanied with the relevant implementation 
of measures by which all citizens of this unitary country would be equally treated” (Reka 2011, p 12).  
 
FYR Macedonia has come a long way since the 2001 conflict, agreeing on an amnesty law for 
the NLA, and incorporating the armed group’s former combatants into the political scene 
(Ruffer 2017). Having won the major share of the Albanian electoral vote, DUI has been part 
of all coalition governments from then till today, bar one. Between 2006 and the end of 2016 
the coalition government was led by VMRO-DMPNE. In many respects this was a time of a 
downward democratic trend in the country. The long-standing impasse on the name issue 
with neighbouring Greece kept FYR Macedonia on a standstill position as far as the EU and 
NATO integration were concerned (Danforth 1995). Moreover, although the country was 
theoretically striving to build a truly inter-ethnic society, there were concerns that the Ohrid 
Agreement was stalling (Ringdal, Simkus and Listhaug 2007). In a power-sharing coalition 
arrangement DUI as junior partner carried a degree of responsibility.  
 
By the end of his tenure as Prime Minister, Nikola Gruevski and his party VMRO-DPMNE were 
accused of blatant state capture, corruption and involvement in illicit activities (Ceka 2018). 
By being a junior partner in coalition with VMRO-DPMNE during this time, DUI and its leader 
Ali Ahmeti were not immune from similar accusations. Even if the Prime Minister’s party was 
primarily to be blamed for corrupt activities, DUI could not escape responsibility precisely 
because they had been part of this coalition government. As a result, this did not bode well 
for the popularity of DUI and Ali Ahmeti among the ethnic Albanian electorate, particularly in 
the last few years of this coalition.  
 
The downward spiral for this coalition began in the early 2015 when the opposition party 
SDSM began publishing transcripts of conversations that were allegedly wiretapped by the 
government. This was just the beginning of what was discovered to be a government-
sanctioned illegal surveillance scheme on a massive scale. There were alleged to be around 
670,000 recordings targeting more than 20,000 people, ranging from government officials, 
media, civil society actors and private citizens. There were also recordings of high-level 
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government officials, such as the Prime Minister, the leader of DUI, and various ministers. The 
language used in those conversations was often highly offensive against each other, 
sometimes bordering on racist (ICG 2015). An EC expert group that investigated the 
wiretapping condemned the scandal as a massive invasion of privacy and fundamental human 
rights. It concluded that there seemed to be, 
[…] apparent direct involvement of senior government and party officials in illegal activities including 
electoral fraud, corruption, abuse of power and authority, conflict of interest, blackmail, extortion 
(pressure on public employees to vote for a certain party with the threat to be fired), criminal damage, 
severe procurement procedure infringements aimed at gaining an illicit profit, nepotism and cronyism 
(EC 2015, p. 6).       
 
FYR Macedonia’s political scene worsened even further when on 9 May 2015 in the town of 
Kumanovo police forces intervened in a stand-off with more than 40 ethnic Albanian gunmen. 
A whole day of fighting ensued, leaving eighteen people dead (eight of them policemen) (Ceka 
2018). As tragic an event as this was, it was also bizarre because of the conspiracy theories 
that emerged from it, claiming to link a few Kosovo politicians or DUI members with the actors 
involved. The circumstances surrounding this incident are not fully clear to this day, but there 
were doubts that a few young Albanian men from Kosovo had been lured to go to Kumanovo 
allegedly to plot against the regime. On the other hand, the regime’s heavy-handed response 
was viewed as a way for the Prime Minister to distract the public’s attention from the 
wiretapping scandal by playing the ethnic card (ICG 2015).  
 
What followed was a period of unrest followed by a social movement which turned into what 
came to be known as the Colourful Revolution (Reef 2017). The demands of this movement, 
coupled by the increasing pressure from the Western delegations, forced early elections in 
the country. In the elections that were held in December 2016, SDSM and its leader Zoran 
Zaev came second by a slight margin, but managed to form a coalition government, forcing 
VMRO-DPMNE into opposition. In a curious case of acrobatics, Ahmeti’s DUI joined Zaev’s 
coalition government after allegedly obtaining assurances from the new Prime Minister for 
the full implementation of the Ohrid accords. As part of this power-sharing arrangement, a 
former commander of the NLA and current member of DUI, Talat Xhaferri, was voted as 
Speaker of the Macedonian Parliament (Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty 2017). 
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There are quiet hopes that with the current government, with DUI as junior coalition partner, 
FYR Macedonia is opening a new page in its history. On the name issue with Greece, Prime 
Minister Zaev upon coming to power immediately rekindled talks with his Greek counterpart, 
Alexis Tsipras. After almost twenty years of deadlock, the two governments reached an 
agreement signed in the Macedonian town of Prespa whose lake connects the borders of 
Albania, Greece and FYR Macedonia. The symbolism of choosing Prespa to sign the agreement 
is obvious. The “Prespa Agreement”18, as it is now known, stipulates that the country north 
of Greece is to be renamed “Republic of North Macedonia” and its citizens and language as 
“Macedonian”. On 11 January 2019, the Macedonian Parliament voted to ratify the “Prespa 
Agreement” to change the name of the country to North Macedonia (Wall Street Journal 
2019). The Greek Parliament ratified the same agreement on 25 January 2019 (The Guardian 
2019a).  
 
In addition to international success with Greece, the Macedonian government achieved some 
success internally, too. The Law on the use of languages was passed in Parliament twice during 
2018. However, President Gjorge Ivanov twice refused to sign it into law, warning that the 
signature would herald a gaping fissure in the country’s identity. Since this avenue seemed 
closed, in January 2019 the Macedonian Speaker, Talat Xhaferri, sent the Law on the use of 
languages to be published in the Official Gazette. The law upgrades the Albanian language 
into an official language at the national level, side by side with Macedonian (EWB 2019). 
 
6. Conclusion 
A lot has been written about the history of the Balkans. Some of that writing is sprinkled with 
a touch of the exotic other, portraying its peoples as historically destined to fight ad 
perpetuum. However, the causes of conflict are in a way much more mundane albeit tragic: 
they relate to deep social, economic and political injustices that are expressed through 
grievances and end up in wars. At the root cause of the Yugoslav implosion were: 1. the 
secessionist and nationalist aspirations of people for independence, and 2. the resurgent 
 
18 Note that a copy of the Prespa Agreement is attached in Appendix X the thesis. 
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hegemonic instincts demonstrated by Serbia wishing for greater control of the Yugoslav 
federation, particularly those parts inhabited with ethnic Serbs.  
 
The trajectory of development of the cases of Kosovo and FYR Macedonia provides for an 
intriguing comparative study: both the KLA and the NLA represented the ethnic Albanian 
population living in different parts of former Yugoslavia. The political and ideological origins 
of both armed groups date back to the 1980s and the clandestine movement known with its 
acronym LPK. For that reason, although the armed conflicts in Kosovo and FYR Macedonia did 
not happen at the same time, both armed groups displayed similar objectives, ideologies, 
manpower and strategy. After their respective conflicts and the peace accords, their leaders 
turned to politics and have since had direct influence upon state-building and democracy.   
 
The rise of both armed groups was accompanied by a degree of intra-ethnic political rivalry. 
Both the KLA and the NLA (as well as their successor political parties) saw the existing ethnic 
Albanian parties as political competitors. The ensuing political fight for the electorate’s vote 
resulted in the overthrow of the old political class and the triumph of the new masters 
dominated by former combatants turned politicians. Another similarity of both case studies 
is the fact that the political parties comprised of former combatants are culpable to a 
considerable degree for the perpetuation of clientelistic practices and state capture in today’s 
Kosovo and FYR Macedonia. Perhaps the scope of culpability is greater in Kosovo simply 
because of the omnipresent nature of war-wing parties, whereas in FYR Macedonia the war-
wing DUI has always been a junior partner in a power-sharing arrangement led by a senior 
Macedonian party.     
 
Another key difference between the two case studies is the degree and scope of involvement 
of the international community during and after conflict. In Kosovo, NATO, the UN, the US 
and other Western powers played an existentialist role during the war and in the post-conflict 
period, too. In fact, they helped building institutions from scratch after 1999, including the 
parliament, ministries, oversight bodies, etc. The creation of the war-wing parties happened 
against this backdrop of international involvement. Conform the principles of inclusiveness 
and representation of the liberal peacebuilding paradigm, they encouraged the creation of 
new political parties comprised of KLA combatants. This was also done as a way of buying 
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peace and ensuring the appeasement of potential spoilers coming from disgruntled KLA 
veterans. By contrast, in FYR Macedonia the international community had a mediating role 
only in key moments such as the signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement in 2001. But the 
creation of the political party that succeeded the armed group was still seen as a pragmatic 
way of keeping a lid on former combatants’ possible discontent and providing a voice for their 
constituency. In both cases, clientelism, corruption and state capture have partly originated 
from the destructive role played by former combatants turned politicians who might have not 
become peace spoilers but, in the process, have mutated into democracy spoilers instead.   
 
This chapter offered a short historical account of the case studies as a way of providing a 
context for the next chapter which delves into the empirical findings. Its aim was to explain 
the rise of armed groups and, in the process, to underline the trajectory of the combatants’ 
movements from their early careers to their present as politicians. Being aware of this 
trajectory will, I believe, help have a more insightful picture of their role as politicians today, 
and their impact on democratisation processes.      
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V. Presentation of Evidence and Findings from the Field 
1. Introduction  
This chapter brings all the main threads of the thesis together. It intends to offer a bottom-
up, inductive-approach theory that emerges from the field, which represents the contribution 
given to political science and democratisation studies. The chapter starts by recounting the 
main milestones of the resistance of ethnic Albanians in former Yugoslavia as a precursor to 
the creation of their armed groups. It describes the context in which their illegal operations 
were conducted, the political ideology that underpinned and fuelled their struggle, ending 
with how the KLA and NLA respectively were created. This second sub-chapter is meant to 
serve as a prelude to set the scene for the rest of the chapter.   
 
The chapter is followed by two main sub-chapters that provide a comparative overview on 
Kosovo and FYR Macedonia, based on the empirical evidence collected from the field on the 
political transformation of combatants and their impact on democracy. The main findings 
from the field and the analysis presented separately for the two case studies will be 
interwoven, elaborated and summarised in the final and fifth sub-chapter. In addition to 
containing the main synthesised findings from the field, these sub-chapters will also suggest 
the theory that springs out of the analysis undertaken in this research. 
 
The primary evidence and findings deriving from the field are constructed by answering the 
sub-questions of the thesis, referred to in the Introduction. Namely,   
1. How have former combatants been integrated into society? 
2. More specifically, how have former combatants been engaged in politics and decision-
making positions across institutions? 
3. What sets apart the former combatants' political engagement from that of other 
politicians? 
4. What is the relationship of former combatants turned politicians with each other and with 
their electoral base?  
 
As I lay down the field evidence through several sub-chapters within this chapter, the above 
sub-questions will be addressed naturally. The topic of each sub-chapter relates to a 
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conceptual category which has emerged from the analysis of my field data and which is 
described in the Research Methods chapter. Also, as set out on the diagrams in the Research 
Methods chapter, the analysis to the above sub-questions translates into an overall output to 
this thesis, which is the integration and political transformation of former combatants in post-
conflict democratic institutions. On the other hand, the outcome product of the overall 
analysis, which emerges from the juxtaposition of the field data with the secondary literature 
on the state of democracy in the two case studies, translates into evidence on the impact of 
former combatants on democracy and state institutions. In the end, the evidence examined 
in sub-chapters feeds into the overarching research question of the thesis, which is: To what 
extent does the integration of former combatants in political structures contribute to, or 
inhibit, democratisation processes in Kosovo and FYR Macedonia?  
 
2. Illegality, ideology and the intra-state armed groups emergence 
 
The national liberations in Kosovo and Macedonia had a political programme which was developed by the 
LPK and which also founded the KLA. Due to the specific circumstances on the ground, the liberation war 
was initially waged only within the administrative boundaries of Kosovo. However, the wars of 2000 and 
2001 were then expanded onto the Valley of Preshevo (author’s note: southern Serbia) and in Macedonia, 
even though the former KLA leadership in Kosovo had promised the internationals that this war would 
remain confined within the territory of Kosovo (FMC 03) 
                 
As explained in the Historical Background chapter, the origins of both the KLA and the NLA 
can be traced back to the clandestine political and quasi-military organization called the 
People’s Movement of Kosovo, known with its Albanian acronym LPK (Lëvizja Popullore e 
Kosovës). At this juncture it is important to shed light upon the background of the LPK and its 
leadership because they were the precursor of both armed groups in Kosovo and FYR 
Macedonia. Having an insight of the past, on the overall strategy of the LPK, and the 
relationship between its members, helps us understand today’s political role of the 
organisation’s successors in the shape of political parties or the leadership of those parties. 
In addition, the role that this organisation had in helping Albanians organize to resist the 
Serbian/Yugoslav rule can by no means be underestimated. However, because most of its 
activities were conducted secretly, the scope of its work and its membership have been a 
mystery for a long time. It is only in the last few years that the pieces of the jigsaw have started 
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coming together, be it through interviews by former members of the organisation or the 
limited number of books on this subject. However, during my fieldwork I managed to acquire 
access to several former LPK activists. Some of the crucial information shared herein results 
directly from my conversations with the interviewees based on their first-hand account.   
 
As the situation in Kosovo was deteriorating in the early 1980s, there were several resistance 
cells that sprung up sporadically, but they did not necessarily operate in unison. Although 
they all came to be viewed as part of the loosely-termed “Illegality” movement, it was not 
until the early 1980s that a relatively large organization was formed with clear (although 
secretive) membership, hierarchy and political programme (OPP 03). This organisation was 
the LPK. 
 
The LPK was founded in 1982, bringing under one decision-making umbrella the different 
resistance cells that had been operating disjointedly in Kosovo, FYR Macedonia and the 
diaspora. Its political programme called for the status of a republic for Kosovo within 
Yugoslavia. Its end-ambition, though, accelerated towards the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
was to demand the right for self-determination, which would translate into secession from 
Serbia and/or unification with Albania. Its ambitions were even wider: they wished to see all 
ethnic Albanian territories of former Yugoslavia, including parts of FYR Macedonia, unite in 
one country. Moreover, the LPK did not see itself as just a political project. Armed 
confrontation was viewed as a possible, and even inescapable, means to reaching its political 
goals. Its programme stated that to achieve the ultimate national objective, which was first 
and foremost the liberation of Kosovo, the LPK would not shy away from employing any 
means: democratic, peaceful, as well as armed (Kelmendi 1999). 
 
A creation of the 1980s which continued to operate throughout the 1990s and, to a limited 
degree, well into the 2000s, the LPK was an ideologically-charged Marxist-Leninist 
organisation. To be more precise, it espoused an Enverist political outlook, after the name of 
Albania’s communist leader at the time, Enver Hoxha. The leaders and activists of this 
organisation were ethnic Albanians who came from various parts of Kosovo and FYR 
Macedonia in what was then the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Through clandestine 
actions – such as writing pamphlets against the Yugoslav/Serbian regime, plotting and 
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organising protests, liaising secretly with the communist Albania’s intelligence and diplomatic 
representatives, raising funds, being very active in the diaspora, and even planning for an 
eventual armed uprising – they aimed to undermine Serbia’s control of Kosovo and eventually 
annex the latter, together with other Albanian-inhabited lands in FYR Macedonia, with 
Albania. This was the grand vision of the organisation. They claimed that this vision was an 
embodiment of life-long aspirations of ethnic Albanians, and an enactment of the principle of 
self-determination, to live in one country – that of Albania.  
 
The LPK grew in membership throughout the late 1980s and the first part of the 1990s. Since 
this was a clandestine organization operating under conditions of utmost secrecy, 
recruitment into its ranks was primarily based on existing representatives knowing 
prospective members and being able to guarantee for them. A lot of times they were family 
members or acquaintances with a proven family record of nonconformism against the state. 
Other times they were close friends who managed to forge intimate ties through their studies 
and the sharing of ideas in close friendship circles. The basis of the operability of this 
organization was the so-called “system of troika” (FMC 08). Each troika was a semi-
autonomous cell comprised of three individuals, as the name suggests. The cell members 
knew of each other and their respective activities but were not aware of others who operated 
in other cells. Only one member of the cell knew the identity of another member of another 
cell, which ensured for uninterrupted lines of communication and coordination between the 
cells. But apart from this, other members were not aware of the identity and the activities of 
other cells and their respective members. The reason for keeping this information on a strictly 
need-to-know basis was to contain the damage that could befall the organization if captured. 
In other words, if a member of the movement was caught by the regime, he or she could only 
be forced to give out the names of the other two members of the troika cell. Even if they 
wanted to, they would not be able to divulge information on other cells, which would limit 
exposing the whole organization (FMC 08).     
 
The LPK was particularly active among the Albanian diaspora in Switzerland and Germany. 
The reasons for this are obvious: there they could operate much more freely than they could 
ever do within Yugoslavia. There they also enjoyed a great deal of support from the large 
diaspora communities in those countries. Besides, they could rely on Albanian communities 
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who came not just from Kosovo but also from FYR Macedonia and other parts of Yugoslavia 
(Elshani 1998). 
 
The LPK attracted membership from outside Kosovo and within former Yugoslavia, 
particularly from FYR Macedonia. In fact, some of the main people who were in the LPK’s 
leadership positions came from the western part of FYR Macedonia, parts of which are 
predominantly ethnic Albanian. One of them was Fazli Veliu who for several years was at the 
helm of the organisation (Televizioni Koha Tetovë 2018). Another one was Ali Ahmeti who 
was an active leadership member of the LPK, operating from the diaspora for most of the 
1980s (FMC 06). It is the same Ali Ahmeti who in the early 2000s became the commander of 
the NLA, and who continues to play a crucial role as the main political figure representing the 
Albanian community in that country to this day.        
 
There are other figures, too. In the late 1980s, while they were still students at the University 
of Prishtina, Hashim Thaçi and Kadri Veseli – close friends already – were inducted into the 
LPK ranks through a trusted family member of the latter. Both went on to play leading roles 
in the KLA during the war of 1998-99, with Thaçi becoming Head of its Political Directorate, 
and Veseli leading the army’s Directorate on Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence. Moreover, 
both are leading figures of the political scene in Kosovo to this day. Thaçi was founder and 
leader of the PDK, and is now President of Kosovo, having previously served as Prime Minister 
for two consecutive mandates. Veseli is in his second consecutive mandate as Speaker of the 
Kosovo Assembly and is Head of the PDK political party.   
 
Other important figures who had operated within the LPK early on are Adem Jashari, Jakup 
Krasniqi, Xhavit Haliti. Adem Jashari is regarded as one of the main founding members of the 
KLA. In March 1998 his house was surrounded by the Serbian forces and in the following 
three-day siege 56 members of his wide family were massacred indiscriminately, including 
him (Bekaj 2010). Jakup Krasniqi went on to become a Spokesperson for the KLA, and after 
the war one of the founding members of the PDK party, as well as a Speaker of the Kosovo 
Assembly for two consecutive mandates. Xhavit Haliti is one of the founding members of the 
KLA, one of the founding members of the PDK party, and has been part of the Presidency of 
the Kosovo Assembly for five consecutive terms to this day. 
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The fact that the LPK was a Marxist-Leninist organisation is viewed as a blemish from today’s 
perspective. In public discourse this tends to shroud and render less important any 
contribution that the organisation might have given. However, more than ideologically-
inclined, the LPK was essentially a pragmatically-driven nationalist movement. In addition to 
being nationalist, it also happened to be Enverist because communist Albania was such at the 
time, and because this country was viewed as the “mother nation” they aspired Kosovo and 
other Albanian-inhabited parts to join (Elshani 1998; Kelmendi 1999). Although forged in the 
spirit of Marxism-Leninism, the ideology was adopted primarily because their points of 
reference were communist Albania and its leader Enver Hoxha, who happened to practice 
such principles. 
 
Marxism-Leninism, therefore, just happened to be the ideology of the day. It is true that the 
organization embraced it wholeheartedly, although it did so for pragmatic reasons. To 
understand their position, we need to recall the wider geo-political context in which such 
organisations operated. Movements like the LPK were taking place in a Cold War world in 
which there was a clear delineation of strategic spheres of interest between West (Capitalism) 
and East (Communism), with the Non-Aligned Movement providing a possible third way for 
those counties that did not necessarily want to take sides between the two ideologies. In this 
regard, the Albanian movements which took hold in Kosovo and FYR Macedonia were not so 
different from other, similar, movements and liberation struggles of the time. Such struggles 
usually had a Marxist-Leninist undertone, too, but they were essentially nationalist ventures 
that used communist rhetoric as a model to rebel against the capitalist one. Such movements 
took place in several countries across Africa, Central and South-East Asia at the time (Maharaj 
2008; Ogury 2008). It is fair to say that although they might have used Marxist-Leninist 
vernacular at the time, generally their struggle was one of independence, decolonisation, or 
combatting apartheid, as the case might have been.     
 
This is important to note because one of the criticisms heard to this day about the LPK and its 
representatives is the alleged stigma stemming from their early allegiance to communism and 
the Eastern Bloc. Moreover, these criticisms resurface time and again since some of those 
early LPK proponents continue to be in leadership positions to this day. However, these 
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criticisms of early allegiance to communism do not hold water in terms of the above-figures’ 
political transformation and their subsequent impact on democratisation processes. As stated 
above, the Marxist-Leninist ideology was a practical cloak to be worn at the time, for what 
were essentially nationalist efforts of liberation and self-determination. Also, the accusations 
are largely unfair and unsubstantiated for two reasons. Firstly, in the bipolar world of 
capitalism versus communism in 1980s and even early 1990s, popular liberation and self-
determination movements were naturally leftist (take for example Northern Ireland, 
Southern African, or Latin American revolutions). In this vein, it makes sense that the LPK 
movement had branded itself along the same lines. Secondly, the LPK movement essentially 
had a cause, which was to liberate Kosovo (and other “Albanian lands” such as those in FYR 
Macedonia) and join Albania. Since Albania was communist, it was a foregone conclusion that 
the LPK leaders would also embrace such ideals, revering as they did Albania and its 
communist leader. This was a pragmatic decision based on nationalism, rather than a 
calculated position based on ideology.  
 
As an example, one of my respondents, FMC 03, who is now a lawyer, was among the first 
members of the LPK from the early-1980s onwards. He was very active in the diaspora, namely 
in Switzerland. He is in his late-50s now and belongs to the first generation of LPK activists. 
The reason for mentioning his age is that he would have been in his mid-to late-20s when he 
began his activities within the organisation. He belongs to a generation of activists who would 
have been at the forefront of clandestine activities from early 1980s onwards. He was one of 
the organizers of the 1981 students’ protests in Prishtina which as an event was the precursor 
of the political turmoil to come in Yugoslavia. In fact, it has often been claimed that while 
Yugoslavia began officially to unravel in Slovenia, followed by Croatia and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, in the early 1990s, the seeds for the implosion of the Federation were planted 
a decade earlier in the streets of Kosovo’s capital, Prishtina (Little and Silber 1995). Following 
those protests, the Yugoslav federation spent another decade managing the cracks until the 
actual implosion happened. Respondent FMC 03 was among those early activists fighting the 
Serbian state’s presence in Kosovo and, by default, opposing the Yugoslav federation. He even 
was a proponent of the idea that Albanians should organize militarily and begin a war of 
liberation against the occupying forces of Serbia (FMC 03).  
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People like the FMC 03 were typical activists who at the time intertwined the nationalist with 
an Enverist ideological outlook. Like a lot of other colleagues of his time, FMC 03 came from 
humble and rural beginnings and a family with a long tradition of resistance against the 
regime. As would be expected, people like him were in the target list of the Serbian regime 
very early on. Often, they spent their youth either in prisons, or hiding and operating half-
clandestinely inside Kosovo. Eventually, they were forced to emigrate and move their 
operations abroad. Such was the fate of the respondent too, who fled Kosovo in early 1990s 
and continued to be very active abroad while stationed in a small city in Switzerland. From 
there, he wrote pamphlets and articles, he met with the diaspora community, raised money 
for the cause, and helped manage and organize the first cells of the KLA. By then (early 1990s) 
he would have been in his early to mid-30s, which was also the age group of many of his LPK 
colleagues who were forced to move abroad, too. 
 
At this juncture it is important to highlight that for ethnic Albanian activists who originated in 
FYR Macedonia (or indeed, for any ethnic Albanian living in Yugoslavia at the time), Kosovo’s 
capital, Prishtina, was viewed as the epicentre of politics, culture and education. In FYR 
Macedonia, the predominantly-Albanian town of Tetovo in the western part of the republic 
was the only place which the students and activists of this ethnic community could consider 
as a point of reference. However, Tetovo was a very underdeveloped and provincial town, 
with no access to higher education. On the other hand, Skopje – the Macedonian capital – 
was predominantly Slavic Macedonian and, although there is a part of the city that is mainly 
inhabited by ethnic Albanians, the opportunities for work and education for Albanian 
students and activists remained limited there. Prishtina was therefore the only place that 
accommodated the interests of Albanian students from all corners of Yugoslavia (being the 
only city in the federation to have had an Albanian-speaking university), as well as potential 
activists who wanted to join the LPK.    
 
My respondent, FMC 06, was a typical case of an activist who came from FYR Macedonia but 
whose activities brought him to Prishtina. Having become a member of LPK in late 1980s, like 
FMC 03, he also belongs to the first generation of LPK activists. FMC 06 is originally from FYR 
Macedonia but moved to Prishtina to study in the mid-1980s. That is when he got involved in 
the clandestine movement and, while his base continued to be Prishtina, he intensified his 
 165 
 
rapports with his contacts in FYR Macedonia (FMC 06). Being persecuted from the regime, he 
was forced to flee the country and subsequently spent more than a decade living and working 
abroad. He continued to be very active with the diaspora cells, helping the “national cause” 
regardless of whether it was Kosovo or FYR Macedonia.   
 
The above examples aim to show that the Illegality Movement, embodied in the LPK project, 
was the motor with which the armed resistance eventually gathered pace. As seen from the 
quote at the start of this sub-chapter, the armed movement was initially conceived as a single 
whole encompassing all Albanian-inhabited territories in Kosovo, FYR Macedonia, and Serbia. 
As one respondent noted, the LPK was the “torso” out of which all clandestine, illegal activities 
branched out (FMC 02). The first military cells were organized by this organization and by 
activists such as the above-quoted respondents. However, by the time the armed resistance 
gathered pace in the beginning of the 1990s, this first generation of activists were in their 30s 
and living abroad.  
 
This brings us to the rapport of the LPK veterans living abroad with the younger generation of 
activists operating inside Kosovo. The idea of an armed confrontation with Serbia came to 
fruition with the birth of the KLA as early as 1994, when its first cells began making isolated 
attacks on Serbian forces in Kosovo. The LPK was de facto the political wing which had given 
birth to its armed wing – the KLA. LPK activists were active in sending communiques, taking 
responsibilities for the KLA’s attacks, raising funds abroad, and organizing people around the 
cause inside Kosovo. Their operations were also very much synchronised with the diaspora 
communities abroad (FMC 02). However, as the KLA became stronger on the ground, the 
younger generation of rising commanders (in their early- to mid-20s) began to challenge the 
supervisory role coming from LPK members stationed in the diaspora. It was around this time 
(circa 1997) when the younger generation took a bold position and quietly began severing 
links with the LPK (the 30-something year olds operating abroad). By breaking ranks with the 
LPK, the KLA was also quick to adjust its ideological viewpoint and, perhaps even more 
importantly, its marketing strategy in order to be in line with the West’s geopolitical interests 
and agendas. This ideological U-turn could not have been entirely coincidental but came as a 
result of increasing deliberations inside the KLA ranks as well as meetings with Western 
delegations. Also, considering the post-Cold War world was no longer bipolar and the West 
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had emerged triumphant, there was a ripening awareness by the KLA’s rising elite of the need 
to retune its ideological compass in response to the wider geo-strategic game in Europe and 
the US. 
 
To sum up on the LPK-KLA rapport: it would be too farfetched to claim that the division 
between them was clear-cut and along differing generations only. But it was true that those 
commanders who were inside Kosovo and operating under the line of fire were often 
younger, perhaps more agile, and boldly ambitious in their endeavour to take charge of the 
war efforts. Besides, it was not difficult to leave the LPK behind since its veterans, operating 
as they did from the cushy positions in the West, were not able to have full access to the 
reality on the ground and to measure the people’s pulse. Those who were younger (Hashim 
Thaçi, Kadri Veseli etc.) created their own contacts in the West (diaspora as well as foreign 
intelligence services) and often travelled in and out of Kosovo, thus helping to organize KLA 
ranks with the embedded commanders.  
 
Based on what was said above it is not an exaggeration to surmise that this was indeed a sort 
of putsch inside the ranks of this politico-military organism called the LPK. The result of this 
putsch was the LPK’s marginalization and the KLA’s stamp of authority as a guerrilla army on 
its own right. Eventually, faced with the rising demands to communicate and establish 
contacts with Western diplomats and the media, the guerrilla army gave birth to its own 
political wing – the Political Directorate – headed by Thaçi. This itself was a paradox, since 
usually it is the political wing that gives rise to its armed faction, not the other way around. 
However, as explained above, the KLA young commanders were very keen to be seen as the 
founders of the army, despite the fact its early origins undoubtedly lay with the LPK. By mid-
1998, however, when the war was in full swing in Kosovo, the KLA as the armed wing was the 
precursor and had given rise to its political wing – the Political Directorate, as opposed to the 
other way around. 
 
The armed conflict in FYR Macedonia which flared up two years after the war in Kosovo, draws 
direct parallels with the KLA story. As much as the DDR process in Kosovo was considered to 
have been successfully completed, the Macedonian conflict confirmed that there were 
sufficient weapons and ammunition hidden away which could be transferred to another 
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battlefield. FYR Macedonia had been an independent country for less than a decade when 
the former LPK activist operating in Switzerland, Ali Ahmeti and his friends, began efforts to 
mobilise young men into joining the newly-formed NLA. A considerable amount of manpower, 
weapons and ammunition was spilled over from Kosovo, helping set up the new army. As a 
result, the 2001 conflict in FYR Macedonia had two main rivals: the NLA on one hand and the 
Macedonian army on the other. However, similar to the Kosovo experience, the NLA managed 
in the process to marginalise the existing Albanian political parties. This, too, can be 
considered a sort of putsch, one which forcefully sought to fight the state while 
simultaneously making sure that the Albanian rival parties are stripped of their monopoly of 
power (CSO 06). In the post-conflict era this is exactly what happened: the DUI political party 
as a direct NLA successor gained the upper hand among the ethnic Albanian electorate, and 
they continue to hold this monopoly to this day.  
 
3. Kosovo 
3.1 The integration and political transformation of former combatants 
In accordance with the structure of the thesis, as laid out in the Methods chapter, this first 
section of the Kosovo sub-chapter will deal specifically with the act of the integration of KLA 
combatants in politics. This act of their political transformation will be examined against the 
background of their war legacy, followed by an analysis as to the reasons why they underwent 
such a transformation: a bottom-up, popular request for representation versus an 
opportunistic career opportunity. 
 
3.1.1 The persistence of war experiences and relationships, and the decision to enter politics 
 
The role of the KLA and its proponents in the democratization processes was key. Immediately after the 
end of the war, the political wing of the KLA took the decision to form a political party, and then another 
one. Former KLA combatants have given their contribution to democratization processes by being 
active players and by accepting the electoral results every time, although they possessed the power to 
create troubles if they wanted to (FMC 01)    
The above quote, taken from one of the interviews conducted with a former combatant 
turned politician (he has served as Member of Parliament in Kosovo in the last three 
mandates), is very telling about the perception that army veterans have about their role in 
the post-war period.  
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Firstly, after conflict the reality on the ground as viewed by the people in Kosovo was that the 
KLA emerged victorious, while the Serbian army was forced to flee the territory. As the 
annexed documents testify (The Military-Technical Agreement, and the UNSC Resolution 
1244/99), while this might have been true it was only part of the story. The truth is that the 
NATO Alliance was instrumental in defeating the Serbian army and installing a peacekeeping 
mission in 1999. However, for the predominantly-ethnic Albanian population, the KLA soldiers 
were regarded as heroes and they were held in very high esteem by the majority. This 
perception of the people, of how they truly felt (and, to a considerable degree, still feel) about 
the war veterans, is crucial to understanding the success of their transformation into politics. 
The war aura, coupled with tales, anecdotes and national songs about their courage facing 
the enemy, still accompanies them twenty years after the end of the war. Whilst today this 
aura has somewhat faded (it would have been surprising if it didn’t in the background of 
simmering corruption and poverty), former combatants-turned-politicians still enjoy a great 
deal of popularity precisely because of their role during the war.   
 
Secondly, as the UN Administration, the OSCE and other international organisations began 
preparing Kosovo for multi-party, democratic elections in the early 2000s, the need for new 
political parties became self-evident. At this point in time, the LDK party which had led 
Kosovo’s non-violent resistance in the 1990s, continued to be viewed as the dominant force 
in the political scene. However, it was clear that the political spectrum lacked diversity and 
did not offer much in terms of options for the electorate. Apart from the LDK, it was clear that 
there was a political vacuum which needed to be filled. Moreover, a considerable percentage 
of the population in Kosovo simply did not view the LDK as a viable option any longer, mainly 
because of its record of clashing with the KLA during the conflict. Another reason for the 
political vacuum in post-war Kosovo was that the former communist leaders had been side-
lined almost completely from public life. Whilst in other parts of former Yugoslavia (Slovenia 
and Croatia, for example) it was not unusual for former communists to continue with 
leadership positions after conflict, the same did not happen in Kosovo.  
Former communist leaders could not really even make an appearance in public. The representatives of 
the monist system were judged very harshly, although they also played a constructive role during the 
times of survival in the 1990s and even before (FMC 05).         
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Thirdly, following the DDR process a considerable number of KLA combatants found 
themselves transferred to the newly-formed KPC or the Kosovo Police. However, for the 
leaders of the resistance it quickly became clear that changing the KLA uniform for that of the 
KPC or the Police was not as fulfilling as initially envisaged. These two organizations were, 
after all, civilian entities. The NATO-led KFOR was the only entity in charge of security. In 
addition, the leaders of the resistance had larger, political, ambitions, which were certainly 
not going to be fulfilled by being stranded in security-related institutions.  
 
Turning to politics was also a question of “organizational survival” and “collective incentive 
strategy” (Manning 2004, p. 66). Besides, what were the alternatives if it was not for politics?  
When the fighting stopped in Kosovo, members of the KLA’s small political leadership initially tried to 
resist the notion that its position as the self-identified guardian of Kosovo’s new-found autonomy 
should be called into question in competitive elections. However, once it became clear that competitive 
elections would indeed be used to establish provisional governing institutions to replace the KLA-led 
structures, a leading faction of the KLA quickly formed itself into the PDK (Manning 2004, p. 64). 
 
Considering all the above, it was obvious that they would go on to create their own political 
parties. The PDK was the first one to be created by Hashim Thaçi and friends in October 1999 
(PDK 2019), followed by AAK founded by Ramush Haradinaj and friends in April 2001 (AAK 
2019).   
 
What set apart the so-called “war-wing” parties from the LDK was undoubtedly the war 
legacy. Going into politics, the KLA combatants were endowed with an incomparable 
advantage of having belonged to an intra-state armed group that was partially deserving of 
Kosovo’s liberation. Consequently, being equipped with such war laurels gave the war-wing 
parties a solid ground to potentially do quite well in elections.    
 
The legitimacy enjoyed by former commanders partly derives from their war credentials. Such 
credentials were “certainly a contributing factor that assisted PDK in entering peace talks with 
Belgrade to the extent they did. Others without such credentials would not have been in a 
position to go so deep for fear of major popular discontent” (CSO 06). 
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However, moving to mainstream politics also meant submitting to accountability and 
transparency, including financial transparency. According to Manning (2007), “the need to 
shift away from any illicit funding sources and for greater accountability and transparency 
with respect to finances poses challenges to party leaders” (Manning 2007, p. 257). As regards 
the KLA spring-off political parties, Manning also talks about the internal competition 
becoming greater as the KLA leaders were preparing to make the jump into politics. In the 
case of PDK, for example, the KLA leaders “aspiring to use their military struggle as a 
springboard into political power was to edge out rivals from the KLA war-time umbrella” 
(Manning 2007, p. 261). Once they entered politics, the most effective way to gain credibility 
was to demonstrate popular support at the ballot box. Their investment into their future 
electoral performance, therefore, was paramount for their political survival in the post-war 
period.      
 
In the short run, the DDR process accomplished two objectives: it provided the former 
combatants with a civil role and removed their weapons from their hands. Of course, the DDR 
process is in many respects as straightforward as that: in times of peace, former soldiers of 
irregular armies need to dispose of arms and provide space, in this case for NATO troops, to 
fill in the security vacuum. Their longer-term transformation into politics, however, is more 
challenging since it changes the political scene of the country beyond recognition.  
   
The formation of two political parties in Kosovo (PDK and AAK) was a result of the political 
transformation of the KLA. For some, their inclusion in politics has served to enrich the 
political scene to a great degree. Moreover, their political record is to be “applauded”, since 
they respected the electoral results even when they lost. PDK particularly proved successful 
in reinventing itself and bringing in new generations, youth and women in its midst (CSO 06). 
 
On the other hand, respondents such as FMC 05 were themselves part of the KLA, but now 
belong to the LDK party. For him, and indeed many others, twenty years after the war it is 
difficult to separate the political parties into camps. “I believe that the people are really 
grateful about the true soldiers of the KLA, even now – 15 years after the war. This is seen 
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also from the fact that every political party is populated with former combatants, so now it is 
impossible to divide us into “war wing” and “pacifist” political parties” (FMC 05). 
 
Most former commanders I have interviewed exuded a sense of sacrifice and duty for joining 
politics after the war. For them, this was just another means of serving their country. If they 
had come to the defence of the country in its darkest hour fighting the enemy, they were 
prepared to do so again in times of peace. They recalled the sacrifices incurred during the 
war, when they had lost friends, family and loved ones. In peacetimes they were even more 
prepared to contribute to society in order to make sure that the country was on the right path 
to peace, democracy and prosperity (FMC 01; FMC 02; FMC 04). In their logic, who deserves 
more than them to be regarded as guardians of the state? Their account of sacrifices they had 
made seemed to give them the right to equip them with a guardianship role. According to this 
rationale, if they had been successful in gaining freedom, they had just as much responsibility 
in preserving that freedom.   
 
These were some of the main reasons for the combatants’ transformation in politics. Their 
willingness to exchange “bullets for ballots” (Ishiyama 2016) was an early indicator of the 
potential success of this transformation. Former combatants, then, got elected and ascended 
to power through democratic means. By all accounts, the move from war to peace, from 
violent means of combat to democratic means of competition through elections, was 
successfully completed.  
 
For a member of PDK (former combatant himself), the very fact that a part of the KLA 
leadership decided to enter politics by forming a political party (and then another one) is 
considered a positive contribution to democracy. They were active players in politics and 
always respected the electoral outcome, regardless if they won or lost. However, there is an 
implicit accusation amongst critics of “war-wing parties” that former combatants are not 
really supposed to be in politics (ACA 05). They might have offered a valuable contribution to 
the liberation of the country, for which they are thanked for, but the underlying tone is that 
somehow, they should not be in politics. The respondent did not show to be impressed, or 
negatively influenced, by the criticism coming from the media, civil society of other political 
parties, that their “place is not in politics”. The respondent takes the will of the people, 
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expressed through their free votes, as an indicator of whether the likes of him should continue 
to be politically active or not (FMC 01). 
 
When talking about this group’s success in elections it is impossible not to refer to the notion 
of the “regional networks of alliances and support” (ACA 01). The very basis of the KLA 
structure was built around village and regional affiliation. Members of this rebel group 
normally knew each other either through family or very close friends. There was a strong 
sense of trust and brotherhood which kept the structure relatively tightly knit. It is no surprise, 
therefore, that by the end of the war these combatants had forged very close networks and 
alliances amongst themselves. Granted, there were sub-groups within the organisation, 
mainly built around sub-regional affiliation, but by the end of the conflict there was a clear 
understanding that the KLA combatants needed to take care of each other. This sense of 
loyalty for one another, these bonds of camaraderie, would eventually feed into the 
organisational and political relations of the war-wing parties.   
 
According to FMC 01, a respondent from PDK, one can never and should never forget about 
the comrades of war. “In fact, the inclusion of former combatants in politics has helped 
democracy, because in that way even the remotest member (veteran) of the war could seek, 
and obtain, answers and accountability from us” (FMC 01). In a sense, this statement 
illustrates what democracy stands for: it is about giving a voice to one’s electorate and fighting 
for their rights and concerns. In the case at hand, the respondent mentioned the state 
benefits for war veterans as one of the issues that had not been resolved in Kosovo for around 
fifteen years after the war. There was a sense that Kosovo institutions were not paying 
attention to the war veterans and were neglecting passing a law that would enable a basic 
level of social support for them and their families. “If it was not for members of the KLA who 
are in politics and who could appeal to their brethren for calm, I am sure we could have had 
more protests and social tensions such as the kind demanding pensions and other benefits 
for war veterans” (FMC 01).  
 
The implicit warning of social turmoil is another characteristic of war combatants who 
became politicians. Herein lies the two-edged sword: as the statement makes it very clear, 
former combatants as a community may represent a threat to peace and social order, 
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particularly if their grievances are not being addressed. However, having their representatives 
in power certainly helps ameliorate those grievances by addressing their concerns or, if that 
is not possible within a given deadline, by keeping their comrades’ potential for social 
implosion at bay and on check.       
 
As we saw, the chains of camaraderie are forged in the embers of war. That rapport is then 
transformed into trust (which equals votes) after the war. FMC 01 was very emphatic about 
pointing out that for him the vote is tantamount with trust. In fact, the inclusion of former 
combatants in politics was a positive factor also because in that way, former combatants 
everywhere had a direct access to government for any grievance or complaint in need of 
address.  
 
But where the line is between representation and accountability from comrades turned 
politicians, versus manifestations of clientelism and corruption? As will be seen below, while 
war veterans did address a need for representation in the electorate, their war-based 
alliances served them well in utilising those links for the consolidation of formal institutional 
relations. It is also interesting to note that the inclusion of former combatants is politics is 
seen as a stabilising factor. Without that, as claimed above, there would have been almost a 
sure chance of protests and social turmoil from war veterans seeking benefits. In fact, this is 
a sentiment one often hears in Kosovo and FYR Macedonia.  
 
3.1.2 Push-pull factors influencing entry into politics, and impacts of entry into politics on post-war 
opportunities 
 
I think the transformation of political parties is bigger than the people realise. Look at PDK with the new 
generations. I think they are modernising from inside. They are not a well-organized group; some 
villages are better off, and some others are poorer. Talk to MPs privately, they want to get jobs for their 
own community. Apart from getting rich for themselves, they want some of it to trickle down to them, 
because this is where they get the vote. It is an accountable system (maybe in the wrong way), but 
history will tell… perhaps a totally normal system for this level of evolution where we are now (CSO 03)     
 
For many respondents, including independent scholars and civil society activists, the inclusion 
of former combatants into politics is seen as a normal political evolution. They have given a 
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“significant contribution to post-war Kosovo, by helping found two political parties, making 
up a large part of the police, and participating in state-building processes” (ACA 01). 
Additionally, their leaders have been in “constant dialogue with international actors” (ACA 
01), which is marked as a praiseworthy characteristic of their political persona, regardless of 
which party they belong. Such was the case, for example, when both Limaj and Haradinaj – 
former KLA commanders and leaders of war-wing political parties after the war - gave 
themselves up to the ICTY at the Hague as soon as indictments against them were brought 
forth in 2004 and 2006 respectively (ICTY 2019). Another example given is the fact that each 
coalition government has been made “in concert with international actors”, thereby 
contributing to stable governments and a unitary position vis-à-vis external challenges such 
as the negotiations with Serbia on Kosovo’s future status (FMC 01). 
 
In Kosovo, the inclusion of former combatants in politics was also a necessity, since there was 
a segment of the population who for a long time had not supported the LDK or its pacifist 
movement. These social grievances of this segment of the population were channelled 
through the clandestine activities of its representatives going back to the Illegality or LPK 
movement of the early 1980s. For two decades they had operated illegally, and their 
operations climaxed with the KLA war. Now, in times of peace, it was finally possible for them 
to take a logical step and enter the mainstream of politics through their own political parties 
and their representatives.  
 
Such was the fate of FMC 02, one of my respondents, who had been a member of the LPK 
movement for more than a decade. In the interview, he gave a short account of his 
engagement from very early on, while he was still a student at university. (Of note, I should 
stress that in the majority of circumstances, those who eventually became leaders in war had 
been involved in clandestine activities for years prior to it.) By taking part or organizing 
protests, writing leaflets, or opposing the regime through sabotage and other similar 
methods, they began getting to know their kin, and in that way deepening and widening their 
network. FMC 02, for instance, was acquainted very early on with the likes of Kadri Veseli, 
Hashim Thaçi or Jakup Krasniqi – leaders of the KLA and of the PDK party after the war. Trust, 
family ties and friendship were the key lubricants which helped the cogs of resistance grow 
and move forward. Those ties served them during the war and, according to him, it is normal 
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to expect that the same ties helped them in their contribution after the war (FMC 02). In fact, 
would it have been realistic to expect a sudden severing of those ties when the war came to 
an end? In fact, one could argue that the need to step forward and enter mainstream politics 
came as a natural progression in their careers, and as a result of grassroot demands made by 
people who needed their “own kin” in Kosovo’s new institutions.   
 
To claim legitimacy, the respondent FMC 02 reiterated that “we fought for liberation and 
independence”. However, he clarified that the immediate objective of the armed group was 
not to enter politics or gain power. This is an important point to make since it dispels 
accusations that the combatants fought to gain political positions after the war. However, 
there is no evidence of such plans having taken place, which comes out clearly from the 
interviews as well.  
 
Further, respondent FMC 02 blamed the “internationals” for having exercised a policy of 
“divide and rule” amongst Albanians, and for having destroyed and looted the “economic 
basis” of the country. He was very critical of the non-armed political actors who, as he 
claimed, did very little, or nothing, to reach out to those who had fought. The combatants 
were “bleeding” and were fatigued from the war; they needed rehabilitation, they had lost 
their loved ones. On the other hand, politicians who had served in the West began returning 
to Kosovo, “full of money, fully charged, in good health and with their healthy families” (FMC 
02). They were returning and occupying space in political life. They spoke the language which 
the international community wanted to hear. The respondent was also explicit in stating that 
some of these returnees were trained to further the agendas of others, not excluding those 
of Serbia (FMC 02).  
 
Considering this situation, it was normal that a number of combatants who had charisma, 
who were more active and ambitious, would rise to the occasion and enter politics so as to 
defend their interests and those of their constituency (FMC 02). It was to be expected that 
the representatives of the armed faction would look after each other’s interest. Besides, the 
enemy was still lurking in our midst, working to topple the fragile peace achieved and to 
return Serbia back to Kosovo. The KLA representatives saw themselves as guardians of the 
new state and as such, were prepared to sacrifice further in its defence. Considering these 
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circumstances, it seems that the issue of “bottom-up request for representation” (FMC 02) 
was naturally born after the war. This expression – bottom-up request for representation – 
was used by the above respondent to illustrate that the desire for political representation 
came from the people themselves. Once the conflict was over, the people were the ones who 
called upon former combatants to lead them in times of peace, too. In post-war Kosovo, 
former combatants needed to make their voices heard and, in addition, there was a whole 
swathe of the population who also looked up to them for direction and leadership. In fact, to 
cease political activity altogether, in addition to being disarmed and demobilised, would in 
fact have been irresponsible and antipatriotic.   
 
During my fieldwork I had the opportunity to speak to a number of former KLA combatants 
who had also served in the Information Service of Kosovo (known with its Albanian acronyms 
ShIK or Shërbimi Informativ i Kosovës). ShIK was the intelligence and counterintelligence wing 
of the KLA. Instead of ceasing their activities, after the war they grew further and were 
transformed into the intelligence wing of PDK. Its members are alleged to have been involved 
in sabotage, coercion and intimidation of Albanian “collaborators” and political enemies. A 
number of deaths and death threats after the war are attributed to ShIK. Of course, its 
members would not portray their organisation with such sinister colours. For them, ShIK was 
an essential part of state-building that positioned itself at the forefront of national security 
and dealt with uncovering and pre-empting threats that came from Serbia or its collaborators 
living in Kosovo.  
 
For example, respondents FMC 02, FMC 06 and FMC 08, and had been active members of 
ShIK for many years. As such, they had a very clear stance regarding certain individuals with 
a non-KLA background: for them, many of these individuals were under the payroll of the 
enemy and promoted certain agendas from abroad. Once war came to an end, they continued 
and even intensified they activities, sabotaging the state-building process and “throwing mud 
on the just war conducted by the KLA”. Taken from that point of view, it is clear why the 
respondents considered it important for former combatants turned politicians to be the 
custodians of the nascent state. Their guardianship was an imperative for its existence (FMC 
02, FMC 06 and FMC 08). 
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There is no evidence, therefore, that might suggest that the KLA combatants were already 
conspiring to take over the politics of the country while the fighting was still raging. 
Nevertheless, when the war came to an end, the circumstances for political engagement were 
such that it seemed natural for combatants to form their own political parties. As another 
respondent noted, post-war Kosovo ushered a new era in which the former combatants saw 
an opportunity to improve their economic wellbeing, and as a result their social standing. “It 
was the underdogs trying to get the upper hand in many ways. It was as much about Albanians 
freeing up themselves from the Serbs as it was about them becoming a factor after the war” 
(CSO 03). Just like the communists used to be the political elite that had seen the height of its 
fame and power in the old regime, so were the KLA combatants intent on becoming the main 
powerholders in today’s Kosovo.  
 
Gradually, politics came to be recognised as an asset, or the only real asset, for personal and 
professional development. In a post-war ruined economy such as Kosovo’s, where there was 
no network of support as such, politics began to be viewed not just as means for gathering 
power but also as an opportunity for career and professional development. 
 
This brings me to an interesting point, which is what happens when politics becomes the asset 
for development and growth in a transitional society. How differently is politics viewed when 
there are meagre alternatives for development and there is a destroyed economy? In such a 
scenario politics could be viewed as the means to develop professionally, to get rich and to 
provide for the inner circle. In such a way one begins to create a network of friends and family 
that they represent through the platform of democracy, but that they also provide for in 
return for their allegiance and support. This seems to be a nascent form of clientelism which 
is reinforced and almost takes a life of its own as it becomes a standard operating procedure 
in a new democracy. Politics as an asset thus resembles a medusa out of which its tentacles 
grow, and which is conditioned and dependent by it. Take higher education with the public 
University of Prishtina, for example: it is a widely accepted claim that politics (read: the war 
wing political parties) had an active interest in influencing who would be nominated in its 
leadership (Rector and deans) positions. By having its people in such posts, PDK could then 
use the University as a platform for educating younger generations and potentially grooming 
a new generation of supporters and party apparatchiks (OPP 01).  
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Indoctrination and party loyalty do not just start at higher education level. Primary school 
directors are also party appointees. “They will ensure that most of the teachers belong to his 
party. This is spread everywhere, even at kindergarten level. Your belonging to an institution 
is measured against your political party affiliation. This corrodes, eats away the substance of 
the state” (OPP 02).  
3.2 Nature and duration of state capture by former combatants  
This second section of the Kosovo sub-chapter focuses on the second phase of the 
combatants’ inclusion in politics, which is their impact on democracy and institutions. With 
the consolidation of the war-wing parties we witnessed the creation of a new political and 
social class, comprised of KLA veterans, their families and friends. This section will therefore 
examine the rise of the new masters and what this has meant for democracy in Kosovo. It will 
also analyse the intricate nature of relations between politicians and voters, highlighting clear 
patterns of a patron versus client rapport, which points at the phenomenon of clientelism as 
one of the defining features of Kosovo’s fledgling democracy today. Lastly, this section will 
look at the role that the international community has had on maintaining the status quo, 
emphasising stability while hampering true democratic principles. 
3.2.1 The rise of the new masters 
The competitive value system happened overnight, in a place where values are up for grabs; and when 
you don’t have this settled value structure, it becomes a battle of groups. What is the difference 
between LDK, PDK and AAK? Have they said anything different about the VAT? No. Have you ever heard 
them having different positions on health care? Or different position on customs tax? There is 
absolutely no ideological difference between them. VV is a party established by a particular socio-
economic group established by a particular socio-economic position. There we have a difference. So 
the battle of the major parties in Kosovo is not ideological; it is about who grabs power. This is not just 
the combatants, it is the overall political culture in Kosovo. With combatants, the only thing is that it is 
a bit more accentuated, because they have the right feeling to be disillusioned in many ways, because 
they contributed, they gave their limbs, risked their lives. And they have a dose of thanklessness from 
the society, and they are right to feel this way [disillusioned, disappointed] (CSO 03)   
 
The Kosovo conflict with Serbia was in way a civil war in the making enmeshed in a liberation 
war. This kind of statement echoed throughout several interviews that I conducted. In both 
societies – that of Kosovo and FYR Macedonia - the combatants often represented the 
“underdogs” of ethnic Albanian society. In FYR Macedonia, the ethnic Albanian parties that 
had represented their community from the country’s independence right to 2001 when the 
armed conflict erupted were mainly members of intelligentsia and from urban areas. The 
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same goes for Kosovo. The biggest party throughout the 1990s was the LDK, comprised of 
intellectuals such as writers, literary critics, doctors, journalists and, certainly, persons who 
did quite well economically during Yugoslav times.  
 
The “war parties”, on the other hand, represented another side of the ethnic Albanian society. 
They were often the traditionally underprivileged, marginalised ones, and they came from 
rural and isolated areas. But they were committed to grasp the momentum gained with the 
advent of the KLA and entrench themselves in decision-making positions in Prishtina after the 
war. Indeed, the tensions which arose within the Albanian factions in Kosovo during and in 
the immediate aftermath of the conflicts led many to suggest that we were witnessing the 
potential of a civil war (CSO 04; CSO 06). In the end, there was no civil war, but there was a 
definitive changeover of the political landscape in favour of the war-wing parties. In other 
words, we saw the creation of the war-wing parties and their eventual penetration of the 
political system through democratic vote all the way to the highest levels of government. 
During this process we also witnessed the creation and consolidation of post-war masters 
which dominates Kosovo’s political and economic scene to date. This new class of the rich and 
the powerful consists mainly of those former combatants who are now politicians, their 
families and entrusted friends, mutually supported by a network of businessmen and 
oligarchs in the making.  
 
One of my respondents who is a civil society activist - CSO 06 - was very clear that had it not 
been for the inclusion of former combatants in security structures, and perhaps more 
importantly, their entrance in politics, post-war Kosovo would have been faced with a civil 
war “in the face of 45 thousand NATO troops” that were deployed to keep the peace in the 
territory after the war. Their political role was therefore unquestionable, and their impact on 
every process of democratization and state-building is clearly marked. However, their role 
was perhaps supposed to be short-lived in the transitional period in post-war Kosovo. But this 
transition happened to continue for many more years than people hoped. Consequently, the 
role of former combatants turned politicians was also stretched and is currently in its second 
decade. The downside to this was that it “depressed the growth of political elites, enabled 
combatants to access the wealth of nation, where they enhanced their formal and informal 
influence and from where they withdrew benefits” (CSO 06).   
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The end of the war saw not just the leap from conflict to peace, and from a communist regime 
to a democratic system of governance. It saw a transplantation of political classes in favour 
of the war-wing faction. My respondent codenamed OPP 01 - a former civil society activist 
and now a member of the LDK opposition party - touched upon the very sensitive issue of 
post-conflict Kosovo, which is the animosity that existed between the KLA and its successor 
parties (mainly PDK), and the LDK. As the war was nearing the end, it was becoming 
increasingly clear that in parallel with the war against Serbia, Kosovo was also undergoing an 
elite, class struggle. The KLA represented the more marginalized, rural and younger part of 
the Albanian population who had fought clandestinely for many years, as opposed to the LDK 
which was run by literary critics, writers, journalists, professors and doctors. The latter, 
although they had been equally suppressed as their Albanian kin, had nevertheless been 
luckier at gaining education and a better standard of living under Yugoslavia (OPP 01). The 
end of the war made these differences crystal clear: KLA young men were eager to move to 
Prishtina and make use of opportunities one enjoys in freedom, such as gain education, enter 
politics, open businesses, and in the process, become wealthy. This also meant that they 
quickly started becoming part of the urban elite, however artificially that seemed to be 
enforced. The incumbent-elite, on the other hand, were left staring at the rapidly-changing 
land-space taking shape in front of their eyes and, what’s more, in their territory, “their” 
capital city. This was, essentially, a leap from war to peace, a jump from village to city, and a 
dramatic change of elite structures.  
 
These claims are echoes by CSO 02 – a civil society activist and an expert of the security sector. 
Although the goal of the KLA was to liberate the country, their sub-goal once the war was 
over was indeed to create their own elite. In the end, together with creating democratic 
institutions, Kosovo was faced with a clash between the elite of socialist Yugoslavia and the 
“war-related elite” (CSO 02).  
 
How did this come about? What were some of the means that the former combatants 
employed to become the nouveau riche? Above I have written about their successful 
transformation from guns to ballot paper and their submission to the democratic will of the 
people. This process of being elected as representatives of the people elevated them to 
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mainstream politics and enabled them to gain influence. However, another method, 
strategically employed to ensure longevity for the new elite structures, was gaining control of 
the management of the public university. The only public university in Kosovo until very 
recently was the University of Prishtina, which accommodates around 40,000 students. The 
PDK was instrumental in penetrating its management structures and implanting its own men 
in decision-making positions. As a result, most of the rectors and several deans in the last two 
decades have also been PDK officials or very close to the party leadership. This was done 
because, “for them, this was a tool for upward mobility, so you want to control that. You get 
lots of kids from your area to get educated, so that you can get them into the party, into 
boards, in the public sector, and you need to do that as fast as you can” (CSO 03). This is 
exactly what has been happening in Kosovo in the last two decades. 
 
During my fieldwork I also spoke with FMC 07 who is now retired. He is a former high-ranking 
officer of the Yugoslav Army. Like many in his situation, with the beginning of the break-up of 
Yugoslavia he managed to obtain early retirement and avoided taking sides in the upcoming 
conflicts. Instead, he retreated home in Kosovo and did not reappear in public life until the 
war was over. As UNMIK and NATO set up the KPC he was recruited to share his expertise for 
the young recruits of the latter. However, he recalled the “humiliation” he experienced from 
the young KLA men who branded him a “communist”, and who forced him into a subservient 
role. “We were pushed aside, and we were commanded by someone who might not have 
even had their primary school completed” (FMC 07).  
 
These young men were the new upcoming elite of Kosovo. My interviewee’s and his fellow 
men’s personal relationship with this new elite (who were all much younger than him) was 
highly acrimonious and shrouded in suspicion. As much as he would have wanted to assist the 
KLA, he would have been viewed with suspicion. He would have been considered a former 
collaborator of the enemy and, as a member of their security structures, might have even 
been involved in crushing Albanian demonstrations during the 1980s in the streets of 
Prishtina. In addition, the younger commanders who were professionally untrained and 
unprepared in matters of complex warfare strategies, would have viewed him as a 
competition. Let us not forget that within the KLA and the successor KPC structures there was 
stiff competition for positions, and the young commanders would have not viewed lightly the 
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prospect of taking orders from a “communist” and a “traitor”. As a result, in the rising order 
of post-war Kosovo even former Generals had to oblige to the instructions of the new 
generation of KLA commanders, ie. the representatives of the nouveau riche.   
 
In the end, what matters is who has the upper hand. Who has the power to set the terms for 
the future? The rising elite that originated from the armed struggle were determined to gain 
monopoly over those terms. In the end, it is about the dominance of “big men”, i.e. the heads 
of family and patronage systems who continue to dominate the country by speaking the 
language of democracy and by offering promises of peace and stability. These “big men” are 
dominant personalities with a legitimized right to power and resources no matter the form of 
notional or rhetorical institutions, norms, and laws (Kanin 2003, p. 492). 
 
According to a Member of Parliament from an opposition party in Kosovo, OPP 02, the battle 
of the major parties in Kosovo is not ideological; it is about who grabs power. Indeed, what is 
the difference between the PDK, AAK and Nisma (all of whom derived from the war) in Kosovo 
today? Have they said anything different about the VAT? Have you ever heard them having 
different positions on health care? Or do they have different positions on customs tax? There 
is no ideological difference between them. “This is not just the combatants, it is the overall 
political culture in Kosovo. With combatants, the only thing is that is a bit more accentuated, 
because they have the right feeling to be disillusioned in many ways, because they 
contributed, they gave their limbs, risked their lives” (OPP 02).  
 
Today, he continues, the ultimate ambition is to get a job in administration/civil service. “Ask 
a young man: where do you wish to get a job? They will tell you it is the civil service, starting 
from being a janitor to getting a job as a taxman, where you could possibly get rich. We need 
to do what Finland did after WWI: they spent billions of euros in education” (OPP 02). There 
are serious problems in this regard too: the biggest employer is state administration (civil 
service), which does not bode well for a small country such as Kosovo, its private sector and 
its economy. Civil service is indeed viewed as a haven not just from unemployment, but also 
from an irregular private job market, where you are likely to have your employee rights 
trampled.      
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3.2.2 Client-patron relationship 
In his paper titled succinctly “Clientelism” Hicken (2011) provides a short but thorough 
literature review on the definition of “client” and “patron” and, by extension, of “clientelism”. 
According to him, at the heart of the phenomenon is the “dyadic relationship” between 
politicians and voters, fostered by an ongoing transaction of support for the former in 
exchange for discriminatory favours for the latter.  
Politicians supply benefits only to individuals or groups that support or promise to support the 
politician. Likewise, the client supports only that politician who delivers, or promises to deliver, a valued 
benefit in return for the client’s electoral support (Hicken 2011, p. 291) 
Unlike, say, the example of bribing a police officer which may be a one-off event, the 
clientelistic transaction is a long-term cycle of mutual and exclusive dependency. This means 
that clientelism is not unlike a single act of bribery in the sense that an illicit transaction has 
occurred for the benefit of a select group of individuals. But it is more than a simple bribery 
in the sense that it is iterated, structurally perpetuated and self-sustained in a wider society.  
The former (read: bribery) are (hopefully) one-off interactions, with neither party having a strong 
expectation of interacting in the future. By contrast, clientelism is at its core an iterated interaction, 
with each side anticipating future interactions as they make decisions about their behavior today 
(Hicken 2011, p. 292) 
This sort of relationship, based in iterated rounds of mutual dependency, is what makes the 
politician a patron and the voter a client.  
 
OPP 02, an opposition party representative as well as a member of the Assembly of Kosovo, 
is of the opinion that the politician-voter relationship created in Kosovo after the war is 
typically clientelistic. He argues that the inception of such a relationship may be detected 
when a person is promised a job not because of their ability but because of their connection 
to powerful people in politics.  
You can get a job if you have connections with a network which will accommodate you. Otherwise, you 
may be the smartest guy, have a PhD, and you may still be unemployed. You and your family may 
prosper in proportion with your personal proximity with the people that control and that accommodate 
(OPP 02) 
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Echoing above’s note by Hicken (2011) on iteration, a number of respondents have stressed 
the long-term effect of clientelism. Talking about war veterans who have entered politics, 
OPP 03 – herself a former civil society and now a Member of Parliament – states, “Yesterday 
they did not fear death, today they do not fear the law, because they sense that they made 
these laws and institutions and they feel entitled. For them, it is entirely normal to 
accommodate their closed ones” (OPP 03). This rings quite true in a country such as Kosovo 
where the rate of unemployment is very high but there is a big and burdensome civil service 
that lives off the taxpayers’ money. For political parties – i.e. the nouveau riche - especially 
the war-wing ones, the challenge is to employ as many of their own supporters in key 
positions in administration because this leads to dual benefits: it is beneficial for the supporter 
who will get a job and consequently be in a position to help their family, and it is beneficial 
for the party as they will be able to further strengthen the ties with the supporter and their 
network. But, as we will see from the quote below, clientelism is long-lasting, which counts 
for its iteration and its vicious circle. 
Clientelism does not come to an end when you get a job. Clientelism is eternal and makes you eternally 
dependent on it. The fact that you got a job does not mean you are safe from it. You will be checked on 
a regular basis: are you following the line? How many of your family have we employed for you? How 
many new members have you managed to recruit for us? It is a periodical verification. You need to 
photograph your vote. So, even when you are employed, you have this Sword of Damocles that hangs 
over your neck. Even if you are not employed, there is the network of false hopes. I have seen it myself. 
They say to people, when we win, I will take your daughter to work in the municipality. And of course, 
if you are earning 300 euros a month and there are six of you in a family, how the hell are you supposed 
to survive with those 300 euros. This will keep around 100,000 to 150,000 stable votes for the party 
(OPP 02)  
 
Above I spoke about the inherently democratic wish of a certain part of the population to be 
politically represented by KLA veterans. When the conflict was over in 1999, freedom was the 
first prize that the people of Kosovo were able to cherish. However, the enjoyment of this 
freedom was quickly tainted by the realisation of the challenges laying ahead. Kosovo was a 
country with a collapsed economy, poor infrastructure and no legal framework (until the UN 
Administration began building one from scratch). The need to create jobs and opportunities 
in a place whose economy was destroyed to the ground was imminent. Building a viable 
future was a task that, almost by default, fell upon the political and military leaders of the 
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time. A significant portion of this leadership came from the KLA ranks, enjoying as they did a 
large popular following. 
 
However, one of the persisting problems is how former commanders use their war-time 
hierarchical links to avoid formal structures and institutions. “Several local and regional 
commanders refused to play by institutional rule and worked hard to maintain their 
underground regional networks and remain still very powerful. In many cases they control 
who gets elected locally and in the national assembly from their region” (CSO 06). A great 
number of former combatants continue to give a valuable contribution in daily life, be it in 
academia, civil service, security structures, politics etc. However, it seems as if, with the 
consolidation of democratic institutions, certain powerful figures have learned to circumvent 
democracy’s basic rules of checks and balances. By using their influence and links on the 
ground, they have been able to influence who gets elected to what office, and how the people 
vote. At first glance, such elections might prove to be free and fair, as most of them have 
indeed been noted by international observers. However, the underlying problems are 
numerous, and they relate to how these powerful figures prepare the ground for votes, so 
that when their persons are elected, the outcome is indeed a free and fair one. These are just 
some of the basic problems faced in a fragile democracy.  
 
These veterans had the credibility and enjoyed the support to run and even win elections. 
However, in the context of a destroyed economy as well as burgeoning needs of the 
electorate for support, the war veterans who became politicians turned to clientelist practices 
as a quick-fix for the daunting challenges ahead. “When the war was over, the clans counted 
on the patronage of KLA commanders for access to jobs and resources. In the context of 
widespread deprivation, such use of networks is very common and often not controversial or 
illicit” (Dziedzic, Mercean and Skendaj 2016, p. 161).  
 
This is in a way how the first seeds of a clientelistic structure were planted: in a virtually 
lawless society that had just emerged from war, the need for direction, resources and jobs 
was an existentialist emergency. The leaders who would trace the way forward were former 
commanders who were slowly reinventing themselves as politicians. However, in a place 
where guns and muscle still spoke louder than words and law, the KLA commanders or their 
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delegates fed off the clientelistic networks and practices. Practices of racketeering and 
organised crime were gradually becoming means for quick enrichment. The international 
administration led by the UN was aware of what was happening. However, their level of 
tolerance, or even collusion, was quite high (Belloni and Strazzari 2014; Distler 2018). 
Maintaining peace also meant ensuring that the former rebels were committed to it and one 
way of making sure they had a seat at the table was to tolerate some of these illicit activities. 
“When KFOR and UNMIK intervened in June 1999, prominent KLA commanders controlled 
illicit, clan-based power structures that opposed the peace process through violent means, 
but their interests were negotiable (Dziedzic, Mercean and Skendaj 2016, p. 191).  
    
CSO 03 is a long-time civil society activist who has written quite extensively on governance 
issues in Kosovo and the wider Balkan region. In our conversation about corruption and 
democratisation in Kosovo, he was of the view that things should be analysed from the point 
of view of those who are involved in clientelistic relations. Taking such a point of view should 
shed light on the genuine causes behind it.  
Corruption is a fairly well-accepted value in our society. To call someone corrupt will not necessarily 
erode their voting base. This is a clientelistic system, a pyramidal one, where a person who is seen as 
clientelistic, his people see him as someone who is trying to get a piece of the pie in this very unjust 
system – their very own Robin Hood (CSO 03) 
 
The respondent’s argument is a sobering one: far from positioning himself in defence of 
clientelistic practices, he understands the corrosive effect they have on democracy. But at the 
same time, he is cognisant of the circumstances reigning in a society in transition such as 
Kosovo’s. “This was the logic during the war, and before it. If you lived in a village and all you 
saw was the police, what level of organization are you gonna flock towards? It is your kin! The 
family is going to provide for you, they will take care of your kid” (CSO 03). Likewise, in times 
of peace and in a ruined economy, one will flock to the politician who will commit to providing 
for them. 
 
However, discerning between genuine democratisation efforts and clientelistic manoeuvring 
is a challenge. How much of the war veterans’ accession to power can be attributed to 
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democratic means versus clientelistic alliances? This is a question which begets no easy 
answer.  
Former KLA leaders turned politicians undertook a successful transition into post-war politics in Kosovo. 
They were able to get elected through their respective political parties, and the war legacy was certainly 
a major factor contributing to their election. Let us not forget that their war time-forged friendships, 
their camaraderie contributed greatly their popular success in post-war politics (ACA 01)  
 
However, once in power, this “network of alliances” was further nourished and cultivated by 
“distributing jobs and services” to friends and family (ACA 01). The line, therefore, between 
democratic representation and clientelism became increasingly blurred.  
 
What is also blurred are the lines between formal and informal relations impacting 
governance in Kosovo. I have referred above to the camaraderie-based, regional and family 
alliances and networks that associate the former KLA combatants. With the set-up of the 
institutions and the legal framework, Kosovo made great strides towards institutionalising 
public and political life. However, those informal networks may still operate underground, 
thus undermining formal and official government business. For politicians/patrons and their 
networks it is vital that informality is maintained so as to be able to attract further riches and 
power.  
 
My respondent, OPP 02 – Member of Parliament from opposition ranks – describes the formal 
versus informal relationship in this way:    
Here, the political power is created for the benefit of clans and narrow groups. I do not think that the 
public good is a priority. The law is like the spider’s net: it catches small creatures, ants, but cannot stop 
big animals. You see this on a daily basis: the policeman will let someone go and not fine him in traffic 
because he is close to power. The law lets the powerful go and penalises the weak. The same is 
replicated at the highest levels, where people strive to get wealthy at the detriment of the public good. 
Even when a law is pushed forth, there might be narrow personal or clan-based interests at play, instead 
of public interests (OPP 02) 
 
Most respondents, apart from the former combatants themselves, shared the opinion that 
Kosovo is shrouded in a system which is deeply corrupt and clientelistic, and which has an 
 188 
 
impact of the consolidation of democracy. Most of them also voiced their belief that, although 
others are also to be blamed, the main culprits are the war-wing parties.   
 
Respondent ACA 07 is an expert on nationalism studies and on the Balkans. He has worked 
for many years in Kosovo with international organisations and the government. He makes a 
few concise points to show that not only are these parties corrupt but that their corruption is 
also directly impacting on democracy. There is plenty of evidence, he explains, that embroil 
the war-wing parties in corruption. PDK and AAK have to “varying degrees manifested the ills 
of corruption, personal and familial embezzlement, illiberal politics, control of media and 
contributing to the entrenchment of new elite which stifle democracy” (ACA 07). He recalled 
many instances when during his own research he encountered people who were scared of 
the reaction of the war-wing parties to criticism from the media and civil society. Therefore, 
it is safe to conclude that “the quality of democracy has not been markedly improved by the 
armed groups transformed into political parties (ACA 07).  
 
The evidence from the interview data suggests that the entrance of combatants in politics 
was generally good for democracy as it has diversified the offers for the electorate. It was 
good for combatants as they managed to find a new objective after the war, and it was good 
for their electorate as they now also felt they had a voice in politics through war veterans. 
However, the evidence also suggests that in the long-run this political transformation was 
blighted by corruption, clientelist practices and the penetration of informal politics in formal 
institutional conduct.   
 
Respondent ACA 07 further believed most former guerrilla leaders in politics have not been 
successful as political leaders. “They have shown illiberal tendencies and through state jobs, 
nepotism, favouritism and through non-transparent political campaign financing have been 
able to rule a “democracy by numbers” system whereby they can dominate the political scene 
and entrench themselves as leading parties or king-making politicians” (ACA 07). 
 
Other respondents have also noted the ability/agility of war-wing parties in this democracy 
of ruling by numbers. Over the past decade or so, elections have generally confirmed free, 
fair and transparent conduct. Observers have confirmed the results of elections as being fair 
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and correct. However, such observations fail to provide deeper examination on how the 
voters are organised, how they choose to vote for the party’s favourite candidates, and how 
social structures at local or regional level are mobilized that succeed in pushing forward their 
preferred candidates. It is these structures and games that happen behind the scene that help 
certain individuals “entrench themselves” in the political scene (CSO 03). 
This brings us back to the issue of structures and alliances that are needed to maintain this 
unholy dyadic relationship between patron and client. In the post-war period when the new 
parties were created, “soldiers were not only subordinates, they were votes, campaign and 
instruments to enhance power” (CSO 03). These social structures were initially used to access 
power and gain wealth. Once in power, the circle of friends and families (read: clients) whose 
interests had to be looked after in exchange for political support, continued to grow and to 
feed off itself. Clientelism is thus transformed into a black hole that continues to suck until 
there is nothing left, at which point a social implosion could be possible. But what is the way 
out? “We (opposition party) are trying to open the people’s eyes by telling them that by voting 
for them (read: war-wing parties) you are perpetuating this situation” (OPP 02). But this is 
easier said than done because, “people are not disposed to think in terms of collective 
damage, and of abstract consequences. When the personal benefit is placed in juxtaposition 
with the collective damage, they will choose the former” (OPP 02).  
 
3.2.3 The culpability of the international community 
A clear gap can be noted between Kosovo’s statebuilding needs and the role the international 
community has played in seeking to reduce those fragilities: in numerous areas, international actors 
and donors actually did precisely the opposite, and have to some extent consolidated those fragilities. 
The reason for this can also be found in the international actors’ prioritisation of establishing short-
term security in Kosovo at the price of long term sustainable peace and economic development 
(Montanaro 2009, p. 19). 
 
When war came to an end in 1999, Kosovo proved to be a suitable terrain for the enactment 
of a liberal peacebuilding paradigm that promoted sustainable peace, democratic 
consolidation and development. However, twenty years later – out of which almost ten were 
a direct UN protectorate - the quality of democracy continues to be challenged by corruption 
and informal practices. With all the interviewees I spoke to – regardless of political leanings - 
there was a joint agreement that Kosovo had a long way to go to reaching a consolidated and 
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deeply-entrenched democracy, with high levels of participation and with embedded 
transparency and accountability. But the fault as to why the country has not reached that 
point yet is more complex and multi-faceted.  
If by democratization one means the construction of a robust democracy, with a responsive elite and 
high levels of participation, this is not what one can observe in Kosovo, but the reason for this is to be 
found in the role the United Nations and other international actors have played in demobilizing both 
the elites and the citizenry. As for the ultimate goal of a truly democratic country where minorities are 
integrated and protected, the responsibility for Kosovo’s failure in this regard falls on both domestic 
and international actors (ACA 01) 
 
The interviewees also underlined that we should not forget the international community’s 
role in building institutions from 1999 to 2008. We should also take into account their role in 
supporting national institutions and even continuing to exercise a limited executive mandate 
in certain areas after independence such as the rule of law and the judiciary. As respondent 
ACA 01 noted above, the UN and other international actors cannot avoid responsibility for 
“demobilizing both the elites and the citizenry”. Since the end of the war, we have indeed 
seen a marginalization of former elites, and the substitution of that elite with a new one. The 
new elite has largely come from the ranks of former combatants, whose representatives 
become some of the main interlocutors of the “internationals” after the war. A similar story 
occurred with the “citizenry” which, after the establishment of UN structures in 1999, began 
to be quickly transplanted with numerous civil society organizations, supported by 
international donors and very much promoting the latter’s agenda of the day. 
 
ACA 01 is an international academic who has previously lived in Kosovo and has written 
extensively about the conflict. She emphasises that although Kosovo is now independent and 
has its own institutions, this was not so the case for almost a decade after the 1999 war. 
Between then and 2008 when independence was declared, the UN Administration had 
executive powers and, consequently, they are partly to be blamed for the democratic 
discourse. “International actors bear most of the responsibility for what Kosovo has become 
(…) because for almost ten years they have held extraordinary power. For example, justice is 
a key sector that works less well than others.” (ACA 01). It is no coincidence that the 
respondent refers to the justice sector, seeing as it continues to be one of the weakest aspects 
in Kosovo’s system.   
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In retrospect, it is evident that the main priority for international actors in Kosovo was to 
maintain security and stability. Since the KLA combatants posed an immediate threat after 
the war, it seemed logical that the attention is directed towards ensuring their demobilisation 
and disarmament. However, this was not enough: their engagement with the political 
representatives of the armed group was gradually transformed into a long-term partnership 
that sought to build institutions and transit to democracy, while keeping the peace. More 
than a willing partnership on the side of the international community, this seemed like a 
pragmatic approach. “If you want peace, you must negotiate with ‘men with guns’. That is a 
prerequisite” (CSO 05). That is exactly what the international actors did. Ideally, you would 
want to negotiate with them until outlive their usefulness and help replace them with a new 
generation of local leaders. “If you manage later to discredit those leaders (armed 
combatants) and find new ones, that is a recipe for democratic consolidation” (CSO 05). 
However, this is not how it transpired in practice seeing as the new political elite deriving 
from the armed group went from strength to strength, rendering political alternatives less 
important and positioning itself at central stage. Since this elite is also involved in corruption 
and clientelistic practices, the international actors have found themselves in a predicament 
between not engaging as a matter of principle or engaging and closing an eye. Taking a 
pragmatic approach, they almost always engaged and, in the process, cohabited with local 
politics where illicit practices are quite widespread. 
     
4. FYR Macedonia 
4.1 The integration and political transformation of former combatants 
As explained in the Methods chapter, this first part of the FYR Macedonia sub-chapter will 
deal specifically with the act of the transfer of NLA combatants into politics. Like the Kosovo 
sub-chapter, the act of the NLA’s political transformation will be examined against the 
backdrop of their war legacy, followed by an analysis as to the reasons why they undertook 
such a transformation: a bottom-up, popular request for representation versus an 
opportunistic career opportunity. 
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4.1.1 The persistence of war experiences and relationships, and the decision to enter politics 
The DUI leader, Ali Ahmeti, is widely reported to have been at the head of the NLA during the conflict 
in 2001. I guess it was this – his conflict-time credentials – that enabled him to gain and maintain the 
party leadership since then (ACA 03) 
 
The NLA trajectory from war to peace and from combat to ballot box, draws many parallels 
with the KLA. Just like with the KLA, the NLA veterans were able to benefit from the war legacy 
for many years after the conflict. In doing so, they assembled around the DUI party, thus 
becoming the most voted party among ethnic Albanians in FYR Macedonia since 2001 to date.  
As explained in the historical background chapter, the armed conflict in 2001 between the 
NLA and the Macedonian army was relatively minor and short-lived. The result that came at 
the end of it was the Ohrid Framework Agreement, signed by the parties in 2001 (Risteska 
and Daskalovski 2011). For the ethnic Albanian community, the NLA was viewed to be the 
motor that spearheaded developments in FYR Macedonia and broke the unequal political lull 
existing between the Macedonian and ethnic Albanian parties in governing coalitions. For 
them, the coalition was an unfair and unequal arrangement that offered Albanian parties a 
symbolic role in government in return for very little for their community at large. Their 
grievances went unaddressed, and the question of the status quo that maintained a de facto 
second-class citizen status for ethnic Albanians, was silently stifled (FMC 06). 
 
The armed conflict shook everything up and demanded a resolution for this status quo. The 
Ohrid Agreement that brought the conflict to an end was generally seen as a good and 
beneficial result for the ethnic Albanian community. As a result, the NLA were to be thanked 
for this, first and foremost. The NLA combatants and its leadership were regarded as heroes 
and gained massive popularity. The war aura about their contribution in the conflict has 
accompanied their political lives since then, catapulting them onto the forefront of 
Macedonian politics ever since. Whilst today this aura does not shine as brightly as it used to, 
the political successors of the NLA armed group continue to enjoy a relatively large support 
from the ethnic Albanian electorate.  
 
Before the conflict erupted, the main political parties that represented the ethnic Albanian 
community were the Party for Democratic Prosperity and the Democratic Party of Albanians. 
The leaders of both parties were signatories of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. What is 
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unique about this Agreement is that, unlike the practice with most peace agreements, OFA 
was not signed by the parties of the conflict, i.e. the NLA representatives and the Macedonian 
army. Instead, it was signed only by parliamentary parties while its key content began to be 
implemented through constitutional reform rather than coming into force directly (Ruffer 
2017). However, despite the above parties being signatories to the peace agreement, the NLA 
was viewed as the actual force that did the hard labour which led to the agreement in the 
first place.  
 
As part of the OFA package was the demobilisation and reintegration of NLA combatants. 
However, in view of the increased popularity of the rebel group, its leader Ali Ahmeti and his 
friends decided to create their own political party called the Democratic Union of Albanians 
(DUI). Certainly, cashing in on the gained popularity was one reason. However, just like with 
the KLA, this was also a question of “organizational survival” and “collective incentive 
strategy” (Manning 2004, p. 66). Disbanding altogether and returning to private lives, and 
then letting the other Albanian parties take over the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement 
seemed counterintuitive, and self-defeatist. In fact, ceasing activities altogether after the 
conflict would have been tantamount to giving up on struggle for their community’s rights in 
FYR Macedonia. Besides, what was the point of having fought in the first place? (ACA 07). 
These were some of the internal deliberations of the NLA leadership leading to their decision 
to turn to politics. In hindsight, it seemed like the normal course of action following the armed 
conflict.   
 
The “war image” (ACA 02) has served DUI well in more than fifteen years of its existence. 
Having this advantage vis-à-vis the other Albanian parties enabled DUI to almost wipe out any 
competition and claim a sort of monopoly over the ethnic Albanian electorate. In addition to 
the advantage of this war legacy, DUI was able to harness its regional and local network as 
well as their networks of family and friends. Their war record also equipped them with the 
credibility that they are loyal to the “cause”. Officially the “cause” was to gain equal rights for 
ethnic Albanians within a democratic and multi-ethnic FYR Macedonia. Indeed, during the 
conflict the NLA had sent communique no. 6 which emphasised that their “objective was jot 
the separation of the country but greater rights for ethnic Albanians in Macedonia” (FMC 06). 
However, for some DUI still harbours ideals to unite Albanian-inhabited territories to Kosovo 
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and/or Albania. Of course, this is pure speculation since DUI is very much involved in political 
processes in FYR Macedonia. However, the nationalistic past of its leadership, be it when they 
fought in NLA or prior to that in the Illegality movement, still makes some doubt DUI’s true 
intentions. “Does DUI belong to the state? How do they see the (Macedonian) state? What 
sort of flag do they have in their cabinet? In their party HQ you see US, EU, Albanian flags, but 
you do not see a Macedonian flag?” (CSO 01). The question of loyalty, therefore, has served 
DUI as a double-edged sword: while for Macedonians their political aims may be viewed with 
some suspicion, it has served them to harness support from the Albanian side precisely they 
are viewed as a nationalist party. 
 
4.1.2 Push-pull factors influencing entry into politics, and impacts of entry into politics on post-war 
opportunities 
Since its establishment DUI was very successful in positioning itself as the war-wing party, 
managing to hold the monopoly of the Albanian vote for more than fifteen years now, and 
playing the king-maker of all coalition governments since 2001 (bar the period 2004-07). “The 
image of the war hero”, ACA 02 states, continues to give this party the political advantage 
which galvanizes the ethnic Albanians into showing their support for it. However, their 
contribution into bettering the socio-economic conditions of the people they seek to 
represent, has been meagre. More than anything else, this party has managed to cement 
itself into a power-sharing arrangement with the Macedonian coalition party, also known as 
“tender-coalition”, which divides government grants and tenders in accordance with party 
and individual interests of the few (ACA 02). 
 
The interviewee makes another pertinent point when she sets to critically examine the DDR, 
qualifying it as a process that should involve the public at large, and if it doesn’t, then it is an 
elite-driven agreement between a few people, thereby failing to trickle down to the society 
at large. Such was the DDR process in FYR Macedonia, according to her, for the coalition is a 
“marriage of interest” between DUI and VMRO-DPMNE, struck for pragmatic purposes aimed 
at benefiting their inner circles. We cannot talk convincingly of a consolidated democracy so 
long as there has not been a comprehensive and just peace (ACA 02). 
Ahmeti is an unchallenged leader since 2002. He never took any state position, except being MP. 
However, he prefers to stay away from the parliament and to communicate directly with the prime 
minister (as a rule, he is ethnic Macedonian), and with the electorate through the media. Interestingly, 
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so far, in 14 years he is never heard to speak Macedonian and has given just couple of interviews for 
the Macedonian media/to Macedonian journalists. Most of his political and diplomatic activity is run 
directly from DUI’s HQ. Negotiations with the Macedonian counterpart in the government often take 
place out of the formal institutions, and in times of crisis through mediation of the international 
community’s representatives. Rhetoric on both sides, especially during electoral campaigns, resembles 
war by words and hate speech (ACA 02).    
 
Again, we see political representatives (in this instance, DUI’s leader) utilising informal links 
with the Prime Minister, his party colleagues or his electorate, as a way of fighting off 
opposition. Instead of setting an example of how formal structures should be respected, Mr 
Ahmeti relies of the personal contacts with the above to maintain stability as well as 
monopoly of the electorate.    
Regress in democratic consolidation was the war/violent conflict per se. In 2001 - according to my 
opinion - there was no genuine internal conflict potential to lead towards violence. It was induced 
intentionally in order to serve as “catalyst” for faster political change and advancement of collective 
rights of ethnic Albanians. Having in mind that DPA had already been a coalition partner and many 
issues on improvement of collective/minority rights had been opened, the use of force was gross 
setback for the democratization and consolidation process. It took many years to recover from the war 
trauma, let alone human casualties and other war related costs. Since 2001 the political system 
transformed into a hybrid power-sharing (bi-national) system that often has nothing to do with 
democracy but represents cartel of ethnic elites that run the country in accordance to their narrow and 
lucrative interests. Conflict past has been always used during the electoral campaign and provocation 
of interethnic incidents (ACA 02).   
 
The war itself served as a “catalyst” for faster political change and advancement of the rights 
of Albanians in FYR Macedonia. Simultaneously, the war represented regress to the 
democratic consolidation of the country, because it took several years for society to address 
issues of war trauma. Since then, far from being a truly inclusive and representative 
democracy, the political system has morphed into a “hybrid power-sharing and bi-national 
system”, or into a two-tiered, bi-ethnic system in which the two parties are in charge of their 
respective ethnic communities. The system, as a result, produces a parallel system of 
governance in which the coalition partners take care of their own insulated interests which 
serves “the cartel”. It is a stable system, in a way, so long as the two coalition partners have 
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an internal agreement on their respective spheres of influence which coincide pretty much 
with ethnic lines of division (ACA 02).  
4.2. Nature and duration of state capture by former combatants 
This second section of the FYR Macedonia sub-chapter focuses on the post-political inclusion 
phase of the combatants, zooming in on the impact they have had on democratisation 
processes in the country. Similar to the Kosovo narrative, FYR Macedonia also experienced 
change of political elites within the ethnic Albanian community, comprised of NLA veterans, 
their families and friends. This part will examine the rising ethnic Albanian nouveau riche in 
the country and will dissect the nature of relations between politicians and voters, underlining 
the patron versus client rapport within the Albanian community but also in the wider 
Macedonian political scene. The specific aspect of clientelism in the Macedonian context is 
applied against a facet of a power-sharing arrangement between Macedonian and Albanian 
political parties respectively, which will also be explored below.   
 
4.2.1 The rise of the new masters 
Without socially just integration of former combatants and full disarmament, even more - without just 
peace, trials for war criminals and reconciliation in the society and between the former enemies - 
democracy is but a distant illusion. The “marriage of interest” between DUI and VMRO-DPMNE 
(previously SDSM) has been only a pragmatic agreement necessary to stay in power while the rest of 
the society has never been involved in the process and lives in parallel worlds (ACA 02) 
 
The NLA combatants represented the underdogs of the ethnic Albanian society. In FYR 
Macedonia, the ethnic Albanian parties that had represented their community from the 
country’s independence right to 2001 when the armed conflict erupted were mainly members 
of intelligentsia and from urban areas. Based on the facts on the ground, it is not an 
exaggeration to claim that alongside the conflict against Macedonian forces, the NLA and its 
successor party DUI waged a tug war against the existing ethnic Albanian political elite of the 
country. As stated in the empirical overview chapter, between independence and 2001 FYR 
Macedonia was governed by a majority Macedonian coalition party and a junior Albanian one. 
The Party of Democratic Prosperity and the Democratic Party of Albanians respectively had 
taken turns at being in these coalition governments. According to the leadership of these 
parties, they had done the utmost to promote the ethnic Albanian interests in the country. 
Although no one could claim they were happy with the progress made, there were discernible 
achievements for this community and, more importantly, the ethnic Albanian parties 
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continued to operate within decision-making bodies of state institutions, as opposed to 
outside of them (Xhaferi 2017a; Xhaferi 2017b).   
 
However, the rebel group begged to differ. Their position was that the incumbent Albanian 
political elite had not been sufficiently emphatic at demanding full constitutional rights for 
ethnic Albanians. They were deemed to be pushovers or even worse, sell-outs of the “national 
cause”, which was a euphemistic way of calling them traitors. That is why alongside the 
struggle against Macedonian forces the NLA needed to overthrow the existing Albanian 
political class in the country. This they did quite successfully by stressing that unlike them, the 
NLA leadership possessed a war legacy and by galvanising the Albanian community’s 
nationalist feelings, which were running high after the conflict. Just like in Kosovo, this was an 
opportunistic strategy at forcing the Macedonian state onto the negotiating table, while 
simultaneously pushing the rival Albanian parties out of the equation in future elections 
because the latter had been too soft in demanding equal rights. “Without DUI’s commitment 
to the Ohrid Agreement it would have been difficult to fully disband the NLA, to persuade 
armed groups to give up arms and violence and to restore police and army control over the 
entire territory of the country in the short time period that it took” (ACA 03). After the Ohrid 
agreement, the two existing Albanian parties offered to integrate Ali Ahmeti and his NLA 
friends into their structures, but Ahmeti refused to be “under their shadow” (ACA 04). This 
tactic is similar to that employed by the KLA leadership in Kosovo: why would they agree to 
be co-opted into existing party structures when they could create their own parties and 
dominate the political scene? Why share power by being merged with existing structures 
when one can keep power for themselves?   
 
It was time for those activists of the Illegality movement (LPK) who had operated clandestinely 
from abroad for many years, gearing support for Kosovo as well as for Albanians in FYR 
Macedonia, to return home and enter mainstream politics. As a result, DUI became the most 
voted Albanian party in the country, and still have “no viable alternative. It continues to 
explore the role of the NLA’s historical win, as they see it. The Ohrid Framework Agreement 
is their trophy” (ACA 04). 
 
 198 
 
It should not be misunderstood, however, that this changeover of political classes, this rise of 
the war-related nouveau riche, was somehow undertaken undemocratically. In fact, the rise 
of DUI, and with it of its network of allies and friends, was a result of it being the most voted 
party among ethnic Albanians in all elections post-2001. Besides, “without the inclusion of 
DUI and Ahmeti, Macedonian democracy would certainly have been less representative, as 
they represent the interests of a large share of the ethnic Albanian community in the country” 
(ACA 03).  
   
For others, however, the rise of the new political elite was very much a top-down imposition 
even within NLA ranks, which left aside a lot of “ordinary soldiers”. This is because the 
reintegration and political transformation from NLA to DUI did not apply to everyone equally. 
In fact, integration and transformation were another name for providing opportunities as a 
kind of “privilege for the NLA top bras” (ACA 02). The “ordinary soldiers” often suffered the 
fate of having to return home with not much to show, or in the best-case scenario, of serving 
as instruments in the clientelistic web for those “top bras” turned decision-makers in politics 
or security structures (ACA 02).   
 
This is supported by claims by another respondent, ACA 07, who considers that the objectives 
of the NLA leadership’s fight were not as pure as stated. Their “propagated goals have been 
nationalistic but if we look at the social origins and the current trajectories of the leaders 
turned into politicians, the picture is more nuanced and shows they have also fought for 
status, power, wealth and prestige” (ACA 07). The war-related nouveau riche is therefore a 
result of democratically elected political elites who achieved “status, power, wealth and 
prestige” by pushing rivals out of the game through the installation of a clientelistic system of 
manipulation and predation, as will be seen below.    
   
4.2.2 Client-patron relationship 
The tacit institutionalization of corruption within the hierarchy of the state apparatus – for example 
through below subsistence civil service wages or the purchase of decision making positions – is a 
powerful means for rulers to retain the allegiance over its individual members and organizations by 
providing both an inescapable economic incentive (access to rents/bribes) and a disciplinary threat 
(dismissal for corruption). Finally, political corruption provides rulers with a means to channel funds 
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outside through a parallel budget used for political purposes, such as patronage or electoral 
campaigning – thereby often sustaining a stable – if not just – political order (Le Billon 2001, p. 3) 
 
The evidence from the interview data and literature suggests that the entrance of combatants 
in politics was generally good for democracy. It helped diversify the political space and 
increased the range of offers for the electorate. Their political transformation was positive 
for NLA combatants because they managed to find a new objective after the war, but it was 
also good for their electorate as they had a voice in politics through war veterans. However, 
the evidence also suggests that in the long-run this political transformation was blighted by 
corruption, clientelist practices and the penetration of informal politics in formal institutional 
conduct (Gromes 2009; Günay and Dzihic 2016; Keil 2018).   
 
Today FYR Macedonia is a young democracy run by a coalition government comprised of a 
Macedonian and an Albanian party. However, there are strong indications that the 
“clientelistic networks” as described by Hicken (2011) are very much alive across the political 
spectrum and especially within the ethnic Albanian electorate. CSO 06 explains that the NLA’s 
approach to mobilising its electoral base was similar to that employed by the KLA after the 
war. Namely, once conflict was over those soldiers who were part of the NLA became “votes, 
campaign and instruments to enhance power” (CSO 06). DUI as a successor party to the NLA 
was careful to nourish relations with its veteran base and their circle of families and friends. 
Since they gained almost complete monopoly of the ethnic Albanian vote in FYR Macedonia, 
they started to practice a method of consolidating its power base by offering jobs and 
resources to key people and areas, a method which is akin to clientelism.   
(…) additional means of maintaining political legitimacy among the electorate are essential for getting 
re-elected at every election after the end of the conflict in 2001, as the DUI and Ahmeti have done. 
Therefore, patronage and maintenance of clientelistic networks are crucial for remaining in power, 
though this is a general hallmark of Macedonian politics, not endemic to political leaders with 
combatant background (ACA 03) 
 
Through the above quote respondent ACA 03 acknowledges that the political system suffers 
from patronage and clientelist networks, and that democracy is still to be consolidated in FYR 
Macedonia. However, there is nothing to suggest that such damaging traits are more evident 
in parties representing former combatants. It is rather a “general hallmark of Macedonian 
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politics.” The example of the Albanian community, however, represents a case of the 
ethnicization of political issues for the benefit of the DUI party. Through every election cycle 
the instrumentalization of ethnicity becomes the norm of political discourse. The “ethnic 
card” enters daily political rhetoric, supported by references to the conflict past and the role 
that the NLA and the DUI leadership had in it. The war credentials certainly help them have 
legitimacy among their electorate. “Because of such credentials, they are in a position to pre-
empt serious popular discontent, which is stifled or addressed by distributing jobs, contracts 
or resources” (CSO 06).  
   
It seems that winning elections and maintaining those wins is achieved through two separate 
methods. To win elections the war wing parties such as DUI refer to their war legacy and the 
patriotic credentials. These references have helped, for instance, the DUI leader, Ali Ahmeti, 
to maintain leadership since 2001. “They have won all post-2001 elections and have been 
members of all but one post-2001 government. So the electorate must be happy with how 
the party performed in office and how well DUI represented their interest at the national 
level” (FMC 06). However, in order to maintain power, and at the lack of a genuine and 
tangible offer for the electorate, feeding the clientelistic network becomes a necessity. 
Patronage and distribution of jobs and services becomes crucial for remaining in power.  
 
4.2.3 The intricacies of a power-sharing agreement 
Since independence the Macedonian government in each of its mandates was formed based 
on a power-sharing arrangement, according to which there is a senior Macedonian party and 
a junior Albanian one. Since 2001 DUI has been that junior party in all mandates except one, 
regardless of which Macedonian party was in power. But how does this power-sharing 
coalition government really work in practice?   
 
Firstly, for a party that fought the establishment, it is impressive to see how committed the 
successor NLA party has become to the power-sharing arrangements. They have even 
become more committed to the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement than 
the other Albanian parties. For instance, the Democratic Party of Albanians “has frequently 
asked for a new agreement to replace the Ohrid Agreement, something that Ahmeti has never 
done” (ACA 03). It is therefore quite impressive to see the transformation of a party’s 
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leadership from leading an insurgency in a state to becoming a staunch guardian of that same 
state. However, this enthusiasm for the state and its institutions cannot fully be explained 
without considering the power-sharing arrangements and the stake of the Albanian junior 
partner (DUI) in it.  
 
The spirit of the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OSCE 2001) promotes a power-sharing 
arrangement which ensures non-discrimination and equitable representation of all 
communities concerned. The international community was called upon to facilitate, monitor 
and assist in the implementation of the Agreement’s provisions which, among others, stated, 
Taking into account i.a. the recommendations of the already established governmental commission, 
the parties will take concrete action to increase the representation of members of communities not in 
the majority in Macedonia in public administration, the military, and public enterprises, as well as to 
improve their access to public financing for business development (OSCE 2011, p. 12). 
 
However, in practice, the power-sharing arrangements seem more like a feudal-like parcelling 
of political space according to ethnic affiliation of the electorate. “Each look within their 
territory of operation, gaining and maintaining their political influence among their 
communities and voters” (CSO 06).  
 
When asked about this issue most of my respondents answered rather cynically, stating that 
the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement has taken the form of everyone taking care of 
their own turf: while Slavic Macedonians go about the business of consolidating the state, 
ethnic Albanians are left under the management of their own parties, willing to distribute 
riches as needed. In that sense, the Macedonian state still resembles a company that 
outsources or subcontracts certain tasks and responsibilities to a smaller company. The Prime 
Minister delegates to his junior partner – the ethnic Albanian DUI - a modest share of the 
budget and jobs, not national policy or governance tasks.  
Limited access to state resources hampers DUI’s ability to deliver services to the fourteen municipalities 
it runs. Jobs that can reward loyalists are mostly non-managerial in the public sector, some existing only 
on paper. They pay a salary but reinforce the message that ethnic Albanians have little role in governing 
(ICG Report 2015, p. 8).  
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The political system in FYR Macedonia has been called ‘Sultanism’ by which one tries to 
denote organizationally weak political parties that are led by corrupt, authoritarian bosses 
(Hislope 2005). Once in power, these bosses treat state assets as their own fiefdoms that are 
to be divided among coalition partners as one would divide spoils. 
 
The way each of the coalition governments has functioned is by dividing the pie along ethnic 
lines while viewing politics as a business interest and opportunity. For example, the senior 
coalition partners, ie. the Macedonian party, is allowed a free reign over general national 
matters, foreign policy, state capital, state security, etc. The Albanian junior party, ie. DUI, is 
given a free hand to manage and allocate resources over the predominantly Albanian 
municipalities in the western and southwestern part of the country, and in Albanian 
neighbourhoods such as north of Skopje. With such a degree of governing autonomy the 
parties are given their respective percentage of the state budget for them to manage and 
utilise accordingly. The unspoken rule is neither intervenes in the “internal” business of the 
other, making this the practice of each coalition government is FYR Macedonia. For some, this 
adds a dualist component into Macedonian government, seeing as there is an arrangement 
of “two ethnically-based governments” that work in silos with one another (ACA 07). Authors 
have even noted that the implementation power-sharing arrangements is used for ethnic 
political engineering and gerrymandering by ethnically-aligned political parties (Stewart 
2019). 
 
In this “politically and ethnically divided society”, DUI’s approach is very much elitist, whereby 
a pronounced role is given to the leader, Ali Ahmeti, and his inner circle of friends. To maintain 
popular support, populist propaganda and the ethnicization of political issues, including the 
implementation of the Ohrid agreement, is regularly employed.  
This approach, which is largely identical to the approach of the coalition partner, is not attached to the 
realization of the objectives associated with the acceleration of democratisation processes and 
economic prosperity. Apart from participation in government, DUI’s main objective is the attractive 
management positions in the organs and institutions of the state (ACA 06).  
 
There is also a strong case to make for the politicisation of public administration. The 
clientelist web ensures that in exchange for votes, people who supported DUI get rewarded 
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with posts in public administration. “And do not forget that family members who work there, 
they are also expected to make sure that their entire family and friends vote for them. This 
creates a powerful structure which is difficult to disengage” (CSO 01). When this dyadic 
relationship between clients and patrons becomes so co-dependent, it is hard to even break 
the bond. Ironically, this ensures the implementation of a power-sharing arrangement, but 
one which is based on informal needs, and immediate and clientelistic opportunities of the 
few, as opposed to the consolidation of the state and its formal institutions.      
Every time elections come, there is a national sport to make a big question, ethnicize it and make it a 
big deal. For example, we will now have elections in April ’16, and all of a sudden DUI is talking about 
establishing a University in Skopje for ethnic Albanians. It is important, but people are saying, is this the 
best you can offer us. These are just cheap nationalistic injections (CSO 01). 
 
5. Conclusion: Synthesis of the two case studies 
Democratization has formed the cornerstone of most peace settlements in this period of “liberal 
peacebuilding” (…) Liberal peacebuilding presumes that armed opposition groups will lay down their 
weapons and replace violent conflict with political competition. To what extent have armed opposition 
groups embraced this model? (Manning and Smith 2016, p. 972) 
 
This conclusion represents a synthesised summary of the two case studies. It identifies the 
main commonalities from Kosovo and FYR Macedonia which feed into the emerging theory. 
By way of mirroring the structural breakdown from the Methods chapter diagrams, the 
conclusion will initially delve into the first stage of the combatants’ post-conflict evolution, 
which is the act of their transformation into political actors. The second part of the conclusion 
will then examine the impact of this transformation for the state institutions and its 
democratic consolidation. The emerging theory, built on the findings from a field-based 
inductive approach, will be elaborated in the end.  
5.1 The integration and political transformation of former combatants  
At the end of their respective conflicts, both intra-state armed groups – the KLA and the NLA 
– underwent a process of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration. In Kosovo the DDR 
process was much more comprehensive and all-encompassing, driven forward by NATO and 
UNMIK international administrators. Since in the post-conflict era the security space was to 
be occupied by NATO, the DDR process was a top-down imposition to ensure that there would 
be no overlap of security mechanisms. In FYR Macedonia, the NLA underwent a similar 
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demobilisation process while its combatants were spared legal prosecution thanks to the 
amnesty law. A symbolic number of them were integrated into security structures, mainly in 
police services.  
 
However, while both armed groups experienced similar processes of demobilisation, the 
context in which these processes happened was quite different. In Kosovo, the KLA was 
transformed into a quasi-military, civilian organisation called Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), 
allowing for a large percentage of combatants of its predecessor to be transferred there. 
Demographically, Kosovo was and is predominantly ethnic Albanian, meaning that after the 
withdrawal of Serbian forces in 1999 there were no other local security mechanisms in the 
country. While the NATO-led Force was mandated with peacekeeping and ensuring the safety 
of Kosovo borders, the local security mechanisms such as the KPC, the Police, intelligence 
services etc. had to be created from scratch. The KLA combatants had a role to play in all of 
them not only by filling most of their positions but also by occupying most decision-making 
posts.  
 
In FYR Macedonia, ethnic Albanians number 25% to 30% of the overall population. Following 
the 2001 conflict, its existing security mechanisms had to undergo slight reforms in order to 
mirror the inclusive spirit of the Ohrid Framework Agreement and to offer more space to 
representatives of the ethnic Albanian community. Therefore, while in Kosovo the former 
combatants of the armed group had almost complete freedom in creating security 
mechanisms from scratch, in FYR Macedonia this was more of an opt-in exercise in already-
existing institutions.       
 
This says a lot about the upcoming internal power relations in the two countries. The context 
in which both processes of demobilisation happened was an early indication of how the post-
war politics would shape up to be. What transpired soon after the conflict was that senior 
members of the now-defunct internal armed groups were not content occupying functions in 
security institutions, functions which were largely symbolic. For those more ambitious to 
extend their influence beyond the war, integration into security institutions was tantamount 
to a containment measure. The police and soldier uniforms proved to be too tight a constraint 
which would only curtail their ambitions for power. That is why the armed groups’ decision-
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makers quickly turned to politics, forming their own political parties and exchanging bullets 
for ballots (Ishiyama 2016). In Kosovo, two war wing parties were created soon after the war 
– PDK and AAK – followed by a third one in 2014 – Nisma. In FYR Macedonia, the head of the 
NLA became leader of the DUI party, formed soon after the conflict ended there in 2001. To 
this date, in the subsequent rounds of democratic elections held in both countries, the above 
parties have managed to attract an impressive percentage of votes, placing them first on in 
the top three most voted parties in their countries.   
 
The emergence of war wing parties changed the political scene once and for all. In Kosovo, 
the upper hand which the KLA had acquired during the war, was extended in times of peace 
through the parties that emerged from the army’s ashes. Suddenly, Kosovo’s political scene 
was crowded with new arrivals that shook up the hitherto established political establishment. 
The LDK, the long-time rivals, were pushed aside and, although they continue to be one of 
the biggest parties in Kosovo, never managed to recover the popularity enjoyed during the 
1990s. As a result, since 1999 there has been no government that has not had one of the “war 
wing” parties in coalition. Currently, all three of them head a grand coalition, with their 
leaders – former and current – occupying the posts of the President, Assembly Speaker and 
Prime Minister respectively.  
 
In FYR Macedonia, DUI erupted victorious from the conflict, managing to just about wipe out 
the existing Albanian parties from the scene. Although their share of the overall vote has 
dwindled a little over the years, they continue to be the most voted party among the ethnic 
Albanian electorate. They, too, have been part of each coalition government since 2001 
(except one) and, although a junior member in these coalitions, they have exerted a 
considerable weight on decision-making processes. Two of the latest examples that are likely 
going to shape the country’s future for decades to come could not have happened without 
DUI’s and, by extension, the Albanian electorate’s vote: the ratification of the Prespa 
Agreement on the country’s name, and the election of the pro-Western Stevo Pendarovski 
for President of the country on 6 May 2019 (The Guardian 2019b). DUI is the king-maker not 
just of coalition governments but also of the formation and implementation of long-term 
consequential national policies.        
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This certainly was not just an impressive transformation of the armed groups into political 
actors, but a successful project on their part in galvanising electoral support which brought 
them to power. But what counts for the success of these parties in the political scene? To 
what do they owe this degree of popularity? Kovacs and Hatz (2016) note that, among other 
factors, the timing of their political transformation is of the essence.   
 The viability of rebel groups to transform into political parties increases when the group’s leadership is 
 united in their decision to abandon the armed struggle and enter peaceful politics, when the rebel 
 group enjoys a relatively high level of support among the population, and when international actors 
 recognize the armed group as a legitimate political actor (Kovacs and Hatz 2016, p. 992). 
 
In addition, the end of the Cold War and the “subsequent onset of the so-called liberal 
peacebuilding era”, was accompanied with a reinvigorated emphasis on “democracy 
strengthening in post-war societies as an integral part of peacebuilding processes and peace 
agreements. The transformation and inclusion of former combatants into politics was part of 
this change” (Kovacs and Hatz 2016, p. 993). 
 
In Kosovo and FYR Macedonia, one of the underlying factors of their success was certainly the 
so-called persistence of war experiences and relationships. This comes out clearly and loudly 
from the field. And yes, almost two decades after the conflicts, these parties remain 
controlled by war veterans. Over the years, a lot of new blood, new ideas and talent has been 
infused in them. They have even maintained an open-door policy to new arrivals. An 
increasingly large share of senior leadership posts, especially in the PDK in Kosovo and DUI in 
FYR Macedonia come from post-war generations (Assembly of Kosovo 2019; DUI 2019). This 
certainly speaks to their propensity for diversification and growth. However, at the helm of 
all these parties, supported by a network of likeminded brothers in arms (metaphorically and 
literally speaking) sit the same people who were in commanding positions during the war. In 
fact, these parties would most likely face near-extinction if the army veterans in control of 
them would suddenly go home. Therefore, it is the war legacy, the war credentials, and the 
respect that they still enjoy among certain strata of society, that explain their popularity to a 
considerable degree.  
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Coupled with the war legacy, and closely interwoven with it, are the personal and 
organisational relations as well as the camaraderie and loyalty forged in the times of war and 
even before it. In Kosovo, the KLA was created through a trust-based network of very close 
friends and family members who shared the same ideals (fighting the Serbian occupation, 
freedom and independence, even secession and unification with Albania). They usually had 
the same background (they came from rural and impoverished areas, their families might 
have served as a nest of resistance for generations, they might have been traditionally 
persecuted etc.). Similarly, in FYR Macedonia a lot of NLA combatants came from families who 
had traditionally been fiercely patriotic and who were not integrated in the new Macedonian 
society. In addition, the NLA had the benefit of the knowhow, the arsenal and a considerable 
number of demobilised KLA combatants who were looking for a way to reengage in combat. 
The latter joined the NLA for reasons which were purely patriotic, as they saw it, i.e. to lend 
a hand to their brethren in FYR Macedonia, but also for more prosaic and selfish reasons, such 
as to engage in another adventure. That is how their relations deepened and widened. As 
regards the more senior, decision-making figures of the resistance in either side of the border, 
most of them came from the LPK and similar related cells of the illegal resistance. In the 1980s 
they had subscribed to an ideology of Marxism-Leninism primarily because they viewed 
Albania that was communist at the time as the mother nation. But more than an ideology 
they subscribed to a straightforward nationalist ideal that sought to fight for the liberation of 
Albanian lands, as they saw it, and their unification with Albania.  
 
It should also be recalled that the post-war period did not offer many opportunities for 
integration or economic betterment. Kosovo’s economy was completely ruined and, together 
with the political institutions, it had to be rebuilt from scratch. FYR Macedonia’s economy was 
in a slightly better position, although the conflict had set it back. For the ethnic Albanian 
community, however, the opportunities for progress were very limited. Given these 
circumstances, one of the immediate challenges for combatants in the post-conflict 
environment was the prospect for a successful integration in the country’s structures. Would 
their country be able to provide for them, take care of them? Who would do that? Could they 
trust their fate to the state structures, i.e. to those against whom they had fought, like in FYR 
Macedonia? Or to those Albanian political parties who had opposed their emergence, had 
criticised them, had even called them traitors? Could they trust the LDK in Kosovo, or PDSh in 
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FYR Macedonia, to be guardians of their fate? The answer, understandably, was an 
unequivocal no. In addition, the conflict had generated a de facto separate electoral base that 
expressed an unswerving loyalty to the armed groups and their representatives. This was a 
loyalty- and camaraderie-based network of comrade-in-arms, friends, family and tribe 
relations that already saw the armed combatants as their future political leaders. It is 
therefore safe to say that the decision of former combatants to turn to politics was driven by 
two opposite factors: it was a bottom-up request for accountability, whereby people in the 
ground saw them and wanted them to be the political representatives. It was also a top-down 
drive according to which, after the conflict, former armed leaders needed to reinvent 
themselves to have a role to play, lest they would be forgotten or side-lined.     
 
Therefore, in such conditions, politics came to be viewed as a career opportunity and 
development. The armed group leaders considered they had a political mission, which was 
first and foremost, to take care of their electoral base and, secondly, to ensure their own 
imprint on their countries’ future political path. That is how politics began to be viewed as a 
career path and an asset for professional development. If seen from their point of view, the 
decision to transform politically makes complete sense. Viewed from a grounded theory- 
perspective, as one of the interviewees (FMC 02) conferred to me, they had paid the ultimate 
sacrifice by going to war. And yet, they were the ones who were left with nothing, exhausted 
and bereft, and there was no one willing to take care of them when war finished (FMC 02). It 
was also out of a sense of sacrifice and duty that they would step forward and take charge of 
their electorate’s political future and, possibly, the future of their countries. In Kosovo, the 
LDK as the KLA’s traditional rival was a completely different political construct. Their 
leadership base had always been much better off, before and after the war, more urban, more 
integrated, “more rested” to take charge of the country after the war (FMC 02). In FYR 
Macedonia, by the time conflict was over an irreparable gulf had already been created 
between the NLA leaders and the existing Albanian parties, primarily because of the latter’s 
refusal to acknowledge them as a rising factor on the political scene. Therefore, in hindsight, 
it seems normal, inevitable even, that the war-wing parties such as the PDK and AAK in Kosovo 
and DUI in FYR Macedonia should have been created.  
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Their political transformation was just as much inevitable because of the dangers of the 
spoiler effect if they were left out. There were plenty of interviewees, former combatants and 
otherwise, who emphasized unequivocally the real risk of a post-conflict intra-Albanian civil 
war had they not been included in political processes (CSO 02; FMC 06; FMC 09). In Kosovo, 
the rivalry between LDK representatives and KLA combatants had flared up to that degree 
that accusations against each other about treason or collaboration with the enemy had 
become a common discourse. After the conflict it was unimaginable for KLA representatives 
to join LDK ranks. Likewise, in FYR Macedonia the incumbent Albanian parties were harshly 
critical of the NLA and its motives. As far as these parties were concerned, the NLA was 
unilaterally causing havoc on all those hard-won concessions for the Albanian community 
which they had fought for since Macedonian independence. For the NLA the prospect of 
joining an existing political structure and, moreover, yielding to the authority of those 
Albanian parties who had not fought and had even sabotaged their efforts along the way, was 
just as unimaginable.  
 
In the end, why would former combatants have joined existing parties, regardless if it was 
Kosovo or FYR Macedonia? Why would they have succumbed to their rivals’ authority when 
they could create their own parties, and their own party base. This was, essentially, a power 
play between different political forces, resulting in the abrupt eruption onto the political 
scene by former combatants. Interestingly, the international community was very supportive 
of the combatants’ switch to politics, too. Their closest local interlocutors after the war 
became the war-wing parties. In Kosovo, even while the PDK or the AAK were in opposition, 
figures like Thaçi or Haradinaj were consulted on all matters related to state- and institution-
building. In FYR Macedonia, DUI was consulted from the very start on all steps related to the 
implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. This approach of the international 
community was driven by a pragmatic logic. For actors such as the EU, Western embassies, or 
NATO, stability was paramount in the immediate post-conflict environment. Rather than 
isolate the former combatants and risk causing social upheavals triggered by their supporters, 
their approach was meant to contain them while making them part of political decision-
making. Some authors have criticised this approach which they consider to be a kind of 
appeasement because they claim the former combatants have benefited undeservedly from 
this preferential treatment. In fact, they have been rewarded with political inclusion in return 
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for not threatening to spoil the fragile peace. This focus on stability, or “stabilitocracy” 
(BIEPAG 2017; Bieber 2018), has come at a high price: the international community has 
continued supporting war-wing parties even when there has been substantiated evidence of 
the latter’s involvement in corruption and crime. Instead of supporting other political forces 
needing a push, so goes the argument, they have extended their support to the 
“commanders” for far too long, contributing to the stagnation of the democratic progress 
(BIEPAG 2017).             
Following their leap onto politics after the conflict, the war-wing parties succumbed 
themselves to the will of the people through the ballot box. In free and fair elections, they 
consistently managed to get a large share of the electorate’s vote, be it in Kosovo or in FYR 
Macedonia. However, these parties did not have clearly-articulated political programmes, 
especially in the first years after the conflict. So how come so many people voted for them, 
and how come they still do?  
 
One of the main factors for this, as has transpired from the interviews, is attributed to the 
war legacy that they enjoyed, and the personal, organisational relations that they forged 
during the war. For a large part of the electorate, the question as to whom to give the vote to 
has been clear: it was a choice between war heroes, liberators, or those party representatives 
who stood idly by as the liberators were prepared for the ultimate sacrifice for the future of 
their people. That was their choice. Their decision to vote for former combatants turned 
politicians, although often not based on ideology or party platform but legacy, was still a 
decision. At this stage, the question as to whether this is fair, i.e. that leaders or parties should 
be elected not based on clear party platform but on elusive ideals and principles of the past, 
is beside the point. It is irrelevant. What is important, and true, is that in competitive elections 
they are voted, and the votes, regardless of the motives behind them, ought to be respected. 
This is a basic tenet of democracy. The follow-up question, though, which points to the crux 
of this thesis and which emerges naturally from the above synthesis, is what happens when 
politicians who come from armed groups enter politics. What is their impact on government 
quality and, by extension, on democracy and its quality? 
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5.2 Nature and duration of state capture by former combatants 
In general, literature shows consensus on the state and quality of democracy in Kosovo and 
FYR Macedonia. According to the latest Freedom House reports (2018; 2019a), both countries 
are ranked as partly free, which is slightly lower than the democratic progress in most 
Western Balkan countries (but considerably lower than those who have already joined the EU 
such as Croatia and Bulgaria). Freedom House ranks countries according to three categories: 
Free, Partly Free, and Not Free, and places an aggregate score for each of them (0 being least 
free, and 100 being most free). The following table provides a comparative snapshot of 
rankings of some Western Balkan countries, including the case studies, as featured in the 
latest Freedom House (2019b) data. 
Country Year Score and Category 
Kosovo 2018 54/100 Partly Free 
FYR Macedonia 2018 59/100 Partly Free 
Albania 2018 68/100 Partly Free 
Serbia  2018 67/100 Partly Free 
Montenegro 2018 65/100 Partly Free 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2018 53/100 Partly Free 
Croatia 2018 85/100 Free 
Bulgaria 2018 80/100 Free 
 
Source: Freedom House (2019b)  
As can be seen, both Kosovo and FYR Macedonia trail along a similar path of democratic 
development as, or just below, most other Western Balkan countries, i.e. those who have yet 
to join the EU.  Croatia and Bulgaria, as seen on the table, are already EU members and their 
democratic progress is much more advanced, on the Free category.  
 
The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) (2018) lists both Kosovo and FYR Macedonia in the 
categories of hybrid regimes and/or flawed democracies. EIU uses an aggregate score 
spectrum from 0 to 10.0. Within this spectrum, countries scoring between 8.0 to 10.0 classify 
as Full Democracies, between 6.0 to 7.99 classify as Flawed Democracies, between 4.0 to 5.99 
as Hybrid Regimes, and between 0 to 3.99 as Authoritarian Regimes (EIU 2018). Below are a 
snapshot of the data on the region from the EIU. 
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Country Year Score and Category 
Kosovo 2018 Between FYR Macedonia and Serbia 
FYR Macedonia 2018 5.87 Hybrid Regime 
Albania 2018 5.98 Hybrid Regime 
Serbia  2018 6.41 Flawed Democracy 
Montenegro 2018 5.74 Hybrid Regime 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2018 4.98 Hybrid Regime 
Croatia 2018 6.57 Flawed Democracy 
Bulgaria 2018 7.03 Flawed Democracy 
 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit (2018)  
The EIU portrays a similar picture of democratic performance in most non-EU Western Balkan 
countries. They oscillate between the upper and lower levels of the Hybrid Regime category. 
Serbia is the only one that scores as a Flawed Democracy in their index. Although the EIU does 
not have a separate score for Kosovo, it is safe to deduct that its performance on its own also 
ranks somewhere between FYR Macedonia’s and Serbia’s. For comparative reasons, Croatia 
and Bulgaria are added to show that they score higher than the average of the rest, ranked 
as Flawed Democracies. 
 
International IDEA (2019b) scores both Kosovo and FYR Macedonia as democracies but with 
mid-range performances in most of the attributes of its conceptual framework. International 
IDEA’s framework of democracy consists of five main attributes (Representative Government, 
Fundamental Rights, Checks on Government, Impartial Administration, and Participatory 
Engagement), and they score democratic performance between 0 and 1. Within this 
spectrum, countries scoring between 0.0 and 0.39 rank as Non-Democracies, those that score 
between 0.4 and 6.99 rank as Hybrid Regimes, and countries that score between 0.7 and 1.0 
score as Democracies (International IDEA 2019b). The table below will provide an overview 
of the performance of the following countries.      
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Country Year Score and Category 
Representative 
Government 
Fundamental 
Rights 
Checks on 
Government 
Impartial 
Administration 
Participatory 
Engagement19 
Kosovo 2018 0.53  
Mid-range 
0.49  
Mid-range 
0.51  
Mid-Range 
0.51  
Mid-Range 
Mid-range 
FYR 
Macedonia 
2018 0.64  
Mid-Range 
0.60  
Mid-Range 
0.54  
Mid-Range 
0.52  
Mid-Range 
Mid-range 
Albania 2018 0.62 
Mid-Range 
0.68 
Mid-Range 
0.59 
Mid-Range 
0.46 
Mid-Range 
Mid-range 
Serbia  2018 0.57 
Mid-Range 
0.59 
Mid-Range 
0.48 
Mid-Range 
0.45 
Mid-Range 
Mid-range 
Montenegro20 2018 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
2018 0.5 
Mid-Range 
0.62 
Mid-Range 
0.56 
Mid-Range 
0.43 
Mid-Range 
Mid-range 
Croatia 2018 0.75 
High 
0.63 
Mid-Range 
0.62 
Mid-Range 
0.54 
Mid-Range 
Mid-range 
Bulgaria 2018 0.68 
Mid-Range 
0.71 
High 
0.68 
Mid-Range 
0.53 
Mid-Range 
Mid-range 
 
Source: International IDEA (2019b) 
 
Although International IDEA does not provide for one single aggregate score on democracy 
but rather five scores across their respective attributes, the picture from the above table is 
quite telling. All the countries in the table classify as democracies, but most of them, including 
Kosovo and FYR Macedonia trail in the mid-range category of performance in all the 
attributes. Two countries that are clearly further ahead in their democratic trajectory are 
Croatia and Bulgaria, which score high on Representative Government and Fundamental 
Rights respectively. 
 
The above data was meant to offer an objective picture on the state of democracy and 
governability in Kosovo and FYR Macedonia, and to show how their performance rates in 
comparison with the Western Balkan region. In addition, authors have been cautioning of an 
emerging democratic crisis engulfing most Central and Eastern European countries in the last 
few years. There are indications of an illiberal rise of democracy, of authoritarian tendencies 
displayed by those in power, of a creeping democratic backsliding, or of incessant attacks – 
 
19 Participatory Engagement is not aggregated into one score. Hence, there is a note on the general category but 
there is no single score. 
20 International IDEA scores countries with 1 million inhabitants or more. Since Montenegro has around 700,000 
inhabitants, they were left out of the measurement data. 
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direct or subtle - on civil liberties and civic space (Mujanović 2018; Krastev 2018; Keil 2018; 
Bieber, Solska and Taleski 2019;). Kosovo and FYR Macedonia are certainly not immune to 
such challenges. In addition to these challenges they also suffer from a precarious majority 
versus minority ethnic balance which some authors argue may still lead to political crises in 
the future (Skendaj 2016; Prelec 2017).  
 
Having depicted the democratic landscape of the two case study countries, as well as the 
region, how can we assess the political impact of former combatants on democracy and 
institutions? How can we dissect the landscape of democracy, and the performance of 
government institutions, and judge what is attributable to former combatants turned 
politicians and political parties, and what is not? In other words, can we identify a clear cause 
and effect link between this group of politicians and the state of democracy in their countries, 
be it progress or regress? My grounded theory-inductive approach was instrumental in 
offering some answers to these questions, referring to the viewpoints obtained in my 
fieldwork and cross-referenced with secondary literature. 
 
As noted in the subsection above, entering politics for former combatants was essentially a 
power play fought between them on one hand and the old political elite on the other. To 
triumph in this power play, they needed to yield themselves to the ultimate means of a 
democratic system, which are elections and the ballot box. The empirical evidence suggests 
that in relatively free and fair democratic elections the war-wing parties managed to attract 
a large number of following, resulting in the overturn of the political system known 
theretofore. In FYR Macedonia, DUI suddenly became the dominant political force 
representing ethnic Albanians, leaving in the shadows all the other Albanian parties. In 
Kosovo, PDK and AAK together counted for roughly half of the constituency’s vote, posing a 
serious rivalry to the LDK. By all standards, this was a successful transformation of combatants 
into politics, and a successful trade-off of weapons for the ballot box. Weapons and bullets 
had been exchanged for votes, while means of violence had been traded for political 
competition (Joshi 2010; Ishiyama 2016; Manning and Smith 2016).  
 
Gradually, both countries saw the emergence of a new masters of politicians who, by all 
accounts, are here to stay. When I use the term “nouveau riche”, I am of course referring to 
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those politicians whose origins are traced back in times of war and armed resistance, as 
already established. But I am also referring to their ever-widening network of friends, family 
and tribe members, war comrades, political allies - old and new - who have stood ready to 
support them in their new fight on the political arena. Perhaps more poignantly, I am also 
referring to the younger generation of supporters who are willing to build on the newly 
acquired political clout of the nouveau riche by echoing their war legacy and taking the reins 
of power further onto the future.  
 
As seen from both case studies, one way of ensuring longevity over the reins of power has 
been to invest in the younger generation through a certain kind of education. This is a sort of 
education which will equip the younger minds with the knowhow and the skills for the future, 
but which is closely aligned with the war narrative, and in support of the war-wing political 
parties. That is why in the immediate post-war period in Kosovo one of the first institutions 
to come in the radar of the war-wing parties was the public university – the University of 
Prishtina. There have been multiple examples over the years of political interference in the 
appointment of professors in key positions such as deans, pro-deans, or even rectors. One of 
my interviewees, FMC 06, is himself a university professor, and he was very clear that they 
(i.e. war-wing parties) needed to make sure that the future generations were taught the right 
narrative of the conflict, as he saw it (FMC 06). In the last few years the Kosovo government, 
when led by the PDK, decided to establish three more public universities and several 
associated faculties. Most, if not all, of these universities and departments are led by 
professors who are also members of the above political parties, or who are closely associated 
with these politicians.  
 
In FYR Macedonia, the situation concerning the political interference in higher education is 
not as bad. After the armed conflict the Albanian-led underground university in Tetovo was 
recognised by the state and, under the mediation of the OSCE, became a national university 
offering education of students of all ethnic backgrounds (University of Tetovo 2019). 
However, the University of Tetovo continues to this day to attract a large following by ethnic 
Albanian students. Most of the teaching staff are Albanian, too. In their own way, both cases 
testify that to ensure longevity the political nouveau riche needs the support of an education 
system that will not back their war narrative but will also craft future generations according 
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to their own design. In conclusion, the role of public universities in this kind of education 
through indoctrination goes hand in hand with the consolidation and perpetuation of the new 
political class. This in turn contributes to efforts to influence collective memory and the war 
legacy. 
 
But above all else, one of the predominant themes that war-wing parties have been accused 
of is their alleged manipulation, or derangement of the voter-politician relationship which, in 
theory, should be sanctimonious. I am of course referring to the patronal and clientelistic 
nature of this relationship which, by its very definition, plunges the voter (read: client) and 
the politician (read: patron) into a vicious cycle of mutual conditionality that is very hard to 
break (Hicken 2011; Hale 2015). Coupled with clientelism, and even immersed within it, is the 
corroding phenomenon of corruption. Political corruption, economic corruption, bribery, 
sabotage, financial extortion, nepotism, they all fall under this category. One could even argue 
that a client-patron relation that intends to play by the rules of democracy prima facie, is in 
fact itself a corrupt manifestation of this rapport. 
  
Many scholars and practitioners have written about the phenomenon of clientelism in the 
Western Balkans and, more specifically, in Kosovo and FYR Macedonia. On Kosovo, Belloni 
and Strazzari (2014) refer to corruption phenomena as deals among friends, Cvejić (2016) 
discusses the informal power networks and political patronage, and Dziedzic (2016) talks 
about “criminalised power structures”. On FRY Macedonia, Gromes (2009) and Ceka (2018) 
elaborate on corrupt and clientelistic interpretation of what is the meaning of power-sharing 
arrangements on the ground, while Günay and Dzihic (2016) talk about the “authoritarian 
code” of politicians that undermines democratic norms and values. The data from my 
interviews and the field work corroborates to a considerable degree the claim that the 
relationship between a politician and a voter in both Kosovo and FYR Macedonia is an essence 
a clientelist one. Such a relationship affects the whole political spectrum but is particularly 
accentuated among the war-wing parties. What is the evidence stemming from the field?                     
Lyon (2015) makes note that in the context of unconsolidated states, there are strong 
pressures to create patronage politics. When state institutions are still being created or 
consolidated, the space for informal manoeuvring is greater for those aspiring power.  
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 This is particularly true in ethnically-diverse democracies, where intra-ethnic party competition may act 
 as a powerful catalyst for intensifying clientelism (…) Disenchantment in local political processes 
 increases the likelihood of patronage-based party-voter linkages, since the parties have no other 
 effective way of attracting and holding on to voters (…) Democratic accountability dependent on 
 clientelistic exchanges between parties and voters derives from the politician’s promise of a job or of a 
 financial reward (Lyon 2015, pp. 170-171).      
 
Kosovo was a clean slate after the war in 1999. Institutions were created from scratch. 
Although the international community oversaw institution-building and was in charge of 
installing democracy, the domestic political spectrum was up for grabs. The war-wing parties, 
PDK and AAK, were quick in filling in the vacuum and posing a serious threat to the LDK. As 
stated in the subsection above, their political transformation was a welcoming and enriching 
development in the country’s political space. As long as they played by the democratic rules 
of the game, their success and contribution to the country’s democratization was duly noted. 
The same was true of DUI after the conflict in FUR Macedonia. As long as they played by the 
rules of democratic game, their contribution to implementing the Ohrid Framework 
Agreement on mending inter-ethnic relations was duly noted. However, what is also true – 
which is corroborated by interviews conducted – is that the war-wing parties were very skilful 
in building a deep and wide informal network of contacts, comprised of war-time veterans 
and their associations, their families, friends and further. Such networks made sure to take 
care of one another using the main commodity at their disposal: the state and its resources. 
Essentially this was the logic and pattern that dictated the distribution of government jobs 
and services, encouraged the collusion politics with the business, or the politicisation of the 
state’s administration and civil service. This is how the phenomenon of clientelism is 
explained by one of my respondents: 
It starts from giving the person the hope that (s)he will get a job not because of their ability, but because 
of their connection with the powerful people in politics. You can get a job if you have connections with 
a network which will accommodate you. Otherwise, you may be the smartest guy, have a PhD, and you 
may still be in a wretched position. You and your family may prosper in proportion with your personal 
proximity with the people that control and that accommodate. Clientelism does not come to an end 
when you get a job. Clientelism is eternal and makes you eternally dependent on it (OPP 02). 
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FYR Macedonia shares many resemblances with Kosovo: there, too, corruption and 
clientelism are real and corrosive elements and they pose real challenges to democratic 
consolidation. However, the Macedonian case is different is some key aspects: following the 
short-term conflict in 2001, institutions did not have to be created from scratch but rather 
reformed to accommodate ethnic Albanian interests. Secondly, although DUI as the only 
descendant of the NLA became the most voted party among the ethnic Albanian community, 
this community is the second largest one in FYR Macedonia, after Slavic Macedonians. Since 
they have been part of all but one coalition governments, they share responsibility in 
widening the clientelistic network, if only by association. The latter years of VMRO-DPMNE 
were shrouded in bizarre twists and turns of corrupt affairs, illegal surveillance scandals, and 
authoritarian tendencies by the former Prime Minister. Through all of it DUI seemed content 
at having a quasi-feudal autonomy over its electorate. In effect, they took the notion of the 
power-sharing agreement and made a distorted interpretation of it. As long as they were 
allowed to have control over their share of distribution of government jobs and services, as 
long as they were allowed to mingle politics with the business, they could turn a blind eye to 
what the senior coalition partner was doing. This way of governing represented a dualism of 
an ethnically-based “two-governments” arrangement. DUI’s role in feeding clientelism and 
corruption was to contribute, rather than lead, to a wider political trend. The maintenance of 
patronal and clientelistic networks became a crucial method for ensuring the maintenance of 
power (ACA 03).   
 
Kuehn (2017) throws an intriguing metaphor on the role of the combatants in a post-war 
setting. Is it their role to be a “midwife or gravedigger of democracy”? (Kuehn 2017, p. 784). 
In the 1990s and 2000s in Latin American countries such as Brazil, Chile and Peru,  
(…) militaries were able to control the pace and direction of the transition to democracy to such an 
extent that they could enshrine amnesty for human rights violations and political privileges into the 
new democratic order. In the civilian-led new democracies of Eastern Europe including Hungary, Poland 
and the Czech Republic, defence and military policy remained the almost exclusive arena of military 
active-duty and retired officers (Kuehn 2017, p. 785).  
 
Similarly, both case studies here testify to the corrosive effect of clientelism, patronage 
system and corruption, which are often instigated and maintained by networks originating 
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from war times. All these negative phenomena corrode government and good governance, 
which in turn corrode democratic consolidation. Right now, every one of the targeted “war-
wing” parties in this thesis could potentially meet some criteria to be branded exactly that: a 
potential gravedigger of democracy. In a sense, it is exactly those old networks and alliances 
that can interfere with formal politics. Lyons (2016) even claims that parties whose origins are 
as victorious insurgent groups have unique legacies and hence different institutional 
structures and patterns of behaviour. Their cohesive leadership, discipline and hierarchy 
shape post-insurgent political parties. This may in turn lead them into becoming “powerful 
authoritarian political parties that dominated post-war politics” (Lyons 2006, p. 1026). 
 
This issue helps us answer the key sub-question of the thesis’ research question, which is what 
is so unique about the former combatants turned politicians and their contribution to 
democracy. 
 
5.3 The emerging grounded theory  
The grounded theory (Charmaz 2014) emerging from the case studies rests on the premise 
that there are genuine underlying factors that push for the creation of intra-state armed 
groups in sovereign countries. Such factors usually have to do with the marginalisation or 
repression of an ethnic group by state authorities, followed by demands for equal human 
rights, autonomy or independence on behalf of that group. The trajectory that is seen in 
conflict-affected countries generally goes like this: state repression is followed by demands, 
which are initially articulated peacefully. If those demands are ignored, or if in an effort to 
silence dissent the state’s response is to intensify the means of repression, an armed 
resistance or insurgency may be created. The armed conflict that ensues usually comes to an 
end after a defeat, a mutually hurting stalemate, if there is intervention from abroad, or if 
there is mutual interest to come to a peace agreement. In the process, rebel groups tend to 
become legitimate stakeholders of the agreement and the ensuing implementation of peace 
accords (De Brún 2008; Durán, Leowenherz and Hormaza 2008; Maharaj 2008; Álvarez 2010).    
 
Once the conflict is over, there are no reasons why former combatants should not get 
involved in politics. My findings affirm the claims of those authors who argue for a meaningful 
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and inclusive DDR process, as well as a political inclusion of former combatants as a 
constructive step towards peace and democracy (Barakat and Özerdem 2005; Collier, Hoeffler 
and Söderbom 2008; De Zeeuw 2008; Glassmyer and Sambanis 2008; Curtis and de Zeeuw 
2009; Jarstad and Sisk 2010; Dudouet, Giessmann and Planta 2012; Gurses and Rost 2013; 
McMullin 2013b; Ishiyama 2016; Marshall and Ishiyama 2016). 
 
In fact, their inclusion in public debate, either through political parties or other fora, is 
encouraged because this ensures that post-war institution-building and democratization is 
widely represented. It is, therefore, good news for a nascent and unconsolidated democracy 
when former combatants have successfully traded weapons for the ballot box. This enriches 
the public discourse and diversifies political opinion and competition. In addition, the former 
combatants’ inclusion in politics helps to neutralise their spoiler effect, which could be 
detrimental for peace and democracy. Literature is rich with findings on the risks posed by 
spoilers and the importance of inclusion in post-conflict democratic transition (Stedman 1997; 
Hoddie and Hartzell 2003; Glassmyer and Sambanis 2008; Lyons 2016; Hansell and Gerdes 
2017).  
 
However, democracy begins to falter, and formal state institutions get corroded when the 
rules of democracy begin to be manipulated for the sake of acquiring power and of enriching 
a small group of people and their cronies. There are numerous instances of clientelism, 
corruption and authoritarian practices noted throughout the Western Balkans, and they are 
all warning signs for the stagnation of democratic consolidation (Petkovski 2015; Günay and 
Dzihic 2016; Ramet, Hassenstab and Listhaug 2017; Bieber 2018; Krastev 2018; Bieber, Solska 
and Taleski 2019). 
 
What is unique about the war-wing parties in this regard is that they have mastered the art 
of clientelism and have created de facto fiefdoms out of their electoral bases. They have done 
so precisely by tapping on those personal informal relations from the times of war, which 
have in turn helped them to maintain informal and illicit networks of people in all strata of 
society. Some of those people are in every level of institutions and they represent important 
cogs in the predatory mechanism of corruption and self-enrichment.  
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The clientelistic relationship is essentially a corrupt one. The client-patron rapport feeds off 
and is maintained by an informal power network of intra-party and party-constituency 
relations. These relations constantly undermine and silently erode the formal and official 
mechanisms of government at all levels. They slow down and corrupt the process of decision-
making, rendering it less effective and efficient, and potentially harmful for the people. As a 
consequence, the cogs of governance calcify, rendering the business of government more 
corrupt, costlier, less transparent, less accountable, less representative and less efficient.  
 
Thus, the novelty aspect of my grounded theory builds upon the long-term political 
transformation of former combatants, which begins by their creation of new political parties 
and subsequently their active participation in government for at least three election cycles or 
around ten years. Grounded theory thus focuses on the long-term ramifications on 
democracy stemming from the political transformation of former combatants, as defined 
above. While their inclusion certainly enriches post-conflict public discourse, the new political 
class tends to undermine long-term democratic consolidation through the maintenance of its 
informal networks and illicit activities. The peacebuilding paradigm may have indeed helped 
neutralise peace spoilers after the war (Dawson and Hanley 2016). However, one of my key 
findings stemming from this research suggests that the war-related political class can easily 
become democracy spoilers instead. The peacebuilding liberal practices are partly to be 
blamed for calling for the appeasement of restive groups of former combatants after conflict 
as a way of buying peace and stability and deepening political inclusion and representation. 
However, in the end, by wanting to maintain their clientelistic networks that profit a few but 
suppress the majority, those restive groups of former combatants became spoilers of 
democratic consolidation instead. Thus, as this thesis infers, the notion of spoilers needs 
rethinking.   
 
As Diamond (2008) states, democracies which are at risk are usually plagued by poor 
governance. They appear to be “trapped in patterns of corrupt and abusive rule” (Diamond 
2008, p. 42). Once they succeed in capturing state institutions, they use the consolidated 
power to limit economic competition and democratic opposition. “The result is a predatory 
state” (Diamond 2008, p. 43). People or constituencies are no longer viewed as equal citizens 
but as “clients of powerful local bosses, who are themselves the clients of still more powerful 
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patrons”. Public policies become irrelevant, or just a façade for “producing private goods for 
officials, their families and their cronies” (Diamond 2008, p. 43). Bad governance directly 
impacts democracy and its norms and values. Therefore, democracy suffers, too. 
  
 223 
 
VI. Conclusion  
Although in the last twenty to thirty years the number of inter-state wars has seen a decrease, 
the world is now faced with a dramatic increase of intra-state wars and conflicts. In a way, 
this has complicated classical warfare since the enemy is not always a clearly organised 
structure with clearly delineated borders and representing a single state. Instead, conflicts 
often are waged between organisations, groups, factions that may fight on behalf of a state 
or may fight against a state. These are all fluid variables, but the constant seems to remain 
the same: such wars and conflicts tend to be waged within the borders of an existing state 
(Olser and Aall 2001; Kalyvas, Shapiro and Masoud 2008; Dudouet 2012; Duffield 2014).  
 
At the time of writing this, examples of such warfare are seen in the Middle East, in Syria and 
Yemen. In a sense, these two tragic conflicts are a continuation of the so-called Arab Spring, 
kickstarted almost a decade ago in Tunisia, only to be spread across most of North Africa and 
parts of the Middle East (Amnesty International 2018; Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue 
2018; Michaelson 2019). This wave of revolution was one of the latest examples of 
movements or conflicts happening inside existing states, demanding equal rights, more 
autonomy for certain ethnic or religious groups, or a change of government.  
 
The intensification of intra-state wars coincided with the end of the Cold War and the fall of 
the communist ideology in Central and Eastern Europe. Some of the bloodiest examples of 
such wars which happened immediately following the fall of Communism were played within 
former Yugoslavia. The Federation proved to be the terrain where tragic conflicts were waged 
between people who had cohabited for almost fifty years. There were two main reasons that 
led to these inter-ethnic conflicts: on one hand it was Serbia’s long-standing nationalist desire 
for hegemony and the impulse to subjugate the neighbouring people; on the other, there 
were reawakened nationalist ambitions of the other entities of Yugoslavia for independence. 
This tension between Serbian nationalist hegemony and the secessionist, independentist 
drive of the other Yugoslav entities, led to the bloody dissolution of Federation, and the wars 
in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Kosovo ended the bloody cycle of the Yugoslav break-
up with the 1998/99 war that culminated with the NATO military intervention against Serbia. 
FYR Macedonia proved to be an exception to this rule, having managed to secede peacefully 
and became independent in 1991. However, due to inter-ethnic tensions between Slavic 
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Macedonians and the ethnic Albanian community, the new country was engulfed in a six-
month armed conflict in 2001 (Little and Silber 1995; O'Neill 2002; Ramet 2002; Rossos 2008; 
Weller 2009). 
 
With the emergence of these intra-state conflicts we also witnessed the creation of rebel 
armies, or intra-state armed groups, that fought on behalf of a national group. In the case of 
Kosovo, the Kosovo Liberation Army was an authentically-driven armed organisation fighting 
on behalf of the majority Albanian population and against the Serbian occupation of the 
country. In the case of FYR Macedonia, the National Liberation Army was created to fight on 
behalf of ethnic Albanians and against the Macedonian state, demanding equal rights and 
representation. Both those armed groups played a role in clinching peace accords and in the 
demobilisation processes afterwards. Further, they share a similar trajectory in so far as their 
leadership’s role in the post-conflict period is concerned, which is the creation of political 
parties out of armed groups and the integration of their combatants into politics. 
 
This thesis focused on two aspects of the combatants’ integration in politics:   
 
- Firstly, it looked at the act of their political transformation. By mapping the political scene 
of the two case studies it seems obvious that the inclusion of the combatants in politics was 
a necessity driven by bottom-up requests for representation. The war legacy was a driving 
force behind the popularity of war veterans, coupled by an enabling environment that was 
supported by strong regional and family ties and alliances; 
 
- Secondly, the thesis examined what this political transformation has meant for the quality 
of democracy in the long-run. By studying the long-term behavioural patterns of former 
combatants turned politicians, the empirical evidence provides some strong correlations 
between their role in politics and the beleaguered state of democratic institutions and 
democracy in general. These correlations are not difficult to make considering that both in 
Kosovo and FYR Macedonia the political scene is populated with war-wing parties. In Kosovo 
there are three such parties – PDK, AAK and Nisma - and they have all been in power at one 
time or another since their inception. In FYR Macedonia, DUI is a direct descendant of the NLA 
and has been a junior member of every coalition government since 2001, apart from one.  
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According to Bieber (2018), countries in the Western Balkans are dominated by competitive 
authoritarian regimes that combined multi-party elections with nationalist rhetoric and the 
privatisation of the state to affiliated business interests. This has come about as a result of 
two defining features: 1. institutional weaknesses that provides insufficient democratic 
safeguards, and 2. authoritarian political actors who utilise these weaknesses to attain and 
retain power (Bieber 2018, p. 338). Kosovo and FYR Macedonia are not immune to these 
predicaments. However, what is specific about these two countries is that a great degree of 
responsibility for the capture of institutions lies with the new political elite which is 
dominated by combatants who turned politicians.  
 
This thesis has focused on the long-term political transformation of combatants and their 
impact in democratisation processes. Long-term political transformation is defined here as 
political inclusion of former combatants through the creation of their own political parties 
and their active participation in the political scene for three election cycles or more, or around 
ten years. While most related literature discusses the validity of the reintegration of 
combatants, their DDR processes, and even the usefulness of their inclusion in politics, the 
aspect of their long-term impact on democracy is not explored. By focusing on this aspect this 
thesis contributes to political science and, in particular, to democratisation studies. Based on 
participant observation and field interview data, the thesis follows the trajectory of their 
political careers up to two decades after the conflict, dissecting the reasons they are in power 
and what this has meant for democracy. The findings concur that the inclusion of former 
combatants in post-war political arrangements is within the spirit of democracy and inclusion, 
which helps maintain the fragile peace.  
 
However, in countries where the clientelistic web and predatory practices corrupt and 
frustrate the process of institution-building and democratic consolidation, such as in Kosovo 
and FYR Macedonia, the political establishment which dominated by former combatants 
turned politicians carries a big part of responsibility and culpability (in Kosovo more so than 
in FYR Macedonia). The grounded theory of this thesis concurs that the inclusion of former 
combatants in the post-conflict political space helped neutralise peace spoilers. However, the 
new war-wing political elite is primarily responsible for maintaining clientelistic networks, for 
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allowing illicit activities to obstruct formal democratic institutions, which in the long-term has 
created democracy spoilers out of this new elite.     
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Postscript 
1) As I was nearing the end of my writing, the political scene in Kosovo experienced major 
upsets which has led to the biggest government shake-up that the country has witnessed 
since 1999. On 6 October 2019 Kosovo held snap general elections, called after Prime Minister 
Ramush Haradinaj decided to resign in response to having been called for an interview as a 
potential suspect by the Kosovo Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office at the 
Hague (The Guardian 2019c). (Some suspect he resigned because of international pressure to 
renege on his government’s decision to place a total ban on all imports coming from Serbia in 
response to the latter’s actions taken against Kosovo’s statehood (DW 2019)). In any case, the 
Kosovo Assembly dissolved, and general elections took place.  
 
The October elections proved that the war-wing parties suffered a debacle not seen since 
their creation. PDK has come third with around 22% of the total vote, AAK has come fourth 
with around 11% of the total vote, whereas Nisma just managed to reach 5% of the threshold 
needed to enter Parliament. The election winners are the opposition parties: LDK came 
second with around 24% of the total vote, and Self-Determination Movement came first with 
around 25.5% of the total vote (CEC 2019). Self-Determination is a party formed about a 
decade ago but has always been in opposition. According to the legal framework, the onus 
falls on the winner of elections to form a government. As a result, in February 2020 the Self-
Determination Movement managed to form a coalition with the LDK, relegating all the war-
wing parties to opposition status for the first time since their creation (Kallxo 2019).  
 
This electoral turmoil comes as a result of the people’s frustration with the chronic corruption 
perpetrated by the “commander generation”, as well as the emergence of a young generation 
in Kosovo who are not impressed by the glories of the past but are keen to look at better 
prospects for their future. The increasing consensus is that Kosovo suffers from endemic 
corruption and state capture and its economy is all but stagnant. Naturally, those who have 
been in power the most – ie. the war-wing parties – are largely responsible. For this, they 
have been castigated through the ballot box like never before in their twenty-year existence.      
 
It is too early to predict, but this government shake-up may lead to big structural changes in 
the political scene in Kosovo. For the first time the former commanders turned politicians will 
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be out of power and, as a result, less able to maintain their monopolies and clientelistic 
networks. Self-Determination seem intent on enforcing the rule of law and strengthening the 
justice sector, which are considered the Achilles’ heel that hampers Kosovo’s development. 
The culprits, according to them, and not just them, are first and foremost the political class of 
combatants turned politicians, now deposed. 
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2) October 2019 did not end without a few dramatic events in FYR Macedonia, too, which for 
the sake of correctness had to be included as a postscript in the final version of this thesis. 
The new Macedonian government that came into power in May 2017, led by prime Minister 
Zoran Zaev in coalition with Ali Ahmeti’s DUI party, was meant to open a new page for the 
country, particularly in view of the corruption scandals associated with the previous 
government. The Prespa Agreement on the name issue, signed between FYR Macedonia and 
Greece in June 2018, was an historic landmark for the country, opening the doors for the 
commencement of its accession to the NATO Alliance. Since Greece is now in support of the 
Macedonian membership, the accession process is currently undergoing the NATO filters of 
approval, and FYR Macedonia will likely become a full-fledged member of the Alliance in the 
next couple of months. These two developments – i. e. a new government and the Greek-
Macedonian resolution on the name issue – coupled with the rule of law, political and 
economic reforms in the country, were preconditions to FYR Macedonia opening accession 
talks with the EU. It should be stressed also that all the signs coming from Brussels were that 
the country had been successful in meeting all these preconditions. 
 
However, to the dismay of all aspiring countries of the Western Balkans, as well as that of 
most EC commissioners, on 16 October 2019 the EU – or rather a selected number of 
countries led by France - decided to block accession talks for FYR Macedonia (and Albania). 
This action was taken in response to the fear that the prospect of new members into the EU 
would stoke populist surge in EU countries such as France, the Netherlands or Denmark. The 
French President, Emmanuel Macron, was primarily responsible for placing this veto, thus 
coming in direct clash with other leaders such as the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, who 
had stated that the EU needed to keep its promise of accession for Western Balkan countries 
(Euronews 2019).  
 
The consequence of the EU’s decision is that Prime Minister Zaev has resigned and snap 
general elections in FYR Macedonia are now planned for 12 April 2020. Meanwhile, there will 
be a caretaker government until then. This will be another test for the ruling Albanian elite 
led by DUI, particularly considering the increased disenchantment of its electorate with it, 
coupled with the rising popularity of new and alternative Albanian parties such as the Alliance 
for Albanians or the Movement BESA (Koha Ditore 2019). It remains to be seen whether DUI, 
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a party beleaguered like never before in the last twenty years of its existence, will be able to 
hold monopoly over the ethnic Albanian vote, or if the above parties will steal its thunder. It 
would not be a total shock if this was to happen in FYR Macedonia, too.    
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Interviewees and Transcriptions 
Former military commanders and activists – coded FMC 
FMC 01 Former commander of KLA; Member of PDK and Deputy of Assembly 
of Kosovo; male, Albanian. Interview conducted on 12 Jan 2015 
 
FMC 02 Former soldier of KLA; Member of PDK; male, Albanian. Interview 
conducted on 30 Dec 2014 
 
FMC 03 Former member of LPK and KLA; Lawyer; male, Albanian. Interview 
conducted on 07 Feb 2015 
 
FMC 04 Former soldier of KLA and war veteran; retired; male, Albanian. 
Interview conducted on 30 Jan 2015  
 
FMC 05 Member of LDK and deputy of Assembly of Kosovo; male, Albanian. 
Interview conducted on 19 Feb 2015 
 
FMC 06 Professor and former intelligence member of KLA; male, Albanian. 
Interview conducted on 21 March 2015 
 
FMC 07 Former high-level officer of Yugoslav Army; former officer of KPC; male, 
Albanian. Interview conducted on 08 Jan 2015 
 
FMC 08 Doctor, former member of LPK and former deputy of Assembly of 
Kosovo; female, Albanian. Interview conducted on 09 April 2015 
 
FMC 09 Member of PDK and deputy of Assembly of Kosovo; male, Albanian. 
Interview conducted on 07 April 2015 
 
Opposition political representatives – coded OPP 
OPP 01 Consultant, civil society activist and LDK member in Prishtina; male, 
Albanian. Interview conducted on 24 Dec 2014  
 
OPP 02 Member of opposition Self-Determination Movement and deputy of 
Assembly of Kosovo; male, Albanian. Interview conducted on 15 March 
2015 
 
OPP 03  Member of opposition Self-Determination Movement and deputy of 
Assembly of Kosovo; female, Albanian. Interview conducted on 25 Dec 
2014 
 
OPP 04 Former representative of the 1990s government in exile and current 
private citizen; male, Albanian. Interview conducted on 30 Jan 2015 
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Civil society organisation representatives – coded CSO 
CSO 01 Civil society activist and researcher on security sector reform in Skopje; 
male, Macedonian. Interview conducted on 31 July 2015 
 
CSO 02 Researcher and civil society activist in Prishtina; male, Albanian. 
Interview conducted on 05 Jan 2015 
 
CSO 03 Researcher and civil society activist in Prishtina; male, Albanian. 
Interview conducted on 20 Jan 2015 
 
CSO 04 Civil society, journalist and civil servant in diplomatic core of Kosovo; 
male, Albanian. Interview conducted on 02 Feb 2015 
 
CSO 05 Civil society activist in Belgrade; male, Serbian. Interview conducted on 
29 Dec 2014 
 
CSO 06 Researcher and civil society activist in Prishtina and Skopje; male, 
Albanian. Interview conducted on 06 Feb 2015 
 
Members of academia – coded ACA 
ACA 01  Lecturer and author of various books and articles on Kosovo and the 
   region; female, Italian American. Interview conducted on 26 June 2015 
 
ACA 02 Professor and author of several books and articles in Skopje; female, 
Macedonian. Interview conducted on 17 March 2015 
 
ACA 03 Consultant and researcher in Skopje; female, Macedonian. Interview 
conducted on 28 June 2015  
 
ACA 04 Professor and former member of intelligence services in Skopje; male, 
Macedonian. Interview conducted on 31 July 2015 
 
ACA 05  Lecturer and civil society activist in Prishtina; female, Albanian. 
Interview conducted on 24 Dec 2014 
 
ACA 06 Professor and author of several publications in Skopje; male, 
Macedonian. Interview conducted on 20 July 2015 
 
ACA 07 PhD candidate and researcher on nationalism and ethnicity; male, 
Albanian. Interview conducted on 17 July 2015 
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Appendix I: Timeline – Jan 2012 to Dec 2019   
Date Activity Location 
Jan 2012 Commencement of PhD programme Prishtina 
March 2012 Review and resubmission of PhD concept Prishtina 
March 2012 Training Needs Analysis Prishtina 
May 2012 Workshop on quantitative methods and data analysis Croatia 
Sep 2012 Presentation at DSC conference Thessaloniki 
Sep 2012 Workshop 'How to write a thesis' Thessaloniki 
Sep 2012 Workshop on interpreting interview material Belgrade 
Nov 2012 PhD course on Fieldwork Methodology Oslo 
Nov 2012 PhD course on Ethics of Peace in World Politics Oslo 
March 2013 Training Needs Analysis Prishtina 
Sep 2013 GERN Doctoral Summer School on Criminology and Criminal 
Justice at the University of Sheffield 
Sheffield 
Oct 2013 Submission of first draft of PhD proposal Prishtina  
Nov 2013 Training Needs Analysis Prishtina 
May 2014 Submission of final draft of PhD proposal Prishtina 
 
July 2014 Defence of PhD proposal Thessaloniki 
Sep 2014 Completion of upgrade procedure 
Obtain University Ethical approval 
Sheffield and 
Thessaloniki 
Sep-Dec 2014 Research records / interview contacts  Prishtina 
Jan-June 2015 Researching / interviews Kosovo 
June-Dec 2015 Data analysis I Prishtina 
April 2015  Research records / interview contacts Kosovo / 
FYRoM 
June-Sep 2015 Researching / interviews FYRoM 
Dec 2015 – 
March 2016 
Data analysis II Prishtina 
May-Sep 2016 Joined data analysis of Kosovo and FYRoM Prishtina 
Sep 2016 – 
May 2017 
Writing up first chapter drafts Prishtina 
May 2017 – 
May 2018 
Review research and results / fill in gaps Prishtina 
Feb-June 2019 Writing up final chapter drafts Stockholm 
Sep 2019 Submission and presentation of paper “Institutions Replacing 
Armed Conflict – What Happens When Soldiers Seek to 
Build a Country?” at EPCR Conference 
Wroclaw, 
Poland 
June-Oct 2019 Review and revision of thesis Stockholm 
Oct-Dec 2019 Submission of final PhD thesis 
Viva voce 
Stockholm, 
Thessaloniki 
and Sheffield 
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Appendix II: List of Supplementary Documentation 
 
Open (Semi-Structured) Interview 
 
Research Project Title: Rearranging the puzzles of security in post-conflict democracies: a 
comparative study of the transformation and political integration of armed groups in Kosovo 
and FYR Macedonia 
 
Researcher: Armend Bekaj 
 
Interviewee: _________________                             Date: ____________ 
(Name, surname & profession) 
 
This thesis will look at how, in the aftermath of armed conflicts in Kosovo and FYR Macedonia, 
security mechanisms in newly-emerged democracies have been rearranged. It will examine 
the role of the armed groups and their legacies in contributing to, or hindering, 
democratisation processes. Their role in building security structures will also be examined 
within the context of emerging democracies. The research is addressing the influence of 
armed groups, the transformation of combatants into politicians of today, the implications of 
such transformation in politics and public life, and their role in consolidating, or hampering, 
democracy in their countries. The interview themes will focus on, but will not be limited to, 
1) the role of the armed group’s leadership in (Disarmament, Demobilisation and 
Reintegration) DDR and transformation processes; 2) their influence in creating and 
maintaining democratic procedures and institutions, such as elections, coalition 
governments, parliaments etc., 3) the influence of informal relations between former 
combatants in post-conflict democratisation processes. 
 
1. To what extent does the integration of former combatants into political and security 
structures contribute to, or inhibit, democratisation processes in Kosovo and FYR Macedonia?  
 
2. Assess the long-term impact of DDR and transformation processes of combatants in politics 
and security structures. What has this meant for the quality of democracy?   
 
3. Offer your thoughts on how former combatants ascended to power and how they maintain 
their power-structures. Through democratic means, legitimacy, political (war) credentials, 
patronage, reward/distribution means? 
 
4. Identify the links, if any, between the former combatants’ influence in politics and their 
countries’ consolidation of democracy. How successful have they proven to be as elected 
leaders?   
 
5. Discern and measure the impact of horizontal links, if any, between former combatants-
cum-politicians after the conflict. In other words, how well has their camaraderie served their 
careers and economic wellbeing?     
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6. Ascertain what level of noted regress in democratic consolidation is attributable to former 
combatants-cum-politicians. Or is such regress a result of more complex political 
circumstances, with an equal share of responsibility across the political spectrum?  
 
7. Examine the horizontal, cross-border relations between the two armed groups in Kosovo 
and FYR Macedonia. What were the goals, real or propagated, of these groups, and what was 
the degree of synergy between them?  
 
8. Look at the role of armed groups in contributing to the implementation of peace 
agreements in partnership with their respective countries and/or international interlocutors.  
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University of Sheffield 
Participant Information Sheet 
Research Project Title: Rearranging the puzzles of security in post-conflict democracies: a 
comparative study of the transformation and political integration of armed groups in Kosovo 
and FYR Macedonia 
You are kindly being invited to take part in the above research project. Before you decide we 
think it is important that you understand why the research is being done and what it will 
involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others 
if you wish. Ask us if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. 
Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part. Thank you for reading this. 
The project’s purpose: This project is part of my PhD programme, which is built around a 
comparative study of Kosovo and FYR Macedonia. They are emerging democracies with a 
common past, but have experienced specific trajectories of security transition and 
democratisation. They both faced internal armed struggles; they dealt with the integration of 
former combatants in security structures and politics; and they both aspire to join the EU. 
This thesis will examine the success of the transformation and integration of former 
combatants into post-conflict security structures, and by consequence their role in these 
emerging democracies.  
 
Why have you been chosen to participate? With your background in armed groups and post-
war democratisation processes in your country, I believe you are in a unique position to shed 
light as first-hand source upon some of the challenges and successes related to the 
transformation of armed combatants into security structures and politics. 
 
Do you have to take part? It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do 
decide to take part you will be given this information sheet to keep, and you will be asked to 
sign a consent form. You do not have to give a reason should you wish not to take part. 
 
What are your responsibilities if you take part? I would be most grateful if we could meet 2-
3 times for a long series of interviews lasting 1-2 hours each.  
 
Possible disadvantages of taking part: There are no foreseeable disadvantages, apart from 
the possibility of some hard questions that I may put to you. In light of the chosen topic, such 
questions will relate to the role that army combatants turned politicians have had on 
democratization processes. Probing questions and themes as to the personal, party or 
leadership responsibility in relation to weak democratization performance will be asked and 
explored. However, if at any point you feel I am not showing a duty of care of appropriate 
sensitivity, I would appreciate if you told me. 
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Possible benefits of taking part: There are no immediate benefits for those people 
participating in the project. It is hoped that the researcher’s fieldwork and interviews will 
culminate into a published PhD thesis and possibly a peer-reviewed article or articles. 
 
What if something goes wrong? As per the Consent Form and this Information Sheet, if at 
any point during this research you as research participant wish to opt out from this interview, 
you are free to do so. Any concerns or complaints regarding this research can be addressed 
to me or, as last instance, to the University Registrar and Secretary. Address and contact 
details:  School of Law, Bartolomé House, The University of Sheffield, Winter Street, Sheffield, 
UK, S3 7ND, Tel: +44 (0)114 222 6771, Fax: +44 (0)114 222 6832, Email: law@sheffield.ac.uk.  
 
Confidentiality: All the information that we collect about you during the course of the 
research will be kept strictly confidential. You will not be able to be identified in any reports 
or publications. 
 
Results of the research project: They will comprise a useful part of a larger study, which aims 
to be published as a PhD thesis. In addition, some of the information gathered herein may be 
utilized for publishing articles related to the subject matter. The principle of anonymity and 
confidentiality will continue to be respected at all times. 
 
Organization and funding of project: The project is being organized by me, while my PhD 
stipend is offered by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology in Kosovo. I am doing 
my PhD with the University of Sheffield, City College Thessaloniki. 
 
Who has ethically reviewed the project? The Law School, University of Sheffield, and the City 
College Thessaloniki. 
 
Recorded media: The audio recordings of your activities made during this research will be 
used only for analysis and for illustration in conference presentations and lectures. No other 
use will be made of them without your written permission, and no one outside the project 
will be allowed access to the original recordings. 
 
Contact for further information: Armend Bekaj, Tel: +377 44 970 912, email: 
armend.bekaj@gmail.com (lead researcher); Prof. Paul Knepper, Tel: +44 (0)114 222 6734, 
email: P.Knepper@sheffield.ac.uk (principle supervisor). 
 
Thank your very much for taking part in this research. Your contribution given is key to making 
this research original and thereby contributing to furthering social science knowledge in 
general. 
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Participant Consent Form 
 
Title of Research Project: Rearranging the puzzles of security in post-conflict 
democracies: a comparative study of the transformation and political integration of 
armed groups in Kosovo and FYR Macedonia 
Name of Researcher: Armend Bekaj 
 
Participant Identification Number for this project:                        Please initial box 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet  
explaining the above research project and I have had the opportunity  
to ask questions about the project. 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to  
withdraw at any time without giving any reason and without there being any  
negative consequences. In addition, should I not wish to answer any particular 
question or questions, I am free to decline.  
 
3. I understand that my responses will be kept strictly confidential. 
I give permission for members of the research team to have access to my 
anonymised responses. I understand that my name will not be linked  
with the research materials, and I will not be identified or identifiable in the 
report or reports that result from the research.   
 
4. I agree for the data collected from me to be used in future research. 
  
 
5. I agree to take part in the above research project. 
 
 
________________________ ________________         ____________________ 
Name of Participant Date Signature 
(or legal representative) 
                                                                                                                                      
_________________________ ________________         ____________________ 
 Lead Researcher Date Signature 
To be signed and dated in presence of the participant 
 
Copies: 
Once this has been signed by all parties the participant should receive a copy of the signed 
and dated participant consent form, the letter/pre-written script/information sheet and any 
other written information provided to the participants. A copy of the signed and dated 
consent form should be placed in the project’s main record (e.g. a site file), which must be 
kept in a secure location.  
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Appendix III: Military Technical Agreement 
between the International Security Force ("KFOR") and the Governments of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia 
9 June 1999 
Article I: General Obligations 
1. The Parties to this Agreement reaffirm the document presented by President Ahtisaari 
to President Milosevic and approved by the Serb Parliament and the Federal 
Government on June 3, 1999, to include deployment in Kosovo under UN auspices of 
effective international civil and security presences. The Parties further note that the 
UN Security Council is prepared to adopt a resolution, which has been introduced, 
regarding these presences. 
2. The State Governmental authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the 
Republic of Serbia understand and agree that the international security force ("KFOR") 
will deploy following the adoption of the UNSCR referred to in paragraph 1 and 
operate without hindrance within Kosovo and with the authority to take all necessary 
action to establish and maintain a secure environment for all citizens of Kosovo and 
otherwise carry out its mission. They further agree to comply with all of the obligations 
of this Agreement and to facilitate the deployment and operation of this force. 
3. For purposes of the agreement, the following expressions shall have the meanings as 
described below: 
a. "The Parties" are those signatories to the Agreement. 
b. "Authorities" means the appropriate responsible individual, agency, or 
organisation of the Parties. 
c. "FRY Forces" includes all of the FRY and Republic of Serbia personnel and 
organisations with a military capability. This includes regular army and naval 
forces, armed civilian groups, associated paramilitary groups, air forces, 
national guards, border police, army reserves, military police, intelligence 
services, federal and Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs local, special, riot and 
anti-terrorist police, and any other groups or individuals so designated by the 
international security force ("KFOR") commander. 
d. The Air Safety Zone (ASZ) is defined as a 25-kilometre zone that extends 
beyond the Kosovo province border into the rest of FRY territory. It includes 
the airspace above that 25-kilometre zone. 
e. The Ground Safety Zone (GSZ) is defined as a 5-kilometre zone that extends 
beyond the Kosovo province border into the rest of FRY territory. It includes 
the terrain within that 5-kilometre zone. 
f. Entry into Force Day (EIF Day) is defined as the day this Agreement is signed. 
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4. The purposes of these obligations are as follows: 
a. To establish a durable cessation of hostilities, under no circumstances shall any 
Forces of the FRY and the Republic of Serbia enter into, reenter, or remain 
within the territory of Kosovo or the Ground Safety Zone (GSZ) and the Air 
Safety Zone (ASZ) described in paragraph 3. Article I without the prior express 
consent of the international security force ("KFOR") commander. Local police 
will be allowed to remain in the GSZ. 
The above paragraph is without prejudice to the agreed return of FRY and Serbian personnel 
which will be the subject of a subsequent separate agreement as provided for in paragraph 6 
of the document mentioned in paragraph 1 of this Article. 
b. To provide for the support and authorization of the international security force 
("KFOR") and in particular to authorize the international security force 
("KFOR") to take such actions as are required, including the use of necessary 
force, to ensure compliance with this Agreement and protection of the 
international security force ("KFOR"), and to contribute to a secure 
environment for the international civil implementation presence, and other 
international organisations, agencies, and non-governmental organisations 
(details in Appendix B). 
Article II: Cessation of Hostilities 
1. The FRY Forces shall immediately, upon entry into force (EIF) of this Agreement, 
refrain from committing any hostile or provocative acts of any type against any person 
in Kosovo and will order armed forces to cease all such activities. They shall not 
encourage, organise or support hostile or provocative demonstrations. 
2. Phased Withdrawal of FRY Forces (ground): The FRY agrees to a phased withdrawal of 
all FRY Forces from Kosovo to locations in Serbia outside Kosovo. FRY Forces will mark 
and clear minefields, booby traps and obstacles. As they withdraw, FRY Forces will 
clear all lines of communication by removing all mines, demolitions, booby traps, 
obstacles and charges. They will also mark all sides of all minefields. International 
security forces' ("KFOR") entry and deployment into Kosovo will be synchronized. The 
phased withdrawal of FRY Forces from Kosovo will be in accordance with the sequence 
outlined below: 
a. By EIF + 1 day, FRY Forces located in Zone 3 will have vacated, via designated 
routes, that Zone to demonstrate compliance (depicted on the map at 
Appendix A to the Agreement). Once it is verified that FRY forces have 
complied with this subparagraph and with paragraph 1 of this Article, NATO air 
strikes will be suspended. The suspension will continue provided that the 
obligations of this agreement are fully complied with, and provided that the 
UNSC adopts a resolution concerning the deployment of the international 
security force ("KFOR") so rapidly that a security gap can be avoided. 
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b. By EIF + 6 days, all FRY Forces in Kosovo will have vacated Zone 1 (depicted on 
the map at Appendix A to the Agreement). Establish liaison teams with the 
KFOR commander in Pristina. 
c. By EIF + 9 days, all FRY Forces in Kosovo will have vacated Zone 2 (depicted on 
the map at Appendix A to the Agreement). 
d. By EIF + 11 days, all FRY Forces in Kosovo will have vacated Zone 3 (depicted 
on the map at Appendix A to the Agreement). 
e. By EIF +11 days, all FRY Forces in Kosovo will have completed their withdrawal 
from Kosovo (depicted on map at Appendix A to the Agreement) to locations 
in Serbia outside Kosovo, and not within the 5 km GSZ. At the end of the 
sequence (EIF + 11), the senior FRY Forces commanders responsible for the 
withdrawing forces shall confirm in writing to the international security force 
("KFOR") commander that the FRY Forces have complied and completed the 
phased withdrawal. The international security force ("KFOR") commander may 
approve specific requests for exceptions to the phased withdrawal. The 
bombing campaign will terminate on complete withdrawal of FRY Forces as 
provided under Article II. The international security force ("KFOR") shall retain, 
as necessary, authority to enforce compliance with this Agreement. 
f. The authorities of the FRY and the Republic of Serbia will co-operate fully with 
international security force ("KFOR") in its verification of the withdrawal of 
forces from Kosovo and beyond the ASZ/GSZ. 
g. FRY armed forces withdrawing in accordance with Appendix A, i.e. in 
designated assembly areas or withdrawing on designated routes, will not be 
subject to air attack. 
h. The international security force ("KFOR") will provide appropriate control of 
the borders of FRY in Kosovo with Albania and FYROM (1) until the arrival of 
the civilian mission of the UN. 
3. Phased Withdrawal of Yugoslavia Air and Air Defence Forces (YAADF) 
a. At EIF + 1 day, no FRY aircraft, fixed wing and rotary, will fly in Kosovo airspace 
or over the ASZ without prior approval by the international security force 
("KFOR") commander. All air defence systems, radar, surface-to-air missile and 
aircraft of the Parties will refrain from acquisition, target tracking or otherwise 
illuminating international security ("KFOR") air platforms operating in the 
Kosovo airspace or over the ASZ. 
b. By EIF + 3 days, all aircraft, radars, surface-to-air missiles (including man-
portable air defence systems (MANPADS)) and anti-aircraft artillery in Kosovo 
will withdraw to other locations in Serbia outside the 25 kilometre ASZ. 
c. The international security force ("KFOR") commander will control and 
coordinate use of airspace over Kosovo and the ASZ commencing at EIF. 
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Violation of any of the provisions above, including the international security 
force ("KFOR") commander's rules and procedures governing the airspace over 
Kosovo, as well as unauthorised flight or activation of FRY Integrated Air 
Defence (IADS) within the ASZ, are subject to military action by the 
international security force ("KFOR"), including the use of necessary force. The 
international security force ("KFOR") commander may delegate control of 
normal civilian air activities to appropriate FRY institutions to monitor 
operations, deconflict international security force ("KFOR") air traffic 
movements, and ensure smooth and safe operations of the air traffic system. 
It is envisioned that control of civil air traffic will be returned to civilian 
authorities as soon as practicable. 
Article III: Notifications 
1. This agreement and written orders requiring compliance will be immediately 
communicated to all FRY forces. 
2. By EIF +2 days, the State governmental authorities of the FRY and the Republic of Serbia 
shall furnish the following specific information regarding the status of all FRY Forces: 
a. Detailed records, positions and descriptions of all mines, unexploded 
ordnance, explosive devices, demolitions, obstacles, booby traps, wire 
entanglement, physical or military hazards to the safe movement of any 
personnel in Kosovo laid by FRY Forces. 
b. Any further information of a military or security nature about FRY Forces in the 
territory of Kosovo and the GSZ and ASZ requested by the international 
security force ("KFOR") commander. 
Article IV: Establishment of a Joint Implementation Commission (JIC) 
A JIC shall be established with the deployment of the international security force ("KFOR") to 
Kosovo as directed by the international security force ("KFOR") commander. 
Article V: Final Authority to Interpret 
The international security force ("KFOR") commander is the final authority regarding 
interpretation of this Agreement and the security aspects of the peace settlement it supports. 
His determinations are binding on all Parties and persons. 
Article VI: Entry Into Force 
This agreement shall enter into force upon signature. 
 
Appendices: 
 
A. Phased withdrawal of FRY Forces from Kosovo 
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(176Kb) 
B. International security force ("KFOR") operations 
1. Consistent with the general obligations of the Military Technical Agreement, the State 
Governmental authorities of the FRY and the Republic of Serbia understand and agree 
that the international security force ("KFOR") will deploy and operate without 
hindrance within Kosovo and with the authority to take all necessary action to 
establish and maintain a secure environment for all citizens of Kosovo. 
2. The international security force ("KFOR") commander shall have the authority, 
without interference or permission, to do all that he judges necessary and proper, 
including the use of military force, to protect the international security force ("KFOR"), 
the international civil implementation presence, and to carry out the responsibilities 
inherent in this Military Technical Agreement and the Peace Settlement which it 
supports. 
3. The international security force ("KFOR") nor any of its personnel or staff shall be liable 
for any damages to public or private property that they may cause in the course of 
duties related to the implementation of this Agreement. The parties will agree a Status 
of Forces Agreement (SOFA) as soon as possible. 
4. The international security force ("KFOR") shall have the right: 
a. To monitor and ensure compliance with this Agreement and to respond 
promptly to any violations and restore compliance, using military force if 
required. 
This includes necessary actions to: 
1. Enforce withdrawals of FRY forces. 
2. Enforce compliance following the return of selected FRY personnel to 
Kosovo 
3. Provide assistance to other international entities involved in the 
implementation or otherwise authorised by the UNSC. 
b. To establish liaison arrangements with local Kosovo authorities, and with 
FRY/Serbian civil and military authorities. 
c. To observe, monitor and inspect any and all facilities or activities in Kosovo 
that the international security force ("KFOR") commander believes has or may 
have military or police capability, or may be associated with the employment 
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of military or police capabilities, or are otherwise relevant to compliance with 
this Agreement. 
5. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement, the Parties understand and 
agree that the international security force ("KFOR") commander has the right and is 
authorised to compel the removal, withdrawal, or relocation of specific Forces and 
weapons, and to order the cessation of any activities whenever the international 
security force ("KFOR") commander determines a potential threat to either the 
international security force ("KFOR") or its mission, or to another Party. Forces failing 
to redeploy, withdraw, relocate, or to cease threatening or potentially threatening 
activities following such a demand by the international security force ("KFOR") shall 
be subject to military action by the international security force ("KFOR"), including the 
use of necessary force, to ensure compliance. 
 
Footnote: 
1. Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional 
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Appendix IV: UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999)  
Adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th meeting, 
on 10 June 1999 
 
The Security Council, 
Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and the 
primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and 
security,  
Recalling its resolutions 1160 (1998) of 31 March 1998, 1199 (1998) of 23 September 1998, 
1203 (1998) of 24 October 1998 and 1239 (1999) of 14 May 1999,  
Regretting that there has not been full compliance with the requirements of these 
resolutions, 
Determined to resolve the grave humanitarian situation in Kosovo, Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, and to provide for the safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons 
to their homes, 
Condemning all acts of violence against the Kosovo population as well as all terrorist acts by 
any party,  
Recalling the statement made by the Secretary-General on 9 April 1999, expressing concern 
at the humanitarian tragedy taking place in Kosovo, 
Reaffirming the right of all refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes in safety, 
Recalling the jurisdiction and the mandate of the International Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, 
Welcoming the general principles on a political solution to the Kosovo crisis adopted on 6 May 
1999 (S/1999/516, annex 1 to this resolution) and welcoming also the acceptance by the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the principles set forth in points 1 to 9 of the paper 
presented in Belgrade on2 June 1999 (S/1999/649, annex 2 to this resolution), and the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia’s agreement to that paper, 
Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity 
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other Statesof the region, as set out in the 
Helsinki Final Act and annex 2,  
Reaffirming the call in previous resolutions for substantial autonomy and meaningful self-
administration for Kosovo, 
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Determining that the situation in the region continues to constitute a threat to international 
peace and security, 
Determined to ensure the safety and security of international personnel and the 
implementation by all concerned of their responsibilities under the present resolution, and 
acting for these purposes under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 
1. Decides that a political solution to the Kosovo crisis shall be based on the general principles 
in annex 1 and as further elaborated in the principles and other required elements in annex 
2; 
2. Welcomes the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the principles and other 
required elements referred to in paragraph 1 above, and demands the full cooperation of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in their rapid implementation; 
3. Demands in particular that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia put an immediate and 
verifiable end to violence and repression in Kosovo, and begin and complete verifiable phased 
withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces according to a rapid 
timetable, with which the deployment of the international security presence in Kosovo will 
be synchronized; 
4. Confirms that after the withdrawal an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serb military and 
police personnel will be permitted to return to Kosovo to perform the functions in accordance 
with annex 2; 
5. Decides on the deployment in Kosovo, under United Nations auspices, of international civil 
and security presences, with appropriate equipment and personnel as required, and 
welcomes the agreement of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to such presences; 
6. Requests the Secretary-General to appoint, in consultation with the Security Council, a 
Special Representative to control the implementation of the international civil presence, and 
further requests the Secretary-General to instruct his Special Representative to coordinate 
closely with the international security presence to ensure that both presences operate 
towards the same goals and in a mutually supportive manner; 
7. Authorizes Member States and relevant international organizations to establish the 
international security presence in Kosovo as set out in point 4 of annex 2 with all necessary 
means to fulfil its responsibilities under paragraph 9 below; 
8. Affirms the need for the rapid early deployment of effective international civil and security 
presences to Kosovo, and demands that the parties cooperate fully in their deployment; 
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9. Decides that the responsibilities of the international security presence to be deployed and 
acting in Kosovo will include: 
(a) Deterring renewed hostilities, maintaining and where necessary enforcing a ceasefire, and 
ensuring the withdrawal and preventing the return into Kosovo of Federal and Republic 
military, police and paramilitary forces, except as provided in point 6 of annex 2; 
(b) Demilitarizing the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups 
as required in paragraph 15 below; 
(c) Establishing a secure environment in which refugees and displaced persons can return 
home in safety, the international civil presence can operate, a transitional administration can 
be established, and humanitarian aid can be delivered; 
(d) Ensuring public safety and order until the international civil presence can take 
responsibility for this task; 
(e) Supervising demining until the international civil presence can, as appropriate, take over 
responsibility for this task; 
(f) Supporting, as appropriate, and coordinating closely with the work of the international civil 
presence; 
(g) Conducting border monitoring duties as required; 
(h) Ensuring the protection and freedom of movement of itself, the international civil 
presence, and other international organizations; 
10. Authorizes the Secretary-General, with the assistance of relevant international 
organizations, to establish an international civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide an 
interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial 
autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional 
administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic 
selfgoverning institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all 
inhabitants of Kosovo; 
11. Decides that the main responsibilities of the international civil presence will include: 
(a) Promoting the establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial autonomy and 
self-government in Kosovo, taking full account of annex 2 and of the Rambouillet accords 
(S/1999/648);  
(b) Performing basic civilian administrative functions where and as long as required; 
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(c) Organizing and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for democratic and 
autonomous self-government pending a political settlement, including the holding of 
elections; 
(d) Transferring, as these institutions are established, its administrative responsibilities while 
overseeing and supporting the consolidation of Kosovo’s local provisional institutions and 
other peacebuilding activities; 
(e) Facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future status, taking into 
account the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648); 
(f) In a final stage, overseeing the transfer of authority from Kosovo’s provisional institutions 
to institutions established under a political settlement; 
(g) Supporting the reconstruction of key infrastructure and other economic reconstruction; 
(h) Supporting, in coordination with international humanitarian organizations, humanitarian 
and disaster relief aid; 
(i) Maintaining civil law and order, including establishing local police forces and meanwhile 
through the deployment of international police personnel to serve in Kosovo; 
(j) Protecting and promoting human rights; 
(k) Assuring the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to their 
homes in Kosovo; 
12. Emphasizes the need for coordinated humanitarian relief operations, and for the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia to allow unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid 
organizations and to cooperate with such organizations so as to ensure the fast and effective 
delivery of international aid; 
13. Encourages all Member States and international organizations to contribute to economic 
and social reconstruction as well as to the safe return of refugees and displaced persons, and 
emphasizes in this context the importance of convening an international donors’ conference, 
particularly for the purposes set out in paragraph 11 (g) above, at the earliest possible date; 
14. Demands full cooperation by all concerned, including the international security presence, 
with the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia; 
15. Demands that the KLA and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups end immediately all 
offensive actions and comply with the requirements for demilitarization as laid down by the 
head of the international security presence in consultation with the Special Representative of 
the Secretary-General; 
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16. Decides that the prohibitions imposed by paragraph 8 of resolution 1160 (1998) shall not 
apply to arms and related matériel for the use of the international civil and security presences; 
17. Welcomes the work in hand in the European Union and other international organizations 
to develop a comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the 
region affected by the Kosovo crisis, including the implementation of a Stability Pact for South 
Eastern Europe with broad international participation in order to further the promotion of 
democracy, economic prosperity, stability and regional cooperation; 
18. Demands that all States in the region cooperate fully in the implementation of all aspects 
of this resolution; 
19. Decides that the international civil and security presences are established for an initial 
period of 12 months, to continue thereafter unless the Security Council decides otherwise; 
20. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council at regular intervals on the 
implementation of this resolution, including reports from the leaderships of the international 
civil and security presences, the first reports to be submitted within 30 days of the adoption 
of this resolution; 
21. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter. 
 
Annex 1 
Statement by the Chairman on the conclusion of the meeting of the G-8 Foreign Ministers 
held at the Petersberg Centre on 6 May 1999 The G-8 Foreign Ministers adopted the following 
general principles on the political solution to the Kosovo crisis: 
- Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo; 
- Withdrawal from Kosovo of military, police and paramilitary forces; 
- Deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security presences, endorsed and 
adopted by the United Nations, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of the common 
objectives; 
- Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo to be decided by the Security Council 
of the United Nations to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in 
Kosovo; 
- The safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons and unimpeded access to 
Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations; 
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- A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement 
providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet 
accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of the KLA; 
 - Comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis 
region. 
Annex 2 
Agreement should be reached on the following principles to move towards a resolution of the 
Kosovo crisis: 
1. An immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo. 
2. Verifiable withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces according 
to a rapid timetable. 
3. Deployment in Kosovo under United Nations auspices of effective international civil and 
security presences, acting as may be decided under Chapter VII of the Charter, capable of 
guaranteeing the achievement of common objectives. 
4. The international security presence with substantial North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
participation must be deployed under unified command and control and authorized to 
establish a safe environment for all people in Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return to their 
homes of all displaced persons and refugees. 
5. Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a part of the international civil 
presence under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations. 
The interim administration to provide transitional administration while establishing and 
overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure 
conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo.  
6. After withdrawal, an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian personnel will be permitted 
to return to perform the following functions: 
- Liaison with the international civil mission and the international security presence; 
- Marking/clearing minefields; 
- Maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites; 
- Maintaining a presence at key border crossings. 
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7. Safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons under the supervision of the 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and unimpeded access to 
Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations. 
8. A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement 
providing for substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet 
accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of UCK. 
Negotiations between the parties for a settlement should not delay or disrupt the 
establishment of democratic self-governing institutions. 
9. A comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis 
region. This will include the implementation of a stability pact for South-Eastern Europe with 
broad international participation in order to further promotion of democracy, economic 
prosperity, stability and regional cooperation. 
10. Suspension of military activity will require acceptance of the principles set forth above in 
addition to agreement to other, previously identified, required elements, which are specified 
in the footnote below. A military-technical agreement will then be rapidly concluded that 
would, among other things, specify additional modalities, including the roles and functions of 
Yugoslav/Serb personnel in Kosovo: 
Withdrawal 
- Procedures for withdrawals, including the phased, detailed schedule and delineation of a 
buffer area in Serbia beyond which forces will be withdrawn; 
Returning personnel 
- Equipment associated with returning personnel; 
- Terms of reference for their functional responsibilities; 
- Timetable for their return; 
- Delineation of their geographical areas of operation; 
- Rules governing their relationship to the international security 
presence and the international civil mission. 
Notes 
Other required elements: 
 277 
 
- A rapid and precise timetable for withdrawals, meaning, e.g., seven days to complete 
withdrawal and air defence weapons withdrawn outside a 25 kilometre mutual safety zone 
within 48 hours; 
- Return of personnel for the four functions specified above will be under the supervision of 
the international security presence and will be limited to a small agreed number (hundreds, 
not thousands); 
- Suspension of military activity will occur after the beginning of verifiable withdrawals; 
- The discussion and achievement of a military-technical agreement shall not extend the 
previously determined time for completion of withdrawals. 
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Appendix V: Undertaking of Demilitarisation and Transformation by 
the UCK 
 
20 June 1999  
 
1. This Undertaking provides for a ceasefire by the UCK, their disengagement from the zones 
of conflict, subsequent demilitarisation and reintegration into civil society. In accordance with 
the terms of UNSCR 1244 and taking account of the obligations agreed to at Rambouillet and 
the public commitments mady by the Kosovar Albanian Rambouillet delegation.  
 
2. The UCK undertake to renounce the use of force to comply with the directions of the 
Commander of the international security force in Kosovo (COMKFOR), and where applicable 
the bead of the interim civil administration for Kosovo, and to resolve peacefully any 
questions relating to the implementation of this undertaking.  
 
3. The UCK agree that the International Security Presence (KFOR) and the international civil 
presence will continue to deploy and operate without hindrance within Kosovo and that KFOR 
has the authority to take all necessary action to establish and maintain a secure environment 
for all citizens of Kosovo and otherwise carry out its mission.  
 
4. The UCK agrees to comply with all of the obligations of this Undertaking and to ensure that 
with immediate effect all UCK forces in Kosovo and in neighbouring countries will observe the 
provisions of this Undertaking, will refrain from all hostile or provocative acts, hostile intent 
and freeze military movement in either direction across International borders or the 
boundary between Kosovo and other parts of the FRY, or any other actions inconsistent with 
the spirit of UNSCR 1244. The UCK in Kosovo agree to commit themselves publicly to 
demilitarise in accordance with paragraphs 22 and 23, refrain from activities which jeopardise 
the safety of international governmental and non-governmental personnel including KFOR, 
and to facilitate the deployment and operation of KFOR.  
 
5. For purposes of this Undertaking, the following expressions shall have the meanings as 
described below:  
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a. The UCK includes all personnel and organisations within Kosovo, currently under UCK 
control, with a military or paramilitary capability and any other groups or individuals so 
designated by Commander KFOR (COMKFOR)  
b. « FRY Forces » includes all of the FRY and Republic of Serbia personnel and organisations 
with a military capability. This includes regular army and naval forces, armed civilian groups, 
associated paramilitary groups, air forces, national guards, border police, army reserves, 
military police, intelligence services, Ministry of Internal Affairs, local, special, riot and anti-
terrorist police, and any other groups or individuals so designated by Commander KFOR 
(COMKFOR).  
c. The Ground Safety Zone (GSZ) is defined as a 5-kilometre zone that extends beyond the 
Kosovo province border into the rest of FRY territory. It includes the terrain within that 5-
kilometre zone.  
d. Prohibited weapons are any weapon 12.7mm or larger, any anti-tank or anti-aircraft 
weapons, grenades, mines or explosives, automatic and long barrelled weapons.  
 
6. The purpose of this Undertaking are as follows :  
a. To establish a durable cessation of hostilities.  
b. To provide for the support and authorisation of the KFOR and in particular to authorise the 
KFOR to take such actions as are required, including the use of necessary force in accordance 
with KFOR's rules of engagement, to ensure compliance with this Undertaking and protection 
of the KFOR, and to contribute to a secure environment for the international civil 
implementation presence, and other international organisations, agencies, and non-
governmental organisations and the civil populace.  
 
7. The actions of the UCK shall be in accordance with this Undertaking. « The KFOR » 
commander in consultation, where appropriate, with the interim civil administrator will be 
the final authority regarding the interpretation of this Undertaking and the security aspects 
of the peace settlement it supports. His determinations will be binding on all parties and 
persons.  
 
Cessation of Hostilities  
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8. With immediate effect on signature the UCK agrees to comply with this Undertaking and 
with the directions of COMKFOR. Any forces which fall to comply with this Undertaking or 
with the directions of COMKFOR will be liable to military action as deemed appropriate by 
COMKFOR.  
 
9. With immediate effect on signature of this Undertaking all hostile acts by the UCK will 
cease. The UCK Chief of General Staff undertakes to issue clear and precise instructions to all 
units and personnel under his command, to ensure contact with the FRY force is avoided and 
to comply fully with the arrangements for bringing this Undertaking into effect. He will make 
announcements immediately following final signature of this Undertaking, which will be 
broadcast regularly through all appropriate channels to assist in ensuring that instructions to 
maintain this Undertaking reach all the forces under his command and are understood by the 
public in general.  
 
10. The UCK undertakes and agrees in particular:  
a. To cease the firing of all weapons and use of explosive devices.  
b. Not to place any mines, barriers or checkpoints, nor maintain any observation posts or 
protective obstacles.  
c. The destruction of buildings, facilities or structures is not permitted. It shall not engage in 
any military, security, or training related activities, including ground or air defence operations, 
in or over Kosovo or GSZ, without the prior express approval of COMKFOR.  
d. Not to attack, detain or intimidate any civilians in Kosovo, nor shall they attack, confiscate 
or violate the property of civilians in Kosovo.  
 
11. The UCK agrees not to conduct any reprisals, counter-attacks, or any unilateral actions in 
response to violations of the UNSCR 1244 and other extant agreements relating to Kosovo. 
This in no way denies the right of self-defence.  
 
12. The UCK agrees not to interfere with those FRY personnel that return to Kosovo to conduct 
specific tasks as authorised and directed by COMKFOR.  
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13. Except as approved by COMKFOR, the UCK agrees that its personnel in Kosovo will not 
carry weapons of any type: 
a. Within 2 kilometres of VJ and MUP assembly areas ;  
b. Within 2 kilometres of the main roads and the towns upon them listed at Appendix A ;  
c. Within 2 kilometres of external borders of Kosovo ;  
d. In any other areas designated by COMKFOR  
 
14. Within 4 days of signature of this Undertaking :  
a. The UCK will close all fighting positions, entrenchments, and checkpoints on roads, and 
mark their minefields and booby traps.  
b. The UCK Chief of General Staff shall report in writing completion of the above requirement 
to COMKFOR and continue to provide weekly detailed written status reports until 
demilitarisation, as detailed in the following paragraphs, is complete.  
 
Cross-Border activity  
15. With immediate effect the UCK will cease the movement of armed bodies into 
neighbouring countries. All movement of armed bodies into Kosovo will be subject to the 
prior approval of COMKFOR.  
 
Monitoring the Cessation of Hostilities  
16. The authority for dealing with breaches of this Undertaking rests with COMKFOR. He will 
monitor and maintain and if necessary enfore the cessation of hostilities.  
 
17. The UCK agrees to co-operate fully with KFOR and the interim civil administration for 
Kosovo. The chief of the General Staff of the UCK will ensure that prompt and appropriate 
action is taken to deal with any breaches of this Undertaking by his forces as directed by 
COMKFOR.  
 
18. Elements of KFOR will be assigned to maintain contact with the UCK and will be deployed 
to its command structure and bases.  
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19. KFOR will establish appropriate control at designated crossing points into Albania and the 
FYROM.  
 
Joint Implementation Commission (JIC)  
20. A JIC will be established in Pristina within 4 days of the signature of this Undertaking. The 
JIC will be chaired by COMKFOR and will comprise the senior commanders of KFOR and the 
UCK, and a representative from the interim civil administration for Kosovo.  
 
21. The JIC will meet as often as required by COMKFOR throughout the implementation of 
this Undertaking. It may be called without prior notice and representation by the UCK is 
expected at a level appropriate with the rank of the KFOR chairman. Its functions will include 
:  
a. Ensuring compliance with agreed arrangements for the security and activities of all forces 
;  
b. The investigation of actual or threatened breaches of his Undertaking ;  
c. Such other tasks as may be assigned to it by COMKFOR in the interests of maintaining the 
cessation of hostilities.  
 
Demilitarisation and transformation  
22. The UCK will follow the procedures established by COMKFOR for the phased 
demilitarisation, transformation and monitoring of UCK forces in Kosovo and for further 
regulation of their activities. They will not train or organise parades without the authority of 
COMKFOR.  
 
23. The UCK agrees to the following timetable which will commence from the signature of 
this Undertaking:  
a. Within 7 days, the UCK shall establish secure weapons storage sites, which shall be 
registered with and verified by the KFOR ;  
b. Within 7 days the UCK will clear their minefields and booby traps, vacate their fighting 
positions and transfer to assembly areas as agreed with COMKFOR at the JIC. Thereafter only 
personnel authorised by COMKFOR and senior Officers of the UCK with their close protection 
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personnel not exceeding 3, carrying side arms only, will be allowed outside the assembly 
areas.  
c. After 7 days automatic small arms weapons not stored in the registered weapons storage 
sites can only be held inside the authorised assembly areas.  
d. After 29 days, the retention of any non automatic long barrelled weapons shall be subject 
to authorisation by COMKFOR.  
e. Within 30 days, subject to arrangements by COMKFOR, if necessary, all UCK personnel, who 
are not of local origin, whether or not they are legally within Kosovo, including individual 
advisors, freedom fighters, trainers, volunteers, and personnel from neighbouring and other 
States, shall be withdrawn from Kosovo.  
f. Arrangements for control of weapons are as follows :  
i. Within 30 days the UCK shall store in the registered weapons storage sites all prohibited 
weapons with the exception of automatic small arms. 30 per cent of their total holdings of 
automatic small arms weapons will also be stored in these sites at this stage. Ammunition for 
the remaining weapons should be withdrawn and stored at an approved site authorised by 
COMKFOR separate from the assembly areas at the same time.  
ii. At 30 days it shall be illegal for UCK personnel to possess prohibited weapons, with the 
exception of automatic small arms within assembly areas, and unauthorised long barrelled 
weapons. Such weapons shall be subject to confiscation by the KFOR.  
iii. Within 60 days a further 30 per cent of automatic small arms, giving a total of 60 per cent 
of the UCK holdings, will be stored in the registered weapons storage sites.  
iv. Within 90 days all automatic small arms weapons will be stored in the registered weapons 
storage sites. Thereafter their possession by UCK personnel will be prohibited and such 
weapons will be subject to confiscation by KFOR.  
g. From 30 days until 90 days the weapons storage sites will be under joint control of the UCK 
and KFOR under procedures approved by COMKFOR at the JIC. After 90 days KFOR will assume 
full control of these sites.  
h. Within 90 days all UCK forces will have completed the processes for their demilitarisation 
and are to cease wearing either military uniforms or insignia of the UCK.  
i. Within 90 days the Chief of General Staff UCK shall confirm compliance with the above 
restrictions in writing to COMKFOR.  
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24. The provisions of this Undertaking enter into force with immediate effect of its signature 
by the Kosovar Albanian representative(s).  
 
25. The UCK intends to comply with the terms of the United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 1244, and in this context that the international community should take due and 
full account of the contribution of the UCK during the Kosovo crisis and accordingly give due 
consideration to :  
a. Recognition that, while the UCK and its structures are in the process of transformation, it 
is committed to propose individual current members to participate in the administration and 
police forces of Kosovo, enjoying special consideration in view of the expertise they have 
developed.  
b. The formation of an Army in Kosovo on the lines of the US National Guard in due course as 
part of a political process designed to determine Kosovo's future status, taking into account 
the Rambouillet Accord.  
 
26. This Undertaking is provided in English and Albanian and if there is any doubt as to the 
meaning of the text the English version has precedence.  
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Appendix VI: Regulation No. 1999/8 on the Establishment of the 
Kosovo Protection Corps 
20 September 1999 
The Special Representative of the Secretary-General, 
Acting pursuant to the authority given to him under United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 1244 (1999) of 10 June 1999, 
Hereby promulgates the following: 
Section 1 
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE KOSOVO PROTECTION CORPS 
1.1 The Kosovo Protection Corps shall be established as a civilian emergency service 
agency, the tasks of which shall be to: 
(a) Provide disaster response services; 
(b) Perform search and rescue; 
(c) Provide a capacity for humanitarian assistance in isolated areas; 
(d) Assist in demining; and 
(e) Contribute to rebuilding infrastructure and communities. 
1.2 The Kosovo Protection Corps shall not have any role in law enforcement or the 
maintenance of law and order. 
Section 2 
ORGANIZATION OF THE KOSOVO PROTECTION CORPS 
2.1 The Kosovo Protection Corps shall consist of active members, up to a maximum of three 
thousand, as well as reserve members, up to a maximum of two thousand, who may be called 
upon when required. 
2.2 Members of the Kosovo Protection Corps shall be individually recruited on the basis of 
professional criteria required for the functions to be performed. In keeping with the multi-
ethnic character of the Kosovo Protection Corps, at least ten percent of both active and 
reserve members shall comprise individuals from minority groups. 
2.3 The Special Representative of the Secretary-General shall have final authority over the 
selection and appointment of members of the Kosovo Protection Corps and shall have the 
authority to dismiss such members on appropriate grounds. 
2.4 The Kosovo Protection Corps shall not take part in any political activity, nor shall members 
of the Kosovo Corps hold public office or actively engage in political affairs. 
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Section 3 
FUNCTIONING OF THE KOSOVO PROTECTION CORPS 
The Kosovo Protection Corps shall operate under the authority of the Special Representative 
of the Secretary-General. KFOR shall provide day-to-day operational direction to the Kosovo 
Protection Corps in accordance with policies and priorities established by the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General.  
Section 4 
ENTRY INTO FORCE 
The present regulation shall enter into force when the Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General determines that necessary funding is available for the establishment and 
maintenance of the Kosovo Protection Corps and COMKFOR confirms compliance with the 
relevant provisions of Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999). 
Bernard Kouchner 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General 
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Appendix VII: Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General 
on Kosovo’s future status 
Recommendation: Kosovo’s status should be independence, supervised by the 
international community 
 
1. In November 2005, the Secretary-General appointed me as his Special Envoy for the future 
status process for Kosovo. According to my terms of reference, this process should culminate 
in a political settlement that determines the future status of Kosovo. To achieve such a 
political settlement, I have held intensive negotiations with the leadership of Serbia and 
Kosovo over the course of the past year. My team and I have made every effort to facilitate 
an outcome that would be acceptable to both sides. But after more than one year of direct 
talks, bilateral negotiations and expert consultations, it has become clear to me that the 
parties are not able to reach an agreement on Kosovo’s future status. 
 
2. Throughout the process and on numerous occasions, both parties have reaffirmed their 
categorical, diametrically opposed positions: Belgrade demands Kosovo’s autonomy within 
Serbia, while Pristina will accept nothing short of independence. Even on practical issues such 
as decentralization, community rights, the protection of cultural and religious heritage and 
economic matters, conceptual 
differences — almost always related to the question of status — persist, and only modest 
progress could be achieved. 
 
3. My mandate explicitly provides that I determine the pace and duration of the future status 
process on the basis of consultations with the Secretary-General, taking into account the 
cooperation of the parties and the situation on the ground. It is my firm view that the 
negotiations’ potential to produce any mutually agreeable outcome on Kosovo’s status is 
exhausted. No amount of additional talks, whatever the format, will overcome this impasse. 
 
4. Nevertheless, resolution of this fundamental issue is urgently needed. Almost eight years 
have passed since the Security Council adopted resolution 1244 (1999) and Kosovo’s current 
state of limbo cannot continue. Uncertainty over its future status has become a major 
obstacle to Kosovo’s democratic development, accountability, economic recovery and inter-
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ethnic reconciliation. Such uncertainty only leads to further stagnation, polarizing its 
communities and resulting in social and political unrest. Pretending otherwise and denying or 
delaying resolution of Kosovo’s status risks challenging not only its own stability but the peace 
and stability of the region as a whole. 
 
5. The time has come to resolve Kosovo’s status. Upon careful consideration of Kosovo’s 
recent history, the realities of Kosovo today and taking into account the negotiations with the 
parties, I have come to the conclusion that the only viable option for Kosovo is independence, 
to be supervised for an initial period by the international community. My Comprehensive 
Proposal for the Kosovo Status 
Settlement, which sets forth these international supervisory structures, provides the 
foundations for a future independent Kosovo that is viable, sustainable and stable, and in 
which all communities and their members can live a peaceful and dignified existence. 
 
Reintegration into Serbia is not a viable option 
6. A history of enmity and mistrust has long antagonized the relationship between Kosovo 
Albanians and Serbs. This difficult relationship was exacerbated by the actions of the 
Milosevic regime in the 1990s. After years of peaceful resistance to Milosevic’s policies of 
oppression — the revocation of Kosovo’s autonomy, the systematic discrimination against 
the vast Albanian majority in Kosovo and their effective elimination from public life — Kosovo 
Albanians eventually responded with armed resistance. Belgrade’s reinforced and brutal 
repression followed, involving the tragic loss of civilian lives and the displacement and 
expulsion on a massive scale of Kosovo Albanians from their homes, and from Kosovo. The 
dramatic deterioration of the situation on the ground prompted the intervention of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), culminating in the adoption of resolution 1244 (1999) 
on 10 June 1999. 
  
7. For the past eight years, Kosovo and Serbia have been governed in complete separation. 
The establishment of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) pursuant to resolution 
1244 (1999), and its assumption of all legislative, executive and judicial authority throughout 
Kosovo, has created a situation in which Serbia has not exercised any governing authority 
over Kosovo. This is a reality one cannot deny; it is irreversible. A return of Serbian rule over 
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Kosovo would not be acceptable to the overwhelming majority of the people of Kosovo. 
Belgrade could not regain its authority without provoking violent opposition. Autonomy of 
Kosovo within the borders of Serbia — however notional such autonomy may be — is simply 
not tenable. 
 
Continued international administration is not sustainable 
8. While UNMIK has made considerable achievements in Kosovo, international administration 
of Kosovo cannot continue. Under UNMIK authority, Kosovo institutions have been created 
and developed and have increasingly taken on the responsibility of managing Kosovo’s affairs. 
This has set into motion a dynamic political process, which has reinforced the legitimate 
expectations of the Kosovo people for more ownership in, and responsibility for, their own 
affairs. These expectations cannot be realized within the framework of continued 
international administration. 
 
9. Further, while UNMIK has facilitated local institutions of self-government, it has not been 
able to develop a viable economy. Kosovo’s uncertain political status has left it unable to 
access international financial institutions, fully integrate into the regional economy or attract 
the foreign capital it needs to invest in basic infrastructure and redress widespread poverty 
and unemployment. Unlike many of 
its western Balkans neighbours, Kosovo is also unable to participate effectively in any 
meaningful process towards the European Union — an otherwise powerful motor for reform 
and economic development in the region and the most effective way to continue the vital 
standards implementation process. Kosovo’s weak economy is, in short, a source of social and 
political instability, and its recovery 
cannot be achieved under the status quo of international administration. Economic 
development in Kosovo requires the clarity and stability that only independence can provide. 
 
Independence with international supervision is the only viable option 
10. Independence is the only option for a politically stable and economically viable Kosovo. 
Only in an independent Kosovo will its democratic institutions be fully responsible and 
accountable for their actions. This will be crucial to ensure respect for the rule of law and the 
effective protection of minorities. With continued political ambiguity, the peace and stability 
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of Kosovo and the region remains at risk. Independence is the best safeguard against this risk. 
It is also the best chance for a sustainable long-term partnership between Kosovo and Serbia. 
 
11. While independence for Kosovo is the only realistic option, Kosovo’s capacity to tackle the 
challenges of minority protection, democratic development, economic recovery and social 
reconciliation on its own is still limited. Kosovo’s political and legal institutions must be further 
developed, with international assistance and under international supervision. This is 
especially important to improve the protection of Kosovo’s most vulnerable populations and 
their participation in public life.  
 
12. Kosovo’s minority communities — in particular the Kosovo Serbs — continue to face 
difficult living conditions. The violence perpetrated against them in summer 1999 and in 
March 2004 has left a profound legacy. While Kosovo’s leaders have increased their efforts to 
reach out to Kosovo Serbs and to improve implementation of standards, protecting the rights 
of minority communities requires their even greater commitment. At the same time, Kosovo 
Serbs need to engage actively in Kosovo’s institutions. They must reverse their fundamental 
position of noncooperation; only with an end to their boycott of Kosovo’s institutions will they 
be able to protect effectively their rights and interests. 
 
13. I therefore propose that the exercise of Kosovo’s independence, and its fulfilment of the 
obligations set forth in my Settlement proposal, be supervised and supported for an initial 
period by international civilian and military presences. Their powers should be strong — but 
focused — in critical areas such as community rights, decentralization, the protection of the 
Serbian Orthodox Church and the rule of law. These powers should be exercised to correct 
actions that would contravene the provisions of the Settlement proposal and the spirit in 
which they were crafted. Recognizing Kosovo’s current weaknesses, the international 
community’s intensive engagement should extend also to institutional capacity-building. I 
envisage that the supervisory role of the international community would come to an end only 
when Kosovo has implemented the measures set forth in the Settlement proposal. 
 
14. Notwithstanding this strong international involvement, Kosovo’s authorities are 
ultimately responsible and accountable for the implementation of the Settlement proposal. 
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They will succeed in this endeavour only with the commitment and active participation of all 
communities, including, in particular, the Kosovo Serbs.  
 
Conclusion 
15. Kosovo is a unique case that demands a unique solution. It does not create a precedent 
for other unresolved conflicts. In unanimously adopting resolution 1244 (1999), the Security 
Council responded to Milosevic’s actions in Kosovo by denying Serbia a role in its governance, 
placing Kosovo under temporary United Nations administration and envisaging a political 
process designed to determine Kosovo’s future. The combination of these factors makes 
Kosovo’s circumstances extraordinary. 
 
16. For over a year, I have led the political process envisaged in resolution 1244 (1999), 
exhausting every possible avenue to achieve a negotiated settlement. The irreconcilable 
positions of the parties have made that goal unattainable. Nevertheless, after almost eight 
years of United Nations administration, Kosovo’s status must be urgently resolved. My 
recommendation of independence, supervised initially by the international community, takes 
into account Kosovo’s recent history, the realities of Kosovo today and the need for political 
and economic stability in Kosovo. My Settlement proposal, upon which such independence 
will be based, builds upon the positions of the parties in the negotiating process and offers 
compromises on many issues to achieve a durable solution. I urge the Security Council to 
endorse my Settlement proposal. Concluding this last episode in the dissolution of the former 
Yugoslavia will allow the region to begin a new chapter in its history — one that is based upon 
peace, stability and prosperity for all. 
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Appendix VIII: International Court of Justice: Accordance with 
International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 
Respect of Kosovo  
(Extract) 
Advisory Opinion of 22 July 2010 
V. General Conclusion 
122. The Court has concluded above that the adoption of the declaration of independence of 
17 February 2008 did not violate general international law, Security Council resolution 1244 
(1999) or the Constitutional Framework. Consequently the adoption of that declaration did 
not violate any applicable rule of international law. 
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Appendix IX: Ohrid Framework Agreement 
Concluded at Ohrid, Macedonia 
Signed at Skopje, Macedonia on 31 August 2001 
 
The following points comprise an agreed framework for securing the future of Macedonia's 
democracy and permitting the development of closer and more integrated relations between 
the Republic of Macedonia and the Euro-Atlantic community. This Framework will promote 
the peaceful and harmonious development of civil society while respecting the ethnic identity 
and the interests of all Macedonian citizens. 
 
1. Basic Principles 
1.1. The use of violence in pursuit of political aims is rejected completely and unconditionally. 
Only peaceful political solutions can assure a stable and democratic future for Macedonia. 
 
1.2. Macedonia's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the unitary character of the State 
are inviolable and must be preserved. There are no territorial solutions to ethnic issues. 
 
1.3. The multi-ethnic character of Macedonia’s society must be preserved and reflected in 
public life. 
 
1.4. A modern democratic state in its natural course of development and maturation must 
continually ensure that its Constitution fully meets the needs of all its citizens and comports 
with the highest international standards, which themselves continue to evolve.  
 
1.5. The development of local self-government is essential for encouraging the participation 
of citizens in democratic life, and for promoting respect for the identity of communities. 
 
2. Cessation of Hostilities 
2.1. The parties underline the importance of the commitments of July 5, 2001. There shall be 
a complete cessation of hostilities, complete voluntary disarmament of the ethnic Albanian 
armed groups and their complete voluntary disbandment. They acknowledge that a decision 
by NATO to assist in this context will require the establishment of a general, unconditional 
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and openended cease-fire, agreement on a political solution to the problems of this country, 
a clear commitment by the armed groups to voluntarily disarm, and acceptance by all the 
parties of the conditions and limitations under which the NATO forces will operate. 
3. Development of Decentralized Government 
3.1. A revised Law on Local Self-Government will be adopted that reinforces the powers of 
elected local officials and enlarges substantially their competencies in conformity with the 
Constitution (as amended in accordance with Annex A) and the European Charter on Local 
Self-Government, and reflecting the principle of subsidiarity in effect in the European Union. 
Enhanced competencies will relate principally to the areas of public services, urban and rural 
planning, environmental protection, local economic development, culture, local finances, 
education, social welfare, and health care. A law on financing of local self-government will be 
adopted to ensure an adequate system of financing to enable local governments to fulfill all 
of their responsibilities. 
 
3.2. Boundaries of municipalities will be revised within one year of the completion of a new 
census, which will be conducted under international supervision by the end of 2001. The 
revision of the municipal boundaries will be effectuated by the local and national authorities 
with international participation.  
 
3.3. In order to ensure that police are aware of and responsive to the needs and interests of 
the local population, local heads of police will be selected by municipal councils from lists of 
candidates proposed by the Ministry of Interior, and will communicate regularly with the 
councils. The Ministry of Interior will retain the authority to remove local heads of police in 
accordance with the law. 
 
4. Non-Discrimination and Equitable Representation 
4.1. The principle of non-discrimination and equal treatment of all under the law will be 
respected completely. This principle will be applied in particular with respect to employment 
in public administration and public enterprises, and access to public financing for business 
development. 
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4.2. Laws regulating employment in public administration will include measures to assure 
equitable representation of communities in all central and local public bodies and at all levels 
of employment within such bodies, while respecting the rules concerning competence and 
integrity that govern public administration. The authorities will take action to correct present 
imbalances in the composition of the public administration, in particular through the 
recruitment of members of under-represented communities. Particular attention will be 
given to ensuring as rapidly as possible that the police services will generally reflect the 
composition and distribution of the population of Macedonia, as specified in Annex C.  
 
4.3. For the Constitutional Court, one-third of the judges will be chosen by the Assembly by a 
majority of the total number of Representatives that includes a majority of the total number 
of Representatives claiming to belong to the communities not in the majority in the 
population of Macedonia. This procedure also will apply to the election of the Ombudsman 
(Public Attorney) and the election of three of the members of the Judicial Council. 
 
5. Special Parliamentary Procedures 
5.1. On the central level, certain Constitutional amendments in accordance with Annex A and 
the Law on Local Self-Government cannot be approved without a qualified majority of two-
thirds of votes, within which there must be a majority of the votes of Representatives claiming 
to belong to the communities not in the majority in the population of Macedonia. 
 
5.2. Laws that directly affect culture, use of language, education, personal documentation, 
and use of symbols, as well as laws on local finances, local elections, the city of Skopje, and 
boundaries of municipalities must receive a majority of votes, within which there must be a 
majority of the votes of the Representatives claiming to belong to the communities not in the 
majority in the population of Macedonia. 
 
6. Education and Use of Languages 
6.1. With respect to primary and secondary education, instruction will be provided in the 
students' native languages, while at the same time uniform standards for academic programs 
will be applied throughout Macedonia. 
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6.2. State funding will be provided for university level education in languages spoken by at 
least 20 percent of the population of Macedonia, on the basis of specific agreements.  
 
6.3. The principle of positive discrimination will be applied in the enrolment in State 
universities of candidates belonging to communities not in the majority in the population of 
Macedonia until the enrolment reflects equitably the composition of the population of 
Macedonia. 
 
6.4. The official language throughout Macedonia and in the international relations of 
Macedonia is the Macedonian language. 
 
6.5. Any other language spoken by at least 20 percent of the population is also an official 
language, as set forth herein. In the organs of the Republic of Macedonia, any official language 
other than Macedonian may be used in accordance with the law, as further elaborated in 
Annex B. Any person living in a unit of local self-government in which at least 20 percent of 
the population speaks an official language other than Macedonian may use any official 
language to communicate with the regional office of the central government with 
responsibility for that municipality; such an office will reply in that language in addition to 
Macedonian. Any person may use any official language to communicate with a main office of 
the central government, which will reply in that language in addition to Macedonian. 
 
6.6. With respect to local self-government, in municipalities where a community comprises at 
least 20 percent of the population of the municipality, the language of that community will 
be used as an official language in addition to Macedonian. With respect to languages spoken 
by less than 20 percent of the population of the municipality, the local authorities will decide 
democratically on their use in public bodies.  
 
6.7. In criminal and civil judicial proceedings at any level, an accused person or any party will 
have the right to translation at State expense of all proceedings as well as documents in 
accordance with relevant Council of Europe documents.  
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6.8. Any official personal documents of citizens speaking an official language other than 
Macedonian will also be issued in that language, in addition to the Macedonian language, in 
accordance with the law. 
 
7. Expression of Identity 
7.1. With respect to emblems, next to the emblem of the Republic of Macedonia, local 
authorities will be free to place on front of local public buildings emblems marking the identity 
of the community in the majority in the municipality, respecting international rules and 
usages.  
 
8. Implementation 
8.1. The Constitutional amendments attached at Annex A will be presented to the Assembly 
immediately. The parties will take all measures to assure adoption of these amendments 
within 45 days of signature of this Framework Agreement. 
 
8.2. The legislative modifications identified in Annex B will be adopted in accordance with the 
timetables specified therein. 
 
8.3. The parties invite the international community to convene at the earliest possible time a 
meeting of international donors that would address in particular macro-financial assistance; 
support for the financing of measures to be undertaken for the purpose of implementing this 
Framework Agreement, including measures to strengthen local self-government; and 
rehabilitation and reconstruction in areas affected by the fighting. 
 
9. Annexes 
The following Annexes constitute integral parts of this Framework Agreement: 
A. Constitutional Amendments 
B. Legislative Modifications 
C. Implementation and Confidence-Building Measures 
 
10. Final Provisions 
10.1. This Agreement takes effect upon signature. 
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10.2. The English language version of this Agreement is the only authentic version. 
10.3. This Agreement was concluded under the auspices of President Boris Trajkovski. 
 
Done at Skopje, Macedonia on 13 August 2001, in the English language. 
Boris Trajkovski 
President of the Republic of Macedonia 
___________________________ 
Ljubco Georgievski  
President of VMRO-DPMNE 
____________________________ 
 
Arben Xhaferi 
President of the Democratic Party of Albanians 
__________________________ 
Branko Crvenkovski  
President of the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia 
____________________________ 
Imer Imeri 
President of the Party for Democratic Prosperity 
____________________________ 
 
Witnessed By: 
Francois Leotard 
Special Representative of the European Union 
_____________________________ 
James W. Pardew 
Special Representative of the United States of America 
____________________________ 
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Appendix X: Prespa Agreement 
(Extract) 
Final Agreement for the Settlement of the Differences as described in the United Nations 
Security Council Resolutions 817 (1993) and 845 (1993), the Termination of the Interim 
Accord of 1995, and the Establishment of a Strategic Partnership between the Parties. 
Part 1 
Settlement of the difference on the name, the pending issues related to it and entrenchment 
of good neighbourly relations.  
Article 1 
3. Pursuant to those negotiations the following have been mutually accepted and agreed: 
a) the official name of the Second Party shall be “The Republic of North Macedonia”, which 
shall be the constitutional name of the Second Party and shall be used erga omnes, as 
provided for in this Agreement. The short name of the Second Party shall be “North 
Macedonia”. 
b) The nationality of the Second Party shall be North Macedonian/citizen of the Republic of 
North Macedonia, as it will be registered in all travel documents. 
c) The official language of the Second Party shall be the “Macedonian language”, as 
recognized by the Third UN Conference on the Standardization of Geographical Names, held 
in Athens in 1977, and described in Article 7(3) and (4) of this Agreement.      
 
